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SUMMARY
This thesis consists of three essays which provide a detailed empirical investigation 
of the returns to education, gender wage gap and public-private wage differential in 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan -  countries that have received little attention 
in the literature. The studies are based on rich data sets which allow the most up-to- 
date analysis of the specific labour market outcomes. All three essays go a step 
further than the existing empirical literature since in each one the quantile regression 
results showed a much broader picture than the ones based on central tendency 
measures such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
The first essay looks at what had happened to the returns to human capital in 
Bulgaria over the period from early 1986 pre-transition to 2003. The study also 
contributes to the literature by estimating returns to education across the entire wage 
distribution, providing further evidence from Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan. 
Moreover, it deals with endogeneity and sample selection biases in a quantile 
regression framework.
The second essay estimates gender wage gaps in the selected countries by applying a 
decomposition method that simulates marginal distributions from the quantile 
regression process. The study seeks to extend the popular Machado and Mata (2005) 
distributional approach by addressing the ‘index’ number problem suggested by 
Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994 and 1998). The gender wage gap 
decomposition is performed for each quantile of the earnings distribution by using 
the pooled wage structure as a non-discriminatory structure and giving a much richer 
picture of the influence of the covariate and coefficient effects.
The third essay provides a comprehensive empirical study on the public-private wage 
differential in Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia, and Tajikistan. The study seeks to understand 
whether the differential in the public-private sector payment is explained by 
differences in workers characteristics or the difference in the returns to these 
characteristics. The endogenous sector choice is also considered. The study further 
analyses what has happened to the public sector hourly earnings differential at 
different points in the conditional earnings distribution and over time by adapting the 
Donohue-Heckman time-wise decomposition.
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CHAPTER ONE
Research Introduction and Overview
1.1. Background and motivation of the study
It is well known that education and earnings are the main determinants of good 
labour market outcomes for individuals. Many empirical studies of the relationship 
between education of individuals and their income show that better educated 
workers earn higher wages in the labour market (Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998). 
This is a conventional view of return to education. Estimate of returns to education 
are useful indicator of the productivity of education and the incentive for 
individuals to invest in their own human capital. Like other investments it is natural 
to ask is it profitable for individuals to invest in education. The answer to this 
question, if  we have labour markets such as those in transition, is not 
straightforward. Transition countries could be considered as a special case when 
studying returns to education. Under Soviet rule wages were compressed and 
differences in wages, depending on the educational level, were low. As a result of 
the transition process, education became more highly rewarded. Structural 
transformations, disruptions and economic disequilibria were important factors for 
the relatively rapid increase in the returns to education. Lei (2005) finds that an 
increase in the returns to education, especially for women, is a common feature of 
transitional economies. Relatively little is known about the late transition years and 
especially the period of EU accession, which was characterised by the progressive 
implementation o f a free market economy in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. From this point o f view, it is interesting to estimate returns to education 
and to observe possible changes in the rates of return to education during the period 
of transition.
Trying to quantify the impact of education by measuring the relationship between 
the number of years of schooling and earnings, however, has many shortcomings. 
Obtaining accurate and credible measures o f returns to schooling involves 
minimizing biases caused by omitted variables, endogeneity and sample selectivity. 
Blackburn and Neumark (1995) remarked that one o f the longest-running debates in 
empirical labour economics regards the biases in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
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estimates of the economic return to schooling. It is commonly assumed that the 
most important unobserved component of earnings is innate ability. However, 
another bias that can contaminate OLS estimates is endogeneity which arises 
because people with higher marginal returns to education choose higher levels of 
schooling. Finally, the principle of comparative advantage suggests that there 
should be some correlation between the decision to participate in the labour market 
and the size of the reward for educational investments. If this is the case, then not 
accounting for participation would provide an unrepresentative estimate o f the rate 
of returns to education. Ideally the way we measure the returns to education would 
account for all these estimation difficulties.
One further conclusion from the existing literature is that men have generally 
benefited more from the transition process than women because they differ in their 
ability to handle the uncertainty inherent in a market economy. The downturn in 
economic development experienced by most transition countries during the 1990s 
was counterproductive to the provision of equal opportunities for men and women 
(Malysheva and Verashchagina, 2008). The most evident effect of transition was a 
decline in female labour force participation as well as a concentration of women 
into low-paid jobs (Brainerd, 2000). Although the gender wage gap has obviously 
narrowed over the last few years, earnings differential between men and women 
remains a feature of transition countries. According to the 2009 Human 
Development Report, the ratios of estimated female to male income is 0.64 in 
Russia, 0.65 in Bulgaria, 0.59 in Serbia, and only 0.47 in Tajikistan. According to 
the World Bank 2005 Report, the gender gap in Tajikistan is the worst in the 
region.
Nowadays, gender disparities exist, even in countries without glaring male 
domination and measuring these disparities is a necessary step towards 
implementing corrective policies. In light of the international awareness of gender 
issues, it is surprising that no country has yet managed to eliminate the gender wage 
gap. Those that have succeeded in narrowing the gap are the Nordic countries, with 
Sweden standing out as the most advanced in the world, followed by New Zealand, 
Canada, United Kingdom, Germany and Australia, all of which have made 
considerable progress in removing obstacles to the full participation of women in
their societies (Claros and Zahidi, 2005). Due to the fact that the issue of the gender 
wage gap has continued to attract considerable political attention it is useful to 
consider how some countries in transition have addressed the unequal pay of men 
and women. The interest in this issue becomes even more relevant given the fast 
changing nature of the labour market in transition economies,
Perhaps the most common approach to identifying and quantifying the gender wage 
gap is the traditional technique of decomposing inter-group differences in mean 
levels of the outcome into a part due to different observable characteristics or 
‘endowments’ across groups (the characteristic effect) and a part due to differences 
in the returns that workers receive for a given set of characteristics (the coefficient 
effect). One important choice to be made in the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) 
decomposition is the assumption made concerning what wages would have been in 
the absence of discrimination, that is, the non-discriminatory wage structure. 
Symptomatic of the ‘index number problem’, results vary depending on the choice 
of male or female prices for weighting the decomposition equation. Various studies 
have emerged: adopting either the male wage or the female wage structure as the 
reference wage structure (Oaxaca 1973); adopting a weighted average of the male 
and female wage structure with the proportion o f each subgroup in the population 
used as weights (Cotton 1988); or adopting the pooled wage structure (Neumark, 
1988, Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994).
More detailed explanations of the wage gap also include utilizing quantile 
regression technique to understand the contribution of observed characteristics at 
different part of the wage distribution. Machado and Mata (2005) for example, 
develop a technique based on quantile regression to study the various source of 
wage inequality through a counterfactual density analysis. Hence the wage gap at 
each quantile in the distribution can be decomposed into a portion due to the 
differences in observed characteristics; a portion due to the differences in the 
returns to those characteristics; and a portion due to differences in residual wages. 
However, this technique shares all the problems of the original Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition, e.g., a potential sensitivity of the results in respect o f the choice of 
the reference group. This is the starting and most challenging point for the 
extension of the Machado and Mata (2005) quantile regression approach and
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addressing the ‘index’ number problem along the line suggested by Neumark 
(1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1988 and 1994).
The current thesis also considers the fact that gender pay differences are just one of 
the many ways in which wage rates differ between individuals. The sector of 
employment might affect employee earnings in a number of ways and wage 
differentials might exist between public and private sector workers. Most studies of 
developed countries reveal that public sector workers are likely to get a positive 
wage premium relative to private sector workers. For example, Fogel and Lewin 
(1974) argue that public sector employers frequently pay more than necessary to 
attract a work force at the low and middle-skill ranges, and generally pay less than 
necessary to attract employees of average quality at the upper managerial and 
professional levels. This empirical conclusion corresponds with the institutional 
framework within which the public sector wages prevail in the private sector. 
Higher job security and unionization of public sector workers strengthens their 
bargaining power, easing access to rents and allowing a higher wage premium 
(Gimpelson and Lukiyanova, 2009). Generally, if the public sector overpaid in 
comparison with the private sector, employees in the private sector may decide to 
queue for the relatively high paying jobs in the public sector. If the government 
underpaid in comparison with the private sector, it would not find skilled 
employees.
During the transition process, the size of the public sector has been typically 
reduced and the labour market has changed from an exclusively formal market with 
public institutions to an extremely polarized market, with pre-transition formal 
employment in the public sector coexisting with an emerging and often highly 
informal and unregulated, private sector (Valmori, 2008). In all transition countries 
there is clear evidence of emerging non-state activity. In Bulgaria, for instance, 
after the crisis of 1996 and 1997, stabilization and mass privatization, the private 
sector became a larger part of the economy (Falaris, 2004). Employment in the 
private sector rose from 19% in 1986 to 75% in 2008. Similarly, the proportion of 
the private sector employees increased sharply in Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan. 
Given the differences in wage setting procedures and changes in the sector of 
employment during transition, it is important to investigate whether an identical
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employee working in the same job in the public and in the private sector earn the 
same amount. This strand of the literature has been largely underdeveloped for the 
selected countries, which is surprising given the current interest in public wage 
setting behaviour in these countries.
All these issues associated with the labour market outcomes constitute the broad 
starting point of this thesis. The collection of empirical investigations in these 
issues compromises three labour market essays. Each essay explores a different 
aspect of the labour market and aims to provide new evidence on interesting 
empirical patterns within the labour markets of a number of transition countries.
Specifically, the thesis is motivated by the following major concerns. First, cross­
country empirical studies that evaluate rates and trends in returns to education in 
transition economies are limited. An interesting question is, therefore, whether the 
estimated returns to education have varied significantly over time. Second, despite 
the remarkable advances in micro-econometrics, many issues regarding estimation 
biases are far from being resolved. Substantial attention in the literature has been 
devoted to the problem of sample selection bias in the estimation o f the returns to 
education, when wages are only observed as conditional on employment. 
Furthermore, if education is endogenous then estimation by OLS will yield biased 
estimates. Therefore, it is important to estimate returns to education in the transition 
countries thus paying particular attention to a number of important estimation 
difficulties -  endogeneity, heterogeneity and sample selection biases. Third, the fast 
changing nature of the labour market in transition economies makes gender wage 
differentials an interesting topic for research, and understanding the effect of the 
transition process may have an essential key to understanding economic inequality. 
This thesis seeks to present a richer description of the differential by using a 
quantile regression approach and providing evidence from four countries. Finally, 
little research has been provided about the public-private wage differential in the 
case of transition and in particularly about the evolution of the wage differential. 
The development of a private sector is generally viewed as a key part of a 
successful transformation to a market economy (Hyder and Reilly, 2005). It is 
appealing, therefore, to examine what has happened to the public sector pay in the 
countries of interest.
The thesis considers the case of four countries -  Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia, and 
Tajikistan -  formerly socialist economies that are culturally and economically quite 
different. The study is comparative in the sense that the evidence available for each 
country will be compared with the rest of the examined economies. When 
attempting to make such comparison, it is necessary to discuss how the countries 
have been chosen. This can be answered from several points of view. Firstly, the 
interest in transition countries has developed since the beginning of reforms from 
planned to market economy and only a few empirical studies have investigated 
these issues in the context of transition. Secondly, the experience of the Eastern 
European and Central Asian economies is an interesting case study as the dramatic 
political, economic and social changes experienced during the transition provides a 
natural ‘laboratory’, with tremendous variation in key variables (Svejnar, 1999). At 
the beginning of the 1990s all former communist countries possessed a highly 
educated labour force and were expected to successfully utilize this precious 
resource. Among the numerous changes, transition brought inequality between men 
and women in terms of employment and earnings. It is then natural to ask how the 
position of women in the labour market has been affected by such changes. Finally, 
the focus on the transition countries was motivated by the fact that international 
institutions, such as the World Bank, were actively involved in supportive reforms 
in these countries. It is hoped therefore, that the analysis will be of interest to 
international policy makers.
The four countries offer a range of economic and labour market conditions and 
have experienced different performance over the past decade. Specifically, these 
economies differ dramatically from one another in terms of initial conditions, 
policies and outcomes. For example, the common perception in the literature views 
Bulgaria and Serbia as Balkan countries where reforms have proceeded more 
slowly compared to the advanced reformers of Central Europe. Serbia was 
confronted with a delayed transition and an erosion of skills. It differs from 
Bulgaria with respect to the speed of educational reforms and their impact on the 
individual labour market outcomes (Arandarenko et al., 2006). The choice of Serbia 
is based on the fact that as a country its initial conditions were very different from 
the other transition countries. Serbian transition commenced 10 years after the first 
East European countries, offering an early experience on which the country could
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rely when designing its transition process (Stalhandske, 2007). In the period from 
1991-2000, when other countries in transition were strengthening their economic 
systems, Serbia went through a five years civil war, isolation and sanctions imposed 
by the international community, hyperinflation, escalation of terrorism, 
secessionism in Kosovo and Metohia and NATO bombing.
Russia is a country where the communist experiment had the longest history 
(Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992). It is an interesting case with its transition away 
from a planned economy, characterised by over-education and over-employment to 
a market based economy. The study by the IMF, World Bank, OECD and EBRD 
(1991) shows that the move to a market economy and the removal of government 
interventions imposed substantial hardship on many groups in the Russian 
population. Following the end of central planning, wage inequality in the country 
had risen far more than in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition 
countries (Lehman and Wadsworth, 2001). According to estimates based on official 
statistics, the Gini coefficient for wages in Russia rose from 0.2 before transition to 
around 0.5 in 1996 (Flemming and Micklewright, 1999). In contrast, over the same 
period, the estimated Gini index for wages in the CEE countries rose from 0.2-0.25 
to levels in the range of 0.3-0.35 (Lehman and Wadsworth, 2001). Given these 
facts, the interest in Russia becomes even more relevant.
Finally, as part of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan differs dramatically from other 
countries included in the thesis. While Russia has enjoyed rapid economic growth 
and has a promising future in terms of strong fundamentals as a middle-income 
country, being well endowed with human capital and abundant natural resources, in 
Tajikistan nearly two-thirds of the population continue to live in poverty. A 
comprehensive study on Tajikistan is of particular interest, because the transition 
process has witnessed a process of political liberalisation, which in association with 
an underlying Islamic culture has allowed the resurgence of more particular 
attitudes to female labour force participation. In addition, there are shortcomings in 
studies and available information on Tajikistan.
In selecting these four countries, others which could put forward claims for 
attention have had to be ignored. An obvious choice would have been some Central
European countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, which would 
have provided useful comparisons. However, in order to keep the thesis 
manageable, we had to restrict ourselves to the four countries -  Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Russia and Tajikistan.
1.2.Research objectives
The overarching aim of the thesis is to provide a detailed empirical investigation of 
the returns to education, gender wage gap and public-private wage differential in 
four transition countries. To achieve this aim, the empirical chapters develop a body 
of evidence. In fulfilling the aim a number of objectives were considered to be 
important:
1. To provide a comprehensive review of the literature related to the main 
aspects of the research and classify the main studies concerning the returns 
to education, gender wage gap and public-private wage differential with a 
special focus on transition countries.
2. To analyse and estimate returns to education in the countries of interest, first 
by answering the question: What has happened to the returns to human 
capital in Bulgaria before and during transition from a centrally planned to a 
market economy? Examining this issue, several methodological and 
empirical limitations will be faced. The study deals with endogeneity and 
sample selectivity issues. Further, the extent to which the return to 
education varies across the conditional earnings distribution will be 
explored by utilising data from Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan.
3. To explain gender wage differential across the entire earnings distribution 
within the broader context of changes in the wage structure of Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan. The study assesses whether the size of the 
gender wage differential has been widening or narrowing across the 
distribution in two separate time periods. The study seeks to extend the 
popular Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition procedure by utilising the
coefficient estimates from the pooled wage regressions as a nori- 
discriminatory wage structure.
4. To examine the public-private wage differential across the entire earnings 
distribution in transition and extend the analysis by providing empirical 
evidence on the evolution of the public sector pay gap. The study adapts the 
Donohue and Heckman (1991) time wise decomposition within the 
Machado and Mata (2005) distributional approach to account for changes 
over two time periods. Another key objective is to control for the 
endogenous sector choice and to address the issue by extending the 
decomposition technique to account for selection across the entire wage 
distribution.
5. To summarise and evaluate the main findings of the research, draw 
conclusions based on these findings and implications for the policy makers 
and economists, and identify directions for future research in this field.
For ease of reference Figure 1.1 below summarises the structure and maps the main 
aims of the present thesis.
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1.3. Data and methodology
The objectives are achieved through use of rich data sources and application of the 
latest econometrics methods. The main difficulty in the study of evolution in the 
returns to education in Bulgaria is the lack of reliable data over time. Gathering 
data for the early transition and especially for the communist period is extremely 
difficult. The first empirical analysis is based on five cross-sectional household 
surveys. One is administrated before transition and the others after the initial 
economic reforms were held: the 1986 Town and Village Survey and Bulgaria 
Integrated Household Surveys (BIHS) collected in 1995, 1997, 2001 and 2003. The 
empirical results in Chapter Five are based on data from Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia 
and Tajikistan, collected in 2003. The gender wage decomposition analysis in
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Chapter Seven and the public-private wage differential estimates in Chapter Nine 
are conducted using data from the same four transition countries.
The empirical research involves the use of the latest applied econometrics 
techniques, such as parametric and semi-parametric two-step estimates, 
instrumental variables (IV), quantile regression decomposition techniques and 
probability models. In particular, to address the problem of endogeneity bias in the 
returns to education in Bulgaria over time, an IV approach has been applied. 
Identification in the endogeneity adjusted two-step estimations is achieved by 
making use of a mother’s education as an instrument, assuming that there is a high 
correlation between children’s educational attainments and those of their parents. 
Further, the question of the impact sample selection has on the returns to education 
is addressed by adopting Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure and a semi- 
parametric two-step estimator. The distributional approach is based on the use of a 
quantile regression (QR) method. As the bivariate normality assumption between 
the error terms in the earnings and participation equation does not hold in the QR 
model, following Buchinsky (1998) we use a higher order correction term to 
account for sample selection. To control for endogeneity bias in a QR framework, 
the control function approach proposed by Lee (2007) was adopted and regional 
variations in average schooling used as an instrument. The approach corrects for 
endogeneity by adding a residual power series as additional explanatory variables 
in the earnings equation. In line with more recent studies on gender wage 
differentials, the QR method is used as it allows estimation of the marginal effect of 
the covariates on the wages at various points of the distribution.
The gender wage gap across the earnings distribution is decomposed by utilising 
and extending the Machado and Mata (2005) technique accounting for the ‘index’ 
number problem suggested by Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1988 and 
1994). From our point of view, it is important that the estimation method chosen 
allows us to take account of the differences across the wage distribution and the 
non-discriminatory wage structure found from a pooled sample of males and 
females.
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The same decomposition technique is applied to examine the public-private wage 
differential in Chapter Nine. The evolution in the public sector hourly earnings 
differential at different points in the conditional earnings distribution is examined 
by adapting the Donohue-Heckman time wise decomposition. In this analysis the 
public sector pay gap is estimated separately for both males and females. To 
estimate the wage equation intercept, which is needed for the Oaxaca-Ransom wage 
decomposition consistency, while accounting for sector choice, we follow the 
procedure suggested by Andrews and Schafgans (1998).
1.4. Structure of the study
To achieve our aims, the three main essays on labour economics issues develop a 
body of evidence. All three essays go a step further than the current literature on the 
returns to education, gender and the public sector wage gap by developing a 
quantile regression approach which provides a much broader picture than the 
results based solely on OLS estimates. Each essay explores a different aspect of the 
labour market outcomes but they are structured in a similar manner: providing 
motivation, highlighting the most important elements of the literature, developing a 
methodology, and presenting and discussing the main results. The layout of the 
thesis is as follows:
Chapter Two surveys the literature on the returns to education and considers the 
main issues involved in estimating the returns to education. It also examines how 
major estimation biases can be potentially overcome. Specific emphasis is placed 
on previous empirical studies in transition countries. Similarly, the chapter reviews 
the most important literature related to the methodology used in order to put the 
research into perspective.
Chapter Three provides an overview of the education systems in each of the 
selected transition countries, and highlights their most important characteristics. It 
also provides a brief background of the Bulgarian, Serbian, Russian and Tajik 
economies by reviewing their labour market performance and some 
macroeconomic indicators.
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Chapter Four looks at what had happened to the returns to human capital in 
Bulgaria over the period from early 1986 pre-transition to 2003. The study deals 
with endogeneity and selectivity bias by adopting different econometric 
approaches.
Chapter Five considers the extent to which returns to education vary across the 
earnings distribution by using cross-sectional data from Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia 
and Tajikistan over the same time period. The study examines the empirical 
implications of allowing for endogeneity and sample selection bias in a quantile 
regression framework by utilising Buchinsky (1998, 2001) power series estimator 
and Lee’s (2007) control function approach.
Chapter Six outlines theoretical and decomposition analysis of the wage gap 
between males and females. It sets out the conventional econometric approach to 
the analysis of unequal pay and introduces the methodologies used in Chapter 
Seven. Discussion in the literature over the techniques of earnings decomposition 
starts from the main estimation problems and methodologies used. The emphasis is 
on the more recent decomposition techniques. The Chapter concludes with the 
motivation for the chosen decomposition technique.
Chapter Seven presents the empirical analysis of the gender wage gap in Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan. The study applies a quantile regression procedure to 
simulate marginal earnings distributions and then assesses whether the gender wage 
gap in the transition countries has been widening or narrowing across the entire 
distribution over two time periods. The empirical study is comparative in the sense 
that we seek to compare the evidence from these four transition countries. The 
analysis of the gender wage differential is based on personal characteristics only. 
The emphasis is on human capital, rather than occupational characteristics. The 
specification of the earnings equation is based on a pure human capital model 
where the only determinants of differences in wages are variations in males’ and 
females’ specific human capital characteristics.
Chapter Eight overviews the empirical literature related to the public-private wage 
differential. It provides some theoretical explanations for the existence of earnings
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differential between public and private sector and discusses the main estimation 
methodologies.
Chapter Nine investigates public-private pay differential across the conditional 
earning distribution in the same four transition economies. The endogeneity of 
sector choice is considered. The study is further extended by using data from 
Bulgaria and Russia to answer the question, what has been happening to the public- 
private wage differential at different points in the conditional earnings distribution 
over time. It also adopts the Donohue and Heckman (1991) time-wise 
decomposition framework to identify the main factors contributing to the change in 
the ratio of public to private sector earnings over the same time period.
Chapter Ten highlights the main research findings emanating from this thesis, and 
provides policy implications and recommendations. This Chapter also discusses 
limitations of the analysis and identifies some suggestions for future research.
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ESSAY ONE
RETURNS TO EDUCATION -  
EVIDENCE FROM TRANSITION
COUNTRIES
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL
LITERATURE
2.1. Introduction
The measurement of the return to education has been the object of extensive 
empirical research and has been the focus of considerable debate in the literature. If 
estimation of the returns to education is measured perfectly, with no measurement 
errors, and there is no endogeneity between earnings, schooling and other 
covariates, then the returns to education will be consistent -  that is its probability 
limit will be equal to the average marginal return to schooling. However, a 
dominate feature of the simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) human capital 
earnings function is that such estimates may be misleading if individuals’ schooling 
level is measured erroneously, or it may be correlated with the regression error and 
the OLS estimate of the schooling coefficient will be biased. The empirical 
literature focuses on ability bias, endogeneity, sample selectivity, and measurement 
error as the central problems in estimating the rate of return to education. 
Unmeasured or erroneously measured human capital components summarized by 
“ability bias” play an important role and the main econometric problem is of 
omitted variable bias in the earnings equation. Furthermore, if education is 
endogenous then estimation by least squares will yield biased results. Finally, the 
sample of population that work in the labour market, and so are included in the 
wage regression, may be biased, with potential high earners being overrepresented. 
Therefore, self-selection into paid employment could be another source of potential 
bias in the estimates.
There have been a number of approaches in the literature to deal with these 
problems. One approach attempts to control for unobserved characteristics that may 
bias conventional OLS by including ability proxies (Bedi and Gaston, 1999). 
Different set of studies have relied on using data for twins to estimate returns to 
education. Another broad approach relies on constructing a ‘selectivity correction’
term from a schooling attainment equation and including the correction term in the 
earnings equation to obtain a consistent estimate of the rate of return to education. 
More convincing approach relies on using exogenous ‘natural’ variation in 
educational attainment to provide instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the 
returns to education.
In this Chapter the main problematic issues involved in estimating the rate of return 
to education are discussed. In Section 2.2 we consider the main theoretical 
framework and empirical difficulties in estimating the return to education. We 
examine how potential biases can be overcome. Section 2.3 provides an overview 
of the international literature related to the rate of returns to education, with a 
special focus on previous studies that have examined return to education in 
transition countries. We divide the empirical literature review into parts, based on 
the methodology that they employ to tackle the estimation problems. Finally, 
concluding comments based on the literature review are provided in Section 2.4.
2.2. Theoretical framework and estimation problems
The human capital theory was first announced in 1960 by Theodore Schultz, but the 
starting point of most works on the estimation of rates of return to education itself 
took place four years later with Becker’s monograph Human Capital (1964). 
Estimation of human capital model was further enhanced by Mincer (1974), who 
was one of the first to apply human capital concepts directly to the personal 
distribution of earnings and used a standard earnings function to estimate the 
returns to education and experience. Mincer’s model focuses on the life-cycle 
dynamics of earnings and on the relationship between observed earnings, potential 
earnings and human capital investment, both in terms of formal schooling and job 
investment, where the optimal schooling decision is reached by balancing benefits 
and costs of alternative schooling choices. Investment in human capital takes two 
complementary forms: formal schooling measured by years of school completed, 
and work experience measured by potential years in the labour force subsequent to 
the completion of schooling. Consequently, post-school work experience can also 
be viewed as an investment in future earnings capacity (Hill, 1981).
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Mincer’s model of earnings (1974) is one of the most commonly estimated 
relationships in labour economics. The usefulness of his theory lies in the extent to 
which it provides a unified interpretation of the detailed empirical characteristics of 
the earnings distribution (Hill, 1981). In one equation, Mincer’s framework 
captures two economic concepts: a pricing equation, or hedonic wage function, 
revealing how the labour market rewards productive attributes like schooling and 
work experience; and the rate of return to schooling which can be compared with 
the interest rate to determine the optimality of human capital investments 
(Heckman et al., 2003).
The Mincer specification is given by the following equation1:
ln[T(5,x)] = a 0 + p ss + J30x  + P xx 2 + s  (2.1)
where Y (s,x ) is the wage or earnings at schooling level s and work experience x,
p s is the ‘rate of return to schooling’ assumed to be the same for all schooling
levels, and e  is a random variable w ith is^  | s,x) = 0 . While p s may vary among
individuals, it is assumed to be uncorrelated with s. This model is motivated by two 
conceptually different theoretical frameworks used by Mincer (1958, 1974), which 
briefly are reviewed in this section.
The first model (Mincer, 1958) uses the principle of compensating differences to 
explain why individuals with different levels of education receive different earnings 
over their lifetimes. The model considers that individuals have identical abilities 
and opportunities, that there is no uncertainty, credit markets are perfect, but 
occupations differ in the amount of training they require. Education is costly 
because individuals forego earnings while in education (Heckman, 2003). However, 
the model entails no direct costs. Individuals are assumed to be identical and they 
require a compensating differential to work in occupations that require a longer 
training period (Heckman et al., 2005). The size of compensating differential is 
determined by equating the present value of earnings streams net of the costs
1 Psacharopoulos (1981) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) provide surveys o f  an enormous Mincer based
earnings literature.
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associated with different levels of investment (Heckman, 2003). Further, Heckman 
et al. (2006) argue that this framework ignores uncertainty about future earnings as 
well as nonpecuniary costs and benefits of schooling and work.
If we let Y (s ) show the annual earnings of an individual with s years of education, 
which are assumed to be constant over his/her lifetime; r an externally determined 
interest rate; and T  the length of working life, which is assumed not to depend on s, 
the present value of earnings associated with schooling level s is:
An equilibrium characterized by heterogeneous schooling choices requires that 
individuals are indifferent between schooling levels. The allocation of people to 
different schooling levels, therefore, is driven by demand conditions. Equating the 
earnings streams associated with different schooling levels and taking logarithms 
yields the following equation:
The final term on the right hand side of (2.3) is an adjustment for finite life, which 
converges to zero as T  gets large2. Specifically, Mincer (1958) observes that for 
large T, the coefficient of years of schooling equals the interest rate r. People with 
more education receive higher earnings. Because the internal rate o f return to 
schooling represents the discount rate that equates lifetime earnings streams for 
different education choices, it will also equal the interest rate in this model. 
Therefore, p s in equation (2.1) yields an estimate of the internal rate of return and
when p s - r  the education market is in equilibrium. If p s > r , there is under­
investment in education (Heckman et a l, 2006).
The second model used by Mincer (1974), and now widely applied, is motivated by 
entirely different assumptions from his earlier model. The second model focuses on
2 This term also disappears i f  the retirement age - T is allowed to increase one-for-one with s, so post-school 
working life is the same for persons o f  all schooling levels.
r
(2 .2)
In Y(s) = Iny(0) + rs + ln((l - e~rT)/(l - e~rV~3))) (2.3)
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the life-cycle dynamics of earnings and on the relationship between observed 
earnings, potential earnings, and human capital investment. Persons are ex-ante 
heterogeneous, so the compensating differences motivation of the first model is 
absent. At the same time, no explicit assumptions are made about the background 
of the economic environment (Heckman et al., 2003).
Mincer (1974) specifies observed earnings as a function of potential earnings net of 
human capital investment costs, where potential earnings at any time depend on 
investments in previous time periods (Heckman, 2003). Let Pt be potential
earnings at time t, investment in training can be expressed as a fraction k t of 
potential earnings invested, i.e. C, - k tPt and let p, be the average return to 
training investments made at age t. Then:
PH l= P ,+ C ,p ,= P l (l + k lp l ) (2.4)
/ - I
Repeated substitution yields Pt
y=o
Formal schooling is defined as years spent in full-time education (k t = 1), which is 
assumed to take place at the beginning of life and to yield a rate of return p t which 
is constant across all years of schooling (p , = p s). Assuming that the rate of return 
to post-school investment p , is constant and equal to p 0 one can write:
i -1
In P, = In P„ + s ln(l + p s) + £  ln(l + p 0k j ) ^ .5 )
j= s
which yields the approximate relationship (for small p s and p 0)
t - \
(2 .6)InPt s ln P 0 + sp, + p 0Z kj
j= s
To establish a relationship between potential earnings and years of labour market 
experience, Mincer (1974) follows Ben-Porath (1967) and assumes a linearly 
declining rate o f post-school investment:
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(2.7)
where x = / -  s > 0 is the amount of work experience at age t. The length of 
working life, 7, is assumed to be independent of years of schooling. Under these 
assumptions, the relationship between potential earnings, schooling and experience 
is given by:
Observed earnings equal potential earnings less investment costs, producing the 
following relationship for observed earnings:
Thus, we arrive at the standard form of Mincer’s earnings model (equation (2.1)) 
which regresses log earnings on a linear term in years of schooling and linear and 
quadratic terms in years of labour market experience (Heckman et al., 2003).
The Mincer model (1958) provides an equilibrium-based model o f earnings 
determination and an easy way to estimate the internal rate of return to schooling. 
However, Heckman (2008) criticise Mincer’s model because of the assumptions 
that individuals have identical abilities and opportunities, credit markets are perfect, 
there are no taxes and the environment is perfectly certain. More specifically, in the 
model there is no loss of working life with additional years of schooling, earning 
functions are multiplicatively separable in experience and schooling, marginal 
returns equal average returns3, which together with multiplicative separability 
implies linearity of log earnings in schooling over the observed range of schooling 
choices. Mincer also neglects major determinants of actual returns, such as the 
direct and indirect costs of schooling, taxes, the length of an individual’s working 
life and uncertainty about future returns at the time the schooling decision is made
3 Cameiro et al. (2006) present evidence that the marginal return does not equal the average return. See also 
Heckman et al. (2006).
InPx„  * [Inpo - k p 0] + PsS + (p0k + M ) *  - M ^ (2.8)
In r(j, * ) «  In - * ( ! “ ) =
= a 0 + p s5 + p 0x + /3lx 2 (2.9)
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(Heckman et al., 2003). In most applications of Mincer model, it is assumed that 
the intercept and slope coefficient in equation (2.1) are identical across individuals. 
This implicitly assumes that PQ,k ,p sand p 0are same across persons and do not 
depend on the level of schooling.
Mincer formulates a more general model that allows for possibility that k  and p s 
differ across persons, which produce a random coefficient model:
InY (s„ x ) = a m + p s,s, +/30lx i +/?„*,.2 + e, (2.10)
Letting a 0 = E (a 0l ), p s = E ( p J ,  /?0 = E(/J0i), /?, = £(/?„ ) we may write this 
expression as:
lnrOy,x) = a 0 + p ss + f i0x + J3xx 2 +[(aQi - a Q) + ( p si -  p s )s + (j30i -  f i0)x + (/3u -  J3x) x 2] 
where the terms in brackets are part o f the error.
Mincer (1974) initially assumes that (a 0i - a Q),(p si - p s) ,(0 Oi - /?0),(/?,, - /? ,)  are 
independent o f(5 ,x ), although he relaxes this assumption in later work.
The empirical approximation of the human capital theoretical framework, adopted 
by most researchers, is the familiar semi-logarithmic form of an earnings equation, 
where log earnings is modelled as the sum of a linear function of years of education 
and a quadratic function of years of potential experience4:
log Y.t -  + p xs{ + P2xt + p zx] + s i (2.11)
where In is the natural logarithm of the observed wage for individual i; a t is a 
constant term; s t is the number of years in schooling for individual i; /?, is the 
average rate of return to one additional year of schooling; x t is post-schooling 
experience of the individual worker which is entered in linear and quadratic forms; 
and £; is assumed to be normally distribute with mean zero and variance cr? .
4 Although a human capital earnings function is typically associated with the work o f  Mincer, other authors also 
made important contributions to that literature.
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Some points regarding Mincer specification should be kept in mind. First, both the 
theoretical model and its empirical representation assume no interpersonal variation 
in the rates of return (Hill, 1981). Second, this specification is often estimated by an 
OLS estimator, which suffers from a number of potential biases that depending on 
their origin may exert either downward or upward pressure on the OLS estimates 
(Card, 1999). For example, the basic Mincerian specification assumes that earnings 
are linear in education, so that each year of education adds the same percentage 
amount to earnings irrespective of the particular year of education. In addition, 
schooling is often treated as exogenous, although education may be an endogenous 
choice variable in human capital theory (Harmon and Walker, 2001). Education is 
an optimizing investment decision based on future earnings and current costs -  that 
is the difference in earnings from undertaking and not undertaking education and 
the total cost of education including any foregone earnings. If investment in 
education results in higher earnings, higher earnings may also result in an increase 
in the amount of education consumed, which is more likely the higher the ability of 
the individual. This is referred in the literature as endogeneity bias. In addition, in 
the Mincer specification, the disturbance term captures unobservable individual 
effects and these individual factors may also influence the schooling decision, and 
thereby induce a correlation between schooling and the error term in the earnings 
function. A common example is unobserved ability. The role of unobserved ability 
in affecting earnings is a subject that has produced a large body of literature5. 
According to Griliches (1977), ability bias arises because the estimation procedure 
is unable to separate the contribution of unobserved ability to productivity from that 
made by education, and attributes it all to education. Heckman and Vytlacil 
(2001a), show that education and cognitive ability are so strongly associated that 
the wage effects of the two cannot be separated.
The early efforts of Becker (1964) and Denison (1964) recognize that the simple 
eamings-by-education relationship typically overestimate the pure contribution of 
education because of an correlation between measured ability and years in school 
completed. The authors suggest that the observed income by education wage gap 
should be reduced by about one-third. Becker (1964) argues that the true rate of
5 See, for example, Griliches (1970) and Hause (1972).
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return to education is grossly overestimated because persons differing in level of 
education also differ in terms of other characteristics that cause their incomes to 
differ systematically. Unless there is a sufficiently large negative correlation 
between ability and opportunity, the model predicts that those workers who choose 
more schooling will also tend to have higher level of ability. The failure to control 
for ability in a wage regression should therefore, result in upward-biased estimates 
of the returns to schooling (Blackburn and Neumark, 1995).
In this context, the problem resolves around the definition and measurement of 
ability. In common usage, ‘ability’ means the power to perform something. In 
Becker’s definition, this power is the capacity to increase future earnings by current 
investments. However, such capacity could be due to a combination of genetic 
factors, previous investment, experience, and other elements that might be difficult 
to unravel theoretically or statistically. Hause (1972) argues that there are some 
difficulties in going from this definition to an empirical study of schooling and its 
return. Difficulties arise in finding a data source that contains a joint distribution of 
ability, schooling and earnings (Hill, 1981). Most data sets do not contain 
information on ability; so that ability bias is, in this case a type o f omitted variable 
bias6. Other authors measure ability by an intelligence or achievement tests. 
However, Hill (1981) argues that intelligence is not fixed and is not independent of 
schooling and other influences. In fact, intelligence can be affected by schooling 
and in turn, affects the amount of learning achieved in a given school situation 
(Hause, 1972).
On the other hand is the effect of ability on earnings over time for a given level of 
educational attainment. If this is true there would be no tendency for the coefficient 
on ability to attenuate with time in the labour force (at least over the first half of the 
life cycle of earnings). However, there may be a tendency for the effect of ability to 
increase with education, especially at high levels of education. Behind this 
hypothesis lies the idea of able people being more effective than the less able in 
raising productivity through job experience. That is measured ability and learning 
in the labour force are complements in the production of earnings. The persistence
6
One exception is the National Child Developm ent Survey, which analyses periodically a cohort o f  individuals 
bom in 1958. The survey includes measures o f  both reading and mathematical ability.
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or increase in the ability coefficient over time implies the existence of productivity 
differentials in earnings even after individuals reach peak-level earnings. Such 
differentials are compatible with the large observable dispersion in personal 
earnings, even after standardizing for age, schooling and occupation (Hause, 1972).
There have been numerous approaches in the literature to deal with omitted ability 
bias. First, measures of ability have been incorporated to proxy for unobservable 
effects. The inclusion of direct measures of ability would reduce the estimated 
education coefficient if  it acts as a proxy for ability, since the coefficient on 
education then captures the effect of education alone since ability is controlled for. 
Another approach includes an explicit proxy for ability, for example from an 
intelligence quotient (IQ) test (Griliches and Mason, 1972; Griliches, 1977). Some 
data sets have a direct measure of IQ, but evidence regarding the relationship 
between intellectual capacity and earnings is not entirely consistent (Zax and Rees, 
2002). Other studies simply find detailed test score information and include these 
test score variables in the earnings equation to obtain estimates of the returns to 
education after directly controlling for measured cognitive ability (Tobias, 2003) 
Specifically, if more able individuals ‘convert’ schooling into human capital more 
efficiently than the less able, this would raise the return to schooling for the more 
able. On the other hand, the more able may have higher opportunity costs since they 
may have been able to earn more in the labour market.
Second, one might exploit within twin differences in earnings and education if we 
accept the assumption that unobserved effects are additive and common within 
twins (Harmon et a l, 2001). The fixed effect estimator on a sample of identical 
twins can be used, from which inherent ability and family background effects are 
assumed to be the same. This procedure is perhaps more plausible for identical 
twins who share the same genetics and the same family background. If 
monozygotic twins indeed share the same level of ability, then estimating the 
difference in returns to education between twins will eliminate ability bias. 
However, twins represent a quite distinct population group and often sample size is 
small. Even where the sample size is larger as in Miller et al. (1995) a substantial 
proportion of the sample of twins report the same level of education. As a result, 
earnings function is sometimes estimated on siblings, father-son or mother-daughter
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paired samples, using fixed-effects or first differencing approaches. By introducing 
sub-samples of households with at least two individuals of a given gender in 
employment, the fixed-effects method effectively controls for all household 
variables that are common across these individuals within a household.
A final approach deals directly with a simultaneous relationship between schooling 
and earnings by specifying a two-stage equation system and identifying variables 
that affect schooling but not the dependent variable other than through the variable 
that is being instrumented (Harmon et al., 2003). If one finds such a variable(s), 
then it can be used to construct instrumental variable estimates of the return to 
education. More specifically, the idea is to instrument schooling by decomposing 
the earnings function into a linear function expressed as:
where Z i s  a vector of exogenous variables that influence the educational decision. 
The next equation is estimated by substituting the fitted values from the first-stage 
regression of s* onZ(. .
Adding s* is sufficient to eliminate the endogeneity bias arising from the possible 
correlation between schooling and unobservable influences on earnings. By 
construction, s* is correlated with actual schooling and will capture the effect of 
education on earnings. However, s* is by construction uncorrelated with the error 
term in the earnings function. Consequently the estimated return /?,, based on 
predicted schooling, is unbiased. The method described is the Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS), which is a special case of the instrumental variable (IV) approach.
A consistent estimator for the returns to education also depends on the statistical 
identification of the model. In order to identify the effect of schooling on earnings 
we need to find a variable which is a determinant of schooling and can be omitted 
from the earnings function. However, searching for such instruments is potentially 
difficult and sometimes they are only weakly correlated with the endogenous 
variable in question. Using such variables as instruments is likely to produce
s '  = n Z t + 77,. (2 .12)
\nYi = a t + /?,£*, + p 2xi + + st (2.13)
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estimates with large standard errors. Some authors highlight that many existing IV 
studies have been undermined by a lack of precision in their first stage estimates7. 
For example, Bound and Jaeger (1996) show how quarter of birth interactions with 
state and year, used in Angrist and Krueger (1991) study, form weak instruments 
causing IV to be more biased than the OLS.
Furthermore, the level of individual earnings is not wholly determined by 
education. A short list o f other factors will include: location, occupation and 
industry, gender, race, age, physical condition, and intelligence, including both 
psycho-motor and intellectual skills. A simple bivariate analysis will always lead to
Q
an overestimation of the influence of education on income . Many studies use age 
as a substitute, or proxy, for job tenure because job tenure is not readily available in 
most survey data sets. Age is typically a measurement-error-ffee variable which can 
be observed for all individuals. However, earnings regressions that contain 
supervisory status or occupations tend to produce lower returns to schooling due to 
occupational outcomes which are also correlated with schooling (Vernon, 2002).
Another issue in the returns to education literature is that married women typically 
experience breaks in their labour force participation, and most cross-sectional data 
do not provide information on either the amount of time spent outside the labour 
market or on the timing of these breaks. Researchers are forced to proxy, such as 
amount of potential experience estimated from age and educational level, which 
may fails to capture the sample variation in actual experience. Some cross-sectional 
or longitudinal studies in which information on actual experience is recorded 
(Malkiel and Malkiel, 1973; Mincer and Polachek, 1974) suggest that the estimated 
return to experience is seriously biased downwards when the incorrect measure is 
used (Zabalza and Tzannatos, 1985). However, even when detailed information on 
labour market experience is available, this variable should not necessarily be 
considered as exogenous. Experience is made up of accumulated participation and 
participation depends among other factors on earnings. For men, this is probably 
not very important, given that most men participate continuously irrespective of the 
level of their earnings. However, for married women, the strong earnings
7 See Staiger and Stock (1997) and Bound et al. (1995) for more details.
8
For in depth surveys o f  these issues see Card (1995, 1999) and Angrist and Krueger (1991).
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relationship might seriously bias the coefficient on experience, particularly when 
earnings are estimated using the OLS technique.
The Mincer equation also includes the experience in quadratic form in order to 
capture the inverted U-shape nature of the relationship between the logarithm of 
earnings and experience or age. In some specifications tenure is added, in linear and 
quadratic form, to capture the acquisition of specific as opposed to general skills. 
Murphy and Welch (1990) examine in detail whether the standard quadratic 
specification in years of potential experience adequately captures the empirical 
experience-eamings profile. They conclude that a quadratic function is not flexible 
enough to capture the main features of the experience-eamings profile. According 
to them the main problem is that the quadratic function understates earnings growth 
over the first 10 to 15 years of individual career.
Furthermore, the question of measurement error also needs to be addressed. 
Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) introduce the idea that individuals differ in their 
propensities to over-report or under-report schooling levels. Card (1999) suggests 
that research over three decades points to the reliability of self-reported schooling 
being no more than 90%. Often, the only data available to measure education is 
years of schooling. However, it can be questioned whether years of schooling 
adequately measures ‘total education’. If schooling variable are subject to survey 
measurement errors, then conventional OLS estimates are biased. Griliches (1977) 
shows, that if the measure for education is imperfect, OLS estimates can have a 
large downward bias. Moreover, the bias is magnified (even if the error of 
measurement is small) when more variables are included in the model.
Additionally, more recent literature recognizes that returns may vary across 
schooling levels and across persons o f the same schooling level9. Heterogeneity in 
the regression coefficients is another source of potential bias in OLS estimates. One 
of the properties of OLS estimation is that the regression line crosses through the 
mean of the sample (Harmon et al., 2001). People differ with respect to their 
marginal return to education, their marginal cost for education and their tastes or
9 See Heckman e ta l .  (1997), Dearden (1999a) and (1999b) and Blundell et al. (2001).
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choices10, hence the return to education is not a single parameter but can potentially 
differs according to differences in individuals’ family backgrounds. Some 
individuals may be able to access funds from family or other sources in order to 
acquire additional education, while others are unable to do so. Theoretically, 
heterogeneity is an important problem. Small differences in the estimates of the 
return to schooling in a given year can generate large differences in estimates of 
lifetime earnings and of lifetime return to schooling. Therefore, unobserved 
heterogeneity might induce a dependency between the education variable and the 
error term. In this context, Card (1999) argues that people with higher returns to 
education tend to acquire more schooling and hence a cross-section regression of 
earnings on schooling yields an upwardly biased estimate of the average marginal 
return to schooling. An alternative methodology is available to OLS known as 
quantile regression (QR) which allows us to estimate the return to a particular level 
of education within different quantiles of the wage distribution.
In approaching this empirical measurement problem, two fundamentally different 
views of the labour market have been taken. The first view, associated with 
Griliches (1977), adopts an efficiency unit view of the labour market. Human 
capital is homogeneous but people possess different amounts of it (Cameiro et al., 
2001). This literature therefore focuses on ability bias and measurement error as the 
central problems in estimating the rate of return to schooling (Heckman and 
Vytlacil, 2001). The second view, associated with Roy (1951) and Rosen and Wills 
(1979), focuses on the choice of schooling and emphasizes comparative advantage 
in the labour market with heterogeneous human capital as a guiding principle. This 
view point is at odds with an efficiency unit point of view and highlights the need 
to address self-selection issues when considering the most appropriate estimator.
In estimating earnings function there is an additional complication and this is the 
problem of sample selectivity issues. It is argued that working women and men may 
not be randomly sampled from the overall population. Consequently, the sample of 
the population that work and so are included in the earnings regression, may bias
10 In practice, returns to education can vary across people due to a number o f  unobserved factors, such as 
ability, motivation, and ambition, as well as differences in the interest rate faced by different individuals (Card, 
2001 ).
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the estimates with potential high earners being overrepresented11. More 
specifically, because offered wages are only observed for individuals who are 
employed, these methods require the estimation of the covariance between the error 
term in the wage offer equation and the error term in the equation determining the 
probability of employment. This covariance is the sample selection effect (Ermisch 
and Wright, 1994). The sample selection correction procedure may be especially 
important for low-income countries, because they often have a higher share of 
family workers and self-employed workers, and for women, because the proportion 
participating in the labour market may be small. Correcting for sample selection 
bias sometimes substantially changes the estimated rates of return to schooling.
Gronau (1974) first noted the problem posed by sample selection bias in the context 
of an earnings regression for women, in which wage data is only available for those 
who received acceptable wage offers. In response to the problem Heckman (1974) 
produced a maximum likelihood estimator and a two-step procedure that are able to 
recover unbiased estimates of the equation of interest in the presence of sample 
selection. Heckman (1976) argues that observed earnings are not a true reflection of 
the underlying earnings distribution because of the existence of selection bias. 
Indeed, search theory holds that unemployed people only accept a job if their 
earnings are higher than their reservation wage. In addition to the parametric two- 
step method proposed by Heckman (1976), Cosslett (1991), Gallant and Nychka 
(1987), Powell (1987), Ahn and Powell (1993) and Newey (1991) propose semi- 
parametric estimators for sample selection models, and more recently, Das et al. 
(2003) propose a fully non-parametric estimator for this model.
Sample selection is assumed to depend on a linear index and is controlled for by 
including the inverse Mill’s ratio of the index as additional ‘regressor’ in the 
outcome estimation. The inverse Mills ratio is a nonlinear transformation of the 
Probit index and is a decreasing function of the probability of selection. It also 
indicates whether there is significant correlation between the error terms in the 
wage equation and the selection equation, which would otherwise bias OLS
11 Working men and wom en are unrepresentative o f  the male and female population and policy inferences 
concluded from regressions for workers may be invalid, both for non-working men and women and for working 
men and women.
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estimates (equivalent to an omitted variable problem). Dolton and Makepeace, 
(1986) argue that sample selection bias is an indication that the observed pattern of 
female earnings is lower than that which would have been observed for the average 
member of the whole female sample had she continued to work.
Despite the clear definition of this covariance, there have often been problems 
associated with its interpretation. In particular, a negative covariance has been 
viewed as being problematic, resulting from misspecification of the wage equation 
(Steinberg, 1989). The sign of sample selectivity term depends in part on the 
variables included in the earning and sample selection equations. A positive and 
significant coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio may imply that those who 
participate in the labour market have higher conditional mean earnings than those 
that do not. In this context, Dolton and Makepeace (1987) conclude that the 
notation of a correct sign for the selection coefficient is difficult to resolve on 
economics ground. They indicate that the positive Mills sign would suggests that 
increased earnings accrue to the type of person who is more likely to have made the 
participation choice compared with someone who is less likely to have made that 
choice. Alternatively, Blackaby et al. (2002) argue that a negative and significant 
selectivity term suggest that if those out of work were to find work they would have 
higher earnings than individuals with similar characteristics already in jobs. This is 
compatible with such individuals setting higher reservation wages, which is 
consistent with their lower employment probability.
The first step in a sample selection procedure is to specify an employment 
participation equation for women or men in a form of Probit function on a sample 
of employed and non-employed. Then selectivity bias can be corrected by including 
an additional regressor in the earnings function related to the probability of 
participation. Importantly, the Heckman correction requires a valid exclusion 
restriction. In this regards, Wooldridge (2006) shows two important implications. 
First, any element that appears as an explanatory variable in the first-step regression 
equation should also be an explanatory variable in the selection equation. Second, 
one should have at least one element in the selection equation that is not in the 
regression equation. Concerns that distributional assumptions made in Heckman 
two-step procedure were too strong lead to development of a semi-parametric
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technique that does not require distributional assumptions for identification. These 
methods, however, require that all employment and wage regressors are exogenous.
There are other criticisms of the Heckman two-step approach. For example, 
Nelsons (1984) shows that the inverse Mills ratio is often highly collinear with the 
explanatory variables and hence, estimates of returns to education tend to be 
unstable, non-robust and sensitive to minor changes in specification of both the 
earnings and participation functions. Nelson (1984) Monte Carlo results show that 
the standard errors o f the estimated returns to education can be very large when the 
degree of collinearity is high. However, such comments are of second order of 
importance when set against the unwarranted bivariate normality assumption 
discussed in the previous paragraph (Moffitt, 1999). These two issues are related 
and both have been addressed by developing semi-parametric methods which do 
not rely on arbitrary distributional assumptions12.
A number of studies have attempted to estimate returns to education for males and 
females separately to see if these returns differ according to gender13. Gender 
differences in the returns to education may arise for several reasons: differences in 
the opportunity costs of schooling for males and females; gender differences in 
traits, or strengths that are valued differently by the market; gender differences in 
jobs; relative scarcity; and sex discrimination in the labour market. A priori, none 
of these factors suggest a higher rate of return to education for males or females. 
However, Madden’s (1987) argues that women’s experience of higher average 
wage returns to education in the US is consistent with their higher average years of 
school attendance. Similarly, Altonji (1993) investigates how expected returns to 
education affect the decision to stay in school and the choice of college major. He 
finds female coefficients to be greater than the corresponding male coefficients for 
17 out of 18 educational dummy variables. Elsewhere, Behrman and Deolalikar 
(1990)14 argue that in Indonesia a possible reason for a higher return to education 
for females may be due to the manufacturing technology adopted in the country. If 
factories are structured in a way that physical strength is important to productivity,
12 See Powell (1993) and Vella (1998).
13 See Madden (1978) and Angle and Wissman (1981).
l4Authors show that the return to university degree is 25% higher for females than for males.
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the earning premium for men in unskilled factory positions and with low schooling 
would be considerable.
Finally, some authors stress the effect of schooling quality on earnings. Bedi and 
Edwards (2002), for example, examine the economic effects of school quality and 
find that men educated in countries with better quality schooling earned 
significantly higher incomes than men educated in low-quality schools. Similarly, 
Johnson and Stafford (1973) compute rates of return to quality as well as quantity, 
using the average price-deflated expenditure per pupil as a quality index. They find 
that expenditure per pupil affects years of schooling attained. Several other papers 
examine the impact of school quality on earnings for developed countries (mainly 
the United States). These papers provide mixed evidence. Some report strong 
effects of school spending on students’ subsequent earnings while another find little 
or no effect15.
2.3. Selective review of empirical studies
2.3.1. Instrumental variable (IV) literature
A general pattern that emerges in all IV studies is that the IV estimates of the
1 6  • .returns to education tend to be larger than the OLS estimates . This is true across 
studies that use different data sets and different instruments. By going from OLS to 
IV, the estimates often increase by more than 30% and in some cases by close to 
100%, indicating that OLS estimates underestimate the true value of returns to 
schooling.
There are several explanations for this and measurement error has been cited as an 
explanation to reconcile these apparently different results17. Attenuation bias caused 
by the measurement error of schooling reduces OLS estimates. More specifically, if 
an individual’s schooling level is measured erroneously and the true value of the 
returns to schooling is positive, the OLS estimate will be biased toward zero. If
15 Examples o f  studies that find a positive and significant school quality effect on earnings include Rizutto and 
Wachtel (1980) and Card and Krueger (1992a,b). Papers that find insignificant school quality effects include 
Ribich and Murphy (1975), Betts (1995), and Grogger (1996). Heckman et al. (1995) also report insignificant 
effects, although the paper does report a positive effect o f  school quality on earnings for college graduates.
16 Another pattern is that IV estimates are also more imprecise than OLS estimates o f  the return to schooling.
17 Schooling is measured with error.
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attenuation bias is relatively larger, the resulting IV estimates will be higher than 
the OLS estimates. Based on Card (1999), measurement error bias itself can explain 
10% gap in the estimated returns between OLS and IV estimations. Generally, the 
two biases that exist simultaneously in applying the OLS estimation are the upward 
bias caused by omitted ability variables and the downward bias caused by 
measurement error in schooling. The result of the IV estimates depends on the 
relative magnitudes of the omitted ability and attenuation biases. If the instruments 
are not correlated with the measurement error in the schooling level, then IV 
estimates will be free of both biases.
However, one of the criticism of the IV estimates resolves around the concern that 
the instrument may not be truly independent of the earnings residual. If the 
instrument is positively correlated with the earnings, the IV estimator may be 
biased upward. Second, an instrument may be so weakly correlated with the 
troublesome variable that in practice it will not overcome the bias of the OLS. 
Thus, when the instrumental variable is weak, the bias in the estimates can be very 
large.
The recent literature has suggested two different interpretations of the results 
obtained using IV methods. Card (1999) shows that from a simple model of 
endogenous choice, the return to education is not a single parameter in the 
population but a random variable that may vary with other individual 
characteristics. In other words, the differences between OLS and IV estimates 
might be caused by heterogeneity in returns to schooling (Bhalotra and Sanhueza, 
2004). Card (1999) also suggests that the instrument probably influences the 
educational decision of individuals with high marginal returns and hence high 
discount rates. Consequently if IV relies on ‘interventions’ that affect the schooling 
choice of children from relatively disadvantaged family backgrounds (high discount 
rates) then their marginal returns to schooling will be higher than the average return 
to schooling of the population as a whole. The second interpretation is based on the 
evaluation of ‘treatment effect’ (Heckman, 1997). Angrist et al. (1996) show that 
the only treatment effect that IV can consistently estimate is the Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE) that is the average treatment effect (average return to 
education) for those who change treatment status (educational choice) because they
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act in accordance with the assignment to treatment mechanism (instrument). 
Different instruments should estimate different returns to education associated with 
different subgroups in the population. For example, IV estimates of the returns to 
schooling based on college proximity as an instrument should be interpreted as the 
average return to education for a person that acquires an additional year of 
education only because they live close to college, but would drop out if no college 
had been nearly.
A common technique of the IV literature is the use of family background variables 
as instruments. One such instrument is mother’s or father’s education. Card (1999) 
observes that there is a tradition of utilising family background data such as 
mother’s and father’s educational attainment to control for unobserved ability. 
There is high correlation between children’s’ educational attainments and those of 
their parents and it is widely accepted that educated parents may motivate their 
child to study harder. Additionally, it is assumed that family background has no 
direct effect on earnings, but only affects earnings through its effect on education. 
Using data from 1972-1976 General Social Survey for the US, Card (1999) shows 
that each additional year of schooling of either parent increases schooling 
completed by their children by about 0.4 years. He also states that around 30% of 
the observed variation in education among US adults is explained by parental 
education.
Family background variables have been used to measure both demand for schooling 
shift factors and supply shift factors. While the true factors must be independent, 
family background measures may be correlated with the ability and child’s human 
capital. It is not possible to separate out these effects with the measures available 
for individuals and families. A further complication in the use of family 
background variables in earnings equation comes from interacting ability measures 
with years of education (Fleisher, 1977; Altonji and Dunn, 1994). In these 
applications, family background variables, as proxies for ability, are used to control 
for measurable and systematic components affecting the rate of return across 
individuals (Griffin and Ganderton, 1996). Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997) for 
example, use father’s and brother’s education as a background variables . The use 
of parental education as an instrument increases the rate of return by 15% above the
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corresponding OLS estimates. For men, the addition of parent education to the 
vector of explanatory variables lowers the OLS estimate of the returns to education 
by 5% to 10%. For women, the addition of mother’s education has no effect on the 
estimates18.
Behrman and Taubman (1977) argue that ability and other unobservable effects 
may be regarded as the consequence of genetic and environmental contribution of 
the family. If it is assumed that the ‘unobserved component’ is a pure ‘family 
effect’ which captures these genetic and environmental effects, then data on sibling, 
especially twin data, may be used to control for these unobservables and permit an 
unbiased estimate of the return to education. The key idea behind this strategy is 
that some of the unobserved differences that bias cross-sectional comparison of 
education and earnings are reduced or eliminated within families (see Ashenfelter 
and Card, 1999). In this case, differences of levels of schooling for the twins or 
siblings can be exploited to estimate the effect of education on the wage. Behrman 
and Taubman (1977) argue that since brothers come from the same economic and 
social background, and presumably differ less in terms of innate ability than typical 
elementary, high-school and college persons, many kinds of ability often 
considered important in explaining earning differentials would be held constant. On 
the other hand, some brothers may become relatively well-educated precisely 
because of unusual ambition and other kinds of ability rather than because of 
interest, luck, or other factors uncorrelated with earnings. Card (1999) gives an 
overview of several studies that use twin data. He concludes that under the 
assumption that identical twins have identical abilities the within-family estimator 
gives a consistent estimate for the average marginal returns to education. A 
drawback of these methods is the possible lack of generalization to non-twins and 
the potential failure of the identical abilities assumptions for identical twins and 
siblings. If the assumption does not hold, twin studies might overestimate the effect 
of education on earnings (Ebber, 2004).
The empirical literature surveyed may be characterized as ranging between two 
extreme positions, one saying that family effects lead to serious overestimation of
18 For a more detailed discussion we refer to Card (1999).
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the true returns to education, which should be estimated solely from differences 
between siblings, preferably monozygotic (MZ) twins (Gronau, 2005). The other 
extreme would take the position that family effect works almost entirely via 
education and hence causes little bias in the estimated coefficient, and that the 
decline observed in within-sibling estimates is the result of aggravating other 
problems, such as errors in measurement and simultaneity, and is not a reflection of 
true family effects (Griliches, 1979).
Other studies exploit natural variation in data caused by exogenous influences on 
the educational decision. For example, Angrist and Krueger (1991) exploit natural 
variation in factors affecting the schooling decision, such as interactions between 
quarter of birth and compulsory schooling laws, in order to create instruments for 
education that are uncorrelated with ability. The underlying idea is that a person 
who has been bom early in the year (the first quarter) reaches the minimum school 
leaving age after a smaller amount of schooling than persons bom later in the year. 
The actual amount of educational attainment is related to the quarter in which they 
were bom, while at the same time there seems no reason to believe that quarter of 
birth has an independent effect on earnings (Angrist and Krueger, 1991).
Studies in different countries have generally found that increasing the school- 
leaving age boosts educational attainment, including in Britain (Harmon and 
Walker, 1995), Canada (Oreopolous, 2003), Norway (Aakvik et a l, 2003) and 
Sweden (Meghir and Palme, 2003). In Germany, the results are more mixed. For 
instance, Pischke (2004) finds that an increase in school-leaving laws boosted 
educational attainment for the cohort bom 1930-1960. However, it is unknown 
whether this difference is due to the impact of school starting and leaving ages, or 
to the age of the two cohorts.
Angrist and Krueger (1991) study has been criticized by Bound et a l  (1995) with 
the argument that quarter of birth may have an impact on earnings other than 
through the effect of education. Moreover, Bound et al. (1995) point out that 
Angrist and Krueger’s IV model includes large number o f weak instruments and 
this will result in large inconsistency in the estimates. Bound et al. (1995) show that 
when the correlation between the instrument and endogeneous variable is weak,
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potential bias arises from any small correlation between the instrument and the 
error term. This is confirmed by the findings of Staiger and Stock (1997), who 
compute a variety of asymptotically valid confidence intervals for standard IV and 
limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimates. A second criticism of 
Angrist and Krueger’s findings, raised by Bound and Jaeger (1996), is that quarter 
o f birth may be correlated with unobserved ability differences.
In a later study, Angrist and Krueger (1992) propose the idea that because college 
enrolment led to draft exemptions, potential draftees for the Vietnam campaign had 
this exogenous influence on their schooling decision. The instruments are based 
around numbers assigned on the basis of month and day of birth from which a 
‘draft lottery’ was conducted. As in other studies, the IV results are higher than the 
OLS, but the difference is insignificant, perhaps reflecting later work that suggested 
the instruments were only marginally significant in influencing the education 
decision (Bound et al, 1995).
Furthermore, Card (1993) exploits data on proximity to educational institutions 
assuming that people living near a college are more likely to avail themselves of the 
facility than someone living farther from college. College proximity may have a 
direct effect on earnings, since families that place a strong emphasis on education 
may decide to live near a college, while their children may have higher abilities and 
motivation to achieve labour market success (Verbeek, 2000). Instruments based on 
schooling reforms, such as changes in compulsory school attendance laws are 
biased upwards compared to OLS because of unobserved differences between the 
characteristics of the treated and non-treated group, since these reform treatments 
are often non-random (Card, 1999). For example, factors like compulsory schooling 
or schooling availability are most likely to affect individuals who might otherwise 
have relatively low educational level. If because of potential heterogeneity these 
individuals have higher than average marginal returns to education, then 
instruments based on these variables tend to recover the returns to education for a 
subset of individuals with higher returns to education, resulting in IV estimates 
which are larger than the OLS estimates.
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A somewhat different approach is used by Duflo (2001), where returns to education 
estimates are based on the exposure of individuals to a massive investment program 
in education in Indonesia in the early 1970’s. Individuals were assigned to the 
treatment on the basis of their date of birth and the district in which they lived. 
Similarly, Denny and Harmon (2001) apply the same approach in Ireland.
Another alternative is to group observations according to childhood smoking 
behaviour on the grounds that those who choose to smoke at an early age have a 
higher discount rate in terms of time preference. That is they place more weight on 
satisfying current wants at the expense of the future (Evans and Montgomery, 1994; 
Chevalier and Walker, 1999). The intuition for that instrument comes from the 
acknowledgement that just as schooling is non-randomly assigned across the 
population, the decision to engage in (un)healthy habits is non-randomly 
distributed. Evans and Montgomery (1994) note that ‘more educated people have 
better health and better health habits’. There is still a debate as to whether or not 
this education-health relationship is causal i.e. more educated people learn the 
dangers of poor health habits and are thus less likely to engage in them. On the 
other hand, smoking at age 16 is not correlated with current earnings, but is 
correlated with the educational choice. The decision that an individual makes at age 
of 16 on whether to continue in education or not is likely to be significantly 
affected by his/her discount rate, whether that is because of access to financial 
resources or because of the individual’s rate of time preference. The authors find 
that concurrence in the timing of smoking and school leaving decisions generate a 
statistically precise and quantitatively large correlation between years of education 
and early smoking.
An alternative to the instrumental variable approach, as already mentioned, is the 
study of education and earnings outcomes for twins, siblings or mother-daughter/ 
father-son pairs19. The assumption made in this literature is that differencing 
eliminates bias due to unobserved ability, but potentially exacerbates measurement 
error, so that instrumenting differenced schooling eliminates the resulting 
attenuation towards zero. The weakness in the method is that differencing may not
19 Since our empirical results are not based on a twin sample, we do not provide detailed discussion on this 
literature.
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remove all of the ability bias if there is some individual component to monozygotic 
(MZ) ability that is not removed by differencing. Most recent studies on twins 
follow the Ashentfelter and Krueger (1994) study, which uses the Princeton Twins 
Survey collected at an annual twin’s festival in 1991 in Twinsburg, Ohio. Their 
results indicate that each year o f education completed increases worker’s earning 
on average by 12-16%. Ashentfelter and Krueger (1994) also find weak evidence 
that unobserved ability may be negatively related to the level of education. The 
survey of twins by Griliches (1979) concludes that the estimated returns to 
education, where ability bias is purged via differencing within twin pairs, is 
typically lower than the estimated return from the whole sample (i.e. without 
differencing).
2.3.2. Semi-parametric literature
A major feature of the recent literature is the development of alternatives to the 
Heckman selectivity estimator that do not rely on normality and linearity 
assumptions. The resulting semi-parametric models combine components of 
parametric and non-parametric models. Hence, they possess the virtue of easy 
interpretability of parametric models and the flexibility of nonparametric models 
(Lei, 2005).The semi-parametric estimates avoid both the assumptions of
parametric models and the functional form since they do not assume a known link
20function, and also solve the curse of dimensionality of nonparametric models . A 
large number of estimators have been proposed to deal with selection issues. For 
instance, Newey (1991) proposes a semi-parametric two-step estimator based on a 
series expansion of the inverse Mill’s ratio. He suggests estimating a linear index 
semi-parametrically to allow for non-Gaussian errors in the first-step regression. An 
important feature of these new models is that they relax the assumption of joint 
bivariate normality in the error terms, which is assumed in Heckman’s two-step 
approach. Many of these new models use nonparametric method for binary 
regression models. They include Manski’s maximum score method (1975, 1985), 
nonparametric maximum likelihood estimation (Cosslett, 1983), weighted average 
derivatives (Stoker, 1986; Powell, 1987), and kernel estimation (Ichimura, 1988; 
Klein and Spady, 1993). Tobias (2003) explores the ability-eamings relationships
20 The precision o f  non-parametric estimator decreases rapidly as the number o f  continuously distributed 
components o f  independent variables increase.
40
using flexible econometric techniques that do not require strict functional form 
assumptions. Estimating the returns to schooling to college and non-college groups, 
he concludes that there is no evidence of non-linearity in the ability-eamings 
relationship. Returns to education increase for the more able and the college 
earnings premium grows over time for individuals at all points in the earnings 
distribution. Tobias (2003) also finds evidence of diminishing returns to ability for 
those with 12 or fewer years of education and weak evidence of increasing returns 
to ability for those with at least some form of college education. He concludes that 
the most able individuals go to college, while the least able do not, and thus 
problems necessarily arise when trying to estimate the returns to education over the 
tails of the ability distribution.
2.3.3. Quantile regression (QR) literature
Since the introduction of the quantile regression (QR) model by Koenker and 
Basset (1978), several authors have used this technique to estimate the earnings 
effects of education at different points of the earnings distribution21. This technique 
has an advantage over traditional mean regression techniques in the OLS because it 
implicitly allows for workers’ heterogeneity. More specifically, the idea with the 
QR is to compare the rate of return at different points in the distribution, for 
example the bottom with the top. By estimating a family of conditional quantile 
earnings function one can see how the return to education varies across the whole 
distribution. For instance, Bushinsky (1994) and Autor et al. (2006) for US, Abadie 
et al. (1998) for Spain, Machado and Mata (2001, 2005) and Hartog et al. (2001) 
for Portugal, report that returns to education tend to be increasing when moving up 
along the earnings distribution. This implies that conditional on observable 
characteristics, more educated workers display more wage dispersion. Moreover, 
higher returns for the higher quantiles suggest that more able individuals profit 
more from additional educational investment. One factor behind the distribution of 
earnings is the distribution of inherent ability so that Tower ability’ individuals are 
more likely to predominate in the bottom half of the distribution (Harmon et al., 
2001).
21 In the present thesis w e use the words quantile and percentile interchangeable. Note that, for example, a 0.5 
quantile is equivalent to 50-percentile, which is the median.
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Following Arias et al. (2001) if ability and education are complements in the 
human capital generation process then education has an additional indirect effect on 
human capital that increases its otherwise constant contribution to earnings. Using 
.British data Harmon et al. (2003) find evidence of complementarity based on QR 
estimates. The return to education is higher for those at the very top of the earnings 
distribution compared to those at the very bottom. Similarly, Mwabu and Schlultz 
(1996) use QR methods on a sample of South African men and obtain different 
returns across quantiles. They interpret an increasing return to education as an 
indicator of complementarities between ability and education. However, in their 
study they find that returns to education in Africa decreases across the earnings 
distribution, which they interpret as substitutability. Elsewhere Heckman and 
Vytlacil (2001) note that educational sorting by ability may make it difficult to 
identify the effects of the two variables. Their evidence suggests that ability and 
schooling appear to be inseparable even if ability is perfectly observed. If 
educational sorting affects measured ability then this will exacerbate the 
identification problem. The strategies for coping with these problems leads to 
different interpretations of the role ability has in explaining increasing returns to 
education across the distribution.
Similarly, Martins and Pereira (2004) use comparable data and a common wage 
equation to calculate quantile returns to years of education in sixteen European 
countries with the purpose of analysing the behaviour of income variations at 
different points of the conditional distribution. By applying QR technique, they 
compare the returns for individuals with different ability, attempting to explain the 
effect of education on wage inequality. Martins and Pereira (2004) find that in most 
countries education has a positive impact on within-groups dispersion (in line with 
Buchinsky, 1994). Budria (2006) also exploits the QR technique to calculate returns 
to lower secondary, upper secondary and tertiary education in nine European 
countries. As in previous studies, returns to tertiary education in most countries 
increase when moving from lower to the upper quantiles. In another study, Patrinos 
et al. (2006) investigate the pattern of returns to education along the conditional 
wage distribution across a mix of East Asian and Latin American countries. They 
also analyse the existence of a relationship between a country’s development stage
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and the pattern of returns to education. Their results indicate that returns decrease 
with quanitles in low-income East Asian countries, while exhibit a clearly opposite 
pattern in the case of Singapore, which is high-income country. The authors argue 
that such patterns are due to more job mobility in developed countries, allowing 
individuals to improve their position by changing jobs.
Works on the returns to education using QR technique in transition countries are 
limited. For example, Flabbi et al. (2008) estimate earnings at different point of the 
conditional earnings distribution and investigate the heterogeneity among workers 
in eight transition countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland 
Russia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia). Their results indicate evidence of 
heterogeneity in returns to education across countries as well as within countries. In 
another study, Skoufias (2003) finds that there are no significant differences in the 
returns to human capital at the median and at the upper and lower tails of the 
distribution among male and female workers employed in the Romanian public and 
private sectors.
2.3.4. Previous studies on returns to education in transition countries
Despite the growing number of studies, there are still several important limitations 
to the research undertaken on the returns to education in post-communist countries 
(Arandarenko, 2006). Due to the lack of available micro-data relatively very few 
studies have analysed the returns to education before and after radical 
transformations in policy. One exception is Andren et al. (2005) who examine the 
effect of education on earnings under socialism and transition in Romania using 
retrospective data from 1950 and a 1994 survey. Because of concerns about 
possible measurement error, the authors estimate the earning function using Least 
Absolute Deviations (LAD) as well as OLS. Under both estimation methods, they 
find a small and statistically significant impact of schooling under central planning: 
a constant 3-4% premium associated with an additional year of education from 
1950 through 1989. These results support previous findings that the educational 
earnings premium was low under central planning and that it grew substantially 
during the transition years.
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Except for Hungary which operated under a considerable less rigid economic 
regime than most of the rest of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, the returns to education in transition economies was typically around 3-4%. 
Ten years later the rate o f return to education rises to about 8 % in most transition 
countries. Fleisher et a l (2005) show that the rapid increase in returns to education 
during the early reform period reflects the ability o f highly educated individuals to 
respond to changing opportunities in a disequilibrium situation. The authors find 
that both the speed of economic transformation from a planning to market economy 
and the degree of economic disequilibrium helped to explain differences in the rate 
of return to education over time and across countries. Similarly, Bevc (1993) 
estimates the rate of return to education in former Yugoslavia in 1970s and 1980s. 
She finds that the rate of return to education in socialist Yugoslavia was lower than 
in other developing countries, leading to a smaller difference in lifetime earnings by 
level of education. These results, however, do not necessarily imply that education 
was of lower importance for the economic development in the former Yugoslavia.
Empirical evidence for Central Eastern European economies, suggests that returns 
to education increased as the market reforms took place. Table 1.1 represents a 
summary of some of the main studies. Chase (1998), for example, uses the 1984 
Social Stratification Survey for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and finds a 
low return to education of 2.5% for men and 4% for women, which increased to 5- 
6 % by 1993. Similarly the return increased for all levels of schooling except for 
post graduate education. Filer et a l (1999) report additional increases in return in 
both the Czech and Slovak republics to 8-9% by 1997. Munich et al. (2004) show 
that the majority of the increase in the rate of return to education for women in the 
Czech Republic took place in the first phase of transition (1986-1996), and that no 
further change was observable in the later phases (1996-2002). Rutkowski (1996) 
also reports an increase in the returns to education in Poland, from about 5% in the 
late 80s to over 7% in the mid-1990s. Using data for Slovenian workers over the 
1987-1991 periods, Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) explore changes in the structure 
of earnings and employment produced by transition. They find that the average 
return to years of education rises dramatically following transition. Moreover, 
changes in the relative returns to education are virtually identical for men and 
women. However, individuals with four years of university education gained the
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most in relative earnings, closely followed by those with two years of university 
training. This supports the findings of Abraham and Vodopivec (1993) who argue 
that higher ability workers are better able to switch jobs. Stanovnik (1997) finds a 
similar pattern for Slovenia, Jones and Ilaypruma (1994) for Bulgaria, and Maurer- 
Fazio (1999) for China. A survey by Psacharopoulos (1994), which compares 
returns to human capital across a large number of countries in the early transition 
phase, finds estimates of less than 9% in most of the former communist countries.
In a related study, Flanagan (1998) examines the effect of changes in the economic 
system on the incentive to invest in human capital before and after November 1989 
in the Czech Republic. He finds a positive but low return to education prior to 
1989. However, the estimated return increase to 5.7% between 1988 and 1996. 
Halpem and Korosi (1997) estimate the return to education using 1986, 1989, 1992, 
1993 and 1994 using Hungarian survey data. They find that the estimated return to 
university education relative to primary ( 8  years) schooling rises from 45% in 1986 
to 62% in 1989 and remains between 56% and 61% thereafter.
Krueger and Pischke (1992) and Bird et al. (1994) estimate Mincer earning 
functions for East Germany before and during the transition. Interestingly, Krueger 
and Pischke (1992) find that the rate of return to education in East Germany fell 
from 0.077 in 1988 to 0.062 in 1992. Similarly, Bird et al. (1994) use the German 
Socio-Economic Panel, find that the point estimate of the rate of return to education 
was 0.044 in 1989, and fell to 0.041 by 1991. This decline is not statistically 
significant but the rate is significantly lower than the rate of 0.067 found in a 1989 
survey: the 1989 Survey of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Other empirical studies provide evidence that education, obtained under central 
planning, is not necessarily appropriate for the new market environment. Whether 
the skills acquired under communism can indeed be adapted to the needs of a 
western market economy is a question of prime importance. Most, albeit not all, 
empirical studies demonstrate that older generation fared worse during the 
transition phase. For Poland, Rutkowski (1996) and Puhani (1997) provide 
evidence of falling return to experience in 1982-1992 and 1992-1995. In the former 
Czechoslovakia, Vecemik (1995), Flanagan (1995), and Chase (1998) observe
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steeply declining returns to education in the early transition period. Similar results, 
can be found in Kertesi and Kollo, (1999) for Hungary; and Steiner and Bellman 
(1995), Krueger and Pischke (1992) and Burda and Schmidt (1997) for the former 
German Democratic Republic. A study by Sabirianova (2003) shows that returns to 
education in transition economies has generally evolved in two distinct phases. An 
early phase characterising movement away from wage setting development by a 
wage grid towards payments that better reflect the relative marginal products of 
skilled and unskilled workers. In the second phase, the relative earnings more 
closely match and follow the path o f relative marginal products of both skilled and 
unskilled workers (Sabirianova, 2003).
Due to data limitations, very few studies examine the Soviet labour market prior to 
1992. Although a Soviet Family Budget Survey has been conducted by the 
Government Statistics Agency continuously since the 1950s, the results of the 
survey were unavailable to researchers, and were used primary for the purposes of 
preparing aggregate data. Most foreign studies of the Soviet labour market are 
based on surveys in which individuals do not have an incentive to misreport their 
income. Obviously, the sample characteristics of these surveys tend to differ from 
those of the overall population (Vernon, 2002). Strumilin et al. (1966) provide the 
first empirical estimates of the return to education in Russia using the discounted 
earnings procedure. Strumilin’s (1966) aim was to advocate an investment program 
in education. He analysed two samples, one of 2,602 machine operators (from the 
year 1919) and the other of 2,307 white collar workers, in order to establish a 
relationship between age, job experience, years of formal education and skill. His 
results show that the return to skill-level increases with age, reaching a maximum 
value at the age of 32 years for machine operators and 34 years for white-collar 
workers.
Later, Gregory and Kohlhase (1988) use a sample of over 2,700 Jewish immigrants 
to the United States in the period 1979-1982. They report returns to university 
education in the Soviet Union relative to secondary education of around of 22% and 
a return to experience of around 2-3%. However, the study has been criticised 
because of the unrepresentative nature of the data -  all of the respondents were 
either from medium or large cities and they were all Jewish. Another study by Katz
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(1999) uses a survey conducted in 1989 of a single city, Taganrog, whose economy 
depends almost entirely on heavy industry. Katz reports an average 23-35 % return 
to higher education for men and 14-32 % return for women, which is in line with 
the results of Ofer and Vinokur (1992) (approximately 29 % for men and 32 % for 
women). Elsewhere, Nesterova and Sabirianova (1998) use the Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) to estimate the relationship between the 
logarithm of hourly earnings from all jobs on a large set of controls, including 
supervisory responsibilities, industry, occupations and local labour market 
conditions. They find an average rate of return to schooling of around 6 - 8 % in 
1994-1996. Typically these estimates are higher than the returns to education 
computed at the beginning of the economic reforms (1992) which tends to support 
the argument that a transition to market economy shifts returns in favour of 
education.
Brainerd (1998) finds an increase in returns to education over the period 1991 to 
1994. More specifically, it increased from 3.1% to 6.7% for men and from 5.4% to 
9.6% for women between 1991 and 1994. Compared to secondary level 
qualifications, the return to university qualification increased from 8.3% to 21.6% 
for men and from 5.4% to 9.6% for women over the same period. Newell and 
Reilly (1999) also estimate an earnings function for Russia using the 1992-1996 
RLMS data and report a lower return to a year of university education 4.2% in 1992 
compared to higher returns of 9.7% in 1994 and 6.3% in 1996. In a similar context, 
Munich et al. (2000) finds that the communist wage grid resulted in a low rate of 
return to education in the Czech Republic, but the rate of return increased 
dramatically during transition. Munich et al. (2000) conclude that the communist 
system succeeded in maintaining small earnings differentials. A later study by 
Clark (2003) for Russia in the years 1994 to 1998, show a significant and positive 
return to education and training, which are comparable in magnitude to those in 
other transition countries. He finds significant returns o f 6 % to 13 %. Clark (2003) 
also finds significantly higher returns to education for workers in the non-state 
sector compared to the state sector.
Cheidvasser and Benitez-Silva (2007) find no improvement in the returns to 
education in Russia over the period 1992 to 1998. Pastore and Verashchagina
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(2006) estimate Mincer earnings functions based on the 1996 and 2001 waves of 
the Belarusian Household Survey. Their results suggest that despite the more 
gradual pace of reform, the rate of return to education was not lower in Belarus 
compared to other transitional countries. Obtaining a university degree provided an 
increase in monthly earnings from the main job of about 70% in 1996 and 75% in
2001, This amounts to an annual rate of return to tertiary education of between 
10.1% and 10.7%, which is higher than in most other transition countries. However, 
the rate of return to vocational education did fall to 6.3%. Gorodnichenko and 
Sabirianova (2005) also measure the returns to schooling in Russia and Ukraine 
between 1985 and 2002. They apply a semi-parametric approach and construct 
counterfactual earnings distribution for university and secondary education 
graduates in Ukraine using the distribution of Russian characteristics, returns and 
unobservable. Their key finding is that after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 
returns to education diverge significantly between Russia and the Ukraine. By
2002, the estimated returns to education were almost two times higher in Russia 
(9.2%) compared to the Ukraine (4.5%).
Relatively few empirical studies exist for Bulgaria, mainly due to poor data. 
However, Jones and Ilayperuma (1994) find that the return to higher education in 
Bulgaria increased significantly between 1989 and 1992 for women, while 
somewhat surprisingly for men no education effect was found in 1989 and only a 
relatively small effect was found in 1991. The results are unaffected by using 
monthly or hourly earnings as the dependent variable. Jones and Simon (2005) 
estimate Bulgarian earnings determination under planned and early transition. Their 
main finding is that the human capital variables are more important during the early 
transition phase than during the planning period. For example, the return to a year 
of education is 5.4% during the transition period but less than 2% at the end of the 
planning period. Using Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) for 2002-
2003, Arandarenko et al. (2006) estimate returns to specific types of educational 
degree in Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia. Their results indicate that in Bulgaria the 
return to education rises consistently for both males and females. However, in 
Serbia and Romania there are higher rewards to education for men than for women. 
In both of these countries, each successive educational level for men results in 
ahigher earnings premium, but for women only is statistically significant. While
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Bulgarian university degree holders enjoy the highest marginal return, 85.7% for 
men and 87.9% for women, in Serbia and Romania male university degree holders 
earn 65% and 60.2% more than those with the lowest educational attainment. In all 
three countries, males who graduated from vocational schools earn much less than 
those who obtained general secondary degree, supporting the view that the skills 
received in such schools are too narrow and poorly suited to the demanded of a 
modem labour market. Using data spanning the transition period 1995-2003, 
Kovacheva (2011) finds that the returns to education in Bulgaria increased over 
time, with younger cohorts receiving higher returns to education.
Relatively few studies estimate the rate of return to education in Tajikistan and 
Kazakhstan. Some evidence is found in Rama and Scott (1999) who show a 
positive return to schooling, at least in the early reform period. Using the 1996 
Kazakhstan LSMS, Rama and Scott (1999) estimate a rate of return of about 7-8%. 
Additionally, Verme (2001) estimates sector earnings equation in Kazakhstan and 
finds that returns to education are 7.4% in the public sector, 3.4% in the private 
sector and 1.7% for the self-employed. A recent study by Arabsheibani and 
Mussorov (2007), however, suggests that returns to education in Kazakhstan are 
higher than the estimates found in Rama and Scott (1999). The results are also 
higher for women. Specifically, for men, the IV estimates are higher than OLS by 
around 3%, and for women the return to education rises to 13.7% after correction 
for both sample selection and endogeneity. The authors conclude that men have 
more opportunities to earn a higher salary with a lower education compared with 
women.
Banzragch (2010) uses Mongolian and Tajikistan Living Standard Measurement 
Surveys to compute the rates of returns to schooling in these two countries. The 
estimated rate of return to schooling for Mongolia in the early 2000s, ranges from 
5.6% to 6.5% for wage earners and over 7% for self-employed individuals. The 
estimated rate of return to schooling for Tajikistan in 1999 is 9.7% which declines 
to 4.1% in 2003 and 2007. Banzragch (2010) indicates that these rates of return are 
lower than the results found for other transition economies and argues that the 
decline in the estimated return to schooling in Tajikistan was the result of 
devastating civil war.
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With the exception of East Germany, Tajikistan and to some extent men in 
Bulgaria, the studies reviewed in this section, suggest a positive and increasing rate 
of returns to education during the transition period. The studies also indicate that 
women enjoyed a higher rate of return on education than men under the 
communism. However, relatively few studies have examined returns to education 
across the entire earnings distribution in Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia, or Tajikistan. 
There is a gap in the literature, therefore, which this thesis in some part attempts to 
fill.
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TABLE 1.1
Summary of the main studies on returns to education in transition economies
Country Year
Returns to 
education
Men W omen Reference
Belarus 1996
0 .100***
Pastore and Verashchagina (2006)
Belarus 2001
0.101***
Pastore and Vereshchagina (2006)
Bulgaria
1985-1995  
pooled data
0.040*** 0.057***
Trostel e t al. (2002)
Bulgaria
1989-1992  
pooled data
0.040***
Jones and Simon (2005)
Bulgaria 1995 0.046*** K ovach eva(2011)
Bulgaria 1997 0.048*** K ovach eva(2011)
Bulgaria 2001 0.058*** K ovach eva(2011)
Bulgaria 2003 0.071*** K ovach eva(2011)
Czech Republic 1988 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.054*** Flanagan(1995)
Czech Republic 1989 0.039*** Munich et al. (2004)
Czech Republic
1985-1995  
pooled data
0 .035*** 0.043*** Trostel e t al. (2002)
C zech and Slovak 1997 0.080*** Filer et al. (1999)
C zech Republic 1984 0.025*** 0.040*** C h a se (1998)
C zech Republic 2002 0.070*** Munich et al. (2004)
East Germany 1988 0.077*** 0.071*** 0.085*** Krueger and P isc h k e (1992)
East Germany 1989 0.044*** Bird et al. (1994)
East Germany 1985-1995  
pooled data
0.026*** 0.045*** Trostel et al. (2002)
Hungary 1988 0.047*** 0.061*** Kbllo (2003)
Hungary 1986 0.062*** Jolliffe and Campos (2005)
Hungary 1989 0 .074*** Jolliffe and Campos (2005)
Hungary 1992 0.095*** Jolliffe and Campos (2005)
Latvia 1985-1995 0.067*** 0.078*** Trostel et al. (2002)
Poland
1985-1995  
pooled data
0.073*** 0.100*** Trostel et al. (2002)
Russia 1985 0 .028*** Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2005)
Russia
1985-1995  
pooled data
0.044*** 0.053*** Trostel e t al. (2002)
Russia 2002 0.092*** Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2005)
Slovakia
1985-1995  
pooled data
0.052*** 0.064***
Trostel e t al. (2002)
Slovenia 1985-1995 0.080*** 0.101*** Trostel e t al. (2002)
Ukraine 1986 0.034*** Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2005)
Ukraine 1987 0.037*** Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2005)
Ukraine 2002 0.045*** Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2005)
Kazakhstan 1996 0.070*** Rama and Scott (1999)
Kazakhstan 2001
0 .080*** 0 .115*** Arabsheibani and M ussorov (2007)
Tajikistan 1999 0.097*** Banzragch (2010)
Tajikistan 2003 0.041*** Banzragch (2010)
Tajikistan 2007 0.041*** Banzragch (2010)
M ongolia 2003 0.065*** 0.058*** 0.076*** Banzragch (2010)
Notes: ’•‘♦♦Statistically significant at 1%, ** statistically significant at 5%, * statistically significant at 10%; 
The rates o f  returns are based on the OLS estimates.
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2.4. Summary and conclusions
The analysis of returns to education remains a highly discussed topic in labour 
economics. Interest comes from a number of potentially disruptive biases 
associated with conventional OLS estimates of the returns to education. In this 
chapter, we have examined several estimation strategies used to estimate the rates 
of return to education and the main problems associated with these estimators. The 
chapter also provides an overview of the empirical literature related to the rate of 
returns to education with a special focus on the returns to education in transition 
countries. More specifically, a number of conclusions can be drawn based on this 
review. They can be briefly summarized as follows:
• The specification is often estimated by OLS, which suffers from a number of 
potential biases that can either exert downward or upward pressure on OLS 
estimates.
• In conventional OLS analysis a potential source of bias is the assumption that the 
number of years an individual spends at school is exogenous (or determined by 
factors outside the model). However, if schooling results in higher earnings, higher 
earnings may in turn result in an increase in the amount of education acquired 
which is more likely the higher the ability of the individual.
• The human capital literature focuses on ability bias as one of the central problems 
estimating rates of return to education. If people of higher ability have the capacity 
to earn more (at a given education level) and if they also tend to acquire more 
education than others, the failure to take ability differences into account has two 
consequences: (a) OLS estimates overstate the gross contribution of education to 
earnings, and (b) understate the opportunity cost of foregone earnings to high- 
ability persons. As most data do not contain information on ability, we have an 
omitted variable bias problem. One solution to the ability bias problem is the 
method of instrumental variables (IV).
• Finding an instrument that identifies demand-side variation in education and is 
uncorrelated with individual earning is difficult. A suitable instrument must meet
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the relevance and exogeneity conditions. The relevance condition requires the 
instrument to be strongly correlated with the number of years of education an 
individual receives. The exogeneity condition requires that the instrument affects 
earnings only through the channel of education, and therefore the instrument is 
uncorrelated with the error term in the earnings equation.
• In estimating earnings function there is an additional complication -  the problem 
of sample selectivity. The sample selection bias in the classic Mincerian equation is 
extensively examined in the literature, especially when analysing womens’ return. 
However, correcting for sample selection bias by identifying satisfactory 
restrictions, sometimes substantially changes the estimated rates of return to 
education.
• Human capital theory implicitly recognises that returns to education may be 
heterogeneous. Inter alia educational returns can vary across schooling levels and 
even across individuals with the same schooling level. Evidence based on a QR 
estimates show that returns are higher for those in the top quantiles of the earnings 
distribution compared to those at the bottom.
• Evidence from transition studies suggests that returns to education increased 
during the transition process and that the sharpest increase took place during the 
early transition period.
• While there are many studies that address these issues in estimating returns to 
education in developed countries, especially in the US and OECD countries, few 
studies take into account ‘ability’ and endogeneity bias for the transition countries. 
Studies that present results for the pre-transition period are also limited.
• The review of existing studies highlights several issues which are important for 
empirical research on the returns to education. First, in order to obtain consistent 
estimates we need to allow for both the endogeneity of education and sample 
selection problem. Second, it is crucial for the analysis, to address the extent to 
which returns to education vary across the earnings distribution. Finally, it is of
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interest to draw conclusions about differences in the rates of return to education 
across the countries analysed.
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CHAPTER THREE
OVERALL BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION IN THE
REGION
3.1. Introduction
The economic effects of transition have been as diverse as there are countries which 
have experienced the transition process. Some of these countries have enjoyed the 
benefits of industrial growth and comparatively high level of initial GDP. Others 
have enjoyed none of these benefits and have struggled to avoid chronic economic 
stagnation (Johnes, 2002). With the exception of Serbia, the countries selected for 
analysis in this thesis are those that commenced their economic transition to a 
marked-based economy between 1989 and 1992. They adopted a shock-therapy 
approach to transition, characterized by fast changes which did not necessarily lead 
to improved economic performance (Hung, 2002).
The current Chapter provides a brief insight of the economic development and 
educational systems under communism and the early transition period in Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan. Section 3.2 provides a brief background of the 
Bulgarian, Serbian, Russian and Tajikistan economies using a number of indicators 
of macroeconomic and labour market performance. The section sheds some light on 
labour market adjustment over the transition period, with particular emphasis on the 
dynamics of employment, including unemployment and labour force participation, 
and real wage growth. Section 3.3 describes the main features of the education 
systems and Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2. Overall background
The structure of a planned economy differs significantly from a market economy. 
At the beginning of transition, the labour markets of the former centrally planned 
economies were characterized by full employment, job security, centrally set wages 
and prices, and output targets for state-owned enterprises (Svejnar, 1999). In 
particular, the economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were guided by a
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principle of distribution according to contribution not need (Atkinson and 
Micklewright, 1992). Full employment, however, was achieved at a cost of low 
wages. Low wages and limited income differentials failed to motivate workers to 
improve their performance. The private sector was practically non-existent or 
played only a limited role in most countries of the Eastern Bloc (e.g. in Hungary or 
Bulgaria) (Nesporova, 1999). However, most of the countries selected for analysis 
in this thesis began the transition period with a relatively good level of human 
capital development22 (Paci and Reilly, 2004). But labour market conditions 
changed rapidly after the introduction of reforms between 1989 and 1991.
The transition process in East and Southeast Europe commenced in the early 1990s 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It implied the end of the economic system 
that had been in force for over four decades: the planned economy. Progress 
towards a new economic system, a market economy, was initiated. The main 
objectives were to create a decentralized and incentive based economy, in which 
the private sector dominated the state sector (Stalhandske, 2007). One of the central 
aspects of transition was the process of structural reallocation of production among 
sectors of the economy and industries. The market reforms implemented across the 
region included wage and price liberalization, trade liberalization and privatization 
of state-owned enterprises. Transition induced major shifts in demand and supply 
conditions. The old centralized wage setting system was replaced by new 
arrangements. These ranged from decentralized plant level negotiations -  in Russia 
-  to collective bargaining in Eastern Europe (Paci and Reilly, 2004).
While market reforms intended to raise economic efficiency, the political and 
economic changes, or what is now called the transition process, involved significant 
costs in the form of lost output and unemployment, widening income inequality, the 
growth of poverty and changing demand for jobs. The market reforms implemented 
across the region contributed to gender wage inequality, increasing unemployment 
and deterioration in health care, pensions, and in the education system. Economic 
transition affected the level of earnings, as well as the level of relative wages. As a 
result of demand and supply shocks that accompanied the reforms, real wages in all
22 The human capital indicators (for instance, gross and net enrolment rates, average years o f  schooling and 
literacy levels) tend to be better in the late 1980s (B eim e and Campos, 2007).
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transition economies experienced a substantial fall, along with the GDP 
(Rutkowski, 1996). In addition, the transition process in Central and Eastern 
European countries exposed serious weaknesses in educational systems. The 
direction and pace of market reforms have been different across countries, which 
also contributed to more diverse labour market institutions in the region (Word 
Bank, 2001). According to Gimpelson and Lippoldt (2001) one of the reasons for 
this large-scale disorganisation was the collapse of bureaucratic coordination while 
market signals were still weak and imperfect. Firms were left to face greater 
uncertainty about prices and wages.
The speed of transition varied widely among countries, with those that implemented 
reforms more quickly, generally experiencing more rapid recovery. Table 3.1 
shows some of the changes in the Eastern European economies documented by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The first column 
gives the value, in 1997, of the EBRD’s ‘transition index’, which summarises 
countries’ cumulative progress from a planned to a market economy. The index 
takes into account a variety of different dimensions of transition -  price 
liberalisation, privatization, restructuring, competition policy and reforms in 
financial institutions (Flemming and Micklewright, 1999).
According to the EBRD’s index of progress, the most advanced countries in 1997 
were those in the Central Europe and the Baltic region23. These countries were 
more successful in achieving a high private sector share of GDP and recovered 
more rapidly from the shock of transition. In contrast, countries such as Bulgaria 
and Albania lagged behind. The least progress was made by the Central Asian 
republics. The slow reformers experienced the largest fall in output over the period 
1989-1997, which was accompanied by a high rate of inflation. The relationship 
between the pace of transition and labour market developments was complex. 
While the labour markets in Central and South-Eastern Europe were characterised 
by high unemployment, in the former Soviet republics unemployment was at lower 
levels. In Hungary, for example, which is a relatively successful model of 
transition, the unemployment rate peaked in 1992 because job creation in the
23 All the countries in these two groups had a value o f  transition index greater than 3.0 and on average the 
private sector accounted for over two-thirds o f  the GDP.
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growing sectors was initially too slow to offset job losses in the restructuring 
sectors, but it has since declined gradually to single digits. However, in the 
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which lagged in the 
reform process, employment remained stable during the early 1990s even when 
there was a significant collapse in output (Schiff et al., 2006).
TABLE 3.1: Indicators of transition
EBRD
transition
index
Private 
sector share 
o f  GDP 
1997(% )
Change 
in real 
GDP 
1989-97 
(%)
Average
annual
inflation
1991-96
(%)
Average 
registered 
unemployment 
1991-96 (%)
Government 
expenditure 
as share o f  
GDP 1996 
(%)
Central Europe 3.4 68 -1 34 10.6 46
SE Europe 2.7 59 -30 179 17.3 37
Baltics 3.2 67 -37 254 4.9 38
Western CIS 2.4 46 -50 775 1.3 38
Caucasus 2.4 50 -63 1926 3.1 19
Central Asia 2.2 41 -42 758 1.6 24
N otes : Central Europe -  Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, South East (SE) Europe -  Albania, 
Bulgaria, FR Y ugoslavia, M acedonia and Romania; Baltics -  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; Western CIS -  Belarus, 
M oldova, Russia and Ukraine; Caucasus -  Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; Central Asia -  Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The figures in the table are all unweighted averages o f  the data for each 
country.
Sou rce : EBRD (1997) for the transition index and private sector share, EBRD (1998) for GDP change and government 
expenditure shares, and UNICEF (1998) for inflation and unemployment.
Under state planning regime, the school system and curricula were subject to rigid 
control by central governments. Enrolment targets were set by planners to serve the 
needs of industry. Secondary and tertiary education, were strongly influenced by 
industrial ministers. Employment was guaranteed for all recent graduates, with 
party affiliation more important than academic achievement for many jobs (Laporte 
and Ringold, 1997). A natural question raised in the literature is whether the 
transition process has produced a worsening in educational opportunities in the 
former socialist countries and whether the extent of differences in educational 
reforms at the end of the 1990s is a cause of major concern (Micklewright and 
Nagy, 1999).
3.2.1. Bulgaria
Located in the Balkan Peninsula, modem Bulgaria is one of the smaller countries in 
Europe, with a population of approximately 7.6 million and an area of 43,000 
square miles. Bulgaria shares borders with Serbia, Macedonia, Romania, Greece,
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and Turkey. Its transition to a democracy and market economy after the collapse of 
communism has not been easy and standards of living have been low. Since the 
onset of the reforms in 1989 Bulgarian society has undergone profound political, 
economic and social changes24.
Bulgaria began transition to a market economy in particularly unfavourable 
conditions, which combined with a number of serious external shocks -  a collapse 
of trade with the former Soviet Union, on which the country was heavily 
dependent; a need to import energy at world prices to replace Soviet supplies; a 
lack of access to commercial credit as a result of the unilateral moratorium on 
external debt declared in March 1990; problems resulting from the international 
embargo on trade as a consequence of the Gulf and Yugoslav wars; and an 
exceptionally high external debt (127% of GDP in 1990).
In early 1991 a package of fiscal and monetary policies were introduced similar to a 
Polish style ‘big bang shock therapy’ to open and stabilize the economy (World 
Bank, 1996). During the ‘big bang shock therapy’ period, Bulgaria implemented a 
wide range of policies: prices were liberalized; an independent central bank and 
commercial banks were created from the old state banking system; the central bank 
implemented a tight monetary policy and introduced a managed float of the 
exchange rate by making it partially convertible; most restrictions on imports and 
exports were removed; and state enterprises were de-concentrated and de­
monopolized (Levinson, 1995).
However, the first phase of economic transformation was characterised by the slow 
implementation of reforms and inconsistent economic policies. The deep recession 
in the initial phase was followed by a weak and fragile recovery in 1994-95, only to 
set the stage for a new and deep recession in 1996 (Dobrinsky, 2000). In 1996 and 
1997 banking and currency crises increased the country’s internal debt (Barlemann 
and Nenovsky, 2003). Like other countries in transition, Bulgaria experienced a 
huge one-time price jump as prices were initially liberalized and real output fell. A 
doubling of consumer price inflation in 1996 was followed by a nine-fold increase
24 Over the period o f  13 years, there were nine government changes.
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in 1997, which was one of the highest inflation rates among the transition 
economies. High inflation rates can be attributed to the price reforms, particularly 
the freeing of prices and budget deficits. The introduction o f a value-added tax in 
1994 also contributed to a high inflation rate. Another factor was the devaluation of 
the Bulgarian currency by nearly 100% in 1994. One important aspect of the 
exchange rate regime in Bulgaria at that stage of its transition was its instability. 
The government lost all credibility and, as a result, the Bulgarian lev depreciated by 
33% in November 1996, by 39% in December 1996, by 110% in January 1997, and 
by a further 187% in the first two weeks of February 1997. As a result, for 
approximately 300 days between April, 1996 and February 1997, the Bulgarian lev 
depreciated by 3500% against the dollar (Ganev, 2001).
Relative economic stability was achieved with the introduction of a Currency Board 
arrangement in 199725. This arrangement along with the economic reforms was 
crucial for stabilizing the economy. The introduction of the Currency Board led to a 
rapid decline in the rate o f inflation, falling to a single digit (Valev, 2004). 
Relatively stable prices, privatization, and increased competition in financial 
markets contributed to an increase in investment levels. For the first time since the 
beginning of transition, Bulgaria experienced positive economic growth after 1997. 
However, despite the positive performance of some economic indicators, the 
recovery was weak. The industrial recession was still present during the first 
months of 1998 and the overall level of privatization was still very slow.
The level of income, using GDP per capita, provides a better understanding of the 
Bulgarian economy. Figure 3.1 indicates that during the initial stage of the 
transition to a market economy, GDP per capita declined by 20% in the first three 
years but after 1997 the trend was reversed due to privatization, fiscal policy and 
structural reforms. The industrial output showed some improvement in late 1994 
and early 1995. The main reason for the decline was that reforms continuously 
weakened uncompetitive industries. Another reason was the slow growth of the 
private sector. In 1994 the share o f the private sector in the Bulgarian GDP was
25The Currency Board is a system that does not allow the Central Bank to implement its own, independent 
fiscal and money supply policy.
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40%, compared to 65% in the Czech Republic, 55% in Poland, Hungary, and 
Slovakia, and 35% in Macedonia and Romania. The massive privatization process 
and enterprise liquidation resulted in 75% of GDP being produced in the private 
sector by 2001. GDP per capita continued to rise thereafter, reaching about 2,661 
US dollars in 2008.
FIGURE 3.1: The Bulgarian GDP per capita, 1989-2009
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Source'. W orld Bank, W orld Developm ent Indicators database.
One of the characteristic features of the transition from a planned to a market 
economy in Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) was a reduction in 
employment and the emergence of a high unemployment. This was especially true 
for Bulgaria, where the number o f  employed was reduced by more than one-third 
from the beginning of the reforms. Table 3.2 provides detailed information on the 
scale of employment losses and employment reallocation in the country. 
Registered unemployment in Bulgaria was among the highest of any of the Eastern 
and Central European countries in transition (Beleva et al., 1995). Specifically, the 
unemployment rate rose from negligible levels pre-1992 to over 11% in 1991, over 
15% in 1992, and 19% in 2001 (see Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2). The unemployment 
rise in 1999 was due to privatizations and restructuring of public enterprises 
(Beleva and Tzanov, 2001). In addition, long-term unemployment was a major 
problem. O f the unemployed, the share that has been out of work for more than 1 
year increased from 53% in 1993 to nearly 66% in 2002. The unemployment rate 
among those in the lowest category of educational attainment was nearly 45% 
(Beleva et a l., 1995).
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Overall, the economic recession during the 1990s led to a sharp decline in the 
labour force participation of both men and women. According to the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) key indicators database, the participation rates for men 
in Bulgaria decreased from 70% in 1980 to nearly 56% in 2003 and from 61% in 
1980 to 45% in 2003 for women (see Figure 3.3).
FIGURE 3.2: Annual registered unemployment rates in Bulgaria, 1991-2009
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Source: Bulgaria National Statistics Office
FIGURE 3.3: Labour participation rate in Bulgaria, 1980-2008
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Source: ILO, Key Indicators o f  the Labour Market database.
The transition period has also been characterized by large shifts in a labour between 
the public and private sectors. Private sector employment in Bulgaria has grown 
rapidly, both in absolute terms and as a share of total employment. By 2002, the 
private sector accounted for 62.5% of total employment (see Table 3.2)26.
26 M ore d iscu ss io n s  on  the sector em p lo y m en t w ill b e  g iv en  in the S ectio n  9 .2 .1 .
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TABLE 3.2: Employment and unemployment structure in Bulgaria
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
W orking age population1 6,881 6,887 6,899 6,903 6,903 6,924 6,890 6,890 6,779 6,740
E conom ically active 2 55.4% 52.9% 51.8% 51.7% 51.8% 51.0% 49.5% 48.8% 49.6% 49.4%
Em ployed 3 
O f  which4:
43.5% 42.2% 43.3% 44.4% 44.3% 43.8% 41.7% 40.6% 39.8% 40.7%
Private sector 22.4% 25.8% 28.2% 31.3% 37.0% 43.3% 39.6% 53.0% 59.5% 62.5%
Youth5 9.4% 9.2% 8.8% 8.4% 8.1% 8.7% 8.6% 8.0% 8.0% 7.7%
Fem ales 46.6% 46.7% 46.9% 47.0% 46.8% 46.9% 46.8% 46.8% 47.8% 47.5%
Em ployees 89.7% 89.4% 88.8% 88.6% 86.2% 86.1% 86.7% 84.9% 84.7% 85.2%
Private enterprises 12.7% 17.2% 19.4% 22.7% 27.3% 34.5% 30.7% 45.2% 52.7% 56.5%
Employers 1.7% 1.6% 1.8% 1.8% 1.9% 2.1% 2.3% 2.4% 3.5% 3.3%
Self-em ployed 8.1% 7.6% 8.1% 8.1% 9.7% 9.9% 9.3% 10.8% 9.8% 9.5%
U nem ployed (in thousands) 815 737 590 505 513 497 534 567 664 592
in % o f  econom ically active  
O f  which6:
21.4% 20.2% 16.5% 14.1% 14.4% 14.1% 15.7% 16.9% 19.7% 17.8%
Youth 30.5% 28.0% 28.9% 26.9% 25.8% 25.1% 23.7% 21.6% 21.2% 20.4%
Fem ales 48.3% 46.8% 48.1% 46.8% 47.0% 45.9% 64.8% 45.9% 45.1% 44.7%
Long term7 52.5% 59.0% 64.1% 61.7% 58.4% 57.0% 54.3% 56.8% 61.8% 65.7%
Basic education8 47.3% 46.8% 48.1% 45.4% 40.5% 40.5% 40.6% 38.0% 35.7% 35.6%
Secondary education 45.1% 46.0% 45.4% 47.6% 51.7% 50.9% 51.9% 53.2% 53.7% 53.6%
Tertiary education 7.6% 7.2% 6.5% 6.9% 7.9% 8.6% 7.5% 8.8% 10.6% 10.8%
Urban areas
Unem ploym ent by  reasons
66.0% 64.7% 59.4% 67.2% 69.3% 69.1% 67.6% 67.9% 68.8% 70.5%
Lost jobs9 55.8% 58.5% 58.7% 57.0% 56.9% 54.6% 55.8% 59.6% 45.1% 43.4%
Temporary job terminated 5.0% 6.4% 7.9% 10.1% 9.7% 12.4% 13.8% 12.1% 7.6% 8.9%
Seeking first job  
Unem ploym ent rates by age
21.4% 21.0% 21.8% 21.4% 21.6% 20.8% 19.5% 18.8% 23.4% 23.8%
A ge 15-19 66.9% 64.7% 57.4% 51.5% 49.9% 45.9% 50.4% 52.9% 58.7% 54.1%
A ge 20-24 40.5% 38.2% 34.4% 30.5% 31.0% 28.9% 30.6% 31.9% 35.3% 33.1%
A ge 25-49 17.7% 17.3% 13.9% 12.2% 12.5% 12.3% 14.0% 15.0% 17.7% 16.2%
A ge 50 and over 15.6% 14.7% 11.0% 9.2% 9.6% 10.2% 11.5% 13.8% 16.5% 14.5%
E conom ically inactive10 3,071 3,244 3,325 3,332 3,330 3,392 3 ,480 3,529 3 ,416 3,408
Notes: 1 A ge 15 and above (in thousands);2 % o f  working-age population; 3 % o f  working-age population; 4Percentage share 
in total employed; 5 A ge 15-24; 6 Percentage share in total unemployed; 7 One year and over; 8 International Standard 
Classification o f  Education (ISCED); 9 From 2001 data refer to unem ployed who lost job  within past eight years; l0In 
thousands;
Source: National Statistics Institute o f  Bulgaria
The very high inflation level in 1997 further contributed to the decline in real wages 
caused by a collapse in output. Bulgaria was one of the countries that suffered the 
largest cumulative fall in real wages among all transition economies of Eastern 
Europe. Real wages in 1998 reached 40% of their level in 1989, with a cumulative 
fall of 60% (Garibaldi et al, 2001b). Changes in real wages were mainly due to 
inflationary shocks, in particular in 1991, 1994, and 1996-1997 (see Table 3.3). 
During these years, nominal wage growth failed to compensate for increase in the 
inflation rate.
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FIGURE 3.4: Real wage growth in Bulgaria (1989=100)
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Source: Garibaldi et al. (2001b).
TABLE 3.3: Real wages and real gross income per capita, Bulgaria, 1990-1999
Year
Nominal wage 
(yearly changes)
Inflation annual 
changes
Real wage3 
yearly change
Real gross income per 
capita (1989=100)
1990 37.9 23.9 5.3 96.2
1991 167.8 338.5 -39.0 59.0
1992 102.3 79.4 12.8 63.5
1993 57.8 56.1 1.1 60.4
1994 53.5 87.1 -17.9 53.6
1995 53.4 62.1 -5.5 49.0
1996 89.2 123.0 -17.6 33.5
1997 884.1 1087.8 -18.8 28.4
1998 47.0 22.3 22.3 36.9
1999 11.9 2.6 9.1 37.1
Source: NSI, Statistical Yearbook.
N otes'.3 Calculated as the ratio between nominal wages and inflation.
Despite recent labour market improvements, in 2008 the employment rate in 
Bulgaria was approximately 2% point lower than the EU-27 average and 6 % point 
lower than the Lisbon target (a 70% employment rate) (World Bank, 2007). The 
country still lags far behind not only the countries of the Western Europe but also 
the more developed transition economies such as Hungary and Poland.
3.2.2. Serbia
Located between Central and Southern Europe, Serbia is located in the Balkan 
Peninsula sharing borders with Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro. Serbia has a population of 7.5 
million which is predominantly Serb, but with a significant and ethnically diverse
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minority27. The largest minority group, according to 2001 Census data, are 
Hungarians (3.9%), Roma (1.4%), Croats (0.9%) and Albanians (0.8%). Despite 
fast economic growth attributed to the far-reaching economic reforms introduced 
after October 2000, Serbia still struggled to overcome the economic and social 
damage suffered during the 1990s. Serbia began the 1990s relatively well integrated 
with the world economy, and with a higher standard of living than many other 
transition economies. However, armed conflicts, international sanctions, and trade 
shocks caused by the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) during the 1990s, had a detrimental effect. Combined with economic 
mismanagement, these events resulted in hyperinflation and a virtual collapse of the 
economy by the end of 1993 (Arandarenko, 2007).
Like other countries in transition, Serbia’s economy suffered the loss of markets 
due to the break-up of the unified Yugoslav market. The economic system in the 
Milosevic-era (1991-2000) was characterized by a war economy, a large informal 
sector, ‘black’ markets, an oligarchy of tycoons controlling large state-owned and 
private business enterprises, state-driven hyperinflation, state-sponsored smuggling, 
client-patron relationships, state-backed pyramidal schemes, inefficient fiscal 
system, and lack of investments (Brunhart and Gajic, 2005). The share of the ‘grey’ 
economy during the unprecedented hyperinflation of 1993 exceeded 50% of GDP 
(Reilly, 2003). Reilly and Krstic (2000) attributed the huge rise in informal activity 
to a combination of declining income pushing individuals into informal activities, 
and to soft penalties imposed by the government. This means that most of those 
employed in the informal sector held a formal sector full-time job and used the 
informal sector to supplement their declining incomes (Kecmanovic, 2009).
In terms of economic policies, the government introduced a number of measures to 
deal with the recession. In 1992 price controls on many products were introduced, 
and a law was passed forbidding firms to fire employees. In 1993 a fall in output of 
more than 30% was experienced and hyperinflation took hold, with the inflation 
rate at one point measured in billions of percentage points. This was the second 
highest inflation rate recorded in monetary history. A stabilization package,
27 83% o f  total population are Serbs (European Training Formation, 2006).
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introduced in 1994 brought inflation down below 20% (Cmobmja and Savic, 
2008). The dramatic fall in the GDP that occurred during the break-up of 
Yugoslavia and the imposition of sanctions can be seen in Figure 3.5. The decline 
in GDP per capita was far deeper than the average for transition countries and 
reached a low point of 650 US dollars in 1993.
FIGURE 3.5: The Serbian GDP per capita, 1989-2009
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database, accessed March 2011.
Since January 2001, Serbia has undertaken an ambitious programme of economic 
reforms, including macroeconomic stabilisation, liberalisation of foreign trade and 
domestic prices, and restructuring of the banking system (Paunovic et al., 2005). 
The structural changes in the economy have put significant pressure on the Serbian 
labour market. Accurate data on economic activity, employment and unemployment 
in Serbia is difficult to get because of the extent of the informal sector. The main 
labour market trends can be identified using data from the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS). The participation rate (employed and unemployed as percentage of active 
labour force aged 15 and 64 years old) reached 65.2% in 2005 (European Training 
Forum (ETF), 2006). The employment rate however, has been constantly declining 
over the last few years. The employment rate of 50.8% in 2009 was significantly 
below the EU-15 average, but also below the rates of Croatia and those of the EU 
members Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia (see Table 3.4). The 2006 ETF country 
profile report shows that large differences exist in the employment rates for groups 
with different educational attainment. For instance, the employment rate is 42.8%
6 6
for low-skilled, 58.2% for medium-skilled and 77.8 % for people with higher 
education.
TABLE 3.4: Employment rates in South East Europe
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Serbia 50.1 50.3 48.6 47.6 45.2 - 49.8 51.5 53.3 50.8
Croatia 53.2 51.6 52.9 53.4 54.9 55 55.6 57.1 57.8 56.6
Kosovo - - 23.8 25.3 27.7 25.7 25.8 23.7 21.8 -
Bulgaria - - - 53.1 55.1 55.8 58.6 61.7 64 62.6
Romania 64.2 63.3 58.6 58.7 58.7 57.6 58.8 58.8 59 58.6
Slovenia 62.7 63.6 64.3 62.5 65.6 66 66.6 67.8 68.6 67.5
EU-15 63.2 63.9 64.2 64.4 64.6 65.4 66.2 66.9 67.3 65.9
Source: Eurostat; w iiw  Database incorporating national statistics.
Notes: Total em ployed in % o f  working age population 15-64.
Figure 3.6 shows that the unemployment rate in Serbia remains an important 
economic and social problem. It increased from 18.5% in 2004 to 20.9% in 2006 
and despite economic growth it has remained high.
FIGURE 3.6: Annual registered unemployment rates in Serbia, 2000-2009
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Source; World Bank, World Developm ent Indicators database.
3.2.3. Russia
Russia is one of the most interesting countries that moved from central planning to 
a market economy not only because it is the largest and most powerful of the group 
of former communist countries, but because it practiced central planning far longer 
than any other country (Schwarz et al., 2002). Nowadays Russia has a population of 
146 million and a land area of 17 million square kilometres. Over the period 1992 
to 2000, Russia’s population decreased by 2.8 million, representing over 2% of the 
total. This decrease was the result o f emigration and falling birth rates, which in 
turn reflected the economic crisis in the country (Bray and Borevskaya, 2001). Prior
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to the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in December 
1991, the population of Russia enjoyed virtual job security and the official rate of 
unemployment was zero. However, subsequent economic transformations have led 
to an increase in the number of unemployed as well as under-employed individuals 
(Foley, 1997). Prices were liberalised, precipitating high inflation, and a mass 
privatization programme was embarked upon.
The Russian recession was deeper and longer than those in most Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries (Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 2001). The first seven 
years of Russia’s transition from a centrally planned economy (1991-1998), which 
coinciding with the regime of President Boris Yeltsin, were a time of economic 
chaos (Cooper, 2009). There was a rapid decline in GDP, by about 45% between 
1989 and 1998 (Figure 3.7). The crisis then turned into an economic catastrophe. 
National income fell by 3.5% in the third quarter of 1990 compared to the same 
period in 1989 (Khanin, 1990). In this regard Russia did worse than other 
transitional countries, where the fall in the GDP was about 26% on average. The 
decline in GDP was accompanied by high rates of inflation and an enormous 
increase in the ‘shadow’ economy. The rate of inflation was over 2,000% in 1992 
and over 800% in 1993 (Markandya and Averchenkova, 2000). Russia’s economy 
came to a head in the financial crisis of August 1998. The devastating crisis in 1998 
resulted in a situation where Russia defaulted on its debts and devalued the rouble 
by almost 75%.
Kapelyushnikov (2003) indicates that wage determination was the most puzzling 
aspect of the Russia’s transition labour market. Average real wages fell 
dramatically after price liberalisation: by more than 30% in 1990, 40% in 1991, and 
nearly 60% in 1992 (ILOCEET, 1996). The collapse in real wages was even more 
dramatic during the period between 1994 and 1999. During the transition years, a 
central issue was the movement of labour from the former state sector to a newly 
emerging private sector, where resources were more efficiently utilised (Huffman 
and Rizov, 2011).
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FIGURE 3.7: The Russian GDP per capita, 1989-2009
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Source: World Bank, World Developm ent Indicators database, accessed March 2011.
According to Gimpelson and Kapeliushnikov (2011) a key distinguishing feature of 
Russian wage formation was its high degree of flexibility. The guaranteed part of 
pay was very low by international standards, at about 50%-60%. Accordingly, 
much of any remuneration package was variable and made up of bonuses, benefits, 
and lump-sum payments. In terms of overall wage inequality, Russia is one of the 
most unequal countries in the world. Wages are closely related to regions, which is 
a key differentiating factor because of high migration costs and low levels o f labour 
mobility; to the industry to which the enterprise belongs; to the professional status 
of the worker; and to the financial and economic performance of the enterprise 
(Gimpelson and Kapeliushnikov, 2011).
Another interesting characteristic of the Russian labour market was a so called 
‘wage arrears’ effect. Wage arrears is a situation in which firms do not pay their 
employees in full (or at all) potentially even for years, which affects up to half of all 
employees and plays an important role in the determination of wages in Russia. 
Delays in Russian wage payments first became substantial in 1993, and according 
to the Russian State Statistical Committee (Goskomat, 1998) the aggregate stock of 
overdue wages grew to a total of 50 trillion rubles (around 8 billion dollars in US) 
by the beginning of 1998 (Earle and Sabirianova, 2002). According to Ivanova and 
Wyplosz (1999) total wage arrears, that is arrears to the consolidated government, 
private and public sectors and suppliers and banks amounted to around 35% of 
GDP in 1998.
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Most studies of the Russian labour market have generally treated wage arrears as a 
way for firms to reduce their wage costs. Layard and Richter (1995) describe wage 
arrears as a form of wage flexibility, in which workers are willing to accept pay 
cuts in order to preserve jobs. The authors identify the lack of binding bankruptcy 
rules in the Russian economy as an explanation for wage arrears, which are related 
to the broader patterns of economics and financial decline in Russia. Another 
explanation suggests the firm’s customers fail to pay on time, resulting in no money 
to pay wages. Alternatively where there is little external finance available, firms 
may take advantage of the possibility of using interest-free loans from their 
workers.
The unemployment rate in Russia remained at less than 10% during most of 
transition period. It increased steadily to 11.5% by 1998, reaching a peak of 12.9% 
in 1999 after the Russian financial crisis o f 1998. Thereafter unemployment 
gradually decreases to 8.3% in 2004 (IMF, 2005). From Figure 3.8 it is evident that 
the participation rate of men and women decreased by 10% over the period 1980 to 
2009.
From 1999 to mid-2008, Russia experienced strong economic growth (see Figure 
3.7). Real GDP per capita increased on average by 6.9% per year and reached 2,805 
US dollars in 2009. In addition, over the period 1999 to 2008, average real wages 
increased by around 10.5% per year (Cooper, 2009).
FIGURE 3.8: Labour participation rate in Russia, 1980-2008
— — -M ales Females
Source: ILO, Key Indicators o f  the Labour Market database. 
Notes: % o f  population ages 15 and over.
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3.2.4. Tajikistan
The country is located on the southern edge of the Central Asian group of nations, 
bordering Afghanistan to the south, China to the east, Kyrgyzstan to the north, and 
Uzbekistan to the West. The smallest of the five former Soviet republics of Central 
Asia, Tajikistan has an area of 143,100 square kilometres, of which 400 square 
kilometres is water (Country profile, 2007). The country, which is one of the new 
independent States of Central Asia, has one of the lowest per capita GDP among 
the 15 former Soviet republics . Tajikistan’s economy was among the worst 
affected by the transition, with hyperinflation and the collapse of industrial 
production aggravated by a five-year civil war (1992 to 1997) (Falkingham, 2000). 
The financial crisis in Russia in August 1998 additionally altered the economic 
environment in the country.
The decline in the output in Tajikistan has been much sharper and more sustained 
than elsewhere in the region. By 1996 real GDP was worth less than 40% of its 
value in 1989 (see Figure 3.9). The GDP per capita declined from 440 US dollars in 
1989 to around 122 US dollars in 1996. The country’s economy started to recover 
in 1997. Even after several years of nearly 7% annual growth real GDP has not 
returned to the level prevailing at the start of the civil war. The civil war that 
erupted in 1992, and was due to ethnic and religious differences, resulted in nearly 
1 million refugees who fled to Afghanistan and to neighbouring Central Asian 
countries. This outflow of population was partly responsible for the dramatic 
economic and social decline in Tajikistan between 1992 and 1997.
28Tajikistan became independent in 1991 follow ing the breakup o f  the Soviet Union, and experienced a civil 
war between regional factions from 1992-1997, which inflicted widespread physical damage and heavy human 
losses o f  up to 50,000 lives.
FIGURE 3.9: The Tajikistan GDP per capita, 1989-2009
500
450
400
350
300
g 200
150 i  
100 
50 
0 1
P II idJ .. wi
afr -o!°5T n?t. A 
Years
' W•s’ -C^  S'
U ii .
SN
Source: World Bank, World Developm ent Indicators database.
While, the country has experienced steady economic growth since 1997, nearly 
two-thirds of the population continue to live in poverty. In 2003, 68% of Tajiks 
lived below the national poverty line (Kohl et al., 2008). Because of a lack of 
employment opportunities in Tajikistan, nearly half of the labour force works 
abroad, primarily in Russia and Kazakhstan, supporting their families in Tajikistan 
through remittances (ETF, 2010). Unemployment is a major push factor of 
migration. Olimova and Bose (2003) find that 14.5% of all interviewed migrants
90had not worked before leaving the country, indicating poor labour prospects . The 
increase in the working-age population affected the informal sector, where 
employment grew by almost 300% over the period 1991 to 2005 (ETF, 2010)30.
As discussed in previous economies, the country’s labour market changed 
dramatically during transition. Since independence in 1991 decreasing production 
and the closure of state-owned companies has led to massive job losses (Kroger and 
Meier, 2011). Due to the privatisation policy pursued in the period 1991-2007, the 
share of people employed in the private sector has increased and the share of people 
employed in the state-owned sector has decreased (Table 3.5). According to official 
statistics, in the period 1991-2007, employment distribution by economic sector 
changed radically. The proportion of the workforce employed in industry declined 
and the proportion employed in agriculture increased more than 1.6 times (Table
29 The collapse o f  the Soviet Union produced a massive increase in migration within the Commonwealth o f  
Independent States (CIS), including internal and cross-border movements within the region.
30 European Training Forum (2010), Tajikistan. ETF Country information note.
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3.6). In 2008, 67.2% of the labour force participation was in agriculture, 7.5% in 
industry, and 25.3% in services31. Figure 3.10, which plots the labour force 
participation rate in Tajikistan since 1980, indicates that under Soviet rule, 
participation rates were high with almost 80% of men and 60% of women being 
employed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the civil war between 1992 
and 1997, participation o f men and women decreased significantly.
FIGURE 3.10: Labour participation rate in Tajikistan, 1980-2008
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Source: ILO, Key Indicators o f  the Labour Market database.
Notes: % o f  population ages 15 and over.
TABLE 3.5
Employment by ownership and economic sector in Tajikistan, 1991-2007
1991 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total employment (million) 1,971 1,796 1,745 1,857 2,090 2,112 2,137 2,150
O w nership  (% )
State-owned 59.4 42.7 32 27.8 26.5 25.7 25.1 24.2
Private1 19.1 33.1 43.1 44 50 51.2 50.7 51.8
C ollective2 20.4 23.2 23.8 27.5 22.6 22.2 23.2 22.9
E conom ic sector (% )
Industry 13.0 8.2 6.9 6.6 5.6 5.7 5.5 5.5
Construction 7.5 2.9 2.1 1.8 1.6 3.3 2.9 3.0
Agriculture 44.7 60.7 65.0 66.6 67.6 66.6 67.5 67.0
Notes: (1) Personal subsidiary plots and farms, individual labour activities, private enterprises. (2) 
Collective farms, cooperatives, public associations.
Source: State Statistics Committee.
An analysis of the outcomes of various surveys shows a decline o f unemployment 
rate for the period 1999-2004. According to the Tajikistan Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (LSMS) conducted in 1999, the unemployment rate was 16%
31 Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book, (2010).
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and it declined to 11.4% in 2002 based on the Poverty Reduction Monitoring 
Survey.
TABLE 3.6: Changes in general unemployment in Tajikistan (%), 1991-2004
1991 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004
Unemployment rate 16.0 9.3 11.4 12.0 7.4
Labour force participation rate 76.5 69.1 63.2 - 64.2 66.5
Source: 1991, official statistics; 1999, Tajikistan Living Standards Measurement Survey; 2000, Census; 
2002 Poverty Reduction Monitoring Survey; 2003 Tajikistan Living Standards Survey; 2004 LFS.
3.3. Educational systems
The countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are unusual in many 
ways but compared to developing economies transition economies have high 
human capital relative to GDP per capita (Spagat, 2006). Education was a top 
priority of communism, serving both ideological and economic roles: to promote 
the goals of the Soviet Union and to meet the skills needs of a centrally planned 
economy (Banzragch, 2010). Under communism, the centrally-planed educational 
system was designed to fill the skill requirements of state firms (Orazem and 
Vodapivec, 1997). Overall, the system encouraged students to select vocational 
curricula and to leave school after completing upper secondary education. In 1989, 
adult literacy was generally universal and participation and completion rates for 
both males and females were high at all levels of education. Education through to 
university level was provided free which meant that the opportunity costs of 
education were low. Employment after graduation was guaranteed by state 
enterprises. Beime and Compos (2007) argue that most human capital indicators 
(for instance, gross and net enrolment rates, average years of schooling and literacy 
levels) tend to be better in the late 1980s for these countries than for, say, the 
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).
Banzragch (2010) indicates several reasons for high enrolments in all level of 
education during the early transition period. Firstly, the organization of labour and 
enforcement of compulsory attendance laws were all under the control o f the 
government authority committed to achieving high enrolment rates for education.
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Secondly, during communism when the government was the only employer, the 
completion of such education led to secure and permanent employment. Thirdly, 
the necessity of education was one of the key points o f the regime. Hence, people 
assigned value to education not because of its future wage rewards but because of 
the prestige it brought. Finally, education at all levels was free.
The situation changed abruptly with the transition to a market economy, when the 
structure of incentives was progressively altered in favour of college and more 
general education. The expansion of skill-intensive services (such as finance, 
insurance and information services) dramatically increased the demand for more 
educated employees. The share of students enrolled in general education between 
1989 and 1997, for example, rose from 24% to 28% in Hungary, from 23% to 32% 
in Poland, from 18% to 22% in the Czech Republic and from 18% to 25% in the 
Slovak Republic (Brunello et al., 2011).
Enrolment rates are the best available measure of learning opportunities in regions 
being considered. In Table 3.7 we show preschool, basic, upper-secondary and 
tertiary education enrolment rates for all of the countries of interest during the 
period of transition. Preschool enrolments varied across countries, being especially 
low in Tajikistan. Basic education enrolment rate have tended to fall in all four 
countries. The lower and generally declining enrolment rates at the upper secondary 
levels in Tajikistan indicate emerging educational inequalities. In 1989 enrolment 
rates in general and vocational upper secondary education in Tajikistan were 
significantly lower than enrolment rates for basic education. In Bulgaria the tertiary 
enrolment rate increased from 16.4% in 1989 to 27.1% in 1997. Tajikistan has the 
lowest upper-secondary and tertiary enrolment rates.
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TABLE 3.7: School enrolment rates in comparative perspective
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
P reschool E nrolm ent rates (net rates, % o f  relevant population)
Bulgaria 63.9 63.9 55.9 57.4 56.2 57.5 61.6 62.6 58.8
FR Yugoslav 24.1 23.8 21.9 20.5 21.8 24.6 26.3 28.1 29.2
Russia 69.3 66.4 63.9 56.8 57.4 56.2 55.5 55.0 56.0
Tajikistan6 16.7 15.4 14.1 11.5 11.5 11.1 8.2 7.7 -
Basic Education E nrolm ent rates (gross rates, % o f  6/7-14/15 age groups)
Bulgaria8 98.4 98.6 97.3 95.1 94.0 94.3 93.7 93.6 94.0
FR Yugoslav1*’6 95.3 95.0 94.4 72.7 74.3 72.5 71.6 72.7 71.8
Russiad 93.0 93.6 94.4 93.3 91.9 90.7 91.3 91.4 90.8
Tajikistan*1 94.1 94.0 94.2 89.6 85.1 86.4 86.6 85.0 85.5
G eneral U pper Secondary E nrolm ent rates (gross rates, % o f  15-18 age group)
Bulgaria 30.9 29.9 29.4 29.3 29.6 31.3 31.7 31.4 30.7
FR Yugoslav - 4.0 6.1 9.6 12.4 12.8 12.9 13.3 13.7
Russia 24.7 22.5 33.9 22.9 22.6 23.7 24.6 26.0 27.7
Tajikistan 41.5 40.7 37.7 29.7 26.8 25.3 23.6 22.3 22.5
V ocational Upper Secondary Enrolm ent rates (gross rates, % o f  15-18 age group)
Bulgaria 47.0 47.3 46.2 43.1 41.5 42.6 42.5 42.2 42.4
FR Yugoslav 13.9 10.7 11.2 12.1 10.0 10.0 11.1 10.6 -
Russia 54.1 50.8 49.0 46.4 44.2 41.7 41.8 41.9 41.9
Tajikistan 20.2 19.3 - 16.2 - - 12.4 - -
T ertiary Enrolm ent rates (gross rates, % o f  18-22 age group)
Bulgariaf 16.4 18.8 18.7 19.8 20.9 23.0 26.0 27.3 27.1
FR Yugoslav 17.1 16.9 15.8 13.7 14.8 14.5 14.9 16.5 -
Russia 16.7 17.0 17.1 16.9 16.4 16.1 16.9 17.6 18.7
Tajikistan 9.0 9.4 9.4 9.3 8.6 9.2 - 9.4 8.9
Source: UNICEF-ICDC Trans M ONEE Database.
Notes: a. 6-14  year olds; b. net rates; c. 7-14  year olds; d. 7-15 year olds; e. 1-6 year olds; f. Includes 
part and full-tim e students 19-25 age group;
Although countries differ in how far they have ‘travelled down the road’ to new 
economic destinations, they have all had to address similar problems in their 
education systems (Berryman, 2000). Reforms of the old system were introduced 
practically in all Central and Eastern European countries and implied a revolution 
with long-term consequences. General reforms were at the root of a series of more 
specific educational reforms: reforms of institutional structures, o f curriculum, of 
management, governance and finance of educational systems (Cerych, 1997). One 
argument made in the literature is that political and economic changes in the 1990s 
rendered some teaching skills obsolete and added others almost overnight. 
Examples include the need to retrain Russian teachers in Central Europe and, the 
need to teach applied as well as theoretical knowledge in subjects such as 
mathematics and the sciences (UNICEF 1998). Berryman (2000) argues that during 
the transition the education sector adjusted to budget constraints in two ways. One 
was to allow the real wages of staff in the sector to decline. Wages for teachers in 
Tajikistan, for example, dropped from 88% of the average wage in 1990 to 49% in
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1996. Rutkowski (1995) finds that being in a social service job in Bulgaria, 
including education, rather than in manufacturing almost doubled the risk of low 
wages. The other adjustment used by the sector was to scale back budgets on other 
inputs in the production of education. Several European and Central Asian (ECA) 
countries, for example, almost eliminated budgets for textbooks, teaching materials 
and maintenance32 (Berryman, 2000).
Greater differences exist between countries in terms of the reform process itself and 
its outcomes. Economically and educationally, the countries of South-Eastern 
Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the former Yugoslav republics) 
developed relatively late, mainly after the Second World War, and they were 
heavily influenced by the Soviet Union. The next sections outline the main features 
of the Bulgarian, Serbian, Russian, and Tajik education systems.
3.3.1. The educational system in Bulgaria
Education in Bulgaria, although fundamentally national in character, has significant 
foreign influences. The Soviet influence was most evident during the period of the 
national revival in the nineteenth century and reflected the ideas of Slavophilism 
and pan-Orthodoxy. After the Second World War, the communist regime wanted to 
establish a system of education similar to that of the Soviet Union, but at the same 
time they wanted to maintain a national culture. The length of time at elementary 
secondary level was reduced to 11 years, instead of 12 years, and the first 4 years 
were compulsory. The primary aim of the communist educational authorities was to 
increase the number of students at each educational level. No questions were asked 
about the quality of education since the majority of teachers either needed special 
training in the new state demands or there simply were no qualified teachers. As in 
Russia, the Bulgarian education system was very much controlled by the party. 
After 1945 an intensive effort was made to include more women, both in the 
economy and in political organizations. Women were required to participate in all 
events which would have been unthinkable before the communist regime. They 
were also included in all communist youth organizations. By 1965, the number of
32 In Russia the percentage o f  textbooks provided by region budgets varied from 6% in Chelybinsk region to 
65% in Irkutsk (Berryman, 2000).
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women in schools, in the economy and in the party was almost equal to the number 
of men (Shimoniak, 1970).
Enrollment rates in Bulgaria were related to the level of family income. Children of 
poorly educated parents tended to complete fewer years of education. While 
enrolment rates in basic and secondary education did not vary much by expenditure 
quintiles in 1995, by 1997 the net enrolment rates for basic education, while stable 
for the top four quantiles, dropped by about 20% for the lowest quantile. Net 
enrolment rates at the upper secondary level for the lowest quantile also declined by 
more than 10 %. Although overall public spending was distributing neutrally, it was 
pro-poor at the preschool and basic education levels and favored the non-poor at 
secondary and tertiary levels (World Bank, 1999). The macroeconomic decline in 
Bulgaria also reduced public funds available for education, which declined from 
5% of the GDP in 1990 to 3.2% in 1996 (UNESCO, 2000).
During the period 1990 to 2006, a number of democratic changes affected society 
as a whole and the educational system in particular. In 1991 a new Public 
Education Act was adopted, which is still in force in Bulgaria. The principle of 
competition for electing school management was introduced, and democratic 
principles of governance and the administration of schools were applied. A serious 
attempt was made to harmonize Bulgarian educational legislation with the 
standards of other European countries, while preserving the achievements of the 
Soviet era (Eurybase, 2005).
In Bulgaria, education is compulsory for children aged between 7 to 16 years old. 
Children at the age of 6 can also be enrolled as first-grade pupils, if their physical 
and mental development allows it. Since 2003/2004 pre-school education has 
become compulsory (Eurybase, 2005). Prior to entry into higher education, the 
education system in Bulgaria consisted of 12 school grades, organized in two major 
levels of study: basic and secondary. Basic education (grades one to eight) is 
divided into two sub-levels: elementary (grades one to four) and pre-secondary 
(grades five through eight). Secondary education normally encompasses grades 
eight to twelve and there are two major types of secondary schools: secondary 
comprehensive, usually called gymnasia (high school) and secondary vocational,
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most often referred to as technikum (vocational school). University education is 
provided at universities and specialized higher schools -  academies or institutes. It 
includes three stages: first stage -  a course of study of at least four-years, leading to 
a Bachelor degree upon graduation; second stage -  a course of study of at least 
five-years, or one-year following a bachelor degree, leading a master degree upon 
graduation; third stage -  a three-year course of study following a master degree, 
leading to a doctoral degree.
Although the majority of European national policies are now encouraging higher 
education institutions to rely increasingly on private sources o f funding, direct 
public funding continues to represent a substantial share of the higher education 
budget. In 2003, within the 27 Member States of the European Union, 79.9 % of the 
funding for higher educational institu tions came from public sources. In Bulgaria 
this proportion was 55.2%. The amount of tuition fees in the country are 
determined by the central education authorities and the proportion of expenditure in 
higher education from households reach about 40% (Eurydice, 2008).
3.3.2. The educational system in Serbia
The progress towards a stable democratic system in Serbia has been slow but 
despite all of its problems Serbia has begun to rebuild and reform its education 
system. Before the global crisis began, public investment in education increased 
from 2.7% of the GDP in 2001 to 3.7% in 2007. Investments into school 
infrastructure also increased but they were far from sufficient (Mijatovic, 2008).
Latest Labour Force Survey (2009) data confirms the low educational attainment of 
the Serbian population: 3% of the population older than age of 15 do not have full 
elementary education; 35% of the population have only elementary education; 48% 
secondary education; and 14% higher education. For almost half of the population 
aged 15 or above, secondary education represents the highest educational 
attainment. The link between poverty and education in Serbia is very strong, with 
71% of those living below the poverty line having no education or only primary 
school education33. According to the last Census (2002), 3.45% of the population
33 UNICEF  Serbian Annual Report, 2007.
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were illiterate and almost a million had not completed primary schooling34. Among 
sub groups of the population, Roma children are the most disadvantaged and 
excluded group in Serbia’s education system. Only 36% of Roma children complete 
primary school, 9.1% secondary school and 0.9% tertiary education (OSI, 2008).
The main intention o f the reforms implemented in Serbia was to make it possible 
for students to compare their higher education qualifications with those acquired by 
students at other European higher education institutions, which would encourage 
student exchange programmes. In 2005 Serbia adopted the Law on Higher 
Education which is considered with the Bologna Declaration (Ciric and Durdic, 
2009). To support educational reform the Ministry of Education undertook a major 
legislative initiative by revising the laws governing pre-schools, primary and 
secondary schools in Serbia. The key innovations adopted by the Parliament in 
2009 set out a framework for an integrated education policy. This included new 
principles of equity, improved access, quality and efficiency of education that 
sought to match competencies to the requirements of jobs, standardise learning 
achievements, increase the autonomy of schools and promote flexible learning 
programmes (Klenha et al., 2010).
The education system in Serbia includes preschool, primary, secondary, higher, and 
university education. Compulsory education (pre-school and primary) and 
secondary education are free and funded from the state budget, but parents and 
pupils have to cover the expenses for textbooks, stationary and school trips. 
Preschool covers children from 6 to 7 years old. Primary education starts at age of 7 
and is compulsory until the age of 16. Primary education in Serbia is 
comprehensive, currently organised in 2 cycles, grades 1-4 as class instruction and 
5-8 as a subject-based instruction. The 2003 legislation introduced nine years of 
compulsory education in 3 cycles, but the 2004 amendments reinstated the previous 
8 grade system (Cerovic, 2007). Secondary education follows primary education 
and while it is not compulsory it is free for all. Secondary schools are divided into 
gymnasiums and vocational schools, each of which lasts 3 or 4 years. Tertiary
34 The population in Serbia was 7.5 million in 2002, excluding Kosovo.
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education is offered at 6 state universities, 6 private universities and at numerous 
tertiary vocational schools that offer 2-year programmes (Cerovic, 2007).
Higher education institutions in Serbia acquire funds from various sources and 
manage these sources independently. These are mainly: the founder; students; 
donations; projects and contracts related to the carrying out of courses of study, 
research and consulting services. State-founded and private-founded universities 
are in a different position in relation to funding. There are two categories students 
with respect of funding: state funded students who study at state-funded higher 
education institutions and self-funded students, who pay the tuition fee determined 
by higher education institutions. All self-funded students at a particular higher 
education institution pay the same fee regardless of age. Tuition fees are 
determined by the higher education institutions (TEMPUS, 2010).
3.3.3. The educational system in Russia
Russia has a long-standing tradition in promoting high-quality education and has 
always shown great concern for education. It probably has also one of the best 
mass-education systems in the world producing a literacy rate (98%) exceeding 
most Western European countries. Education was one of the top priorities during 
the new communist regime and it is highly valued not only because it offers higher 
wages but because of prestige self-esteem associated with its acquisition 
(Cheidvasser and Benitez-Silva, 2007). One general characteristic of the education 
system prior to the transition was a high degree of centralisation. Curricula, 
personnel, criteria for enrolling pupils and many other dimensions of the school 
system were controlled by the central authorities, and there was little autonomy at 
either the school or district level (Bray and Borevskaya, 2001). Free educational 
establishments provided equal educational opportunities to all. Compulsory 
education was 10 years in duration. A large proportion of secondary school 
graduates went to specialized vocational schools. Access to higher education was 
controlled and the content of higher education emphasized the technical needs of 
the economy (Banzragch, 2010).
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Following the break of the USSR in December 1991 the entire Soviet education 
system, given the collapse of Soviet ideology, were restructured and transformed. 
Educational reforms moved much more rapidly than the democratic transformation 
of society. Major provisions of the education reforms included overhauling the 
curriculum to make it less complex; adding new courses in social and political 
science; increasing the vocational component of education by requiring vocational 
training at all levels; achieving universal computer literacy; and increasing 
resources for education (Kaufman and Hardt, 1993). In 1992 the Law on Education 
and in 1993 the Federal Programme of Educational Development were 
implemented. Article 41 of the Law stipulated that educational institutions would 
be financed on a per student basis according to federally and locally established 
criteria for financing all type of educational establishments. Eleven years of 
secondary education were made universal and compulsory during the 1980s. 
However, because of qualitative and financial problems, the government decided to 
reduce the duration of compulsory education to 9 years in 1992. Despite these 
changes, much of the Soviet education system remains in place in Russia today.
Tuition-based education and private education have been legalised and the non­
state education sec-tor has witnessed rapid growth in recent years. By 2004 there 
were 655 state and about 530 non-state higher education institutions in Russia. Of 
the 530 non-state higher education institutions, 364 were accredited by 2004. In 
2002/2003 there were 5,228,700 students in state institutions and 718,800 in non­
state institutions.
If we look at the two widely used indicators of the extent to which governments 
give priority to education -  public expenditure as a percentage of GNP and public 
expenditure on education as a percentage of total public expenditures, the figures 
for Russia are lower than for many other countries (see Table 3.8). Moreover, 
public expenditures on education declined from 3.9% of the GNP in 1975 to 3.1% 
in 1985, and only increased to 4.2% in 1997 (UNESCO, 2000).
82
TABLE 3.8: The public expenditures on education as % o f  GNP, 1985-1997
Country/region 1985 1990 1995 1997
Russia 3.2 3.5 3.5 4.2
North America 5.0 5.4 5.3 5.4
Europe 5.2 5.1 5.3 5.3
Sub-Sarah Africa 4.5 4.6 5.1 5.1
Arab States 5.8 4.9 5.0 5.4
Latin America and Caribbean 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.6
Eastern Asia and Oceania 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.9
Southern Asia 3.4 3.7 3.2 3.3
Source: Berryman (2000, p. 123), UNESCO (2000).
Table 3.9 shows the proportion of government total expenditure. The statistics refer 
to consolidated budgets, e.g. the sum of the national, regional and sub-regional 
budgets. The situation in Russia was markedly different prior to the market reforms 
and there was a steady decline in public expenditure on education as a share of total 
government expenditure until 1995. Even in 1995, the Russian figures were 
significantly lower compared to the shares reported for both Europe and Asia.
TABLE 3.9
The public expenditures on education as % of total public expenditures in Russia
1980 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Russia 16.7 14.8 11.0 12.7 11.7 12.4 12.8 14.4 12.9
Asia - - - - - 15.1 - - -
Europe - - - - - 13.4 - - -
Sou rce : Bray and Borevskaya (2001).
Education in Russia is split into a compulsory basic education, and higher 
education. The stages of compulsory schooling are: primary education for ages 6-7 
to 9-10 inclusive; senior school for ages 10-11 to 12-13 inclusive, and senior school 
for ages 13-14 to 14-15 inclusive. If a secondary school pupil wishes to go on to 
higher education, he or she must stay at school for another two years. Primary and 
secondary schooling together account for 11 years of study, split into elementary 
(grades 1-4), middle (grades 5-9) and senior (grades 10-11) classes. Eleven-year 
secondary education in Russia has been compulsory since September 1, 2007. No 
entrance examination is required for admission to programmes of basic vocational 
education. Entrance to basic vocational education is after year 9. Students entering 
basic vocational education after eleven years of general education follow shortened 
programmes. Higher education is provided by state and non-state higher education
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institutions. There are three levels of higher education -  incomplete higher 
education (2 years at least), 4 year programmes leading to bachelor degrees and 
postgraduate study of 1-2 years leading to masters degrees.
3.3.4. The educational system in Tajikistan
With the breakup of the Soviet Union and independence, Tajikistan witnessed 
formidable changes in the education sector -  including the provision of 
postsecondary school graduates; maintaining free and compulsory secondary 
education; ensuring an adequate number of teachers; and developing legal 
frameworks, new standards and curricula. The country saw significant changes in 
the financing of education. At the beginning of the decade, the central government 
was virtually the only source of funding. After the civil war, government revenues 
fell and funding for education dropped from 22.1% of the national budget (10.7% 
of the GDP) in 1990 to 11.8% in 1999 (2.1% of the GDP) (Asian Development 
Bank, 2004). The education system in Tajikistan underwent two major changes. 
First, there was an increased emphasis on the use of the Tajik language, and second, 
there was a considerable reduction of government funding of the educational 
system as a direct consequence of the 1992 to 1997 civil war (Banzragch, 2010). 
Tajikistan was the first country in Central Asia to pass legislation adopting a 
national language other than Russian. The Law on Language (1989) established 
Tajik as the official language and Russian as an international language.
Education reforms in Tajikistan were initiated later than in other Central Asian 
countries. The adoption of the Law of Education in 1993 and its amendments in 
1996 and 1999 set up a new legal framework for the reform of education. The Law 
extended the rights and autonomy of education institutions while promoted 
alternative sources of finance for education by allowing financial support from 
other sources, such as parents, sponsors, enterprises, international organisations and 
foreign investors. In 1995 a Concept of National Education was established, which 
defined the purpose and future directions of the education system. The issues of 
inadequate teacher supply and the need to upgrade the qualification of existing 
teachers were addressed.
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There was a significant fall in preschool enrolments and the proportion of total 
expenditure on education going to preschool education declined from 13.8% in 
1995 to 4.5% in 2000 (Asian Development Bank, 2004). However, general 
education suffered less and broader ranges of programs were introduced, providing 
students with more options. In addition to secondary schools, gymnasiums and 
colleges were established and the share of general education in total education 
expenditure increased from 57.4% to 80.1% between 1995 and 2000. The number 
of postsecondary institutions also increased from 13 in 1991 to 30 in 2000, and 
student enrolment increased from 69,300 to 79,200. Fewer girls, however, were 
enrolled and remained in schools especially at the secondary level. Indeed in some 
districts girls were not allowed to attend secondary school by their parents because 
of religious beliefs (Asian Development Bank, 2004). Since 2000, private schools 
and non-profit training institutions have appeared in Tajikistan, responding to a 
demand for emerging secondary education. By 2006, the number of gymnasiums 
had more than doubled and 26% of these were private schools.
In general, the education sector pays low wages, and this is a main cause of the 
decline in teacher professionalism in secondary schools and vocational education 
(ETF, 2011). As a result of poor salaries, many teachers left teaching for jobs in 
other fields, and this caused a severe shortage of qualified staff. In 1998, the 
average salary of employees in the education sector was 6.9 US dollars a month 
while the living wage was estimated to be 28.3 US dollars per month. The low 
quality of education was a serious concern in rural areas (Banzragch, 2010).
The Tajik education system has two major stages: general and professional. The 
general education stage is comprised of three levels - primary, basic education (also 
called incomplete secondary education) and secondary education. The second stage, 
professional education compromises three elements -  initial, secondary, and higher 
professional education. At the age of seven, children begin 9 years of compulsory 
education consisting of 4 years of primary school and 5 years of lower education 
with no vocational qualification of any kind. Those leaving the education system at 
this point therefore enter the labour market as unskilled workers.
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Education legislation guarantees each student free access to any school at the upper 
secondary (general or vocational) level and on a competitive base, to technical 
(secondary specialist) and higher level schools where they can obtain work-related 
qualifications. Following completion of compulsory basic education the Tajik 
education system offers a number of different options, including general upper 
secondary, vocational and technical education, or combination of these (ETF, 
2011). Following completion of general and upper secondary education students 
may continue to either higher education, technical or vocational education. The 
state only supported tertiary education students, paying stipends and providing 
them accommodation, no stipend is envisaged for initial vocational education 
students and existing professional-technical school premises. After technical 
education students can continue to higher education and may enter post-secondary 
and higher-level public schools free of charge on the basis of a competition for 
limited places. Almost half of all students are admitted into universities on a fee- 
payment basis. They can also gain access on a fee-paying basis. Students can also 
complete postgraduate studies in a 3 year program, which combines coursework 
and dissertation writing (Banzragch, 2010).
The development of higher education is ensured by financing from the state budget 
and grants as well by creating favourable conditions for self-financing of the 
process of training specialists and academic staff. Higher education in Tajiksitan is 
financed from three sources: national budget, private funds (student fees) and other 
sources, which consist of income received from research and manufacturing 
contracts and international funds (grants). Course fees are fixed by the higher 
education institutions in coordination with the Minsitry of Education and the 
Ministry of Economy and Trade. The fees depend on the speciality and it varies 
from 880 somoni (150 EUR) per year for a teacher-training courses up to 5,280 
somoni (935 EUR) for law. Only full-time students with academic progress have 
the right to receive a grant (European Commission, 2010).
3.4. Summary and conclusions
In this Chapter we have provided an overview of economic developments during 
the transition process and briefly summarized the key features of the education
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systems in Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia, and Tajikistan. The review of educational 
developments is important as it reflects the diversity of the educational systems in 
place in the countries examined in this thesis. The overview of the transition 
process in Central European and Central Asian countries highlights three main 
facts: a move from the communist political system to a democratic one; overcoming 
deep structural economic crises by developing free market economies; and 
modernization and adjustment to global changes.
The evidence reviewed suggests that the selected countries resemble the 
characteristics of the wage settings and education systems observed in most Central 
and Eastern European economies under the central planning and thus providing a 
particularly interesting combination for estimating the returns to education. 
Specifically, wages in all four countries were paid under highly centralized wage 
grids and little variation was observed by their level of education or occupation. 
The Soviet commitment to universal education and employment meant that these 
transition economies inherited a legacy of high education levels. The educational 
systems emphasized secondary and vocational training which were relevant to the 
demands of state run industries. In all four countries, during the transition economic 
uncertainty increased and job security disappeared, leading to problems in their 
labor markets. Almost all of these countries suffered severe recessions, rising 
unemployment, a collapse of economic activity and a sharp deterioration in growth 
performance. This decline reduced the public funds available for education in all 
four countries.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EVOLUTION OF THE RETURNS TO 
EDUCATION IN BULGARIA: AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION
4.1. Introduction
Changing conditions in the labour market, and in the education system, suggest that 
returns to education may not be constant over time. A number of studies have 
shown that transition process had significant effects on labour market outcomes and 
the distribution of income35. Early empirical evidence suggests that, on average, 
returns to education rose during the early transition from central planning to a 
market economy. Andren et al. (2005), for example, find that the returns to 
education in Romania increased from 3% during the pre-transition period to 8.5% 
in 2000. A similar pattern is reported by Compos and Jolliffe (2002) for Hungary, 
where the returns to education rose from 6.4% in 1986 to 11.2% in 1998. Munich et 
al. (2004) find for the Czech Republic that in 1989 women with university 
education earned on average 45% more than women with secondary education and 
that this had increased to 85% by 2002. Munich et a l  (2004) also show that the 
major increase in the rate of returns to education occurred in the first phase of 
transition (1989-1996) and no further changes were observed in the later phase 
(1996-2002). Similarly, study by Fleisher et a l  (2005) suggests that the sharpest 
increase in returns to education took place during the early transition (around the 
early 1990s).
There is an alternative hypothesis, however, namely that the rate of returns to 
education and experience fell from the pre-transition to the transition period. 
Education was poorly rewarded in many transition economies in the initial stages of 
transition and directed toward the productive and ideological goals of the 
communist regimes. Returns to schooling were low and hence have been limited in
35 See for example Fleisher et al. (2005) analysis o f  returns to education. They use metadata between 1975 and 
2002 collected from 33 studies o f  10 transition econom ies, to assess changes in the returns to education over the 
transition period.
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its ability to respond to changing economic and employment patterns essential for 
the success of market economy (Laporte and Ringold, 1997). An interesting view 
among researchers on transition economies is that education obtained under central 
planning is too narrow and firm specific, and not appropriate for the new market 
environment (Kertesi and Kollo, 1999; Filer et al., 1999). Some individuals (in 
particular, low-educated or women) are more likely to become unemployed and to 
experience more difficulty in moving out of unemployment into a job, whereas for 
the young educated people it is relatively easy to find new job. Some studies argue 
that the ‘losers’ of transition are women and older workers, whose human capital 
has been relatively devaluated and have low incentives to acquire the new skills 
relevant to the emerging market economy . There is also evidence of factors 
making the ‘losers’ more difficult to move from the group of ‘losers’ to that of 
‘winners’, such as marked regional imbalances in the allocation of employment 
opportunities, and the narrow base o f many vocational education curricula, which 
reduce the eligibility of the workforce (Boeri and Terrell, 2001).
Changes in the returns to education typically arise from three sources: changes in 
the demand for educated workers, changes in the supply of educated workers or 
from the institutional features of the wage formation. Internationally, a rising return 
to education has been attributed to an increasing demand for highly educated 
workers, particularly as a result o f technological changes and innovation (Barth and 
Roed, 2001). For instance, Fleisher et al. (2005) find that both the speed of 
economic transformation and the degree of economic disequilibrium measured by 
macroeconomic volatility explain differences in the rates of return to schooling 
over time across Central Eastern European countries and Russia. Moreover, the 
economic and political transition in the countries o f transition has led to 
considerable reduction in political supervision of the wage structure. Orazem and 
Vodopivec (1997) categorise the fundamental forces which have influenced the 
wage structure during transition into three groups. The first group consist of 
corrections in distortions presented in the labour market during communism, 
meaning measures that secured the egalitarian wage structure. The second group 
consists of changes in the final demand for goods and services which indirectly led
36 See for example Orazem and Vodapivec (1995).
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to reduced demand for labour in industry. The final group consists of shifts in 
demand pertaining to the imbalances which emerged during the process of 
transition, i.e. the fact that education and entrepreneurship associated with it were 
not sought in the previous system, so due to the elasticity in the labour supply over 
the short period, its supply is lower than could be expected given the incentives 
established. All these forces pushed the wage structure in the same direction, 
toward growing wage premiums for education (Vujcic and Sosic, 2007).
Despite the large number of empirical studies on returns to education in transition 
economies, the results for the pre-1989 transition period are limited. There is no 
evidence for returns to education in Bulgaria and in particular on the evolution of 
returns to education in the 1980s. In this context, we believe it is interesting to 
examine whether the transition process has caused changes in economic returns to 
education in Bulgaria, a country which went through radical economic 
transformation after the 10th of November 1989.
This chapter attempts to contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we 
address the question what has happened to returns to human capital in Bulgaria 
before and during the transition from centrally planned to market economy by 
examine the evolution of returns to education for the 1986 to 2003 period. Second, 
the study adds to the previous literature by using econometric techniques, which 
have not previously been applied to Bulgarian data. We begin by presenting OLS 
estimates of a Mincerian earning equation. Next we account for a potential 
selectivity bias. We compare parametric and semi-parametric sample selection 
results. We also deal with possible endogeneity bias o f education by employing an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach. The analysis is undertaken separately for men 
and women. Finally, we provide evidence on how returns to schooling in Bulgaria 
have evolved at various points along the conditional wage distribution. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first study that estimates the evolution of returns to 
education in Bulgaria.
The empirical analysis covers quite an important period in Bulgarian’s transition. 
The year 1986 falls within the socialist period, whereas in 1995 Bulgaria was into 
the initial transition phase. As we have discussed in Section 3.2.1, the end of 1996
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and the beginning of 1997, the country saw an increase of 827 percentage points in 
the inflation rate from an already high base of 122.9 percentage points37. Real GDP 
fell by another 10.1% in 1996 and 7% in 1997 (Dimova and Wolff, 2008). At the 
end of 1996 about one-third of Bulgaria’s banking system dissolved. Households 
had to bear the largest part of the currency devaluation and the GDP contraction as 
those losses worked their way through the banking sector and the government 
budget down to the consumer (Ivanov, 2003).
The structure of the Chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2 the data sets and 
the empirical methodological framework are presented. Main results are discussed 
in Section 4.3, and finally Section 4.4 draws some conclusions.
4.2. Data and methodology
4.2.1. The data
The empirical analysis in this Chapter is based on five household surveys 
conducted in Bulgaria. One is administrated before transition and the others after 
the initial economic reforms were held. The 1986 Town and Village Survey, 
conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Bulgarian Academy of Science in 
Sofia, was carried out in conjunction with the national census delivered in the 
winter of 1985 and contains information on the structure of Bulgarian wages prior 
to the transition (Giddings, 2002b). This survey is the only existing pre-transition 
survey in Bulgaria. The sample is representative of the population and contains 
10,333 respondents. After eliminating those who reported zero earnings and 
excluding individuals who were not o f working age, the sample consists of 6,451
-JO
individuals .
The next data sets comes from the nationally representative Bulgarian Integrated 
Household Surveys (BIHS) collected in 1995, 1997, 2001 and 2003. The Gallup 
Organization in Sofia managed the survey and the Bulgarian Ministry o f Labour, 
the National Institute of Statistics and the World Bank provided technical 
assistance. The BIHS questionnaire follows the structure of a typical Living
37 Inflation reached 4-digit numbers from February until August 1997 (Ivanov, 2003).
38 We sample individuals aged between 16 and 65 in all surveys.
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Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS). The sampling procedures ensured that all 
the BIHS samples were highly representative. Exclusion of individuals who do not 
report wages accounts for a substantial reduction in sample sizes. Our final working 
samples consist of 1,317 individuals in 1995, 1,531 individuals in 1997, 1,438 
individuals in 2001 and 2,482 individuals in 2003.
While the LSMS and the 1986 Town and Village Survey were conducted for 
different purposes, the surveys are comparable and representative at country level. 
An comparison of 1986 and 2001 data indicates that both have similar gender, age, 
and regional distributions. For instance, 50% and 49% of females in both samples 
are in paid employment. The regional variation have been found to be close 
between surveys with about 4% of the individuals in 1986 sample and 4.4% in 
2001 worked in the Pleven region (see Appendix Table A4.17).
The dependent variable used in the analysis is the logarithm of hourly earnings 
resulting from the primary occupation and excludes earnings from secondary jobs, 
or from agricultural production, and non-monetary benefits39. Wages are net of 
taxes. The variable also includes all additional payments in cash, in kind and 
bonuses. Education is represented by binary variables measuring the completion of 
indicated levels of schooling. These levels consist of primary, secondary, and 
university education. However, our empirical analysis is based on the total number 
of years in education, which are also available within the data sets. It comprises of 
the number of educational grades completed by the individual and takes on 18 
different values: from 0 in the individual achieved no grade to 18 if the individual 
has a postgraduate education. The binary variable Bulgarian takes value 1 if an 
individual is ethnic Bulgarian and 0 if an individual is a member of an ethnic 
minority group, of which the main groups are Roma and Turkish. The vector of 
exogenous control variables used in the estimations also includes potential 
experience40 (linear and quadratic terms), dummy variables for individuals years of 
tenure within the firm (less than 1 year, between 1 and 2 years, between 3 and 5 
years, between 6 and 10 years and more than 10 years) and urban settlement. We
39 Hourly earnings are defined as reported monthly net earnings divided by 4.34 and then divided by reported 
weekly hours o f  work.
40 Potential experience is imputed as follows: age -  7 -  years o f  schooling.
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have also included a public sector dummy so as to control for the remaining effect 
of the old public sector wage structure.
In Table 4.1 we report descriptive statistics of the resulting samples. For all years, 
the average log hourly wage rate is higher for men. Interestingly, in 1986 in terms 
of the hourly wages and education, there is no significant difference between the 
genders mainly explained by the socialist ideology of equality and wage setting 
structure. Wages under the communist regime were paid under highly centralized 
wage grids and differentials were kept within certain limits. Moreover, under 
communism, tuition was free and all students were eligible for textbooks and meals 
that were subsidised by the state. Our descriptive statistics show dramatic fall in 
wages in 2001, and the reason for that is the 1999 redenomination of the Bulgarian 
currency41.
According to the 1986 data, 9.9% of employed men and 9.5% of employed women 
have a university degree. Public sector employment in 1986 accounted for around 
81% of total employed males and females. Experience, defined as age minus years 
in school minus 7, is higher for females than males in 1986. However, potential 
experience might overstate women’s actual labour market experience as it does not 
account for female absence due to childbearing activities. It is also interesting to 
compare particular social groups with a certain level of education and the 
completed education levels of their offspring. The 1986 Town and Village Survey 
provide information o f the educational level o f the respondent’s father and mothers. 
According to this data, 13% of respondent’s mothers had a high degree (university 
and college education), which indicates that our respondents were slightly better 
educated than their parents. In contrast to the 1986 data, the 1995, 1997, 2001 and 
2003 samples indicate that women earn less than men, which support the thesis that 
transition has resulted in increased gender inequality and large changes in the 
distribution of wages. For the whole period, women have more years of schooling, 
measured as a number of total year’s education. Moreover, the data shows that 
26.3% of employed women in 1995 had a university degree compared with 17.4 % 
for men. Women have higher participation rate in the public sector and we can see
41 As o f  5 July 1999 the Bulgarian lev was redenominated whereby 1,000 old levs shall be exchange for 1 new  
lev (Law o f  Redenomination o f  the BG lev adopted by the 38th National Assem bly on 19 February 1999).
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that for the period 1986-2003 the percentage of public sector workers significantly 
decreased (from 82% of working women employed in public sector in 1986 to 39% 
in 2003). The majority of working males and females live in urban areas.
FIGURE 4.1: Educational structures of employed respondents in Bulgaria
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Notes: Bulgarian Household Surveys descriptive statistics based on working individuals.
All the cross-section data clearly indicate that in the beginning of the period, the 
majority of the working sample was poorly educated and only a small proportion 
had university degrees. For the period 1986-2003 the percentage of working 
individuals with secondary and university education increased, while the proportion 
of those with primary decreased from 29% in 1986 to 13% in 2003 (see Figure 4.1). 
Significant changes in the educational structure o f  the working population, which 
were expressed in a 10% increase of the share of secondary and university 
graduates, took place in 1995. Overall, individuals with secondary education 
dominated the educational structure. This might be an indication for the transition 
wage structure, which did not provide adequate incentives to invest in education.
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TABLE 4.1
Descriptive statistics -  Bulgarian working samples, 1986-2003
Variables 1986 1995 1997 2001 2003
Description M ales Fem ales M ales Females M ales Fem ales M ales Fem ales M ales Fem ales
Log o f  hourly 0.955 0.940 4.914 4.617 5.912 5.664 1.519 1.342 1.622 1.460
w age (0.461) (0 .460) (0.594) (0.615) (0.855) (0.775) (0.668) (0.539) (0.558) (0.519)
Education
Total years in 10.142 10.193 11.182 11.452 11.675 12.132 11.407 12.099 13.056 13.875
education (3.361) (3 .456) (3.077) (3.038) (2 .838) (2 .862) (3.202) (3.304) (3.420) (3.424)
1 if  primary 0.304 0.275 0.199 0.146 0.150 0.122 0.143 0.102 0.154 0.105
(0.460) (0 .447) (0.400) (0.354) (0 .357) (0 .327) (0.350) (0.302) (0.361) (0.307)
1 i f  secondary 0.504 0.491 0.614 0.576 0.640 0.556 0.635 0.557 0.620 0.532
(0.500) (0 .500) (0.487) (0.495) (0.480) (0.497) (0.482) (0.497) (0.486) (0.499)
I if  university 0.099 0.095 0.174 0.263 0.127 0.172 0.137 0.207 0.167 0.256
(0.298) (0.293) (0.379) (0.440) (0.333) (0.377) (0.344) (0.406) (0.374) (0.437)
potential exp 30.072 31.366 22.468 20.941 22.343 20.251 21.79 20.25 19.972 18.653
(14.638) (15 .244) (11.399) (9.937) (10.837) (9.472) (11.739) (10 .799) (12.264) (11.179)
Tenure within the firm
1 if  <1 year 0.033 0.039 0.151 0.126 0 .309 0.259 0.136 0.159 0.270 0.226
(0.178) (0 .194) (0.358) (0.333) (0 .463) (0 .438) (0.343) (0.366) (0.444) (0.418)
1 if  1-2 years 0.030 0.027 0.061 0.051 0.073 0.060 0.071 0.075 0.177 0.163
(0.169) (0 .162) (0.239) (0.220) (0 .260) (0.237) (0.258) (0.263) (0.382) (0.369)
1 if  3-5 years 0.095 0.090 0.127 0.123 0 .139 0.096 0.148 0.133 0.191 0.206
(0.293) (0.286) (0.333) (0.329) (0.346) (0 .294) (0.355) (0.339) (0.393) (0.404)
1 if  6-10 years 0.158 0.170 0.151 0.192 0.133 0.199 0.255 0.240 0.124 0.142
(0.365) (0.375) (0.358) (0.394) (0.340) (0 .400) (0.436) (0.427) (0.330) (0.349)
1 i f  >10 years 0.684 0.674 0.510 0.507 0.345 0.387 0.390 0.394 0.238 0.263
(0.465) (0.469) (0.500) (0.500) (0.476) (0.487) (0.488) (0.489) (0.426) (0.440)
1 if  married 0.819 0.856 0.806 0.818 0.820 0.820 0.760 0.726 0.680 0.728
(0.385) (0.351) (0.395) (0.386) (0.385) (0.385) (0.427) (0.446) (0.467) (0.445)
1 ifB ulgarian 0.852 0 .866 0.919 0.910 0.906 0.912 0.877 0.918 0.901 0 .896
(0.355) (0.340) (0.272) (0.287) (0 .291) (0.284) (0.329) (0.274) (0.298) (0.305)
1 if  in public 0.811 0.819 0.814 0.859 0.743 0.821 0.432 0.444 0.306 0.390
(0.392) (0.385) (0.390) (0.349) (0 .437) (0.384) (0.496) (0.497) (0.461) (0.488)
1 if  urban 0.526 0.538 0.740 0.767 0.780 0.790 0.748 0.811 0.766 0.808
(0.499) (0.499) (0.439) (0.423) (0.415) (0.408) (0.435) (0.392) (0.423) (0.394)
1 i f  in Sofia 0.110 0.140 0.114 0.118 0.092 0.102 0.112 0.128 0.165 0.167
region (0.313) (0.347) (0.319) (0.323) (0 .289) (0.303) (0 .316) (0.335) (0.371) (0.373)
Sam ple size 3213 3238 708 609 727 804 729 709 1296 1186
N otes: Standard deviations in brackets.
4.2.2. Endogeneity o f  education
As we have already discussed, the OLS estimate o f the return to education is 
unbiased only if measured schooling is exogenous. Endogeneity arising from 
measurement error in schooling and is generally thought to bias the estimate of the 
schooling coefficient toward zero, although this effect is believed to be small 
because the reliability of measuring the schooling data is typically quite high. The 
endogeneity can also arise because of omitted ability bias. That is, the return to 
schooling coefficient is biased (upward) because chosen schooling levels are 
positively correlated with omitted ability, and ability is correlated with earnings
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(Trostel et al., 2002). To address the problem of endogeneity bias we need to 
instrument education, using a variable that is correlated with education but not with 
earnings other than through the variable that is being instrumented. Specifically, 
our instrument needs to be orthogonal to the unobserved component of the earning 
equation.
The following two-equation model describing the log of earnings (lnfj) and years 
of schooling (St) is applied:
where Z u is a vector o f exogenous variables that determine individual earnings 
(T,), Z. is a vector of exogenous variables that influence the educational decision, 
E(Zi ,vj) = 0, Z u is a subset of Z(.. The returns to schooling is measured by p  and 
since is defined as the residual from a regression of vf on Z(., it is uncorrelated 
with Z h by construction, and Zia  = Z ua i + Z2ia 2, a 2 ^ 0  is the rank condition 
needed for identifying equation (4.1), or as discussed by Heckman (1990) and Card 
(1993), identification is provided by including variables in the vector Z, that are
not contained in Z1(. . Equation (4.1) is then estimated by substituting the fitted 
values from the first-stage regression of S ( on Z j as defined in equation (4.2). In 
practise, to model the relationship between education and earnings, we need to 
compute the predicted values S'* for education S’, and then replace the education
variable in the earnings function with this predicted value. Since S* is not 
correlated with the error term in the earnings function, the estimated return based 
on predicted education is unbiased. The addition of S* is sufficient to eliminate 
endogeneity bias arising from the possible correlation between education and 
unobservable influences on earnings.
Identification in the endogeneity adjusted two-step estimations is achieved by 
making use of a mother’s education as an instrument, assuming that there is high 
correlation between children’s educational attainments and those of their parents. 
Higher parental education is also associated with more substantial family
In ^ = / B l + Zu<y+5 (4.1)
S ,. = Z .a  + v, (4.2)
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investments in children42. Relatively well-educated parents, cognizant o f the 
importance of human capital in determining socioeconomic well-being, are 
arguably more willing and able to help in the education of their children (Chen, 
1998). However, the exclusion restriction that a mother’s education has no direct 
effect on earnings is equally, if not more, problematic. Trostel et al. (2002) argue 
that it is not difficult to think of good reasons why it should not hold. Even if family 
characteristics are considered to be correlated with earnings, they are still widely 
used in the literature.
Theoretically if the instrument is valid, IV estimates yields consistent estimates of 
the impact of schooling on earnings. As we have discussed, a suitable instrument 
must meet two conditions: relevance and exogeneity. First, relevant instruments are 
highly correlated with the endogenous regressor even after controlling for other 
exogenous regressors. The relevance of the instruments can be tested in the first- 
stage regression. As suggested by Bound et al. (1995), we report F-tests on the 
excluded variables and the partial R2 from the first stage regression43. As shown by 
Staiger and Stock (1997), the first-stage F-statistic on the excluded instrument 
served as an indicator for weak identification. Bound et al. (1995) show, that 
instrumental validity exists if there is a strong correlation between the potential 
instrument and education. Intuitively, the stronger the association, the stronger will 
be the identification of the model. If the potential instrument is weakly correlated 
with schooling, it is likely to obtain much less precise estimated results. The 
exogeneity requirement, however, needs a stronger theoretical argument. As for the 
exogeneity test, to ensure that the selected instruments have no relationship with the 
unobserved error term, the over-identifying restrictions test is performed and a 
second instrument is utilised.
An important potential source of regional divergence, featured in the literature, is a 
local human capital concentration. A recent article by Jurajda (2011) indicates that
42 Parent’s education was one o f  the first instruments proposed in the literature to obtain IV estimators. This 
choice has recently been criticized because parent’s education is arguably not exogenous to the wage 
determination process.
43 To examine whether the instrument is sufficiently correlated with the amount o f  education, Bound et al. 
(1995) have proposed researchers to report the partial R2 and the F-statistics o f  the identifying instruments in 
the first-stage estimation. As a rule o f  thumb, the F-statistic o f  a joint test whether all additional instruments are 
significant should be bigger than 10. Partial R2 relates to the variation in the first stage regression estimates o f  
the year o f  schooling on the instrument and exogenous variables.
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areas with a higher concentration of human capital experience a larger increase in 
their human capital endowment, and have higher returns to education. There exists 
a significant positive impact from living in a ‘good’ neighbourhood for children’s 
educational attainment (Chen, 1998). Based on that theoretical argument, we 
propose as a second instrument in the analysis the regional average differences in 
schooling. The average educational attainment may be higher in some districts 
because of the presence of a college, or some other geographical dimension factors 
that affect schooling decision. Any significant effects stemming from differences in 
geographic location point to differences in the macro-level structure of those 
regions. Specifically, we look for significant effects on educational attainment from 
different geographic locations. In our data, the district’s educational composition 
provides evidence of regional divergence driven by a concentration of human 
capital and we can see a unique schooling distribution in each region.
This allows us to generate the average schooling instrumental variable as a 
continuous variable based on the means of total number years spent in education 
within 28 different regions in Bulgaria, respectively for 1986, 1995, 1997, 2001 and 
200344. Significant difference does exist between educational levels in these 28 
regions. We find high concentration of more endowed workers within the capital 
Sofia. For instance, in 2003 individuals living in district of Silistra have on average 
10.7 years spent in education compared to the average of 14.8 years for the 
respondents in Sofia city (see Figure 4.2).
44 Since 1999, Bulgaria has been divided into 28 provinces (Bulgarian: objiacTH, oblasti; also translated as 
‘region’) which correspond approximately to the 28 districts that existed before 1987.
FIGURE 4.2: Regional variations in the average schooling in Bulgaria, 2003
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Finally, we report the Durbin-Wu-Hausam (DWH) test for endogeneity of 
schooling, which allows us to reject or accept the null hypothesis that the OLS 
estimates are consistent (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). If the DWH test 
statistics is significant, we reject the null hypothesis and we show that the 
endogeneity adjusted results are more robust.
4.2.3. Heckman two-step estimation fo r  sample selection
Sample selection bias arises as individuals have a choice whether to work, and thus 
earnings are observed only for those in work. This decision is not made randomly 
and is typically linked to certain characteristics. We address,the question of the 
potential impact of sample selection bias on returns to education by adopting 
Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure. The sample selection model has the 
following form:
Wage equation: In Yi = a  + /3Si + uu (4.3)
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where In Yt is the log of earnings, Sj is schooling for individual i; 
Selection equation: z ty  + u2i > 0 (4.4)
where w, ~N(0, <t )
u2 ~N(0, 1) 
corr (w, ,w2) = p
In the first step, the female or male probability of being employed is estimated from 
an auxiliary probit regression on a sample of employed and non-employed 
individuals to obtain estimates of y .
Thus, following Heckman two-step procedure, the selectivity corrected wage 
equation can be estimated by Ordinary least Squares (OLS) which provide unbiased 
coefficient estimates for the population as a whole, since the selection variable 
removes the part of the error term that is correlated with the explanatory variables:
Mills’ ratio, where </>(.) and 0 ( .)  denote the probability density and cumulative 
distribution functions of the standard normal distribution, a  is the covariance 
between the error term in the wage equation and the employment equation.
The dummy variables that define labour force participation decision of females and 
males are set to 1 if they are economically active and 0 otherwise. As for the 
identification the number of young children under 6 years in the family is used, 
assuming that it is an exogenous variable. The rationale for this is that it should 
influence the employment participation of women or men in the labour market but 
not their performance and earnings. We expect lower employment participation 
especially for females if there are dependent children in the household45.
45
The presence o f  young children is expected to reduce female participation since with fewer children or older 
children, women will be better positioned to avail them selves for work outside the home. For consistency the 
same identifying variable has been applied in m ale’s specification, where the assumption is that the presence o f  
younger children is expected to encourage male participation since men are likely to be the main family
Pr ( y (. observed | z ■) = ®(zy.y)
In Y; = a + pSt + crAy + coiJ (4.5)
Ay is estimated from the employment probit At = and is the inverse of
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4.2.4. Semi-parametric two-step fo r  sample selection
An alternative approach to account for the sample selection bias is based on Newey 
(1991, 2009) two-step estimator. The estimator is analogous to Heckman (1976) 
two-step procedure for the Gaussian disturbances case. This approach amounts to 
replacing a linear regression of the selection term with a series expansion. The 
method is described in details in Buchinsky (1998). The estimation is semi- 
parametric in a sense that it does not assume any distributional form for the 
disturbance term46. However, it assumes that the choice probability function 
depends on the parametrically specified index function47. To perform the semi- 
parametric correction procedure, we use a power series expansion of the inverse 
M ill’s ratio of the normalized estimated index through participation decision in a 
first step and relax the normality assumption48:
S i  = P i  + f  ,■ (45)
where g, is an index function.
To get unbiased estimates of f  for the male and female respondents it is necessary 
to introduce an extra term:
In y ,= 0 S ,+ *(* ,) + £„ (4.6)
This new term h{gt) includes information about the unobservable characteristics of 
the respondents which affect their labour force participation decision and it plays a 
similar role as the Mills ratio in the usual Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. The 
estimated probability function provides the location for the index g i y Z J  and the
supporters. In addition, expectations about m en’s involvem ent in the care o f  children are changing, albeit 
slowly. In sum, a common trend for families with young children is for women to reduce out o f  home working 
hours while men often increase theirs. Som e other identifiers were considered such as urban residence which is 
believed to be associated with various factors that help in reducing fertility and increasing female participation 
rate. However, the size o f  M ills ratio does not vary much with the suggested identifying variable.
46 Semi-parametric models combine components o f  parametric and nonparametric models. They avoid the 
assumptions o f  parametric models and functional form since they do not assume a known link function, and 
solve the curse o f  dimensionality o f  nonparametric models. However, i f  the distribution o f  parametric 
distributional assumption is valid, a semi-parametric estimator will be less efficient than its parametric 
counterparts (Lei, 2005).
47 There are many distribution-free estimates that are available for the first-step, including those o f  Manski 
(1975) when there is conditional median restriction, Cosslett (1983) when the selection disturbance is 
independent o f  regressors, Klein and Spady (1993) and Ichimura (1993) estimators.
48 W e also experimented with power series in the index however the results do not depend on doing so.
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values of g  = fZi are now used to expand h(g t) in a power series by 
approximating49:
(4 7)
where k  is the number of terms in the approximating series and is allowed to grow 
with the sample size. In the results reported here experimentation with different 
power series indicated that a second order power series was sufficient in each 
case50. Thus, equation (4.6) can be defined as:
( 4 g )
4.2.5. Quantile regression approach
Distributional approach is based on the use of quantile regression (QR) method 
(Koenker and Bassett, 1978)51 which provides estimates of the effect of education 
on earnings at different points in the earnings distribution. Estimating the effect of 
education at conditional quantiles, therefore, allows for heterogeneity in the returns 
to education. Just as OLS models the conditional mean of the dependent variable Y 
relative to the covariates X  used in the analysis, QR gives estimates of the effect of 
covariates at different percentiles of the conditional earnings distribution . In a 
wage equation setting, the QR model can be written as:
In = X 'f i ,  + u„ with f t  (In y, \X , )  = P 'X ,  (4.9)
where as before, the notation In Yi denotes the logarithm of hourly earnings for the 
sample of individuals i=l.. .n,  g 0( ln ^ |X (.) denotes the conditional quantile 6 of 
In Yt , conditional on the regressor vector of characteristics X t , p e denotes the
49 N ew ey (2009) explains that this power series can lead to several different types o f  sample selection  
correction and we can have a power series in the index, in the inverse M ills ratio or in the normal cumulative 
density function (CDF). N ew ey (2009) also allow s the correction term to have an unknown functional form.
50 According to Buchinsky (1998) addition o f  more terms to the series expansion resulted, in som e cases, in 
severe multi-col linearity problems.
51 Among many others, Buchinsky (1994, 1998) and Powell (1986) extend the use o f  QR to get information 
about the effect o f  exogenous explanatory variables on the dependent variable at different parts o f  the 
distribution.
52 Another advantage o f  QR is that it tends to be less sensitive to the presence o f  outliers in the dependent 
variable. This is because in the QR the residuals to be minimized are not squared as in the OLS, and as a result 
outliers receive less emphasis. Moreover, i f  the error term o f  the regression is not distributed normally, the QR 
may be more efficient than the mean regression (Buchinsky, 1998).
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vector of quantile regression coefficients and ua denotes the random error term with 
an unspecified distribution.
The 6 th regression quantile, 0 < 6 < 1 are defined as a solution to the problem:
min £  6 \ \ n Y t -  p eX , |+  £ ( 1 - 0 ) 1  In Y, -  p eX ,  | (4 10)
This is written as:
min £  Pe (ln y , - P e x >) (4 .! ! )
where p e (s) is the check function defined as p e (e) = Qs if s  > 0, or
s  ^  0. The model specifies the d quantile o f the conditional
distribution of the ln Yt given the covariates X j as:
Qa ( O \ X t) = p oX lt0 e ( O 9 \) (412)
We obtain different quantiles by increasing 6  from 0 to 1. As 6  is increased, the 
entire distribution of ln is traced conditional on X t . We assume that both ln Yt and 
W,.are observed with no error and that equation (4.9) is correctly specified. Thus,
we can view the model as the best linear predictor for the conditional quantile. 
However, the distribution of the error term is left unspecified and we only assume 
that the 0 th quantile of the error term is zero, so t h a t ^ C ^  I X t) = 0 . The median
regression can be defined by minimizing the sums of the absolute errors rather than 
minimizing the sum of squares as in the OLS framework. This estimator is known 
as the Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimator.
Estimates at different quantiles can be interpreted as showing the response of the 
dependent variable to the regressors at different points in the conditional wage 
distribution. The relative positioning of workers in the conditional wage 
distribution, therefore, can be related to systematic differences in unobservable, 
which generically may be referred to as ‘ability’ and include a diverse range of 
attributes like motivation, labour market connections, family human capital, school 
quality, etc (Arias et al ., 2001). Variation in ability concerns variation in the 
intercept of the wage equation. One feature of the model is that variation in ability 
also concerns the slope, or in other words, ability influences the wage-effect of
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education. If it only influenced the intercept, individuals with higher ability might 
well invest less in education, since they have a higher opportunity cost of school 
attendance.
4.3. Empirical results
In Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3 we report the estimated OLS and IV returns to 
education coefficients for males and females in Bulgaria in five different years. The 
full set of results applying the OLS, Heckman two-step, semi-parametric, 
instrumental variable and the QR approaches are given in the Appendix Tables 
A4.l-A4.15. The probit results are also reported. We have attempted to fit 
comparable specifications to the samples across years, to put the analysis in a 
common framework. The vector of control variables includes respondent’s potential 
experience (linear and quadratic terms), variables for years of tenure with the 
current firm, being married, Bulgarian ethnicity, public sector, urban settlement and 
living in the capital city. The instrumental variable in the IV estimates is defined as 
a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if a respondent’s mother reports higher 
education degree and 0 otherwise. The over-identification restrictions test is 
performed by combining the two instruments -  mother’s education and average 
regional schooling. A test for misspecification of the OLS models is also conducted 
by using the Ramsey stability test (RESET). The test is obtained by adding powers 
of the fitted values from the estimated model to the original regression equation. It 
uses the squares of fitted values to test the assumption that the relationship between 
the dependent and independent variables is linear and therefore test the correctness 
of the functional form of the model which is based on the linearity assumption. The 
diagnostic checks are reported at the bottom panel of Tables A4.1, A4.3, A4.5, 
A4.7 and A4.9.
Turning to the OLS estimates in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3, we can see that for both 
men and women there was a rise in the returns to education in the early 1995, 
followed by a decline in 1997. Overall, the returns to education in Bulgaria are 
increasing over time. More specifically, the OLS estimate of the rate of returns to 
education for men rises from 1.1 % in 1986 to 5.1% in 2003 and from 2.1% to 5.9% 
for women. This finding is in line with Arandarenko et al. (2006) who conclude
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that in Bulgaria the returns to all types of educational degrees increased 
substantially between 1995 and 2003. The very low return to education in 1986 
suggests that the structure of wage rates in a centrally-planned economy does not 
create incentives for obtaining more education. The returns o f 1.1 % for males and 
2.1% for females in 1986 are also in line with Hung (2002), who reports return to 
education of 1.9% for Bulgaria in 1989/1990. Clearly, there is a marked downturn 
in estimated returns after 1995, which might be due to the recession of 1996/9753. 
Accordingly, there is a recovery after 2001 when the Bulgarian economy has 
improved. Turning to the market forces, Bulgaria has experienced an increase in the 
supply of higher education over the period -  between 1995 and 2002, the number of 
university graduates increased from 33,000 to 50,00054.
The OLS estimates of the return to education are higher for women than for men. 
For instance, the estimated return to education in 2001 is 4.3% for males and 6.6% 
for females. By 2003 the estimated return to education for males increases to 5.2%, 
while females’ coefficient fell slightly to 5.9%. The upward trend in the returns to 
education found here is in line with previous findings. For example, in the Czech 
Republic the returns to education for men rose from 2.4% to 5.2% between 1983 
and 1993 (Chase, 1998). Similarly, increases in returns to schooling also occurred 
in Poland (Rutkowski, 1996) and Slovenia (Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995).
53 As we have already discussed during 1996, the Bulgarian econom y collapsed due to an unstable and 
decentralized banking system, a wave o f  hyperinflation throughout several countries o f  Eastern Europe, and 
slow reforms, which led to the collapse o f  the Bulgarian currency. In 1997 the government set up a currency 
board to stabilize the currency.
54 Country Profile (2006) Bulgaria, Library o f  congress country studies program, p.6 .
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TABLE 4.2
Estimated returns to education over time in Bulgaria, by gender
MALES FEMALES
OLS IV, IV2 OLS IV, IV2
1986 0 .0110*** 0.0215*** 0.0228*** 0.0207*** 0.0415*** 0.0415***
(0.0030) (0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0029) (0.0072) (0.0071)
1995 0.0453*** 0.0850** 0.0923*** 0.0700*** 0.0838* 0.0971**
(0.0097) (0.0331) (0.0332) (0.0113) (0.0434) (0.0433)
1997 0.0397*** 0.0745*** 0.0774*** 0.0454*** 0.0595*** 0.0635***
(0.0119) (0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0115) (0.0179) (0.0174)
2001 0.0431** 0.1281** 0.1036*** 0.0664*** 0.1005*** 0.0983***
(0.0117) (0.0614) (0.0474) (0.0094) (0 .0212) (0.0184)
2003 0.0512*** 0.0996** 0 .] 144*** 0.0598*** 0.1051*** 0.1056***
(0.0048) (0.0496) (0.0310) (0.0046) (0.0143) (0.0132)
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 1 0 % level respectively;
IVi -  specification where mother’s education is used as an instrument; IV2 -  over-identification specification - 
both mother’s education and average regional differences in schooling are used as instruments.
The stability tests used to detect the general functional form misspecification in the 
OLS, report insignificant x2 and F-statistics and thus indicate that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of no model specification problem.
FIGURE 4.3
Returns to education over time in Bulgaria, males and females
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The corresponding IV results reveal a similar increasing pattern. For instance, by 
using mother’s education as an instrument, the IV coefficient for men rises from 
2.2% in 1986 to 9.9% in 2003. Similarly for women, the IV estimates increase from 
4.2% in 1986 to 10.5% in 2003. We obtain higher IV estimates for both genders
/  ",
1986 1995 1997 2001 2003
 Males ~ Females
Notes: OLS estimates o f  return to education, Bulgaria.
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than the corresponding OLS and this is in accordance with the results reported in 
the literature. For example, our IV estimate for males in 2003 is 42% higher than 
the corresponding OLS estimate. Similarly, for females in 2003, the IV estimate of 
the return to education increases by 47%. The coefficients do not change 
significantly in the over-identified specifications where both instruments -  a 
mother’s education and regional average schooling are used. For instance, the IV 
estimates for males in 1986 are 2.2% when the mother’s education is used as an 
instrument and 2.3% in the over-identification specification by adding average 
regional schooling as an additional instrument.
We also report the results from the first stage regressions. As might be expected, 
there is a strong relationship between a mother’s education and individual’s school 
attainment. Throughout all the years the instrument does show a strong significant 
and positive effect on the school outcome of individuals. For both males and 
females, the /^-statistics of the excluded instrument indicates the significance of the 
coefficient in their first stage regression. Moreover, the partial R2 of the effect of 
the instrument on the years of schooling is higher than the guidelines given by 
Bound et al. (1995). For instance in 1986 just-identified IV estimates, the F- 
statistics of 511.63 (partial R2 o f 0.138) for men and 586.78 (partial R2 o f 0.154) for 
women confirm validity of the instrument and reject the null hypothesis that this 
instrument is weak (the critical value is 16.38). Therefore we can conclude that in 
the 1986 specification, men and women with highly educated mothers have on 
average 3.3 more years of schooling compared to their counterparts (see Table 
A4.2). Slightly lower, but still valid following Bound et al. (1995), are the tests for 
the 1995 just-identified estimates, where the tests of excluding the instrument from 
the reduced form equations, yield an / ’-statistics of 54.13 (partial R2 o f 0.073) for 
males and 36.03 (partial R2 of 0.057) for females (see Table A4.4).
Our main concern however, lies in the direct effect of the mother’s education on 
earnings. In an exactly identified model we cannot test the hypothesis that the 
instrument is valid. In that case, the assumption that the instrument is valid will
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essentially have to be taken in faith (Soderbom, 2011)55. As we discussed, having 
more than one potential instrument, will enable us to undertake the Sargan 
instrument validity test of the over-identifying restriction and to provide support for 
our empirical approach. The Sargan test results in failure to reject the null 
hypothesis56 in all specifications (for instance, in 1986 estimates the p-value of 
0.4748 for males and 0.9497 for females). The validity tests were passed for both 
males and females, which provides some support for the approach adopted here. In 
addition, we apply the Stock and Yogo (2005) (SY) test. We compare the minimum 
eigenvalue statistic (MES) with the critical values (we are willing to accept at most 
a rejection rate of 10% of a nominal 5% Wald test) in the 1986 sample. Since the 
MES statistics of 271.25 for males and 299.6857 for females exceed the critical 
value of 19.93, we passed the SY test in the over-identified model.
The endogeneity test (DWH test58) indicates that the hypothesis of endogeneity of 
education is rejected at a 1% level only in female specifications for 1986 and 2001 
and for both male and female over-identified specifications in 2003, and we can 
conclude that the OLS estimates tend to underestimate the average effect of 
schooling. The DWH test is also rejected at a 10% level of significance for males in 
1997 estimates. The sign of the bias is in accordance with the results reported in the 
literature (Card, 1999, 2001; Griliches, 1977). In all other specifications we do not 
reject the null hypothesis (for instance in 1995, DWH /?-value=0.2059 for males 
andp-value=0.7428 for females, see Table A4.4).
55 In order to show why w e cannot test for validity o f  this assumption, the following exactly identified model 
can be considered: y, =/?0 + f i y 2 +«,
Expressing the structural equation as a function o f  the predicted value o f  leads:
Ti = Po +A(*izi)+M2 =  (Po + P f i a) + P x{ n xZ x) + u x
One cannot test the hypothesiscov(z,,w 1) =  0 ,  simply because ut is not observed and without further 
information, is not possible to obtain an estimate o f  u/ unless we assume cov(z,, w,) =  0. That is, the estimate o f  
Ui w ill be uncorrelated with z/ by construction.
56 The null hypothesis o f  over-identifying restriction test is that all included instrumental variables are jointly  
exogenous.
57 These are statistics in the 1986 over-identified specification.
58 A  DWH test is performed by comparing p QLs and p jy estimates. The null hypothesis is that there are no 
endogenous variables or that endogeneity does not affect the OLS estimator. Under the null hypothesis, p  is 
consistent and efficient and p  is consistent but inefficient. Under alternative hypothesis, p QLs is inconsistent 
but p  remains consistent.
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The coefficients on the return to education do not change significantly between 
Heckman and semi-parametric approaches. For example, the estimated rate of 
return to education for males in 2003 using the Heckman parametric two-step 
approach is 4.8%, while the semi-parametric approach gives an estimate of 4.7%. 
The similarity o f the parametric and semi-parametric two-step estimates suggests 
that inclusion of the two approximation terms is essentially performing the same 
task as the inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio. A similar finding was provided in 
Vella (1998). Moreover, Heckman two-step estimates do not confirm selectivity 
bias as the included Mills ratio is statistically insignificant in all specifications for 
both males and females. This also suggests that there is no correlation between the 
error terms in the earnings equation and in the selection equation. Apart from the 
1995 male estimates, the coefficients of the two approximation power series 
correction terms in the semi-parametric approach are jointly not significant in both 
male and female specifications. Therefore, we may draw a conclusion that the 
corrected returns to education in the Heckman specification is not significantly 
different from the one obtained in the straightforward OLS specification.
Importantly, the selection equation (probit equation) has to be properly specified. 
The dependent variable in our probit specifications is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if females or males are in employment and 0 otherwise. The possible 
exclusion variable in our data sets is the number of children up to the age of 6, 
currently present in the family. The presence of young children is expected to 
reduce female participation since with fewer children or older children; women will 
be better positioned to avail themselves for work outside the home. For consistency 
the same identifying variable has been applied in male’s specification, where the 
assumption is that the presence of younger children encourages male participation 
since men are likely to be the main family supporters. In addition, expectations 
about men’s involvement in the care of children are changing, albeit slowly. In 
sum, a common trend for families with young children is for women to reduce out 
of home working hours while men often increase theirs. In order to eliminate the 
possibility of reaching a conclusion regarding selectivity bias based on 
misspecification of the model, we experimented with several specifications. Some 
other identifiers were considered such as urban residence which is believed to be 
associated with various factors that help in reducing fertility and increasing female
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participation rate. The size of Mills ratio does not vary much with each specific 
choice o f identifying variables included in the probit function and all specifications 
lead to the conclusion that no selectivity bias is present in the data59. The 
probability models indicate that having children in a household does seem to have 
significant effect in females’ participation decision only in 1986, 1995 and 1997 
specifications. In addition, married females in the 1986 and 1995 specifications are 
less likely to be in the labour force.
There are several potential explanations for the increasing trend in returns to 
education in Bulgaria. In the literature, a lot of emphasis has been placed on the 
role o f skill-based technical changes60. By shifting the relative demand of educated 
labour relative to available supply, the skill-based technical change has increased 
the returns to education (Denny and Harmon, 2001). The skill-based technical 
progress increased the relative productivity of skilled labour and generated a 
continuous upward shift in its demand (see Acemoglu and Autor, 2010, for a recent 
discussion). Supply and demand factors affecting the returns to education include 
changes in the relative supply of educated workers, the changing composition of the 
labour force as retiring cohorts were replaced with younger workers over time, 
skill-biased technological change and globalization of the economy, i.e. 
international trade (Zhang et el., 2005). Desjonqueres et al. (1999) emphasizes that 
the rise in skill premium has been accompanied by increases in the ratio of skilled 
to unskilled employment in all sectors. Moreover, the skill premium has risen in 
less-developed and newly industrializing countries as well as in OECD countries.
The most obvious explanation for the steady increase in the returns to education in 
Bulgaria is that as a transition economy, the country moved from a system of 
government compressed wage scales to a market-oriented system. The downsizing 
of heavy industry in Bulgaria during the transition period caused a reduction in the 
demand of unskilled labour. The expansion of skill-insentive services (for example, 
finance, insurance and real estate, information services) increased the demand for 
more educated employees61. While the current study is unable to examine a
59 Since most women in Bulgaria are in work this result is expected.
60 See Card and Lemieux (1999) for a recent review.
61 As shown in Appendix Table A4.16 the service sector in tersm o f  employment expanded significantly. 
Between 2000 and 2003, for example, employment in the real estate sector increased by 27%. Further
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systematic link between returns to education and economic reforms, as in Flabbi et 
al. (2008) we can indicate that heterogeneity in estimated returns to education 
coefficients suggests that non-competitive forces might have determined wage 
levels and their distributions in Bulgaria. We draw this conclusion from the QR 
estimates showing how return to education has evolved at different points of the 
earning distribution. Table 4.3 shows estimated returns to education over time at the 
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles for males and females respectively. The full 
set of estimates is presented in Appendix Tables A4.11 -  A4.15.
TABLE 4.3
Evolution of returns to education across distribution, Bulgaria
M ales
QR (9=0.10 0=0.25 0=O.5C 0=0.75 0 = 0 .9 0
1986 0.0281*** 0.0205*** 0.0098*** -0.0005 0.0000
(0.0043) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0 .0001)
1995 0.0451*** 0.0292*** 0.0236** 0.0308** 0.0395*
(0.0161) (0.0086) (0.0094) (0 .0122) (0.0218)
1997 0.0172 0.0270 0.0352*** 0.0450*** 0.0678***
(0.0205) (0.0167) (0.0107) (0.0144) (0.0161)
2001 0.0344** 0.0310*** 0.0427*** 0.0305*** 0.0166
(0.0146) (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0104) (0.0198)
2003 0.0383*** 0.0463*** 0.0461*** 0.0490*** 0.0589***
(0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0082)
F em ales
QR (9=0.10 0=0.25 0=O.5C 0=0.75 0 = 0 .9 0
1986 0.0524*** 0.0305*** 0.0171*** 0.0082** -0.0032
(0.0050) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0 .0021)
1995 0.0557*** 0.0526*** 0.0644*** 0.0448*** 0.0458**
(0.0093) (0.0058) (0.0070) (0 .0120) (0.0192)
1997 0.0571*** 0.0383*** 0.0492*** 0.0604*** 0.0436**
(0.0144) (0.0116) (0.0153) (0.0175) (0.0213)
2001 0.0591*** 0.0672*** 0.0566*** 0.0434*** 0.0533***
(0.0097) (0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0130) (0.0139)
2003 0.0478*** 0.0505*** 0.0625*** 0.0699*** 0.0673***
(0.0073) (0.0034) (0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0080)
N o te s :  Standard errors in parenthesis; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
The results demonstrate that the average returns to education in Bulgaria, for both 
males and females, are driven by an increasing trend in return in the upper end of 
the conditional wage distribution. In 1986 the point estimates at the top of the 
distribution are insignificant and even negative. In 2003, the rate of return to 
education at the 90th quantile rises to 5.9% for males and 6.7% for females. For
examination o f  the explanations for the increased return to education refer back to Table 3.5 which shows that 
the increased rate o f  return to education is unlikely to be due to increased shortatge o f  highly educate labour 
arising from changes in the educational participation rate (since this rate has been rising).
I l l
females, the changes in returns to education at the lower part of the distribution are 
roughly proportional over time. The spread in returns between the 10th and 90th 
percentile is higher for males as compared with females.
In addition, Figure 4.4 shows the evolution of the employment structure based on 
qualification in Bulgaria. One can see that employment possibilities for primary 
educated workers declined considerably during the first years of transition and the 
share of university workers rapidly increased in 1995, thus we may suggest that 
adjustment in the labour market could have been made through the change in 
supply of educated workers.
FIGURE 4.4
Evolution of the structure of employees based on qualifications in Bulgaria
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Notes: T he figure is based on the descriptive statistics for workers who report wages.
Finally we briefly consider the return to the other covariates included in the models. 
The estimated coefficients in the potential experience are insignificant in most of 
the OLS estimates and this may be explained by the structural reforms that have 
taken place in Bulgarian economy during the transition. Only in 2003 the 
experience coefficients are statistically significant and earnings tend to increase 
with tenure. Married women in 1986 report 37% higher earnings when compared to 
other categories (single and divorced). The results also show that workers who 
reside in an urban or capital city show positive relationship between years of 
schooling and the type of settlement and thus earnings increase with urban 
residence. This is consistent with expectations that individuals living in urban areas
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have more opportunity to exploit skills acquired through higher education than do 
those living in rural areas. One would have expected public sector employment to 
be associated with higher earnings. However, the coefficients on public sector 
employment tend to be insignificant in most of the OLS specifications and even 
negative in value for the 1995 OLS estimates. Only for the 1997 and 2003 OLS 
estimates, the public sector wages are statistically significant standing at 19.7% for 
males and 5.9% for females in the latest year. Looking at the returns to public 
sector across the conditional earnings distribution, however, it appears that for both 
males and females in 1986, returns to public sector employment tend to be 
significant and positive in the lower part of the distribution, and significant and 
negative in the top end.
4.4. Conclusions
The empirical analysis in this Chapter provides a broad assessment of the returns to 
education in Bulgaria over the transition to market economy. The main question 
addressed in the Chapter concerns the hypothesis whether Bulgarian returns to 
education rise or fall during the transition. Unlike most studies on returns to 
education, we have taken into account several empirical methods -  the OLS, 
Heckman two-step, semi-parametric two-step approach, instrumental variable and 
the QR. Based on the empirical estimations, the following conclusions can be 
drawn:
• Over the period of transition, which continued until the early 2003, we find an 
upward trend in the evolution of returns to education in Bulgaria. The average 
returns to one additional year of education raised from 1.1% to 5.1% for males and 
from 2.1% to 5.9% for females. Similarly, in the IV just-identified estimates, return 
to education increased from 2.2% in 1986 to 9.9% in 2003 for males and from 4.2% 
to 10.5% for females. The results are not surprising, given the documented increase 
in the rate of returns to education over the transition period. Estimates of earning 
function using data from Russia and Eastern Europe exhibit the same increasing 
tendency (Brainerd, 1998; Chase, 1998). These results clearly suggest that market 
reforms in Bulgaria led to the productivity augmenting factors being rewarded 
accordingly.
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• The OLS estimates show that returns to education in Bulgaria are statistically 
significant and lower than the international average of 7% to 8% and certainly 
broadly similar to other transition countries, such as the Ukraine for example62. Our 
findings of a very low return to education in 1986 are in line with previous studies 
that estimate returns to education in transition economies (Brainerd, 1998; Katz, 
1999; Newell and Reilly, 1996).
• In line with Flabbi et al. (2008) findings, our results confirm that the largest 
increase in the rate of returns to education took place in the early transition period. 
For males, the OLS estimate of the return to education increased from 1.1% in 1986 
to 4.5% in 1995 and from 2.1% to 7.0% for females.
• We have been able to control for the endogeneity of education by employing the 
IV estimation procedure. The IV estimates, when using mother’s education as an 
instrument increased by approximately 42% in all specifications, and this increase 
is clearly documented in the literature. Mother’s education presents a strong 
correlation with the schooling variable. The instrumental validity was strengthened 
by the over-identification tests, which result in failure to reject the null hypothesis 
in all specifications. However, the DWH test rejected the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity only for females in 1986 and for both males and females in 2003 over­
identified specifications.
• Selectivity bias with respect to the participation of men and women in the labour 
market shows that there are no reasons to suspect the estimates of returns to 
education are misleading. Only in the 1995 male estimates, the two approximation 
selectivity terms are statistically significant at 5% level.
• The similarity of the parametric and semi-parametric two-step estimates indicates 
that inclusion of the two approximation terms perform the same task as the 
inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio.
62 See Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2005).
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•W e  found that not all individuals benefited equally from education. Early in 
transition, individuals at the lower part of the distribution appear to have benefitted 
more from education compared to their counterparts at the upper part of the 
distribution, lending support to the notion that education could have been 
substituted for the low ability. Whereas the return for males in 1986 at the 10th 
percentile was 2.8%, it tended to be insignificant at the 90th percentile. Similarly 
for females, the rate of returns to education at the 10th percentile was 5.2% and it 
turned to negative at the top of the distribution.
• Over the examined period, the most prominent increase in the wage premium 
occurred at the top of the distribution, where the rate of returns to education, in 
particular for females, increased from a negative and insignificant sign in 1986 to 
7% in 2003.
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CHAPTER FOUR APPENDIX
TABLE A4 Classification o f  the levels o f  education
Terms used in the study 
Primary education
The first stage of education designed to provide a sound 
of basic education in reading, writing, and mathematics. 
Entry age: between 6 and 7.
Lower secondary education
Completes provision of basic education, usually in more 
subject-oriented way. Duration is 3 years.
Upper secondary education
Stronger subject specialisation than at lower secondary 
level. Students typically expected to have completed 9 
years of education or lower secondary schooling before 
entry and are generally 15 or 16 years old. 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education 
This level straddles the boundary between upper 
secondary and post-secondary education. Programme 
content may not be significantly more advanced than that 
in upper secondary, but is not as advanced as that in 
tertiary programmes. Duration usually is the equivalent 
of between 6 months and 2 years. Students tend to be 
older that those enrolled in upper secondary education 
Tertiary education
Programmes designed to provide qualifications for entry 
to advanced research programmes. Duration at least 3 
years.
Advanced research programmes
Programmes that lead to the award of an advanced 
research qualification, e.g. Ph.D. The duration of these 
programmes is 3 years ___________________________
j ISCED classification
; ISCED 1
! ISCED 2
ISCED 3
f  ISCED 4
! ISCED 5
| ISCED 6
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TABLE A4.1
Returns to education in Bulgaria, by gender, 1986
M ales F em ales
OLS Heckman Probit Sem i-
parametric
OLS Heckman Probit Sem i-
parametric
(I) (2) (3) (4) 0) (2) (3) (4)
school 0 .0 1 1 0 *** 0 .0 1 1 0 *** -0 .0113* 0.0109*** 0.0207*** 0.0208*** 0 .0 1 2 0 ** 0.0205***
(0 .0030) (0 .0031) (0.0060) (0 .0031) (0 .0029) (0.0029) (0 .0060) (0.0030)
exp 0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0069*** -0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0004 -0.0003 0.0069*** -0.0004
(0 .0009) (0 .0 0 1 0 ) (0 .0013) (0 .0 0 1 0 ) (0 .0007) (0.0009) (0 .0013) (0 .0 0 1 0 )
expsq 0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 0 2 *** 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 2 *** 0 .0 0 0 0
(0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 )
1 -2  years 0 .1 2 2 2 0.1248 0.1804 0.1243 0.0247 0.0208 -0.1797 0.0239
(0 .0753) (0 .0768) (0.1248) (0.0771) (0 .0733) (0 .0746) (0 .1247) (0.0748)
3-5 years 0.1237* 0.1254* 0.1379 0.1250* -0 .1465** -0 .1483** -0 .1369 -0.1478**
(0 .0644) (0 .0649) (0.0982) (0 .0651) (0 .0585) (0 .0588) (0 .0982) (0.0589)
6 - 1 0  years -0.0358 -0.0359 0.0417 -0 .0359 -0 .2235*** -0.2219*** -0 .0394 -0.2242***
(0 .0652) (0 .0652) (0 .0975) (0 .0652) (0 .0575) (0 .0578) (0 .0975) (0 .0580)
> 1 0  years 0.0087 0.0058 -0.1319 0.0064 -0.1642*** -0 .1582” 0 .1370 -0.1647**
(0 .0699) (0 .0723) (0 .1062) (0 .0730) (0 .0618) (0 .0657) (0.1062) (0 .0669)
married 0.2166*** 0.2133*** 0 .1033** 0.2139*** 0.3754*** 0.3797*** -0.1026** 0.3758***
(0 .0258) (0 .0324) (0 .0504) (0 .0335) (0 .0289) (0 .0337) (0.0504) (0 .0353)
3ulgarian 0.1367*** 0.1357*** -0 .1103** 0.1360*** 0 .0629** 0.0650** 0.1096** 0 .0629“
(0 .0275) (0.0281) (0 .0492) (0 .0282) (0 .0291) (0.0298) (0 .0492) (0.0302)
Dublic 0 .0167 0.0171 0.0275 0.0171 -0.0362 -0.0371 -0.0285 -0.0363
(0 .0270) (0.0270) (0 .0441) (0 .0271) (0.0254) (0 .0256) (0 .0441) (0.0257)
urban 0.0596*** 0.0582*** -0 .1156*** 0.0585*** 0.0398** 0.0424* 0.1148*** 0.0407*
(0 .0187) (0 .0205) (0.0381) (0 .0 2 1 0 ) (0 .0193) (0 .0 2 2 0 ) (0 .0381) (0.0224)
sofia region 0.0572** 0.0532 -0.3110*** 0.0546 0.0432* 0.0501 0.3061*** 0.0467
(0 .0266) (0 .0344) (0.0579) (0 .0378) (0 .0262) (0 .0371) (0 .0579) (0 .0382)
mills 0 .0217
(0 .1237)
0.0362
(0 .1433)
children 0.1148***
(0 .0204)
-0.1151***
(0 .0204)
( z ' y ) 0 .0450 0.1432
(0 .1796) (0 .3354)
(■z ' r ) 2 -0 .0178 -0.0848
(0 .1266) (0 .2224)
constant 0 .4777*** 0 .4739*** 1.1026*** 0.4647*** 0.5042*** 0.4525** -1.1165*** 0.4457*
(0 . 1 0 2 1 ) (0 .1034) (0.1604) (0 .1226) (0 .0921) (0 .2228) (0 .1605) (0 .2399)
N 3213 3213 6450 3213 3238 3238 6450 3238
R: 0 .0724 0.0724 0.0725 0.1096 0.1096 0.1097
F 16.08 14.86 13.81 24.42 22.53 20.92
^og-likelihood -1946.76 -1946.75 -4390.15 -1946.74 -1888.39 -1888.34 -4389.75 -1888.22
ilam sey test j 2=2.81 fO.0381 * 2=0.32r0.8101
N otes: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.Figures in squared 
brackets are p-values.
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TABLE A4.2
IV estimates o f  returns to education in Bulgaria, by gender, 1986
M ales F em ales
First stage IV, First stage iv2 First stage IV, First stage iv2
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4)
pschool 0.0215***
(0 .0079)
0 .0228***
(0 .0077)
0 .0415***
(0 .0072)
0 .0415***
(0 .0071)
exp 0.0153*** -0 .0 0 0 0 0.0156*** -0 .0 0 0 0 0.0373*** -0 .0009 0.0377*** -0 .0009
(0 .0036) (0 .0006) (0 .0036) (0 .0006) (0.0034) (0 .0006) (0 .0034) (0 .0006)
expsq -0.0017*** 0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0016*** 0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0014*** 0 .0 0 0 1 *** -0.0014*** 0 .0 0 0 1 ***
(0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 )
1 -2  years -0.1833 0.1270** -0.2268 0.1276** -0.4078 0.0312 -0 .4294 0.0311
(0.3535) (0.0633) (0 .3521) (0 .0633) (0 .3494) (0 .0609) (0 .3489) (0 .0609)
3-5 years -0 .6155** 0.1322*** -0 .6293** 0.1332*** -0.2145 -0 .1394*** -0 .2288 -0 .1394***
(0 .2838) (0 .0512) (0 .2827) (0 .0511) (0 .2730) (0 .0476) (0 .2727) (0 .0476)
6 - 1 0  years -1 .2236*** -0.0197 -1.2445*** -0.0178 -0 .7371*** -0.1993*** -0.7391*** -0 .1993***
(0 .2794) (0 .0514) (0 .2783) (0 .0513) (0.2667) (0 .0471) (0 .2663) (0 .0471)
> 10  years -3 .3591*** 0.0522 -3.3418*** 0 .0574 -2.6361*** -0 .0900 -2 .6132*** -0.0902
(0.2928) (0.0614) (0 .2917) (0.0610) (0 .2871) (0 .0557) (0 .2867) (0.0556)
married -0 .7533*** 0 .2 2 1 0 *** -0.7068*** 0.2216*** -0 .3686*** 0.3755*** -0 .3429** 0 .3755***
(0 .1262) (0 .0227) (0 .1260) (0 .0227) (0 .1341) (0 .0232) (0 .1341) (0 .0232)
bulgarian 0 .9950*** 0.1246*** 0.8758*** 0.1232*** 1.4311*** 0 .0327 1.3356*** 0.0328
(0 .1297) (0 .0249) (0.1312) (0 .0248) (0.1403) (0 .0266) (0 .1431) (0 .0266)
public 1.0041*** 0.0054 0.9749*** 0.0041 0.9260*** -0 .0588** 0.8899*** -0 .0587**
(0 . 1 2 0 2 ) (0 .0231) (0.1198) (0 .0230) (0 .1245) (0.0230) (0 .1248) (0 .0230)
urban 1.3298*** 0.0430* 1.3073*** 0.0410* 1.1953*** 0.0092 1 ]913*** 0.0093
(0 .1018) (0 .0 2 2 1 ) (0 .1015) (0 .0219) (0 .1070) (0 .0214) (0 .1069) (0 .0213)
sofia region 2.4348*** 0.0233 1.5432*** 0.0193 2.0736*** -0.0192 1.5380*** -0 .0190
(0 .1616) (0 .0379) (0.2359) (0 .0375) (0.1555) (0 .0339) (0 .2251) (0 .0337)
mother_educ 3.2874***
(0 .1453)
3.2247***
(0 .1453)
3 .2988***
(0 .1362)
3.2436***
(0 .1370)
average_sch 0.3321***
(0 .0642)
0 .2095***
(0 .0637)
constant 11.7082*** 0.3449*** 8.4913*** 0.3291*** 9.6087*** 0.2733** 7.5809*** 0.2740***
(0 .3850) (0 . 1 2 1 1 ) (0 .7307) (0 .1190) (0 .4119) (0 .1063) (0 .7416) (0 .1057)
N 3212 3212 3212 3212 3237 3237 3237 3237
R2 0.4537 0.0704 0 .4582 0.0708 0 .4769 0.1038 0 .4787 0 .1039
F 221.37 20.18 208.04 20.30 244.94 31.11 227.62 31.16
Log-likelihood -7476.16 -1950.07 -7462.78 -1949.41 -7553.77 -1898.63 -7548.35 -1898.37
F (excluded) 511.63*** 271.25*** 586.78*** 299.68***
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sargan test 0.511 0.004
p-value 0.4748 0 .9497
Partial R2 0.1379 0 .1450 0.1540 0.1568
DW H test 1.9807 2.6435 9.8647 10.0199
p-value 0.1593 0.1039 0.0016 0.0015
N otes: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
IVi -  specification where mother education is used as an instrument; IV 2 -  over-identification specification - both mother 
education and average regional differences in schooling are used as instruments
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TABLE A4.3
Returns to education in Bulgaria, by gender, 1995
M ales F em ales
OLS Heckman Probit Semi-
parametric
OLS Heckman Probit Semi-
parametric
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4)
school 0.0453*** 0.0444*** 0.0405*** 0.0328*** 0.0700*** 0.0710*** 0.0605*** 0.0713***
(0 .0097) (0 .0096) (0.0185) (0 .0108) (0 .0113) (0 .0115) (0 .0185) (0.0115)
exp 0 .0 1 2 1 0.0136 0.0230*** 0.0285** -0.0013 -0 .0060 -0 .0730*** -0.0064
(0 .0 1 2 2 ) (0 .0123) (0.0175) (0 .0135) (0 .0106) (0 .0114) (0 .0175) (0.0125)
expsq -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0015*** -0 .0007** 0.0003 0.0004 0.0018*** 0.0004
(0 .0003) (0 .0003) (0.0004) (0 .0003) (0 .0003) (0 .0003) (0 .0004) (0.0003)
1 -2  years 0.0823 0.0811 0.1126 0.0455 0.3543** 0.3496** 0.2125 0.3508**
(0 .1013) (0 . 1 0 1 1 ) (0 .0085) (0 . 1 0 2 2 ) (0 .1460) (0 .1450) (0 .2085) (0 .1461)
3-5 years 0.1048 0.1037 -0 .1826 0.0770 0.1470 0.1408 0.1826 0.1411
(0 .0829) (0 .0829) (0.1884) (0 .0835) (0 .1150) (0 .1140) (0 .1884) (0.1142)
6 - 1 0  years 0.2466*** 0.2460*** -0.1837 0.2132** 0.1983* 0.1905* 0.1837 0.1910*
(0.0847) (0 .0846) (0 .1792) (0 .0863) (0 .1119) (0 .1123) (0 .1792) (0 .1130)
> 1 0  years 0.1630** 0.1610** -0.2733 0.1149 0.1140 0.1103 0.2733 0.1108
(0 .0768) (0 .0767) (0 .1751) (0 .0784) (0 .1095) (0 .1098) (0 .1751) (0 .1104)
married 0.0537 0.0689 0.1737*** 0.1801** 0.1429* 0.1252 -0 .5737*** 0 .1 2 2 1
(0 .0600) (0.0625) (0 .0199) (0 .0746) (0 .0830) (0 .0793) (0 .1199) (0 .0815)
bulgarian -0.0298 -0.0274 0.1525 -0.0025 0.0894 0.0979 -0.1525 0.0977
(0 .0800) (0.0801) (0 .1976) (0.0794) (0 .0778) (0 .0760) (0 .1976) (0.0760)
urban 0.1276** 0.1292** -0.0161 0.1171** 0.0856 0.0811 0.0661 0.0818
(0 .0536) (0.0536) (0 .0138) (0 .0540) (0 .0654) (0 .0645) (0 .1138) (0 .0644)
sofia_region 0.2209*** 0.2252*** 0.2915 0.2628*** 0.1660** 0.1627** -0.1915 0.1628**
(0 .0617) (0.0619) (0 .0344) (0 .0635) (0 .0665) (0 .0665) (0 .1344) (0 .0666)
public -0.0633 -0.0635 0.1150 -0.0927 0.0925 0.0944 0 .1650 0.0948
(0 .0617) (0 .0618) (0 .1304) (0.0626) (0 .0860) (0.0860) (0 .1304) (0.0860)
children 0.1537
(0 .0507)
-0.9535***
(0 .2050)
mills 0.0596 -0.0692
( z ' y )
(0 .0688) (0 .0505)
0.6597** -0.0927
( z ' y ) 2
(0 .2624) (0.2065)
-0 .1635**
(0 .0755)
0.0156
(0.1329)
constant 4.1018*** 4.0657*** 0.8135*** 3.8529*** 3.1930*** 3.2509*** -0 .8135*** 3.2555***
(0.1634) (0 .1714) (0.3062) (0 .1831) (0.2215) (0 .2104) (0 .3062) (0.2183)
N 708 708 1379 708 609 609 1379 609
R2 0.1326 0.1333 0.1361 0.1439 0.1469 0.1469
F 7.3059 6.7918 6.9158 8.2355 7.5914 7.1434
Log-likelihood -575.58 -575.28 -486.86 -574.14 -514.00 -512.94 -486.86 -512.94
Ram sey test j 2= l .24(0.433] * 2=0.47r0.7011
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Figures in squared brackets are p-values.
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TABLE A4.4
IV estimates o f  returns to education in Bulgaria, by gender, 1995
M ales F em ales
IV, First stage IV2 First stage IV, First stage i v 2 First stage
( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4)
school 0.0850**
(0 .0331)
0 .0923***
(0 .0332)
0.0838*
(0 .0434)
0 .0971**
(0 .0433)
exp 0 .0098 0.0722** 0.0093 0.0721** -0.0019 0.0642 -0 .0026 0.0635
(0 .0086) (0 .0348) (0 .0087) (0 .0348) (0 .0109) (0.0427) (0 .0109) (0 .0427)
expsq -0 .0 0 0 2 -0 .0036*** -0 .0 0 0 2 -0 .0036*** 0.0003 -0.0043*** 0 .0004 -0.0042***
(0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0.0007) (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0007) (0 .0003) (0.0009) (0 .0003) (0.0009)
1 -2  years 0 .0720 0.1048 0.0702 0.1048 0.3498*** -0.0438 0 .3455*** -0 .0386
(0.1036) (0 .4822) (0 .1042) (0 .4825) (0.1250) (0 .4797) (0 .1255) (0.4783)
3-5 years 0 .1190 -0.2059 0 .1216 -0.2061 0.1438 -0.1372 0 .1407 -0.1606
(0 .0841) (0.3097) (0 .0846) (0 .3106) (0 .0967) (0.3433) (0 .0971) (0.3454)
6 - 1 0  years 0 .2532*** -0.0803 0 .2544*** -0 .0804 0.1944** 0 .1256 0 .1907** 0.1183
(0.0834) (0 .3457) (0 .0839) (0 .3459) (0.0938) (0 .3353) (0 .0942) (0.3353)
> 1 0  years 0 .1819** -0.2658 0.1853** -0 .2657 0 .0970 1.1242*** 0.0805 1.1118***
(0 .0786) (0 .3408) (0 .0790) (0 .3418) (0 .1042) (0 .3102) (0 .1044) (0.3085)
married 0.0291 0.9028*** 0.0246 0.9028*** 0.1536** -0.3999 0 .1638** -0.4030
(0.0618) (0 .2214) (0 .0622) (0 .2217) (0.0743) (0 .2823) (0 .0745) (0.2819)
bulgarian -0 .1280 2.2660*** -0 .1459 2.2659*** 0 .0529 2.5212*** 0.0177 2.5363***
(0.1138) (0.3141) (0 .1144) (0 .3147) (0.1416) (0 .3637) (0 .1416) (0 .3626)
public -0.0853 0.4490* -0.0893 0.4493* 0.0970 -0.3182 0 .1014 -0 .3000
(0.0626) (0.2365) (0 .0629) (0 .2376) (0.0778) (0 .2926) (0 .0781) (0.2941)
urban 0.0886 0.9170*** 0.0815 0.9167*** 0 .0712 0.8752*** 0 .0572 0.8391***
(0 .0591) (0.2003) (0 .0594) (0 .2041) (0.0730) (0 .2181) (0 .0731) (0.2198)
sofia_region 0.1523* 1.7025*** 0 .1398 1.6951** 0.1558* 0.7697** 0.1459* 0 .0770
(0 .0887) (0.3158) (0 .0892) (0 .8200) (0 .0807) (0 .3299) (0 .0810) (0.7876)
m oth_educ 3.8402***
(0.4355)
3 .8396***
(0 .4390)
2.5001***
(0 .4264)
2 .4890***
(0.4319)
average_sch 0.0030
(0.2990)
0 .2786
(0.2788)
constant 3.7726*** 7.9400*** 3.7127*** 7.9109*** 3.0612*** 9 .4 4 7 9 *** 2 .9340*** 6.7341**
(0.2995) (0.4870) (0 .3009) (2 .9086) (0.4365) (0 .5480) (0 .4358) (2 .7447)
N 708 708 708 708 609 609 609 609
R- 0.1074 0.3556 0 .0974 0.3556 0.1414 0.4035 0.1342 0 .4044
F 6.94 33.85 6.96 31.31 4.84 35.88 4.91 33.07
Log-likelihood -585.59 -1626.72 -589.49 -1626.72 -514.88 -1456.32 -517.38 -1455.83
F (excluded) 54.13*** 27.10*** 36.03*** 18.23***
p -\a lu e 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0
Sargan test 19.055 7.380
p-value 0 .0 0 0 0 0.0066
Partial -R 2 0 .0730 0 .0732 0 .0576 0.0584
DWH test 1.5998 2 .2410 0 .1076 0 .4209
p-value 0.2059 0.1343 0.7428 0.5164
N otes: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
IV, -  specification where mother education is used as an instrument; IV2 -  over-identification specification - both mother education and 
average regional differences in schooling are used as instruments
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TABLE A4.5
Returns to education in Bulgaria, by gender, 1997
M ales F em ales
OLS Heckman Probit Sem i-
parametric
OLS Heckman Probit Sem i-
parametric
( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4)
school 0 .0397*** 0 .0168** 0.0482 0.0363** 0.0454*** 0.0515*** 0.0329 0.0586***
(0 .0119) (0.0084) (0 .0521) (0 .0182) (0 .0115) (0.0149) (0.0539) (0 .0141)
exp 0.0119 -0.0034 -0.0355 0.0138 0.0040 -0.0439*** -0.0196 0 .0 0 2 1
(0 .0113) (0.0069) (0 .0337) (0 .0144) (0 .0 1 2 1 ) (0 .0160) (0 .0631) (0 .0136)
expsq -0.0004 0 .0 0 0 2 0.0003 -0 .0004 -0 .0 0 0 1 0.0015*** -0.0005 -0 .0 0 0 2
(0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0006) (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0003) (0 .0004) (0 .0 0 1 2 ) (0 .0003)
1 -2  years 0 .2277 0.1167 0.2701 0 .2254 0 .3047** -0.1982 0.1592 0.3512***
(0 .1450) (0 . 1 2 0 1 ) (0 .3618) (0 .1555) (0.1224) (0 .2302) (0 .3727) (0 .1258)
3-5 years 0 .0769 -0.0713 0.0555 0.0797 0.1462 0.0527 0.3294 0 .0 0 1 0
(0 .0883) (0 .0652) (0 .3345) (0 .0888) (0.1018) (0 .1066) (0.2203) (.0 .0834)
6 - 10  years 0 .1276 0.0416 0 .6456 0.1004 0 .1136 -0.1197 0.2074 0.1532*
(0 .1095) (0.0713) (0 .4385) (0 .1788) (0 .0830) (0 .1149) (0 .3438) (0 .0875)
> 1 0  years 0 .2662*** -0.0174 0.9946*** 0.2049 0.2452*** -0.0327 0.2928 0.3056***
(0 .0740) (0.0671) (0 .3699) (0 .2477) (0 .0745) (0 .0951) (0 .2688) (0 .0869)
married 0.1287 -0.0520 0 .3060 0.1107 0.0152 -0.1195 -0.1225 -0 .0326
(0.0857) (0.0520) (0 .3452) (0 .1073) (0 .0804) (0 .1070) (0 .3732) (0 .0922)
bulgarian 0.0621 -0.1199 0 .9171*** 0.0719 0.0562 -0.0796 -0 .1680 -0 .0 2 1 0
(0 .1338) (0.0954) (0 .2889) (0 .2744) (0 .1070) (0 .1781) (0 .4322) (0 .1208)
urban 0.3151*** 0.0153 -0.3451 0 .3343*** 0.2378*** -0.0679 -0.1966 0 .1782**
(0 .0771) (0.0574) (0 .2418) (0 .1189) (0 .0715) (0 .1066) (0.2952) (0 .0837)
sofia region -0.0532 0.0306 -0 .8239** -0.0173 0 .0674 0.1237 0 .2996 0 .1510
(0.1189) (0.1034) (0 .3333) (0 .2406) (0.1003) (0.1455) (0.4739) (0 .1144)
public 0.2445*** 0.0247 0.1808 0.2368** 0.1414* 0.2090 0.8261*** 0.3238**
(0.0757) (0.0552) (0 .2314) (0 .0931) (0.0787) (0.1616) (0.2472) (0 .1413)
mills 0 .1886
(0.6090)
-0.3081
(0 .6842)
children -0.3445
(0 .3748)
-0.5453*
(0.3177)
W ' r )
-0 .2837 -0 .2400
(0 .4032) (0 .3036)
W r y
0.0721
(0 .0706)
0 .0067
(0 .0591)
constant 4 .6832*** 1.5499*** 1.1602 4.9508*** 4 .5390*** 0.9434*** 2.1390** 4 .9588***
(0.1888) (0 .1738) (0 .7252) (0 .4359) (0 .1900) (0 .2511) (1 .0627) (0 .4215)
N 727 727 895 727 804 804 895 804
R2 0.1204 0.0206 0 .1219 0.0893 0.0513 0 .0944
F 9.1314 1.0771 8.0272 6.7998 3.3229 6 .1457
Log-likelihood -870.18 -576.77 -60.45 -869.54 -897.57 -1055.77 -62.45 -807.75
R am sey test * 2 = 1 .5 7  [0.1951 * 2= 0 .6 9  [0 .557 ]
N otes: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Figures in squared brackets are the p-values.
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TABLE A4.6
IV estimates o f  returns to education in Bulgaria, by gender, 1997
Males Females
IV, First stage i v 2 First stage IV, First stage i v 2 First stage
0 ) (2 ) (3) (4) ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4)
school 0 .0745***
(0 .0198)
0 .0774***
(0 .0197)
0 .0595***
(0 .0179)
0 .0635***
(0 .0174)
exp 0 .0 1 1 0 0.0450 0.0109 0.0426 0 .0030 0.0873** 0.0027 0.0922**
(0.0119) (0.0302) (0.0119) (0 .0301) (0 .0125) (0 .0383) (0 .0125) (0 .0376)
expsq -0.0003 -0.0025*** -0.0003 -0.0024*** -0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0038*** 0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0038***
(0 .0003) (0.0006) (0 .0003) (0 .0006) (0 .0003) (0 .0009) (0 .0003) (0 .0009)
1 -2  years 0.2255* 0.2745 0.2253* 0.2473 0 .3118** -0.1651 0 .3138*** -0.1352
(0 .1240) (0.2692) (0 .1241) (0 .2664) (0 .1216) (0 .2494) (0 .1217) (0 .2507)
3-5 years 0.0902 0.1514 0.0913 0.1262 0.1483 -0.0208 0.1488 -0 .0224
(0 .0984) (0.2626) (0 .0985) (0 .2639) (0 .0994) (0 .2910) (0 .0995) (0 .2842)
6 - 1 0  years 0.1185 0.2629 0 .1177 0.2568 0.1127 -0.1543 0 .1124 -0.1281
(0 . 1 0 1 2 ) (0 .2334) (0 .1013) (0 .2322) (0 .0791) (0 .1984) (0 .0792) (0 .1924)
> 1 0  years 0 .2626*** 0.1910 0 .2623*** 0.1768 0.2366*** 0.3741* 0.2341*** 0.3725**
(0 .0798) (0 .2 0 2 0 ) (0 .0799) (0 .2016) (0 .0721) (0 .1907) (0 .0721) (0 .1891)
married 0.1041 0.4198** 0 .1 0 2 0 0.4165** 0.0224 -0.1673 0 .0244 -0.1678
(0 .0861) (0.1964) (0 .0862) (0.1975) (0 .0722) (0 .1860) (0 .0723) (0 .1862)
bulgarian -0.0419 2.4116*** -0 .0506 2.3313*** 0.0135 2.3512*** 0.0013 2.3735***
(0 .1230) (0.2816) (0 .1229) (0 .2885) (0 . 1 1 0 2 ) (0 .3103) (0 .1096) (0 .3122)
public 0 .2377*** 0.2552 0 .2372*** 0.2799 0.1364* 0.0347 0.1350* -0 .0044
(0 .0728) (0.1825) (0 .0729) (0 .1818) (0 .0739) (0 .1707) (0 .0739) (0 .1688)
urban 0.2783*** 0.6083*** 0.2753*** 0.5556*** 0.2257*** 0 .6303*** 0 .2 2 2 2 *** 0.4306**
(0 .0804) (0.1995) (0 .0804) (0 .2 0 0 2 ) (0 .0727) (0.1972) (0 .0727) (0 .1963)
sofia_region -0.0297 -0.3973* -0.0277 -0.0863 0.0837 -0 .7157*** 0.0883 -0.3243
(0 .1094) (0.2308) (0 .1095) (0.2481) (0 .0951) (0 .2123) (0 .0950) (0 .2071)
moth_educ 4.6623***
(0.1458)
4.6029***
(0 .1502)
4 .1143***
(0.1385)
3 .9815***
(0 .1441)
average_sch 0.3136***
(0 .1184)
0.5104***
(0 .1083)
constant 4 .3903*** 8.3218*** 4 .3659*** 4.6994*** 4.4049*** 8 .9740*** 4 .3668*** 2.9585**
(0 .2296) (0.3594) (0 .2288) (1 .3905) (0 .2302) (0 .4220) (0 .2271) (1 .2615)
N 727 727 727 727 804 804 804 804
R2 0.1104 0.5382 0.1087 0 .5429 0.0874 0.5629 0.0862 0 .5769
F 8.34 147.01 8.43 136.63 5.94 148.60 6 .1 1 152.05
Log-likelihood -874.27 -1508.56 -874.98 -1504.82 -898.41 -1653.11 -898.95 -1639.97
F (excluded) 435.81*** 223.55*** 471.88*** 256.59***
p-value 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0
Sargan test 1.303 0.981
p-value 0 .2537 0 .3220
Partial-R2 0.3790 0 .3854 0.3737 0.3938
DW H test 5.0225 6.0588 0.9977 1.7906
p-value 0.0250 0.0138 0.3178 0.1808
N otes: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
IVi -  specification where mother education is used as an instrument; IV2 -  over-identification specification - both mother 
education and average regional differences in schooling are used as instruments
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TABLE A4.7
Returns to education in Bulgaria, by gender, 2001
M ales Females
OLS Heckman Probit Sem i-
parametric
OLS Heckman Probit Sem i-
parametric
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) 0 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
school 0.0431*** 0.0820** -0.0241* 0 .0944*** 0.0664*** 0.0699*** 0.0231* 0 .0703***
(0 .0117) (0.0330) (0.0128) (0 .0345) (0 .0094) (0.0088) (0.0128) (0.0092)
exp -0 .0 0 0 2 0.0157 -0.0108 0.0279 0.0040 -0.0076 0.0083 -0.0078
(0 .0107) (0.0169) (0 .0116) (0 .0196) (0.0089) (0 .0149) (0 .0116) (0 .0149)
expsq -0 .0 0 0 1 -0 .0006 0.0004* -0 .0 0 1 0 * -0 .0 0 0 1 0 .0004 -0.0004 0.0004
(0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0005) (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0006) (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0005) (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0005)
1 -2  years 0.1417 0.1272 0.0115 0.1097 0.0099 -0.0254 0.0239 -0.0298
(0 .1055) (0.1089) (0 .1384) (0 .1073) (0 .0770) (0.0834) (0 .1385) (0.0859)
3-5 years 0 .2092** 0.0270 0.1188 -0.0358 0.1045 0 .2 1 1 1 -0 .0897 0 .2 2 0 0
(0 .1058) (0.1954) (0 . 1 1 2 1 ) (0 .2 0 0 1 ) (0 .0764) (0 .1324) (0 . 1 1 2 1 ) (0 .1352)
6 - 1 0  years 0.4157*** 0.2686 0.0971 0 .2070 0.1205 0.1839 -0.0539 0.1881*
(0.1068) (0.1680) (0.1066) (0 .1728) (0 .0868) (0 . 1 1 2 2 ) (0 .1065) (0 .1 1 2 0 )
>  10  years 0.4514*** 0.3941*** 0.0391 0 .3673*** 0.1333 0.1298 0.0007 0.1291
(0 .1066) (0 .1238) (0.1096) (0 .1228) (0 .0812) (0.0804) (0.1095) (0 .0806)
married 0.1254* -0.0391 0.0887 -0.0923 -0.0128 0.1060 -0.0927 0.1182
(0 .0719) (0.1517) (0 .0786) (0 .1567) (0 .0469) (0 .1243) (0 .0787) (0 .1308)
bulgarian 0.2096** 0.3428*** -0.0878 0 .4196*** 0.0171 -0.1632 0.1360 -0.1702
(0 .0971) (0.1139) (0 .1131) (0 .1205) (0 .0813) (0 .1755) (0 .1135) (0 .1786)
public 0.0107 0.0175 -0 .0040 0 .0209 0.0166 0.0003 0.0168 -0.0023
(0 .0594) (0.0588) (0 .0664) (0 .0581) (0 .0489) (0.0497) (0.0664) (0 .0508)
urban 0.1116* 0.2219** -0 .0730 0.2689** -0.1083* -0.1706* 0.0502 -0 .1747*
(0 .0591) (0.1108) (0 .0819) (0 .1181) (0 .0599) (0 .0907) (0 .0819) (0 .0924)
sofia_region 0.0892 0.0249 0.0402 0.0025 0.0727 0.1077 -0 .0280 0.1108
(0 .0844) (0.0991) (0.0794) (0 .1019) (0 .0670) (0 .0742) (0 .0795) (0 .0742)
children 0.0472
(0 .0732)
-0.0438
(0.0732)
mills -2.4700
(0 .9544)
-1.9253
(0 .8612)
0  » -7 .0139* -3.0135(0 .8957) (0 .6147)
( * » 2
2.4249 0 .5467
(0 .8648) (0 .4233)
constant 0.3314** 1.7841 0.3242 3 .6064** 0 .4621*** 2.4814 -0.3566* 3.0297
(0 .1542) (1.2049) (0.1981) (1 .7769) (0 .1467) (1 .9714) (0.1981) (2 .5849)
N 729 729 1712 729 709 709 1712 709
R: 0.1510 0.1531 0 .1550 0.1350 0.1365 0 .1367
F 8.85 9.83 9.25 8.23 7.83 7.34
Log-likelihood -664.39 -663.55 -1172.87 -662.80 -468.02 -467.45 -1171.84 -467.40
R am sey test * 2= 0 .7 4  [0.5261 * 2= 0 .4 5 [0 .7 8 9 ]
N otes: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Figures in squared brackets are p-values.
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TABLE A4.8
IV estimates o f  returns to education in Bulgaria, by gender, 2001
M ales F em ales
IV, First stage i v 2 First stage IV, First stage i v 2 First stage
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4)
school 0 .1281**
(0 .0614)
0 .1036**
(0 .0474)
0 .1005***
(0 .0 2 1 2 )
0 .0983***
(0 .0184)
exp -0.0302* 0 .2718*** -0 .0242* 0 .2669*** -0 .0174* 0.2600*** -0 .0169* 0.2690***
(0.0174) (0 .0672) (0 .0144) (0 .0670) (0 .0091) (0.0680) (0 .0087) (0.0664)
expsq 0.0005 -0 .0065*** 0.0004 -0 .0063*** 0.0004* -0 .0074*** 0.0004* -0.0076***
(0.0004) (0 .0013) (0 .0003) (0 .0013) . (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0014) (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0014)
1 -2  years 0 .2208* -0 .5896 0.2038* -0 .5427 0.0280 0.6271 0.0289 0.6121
(0.1242) (0 .4786) (0 .1175) (0 .4848) (0 .0894) (0.5012) (0 .0890) (0.4870)
3-5 years 0 .2964*** -0.4263 0 .2884*** -0 .3964 0.1492** -0.3435 0.1484** -0.3479
(0.0979) (0 .4504) (0 .0940) (0 .4467) (0 .0759) (0 .5040) (0 .0756) (0.4982)
6 - 1 0  years 0 .4540*** -0 .5377 0.4423*** -0 .5156 0.1816** -0.3084 0.1813*** -0.3204
(0 .0935) (0 .3854) (0 .0888) (0 .3827) (0 .0705) (0 .4120) (0 .0703) (0.3936)
> 10  years 0 .5153*** -0 .3214 0 .5115*** -0 .3166 0.2267*** 0.1340 0.2275*** 0 .1 0 1 0
(0 .0893) (0 .4097) (0 .0862) (0 .4080) (0 .0717) (0.3836) (0.0714) (0.3706)
married 0.1557** 0 .0312 0.1581** 0.0071 0.0177 0.0024 0.0176 -0.0746
(0.0689) (0 .3243) (0 .0665) (0 .3259) (0 .0482) (0 .2615) (0 .0481) (0 .2612)
bulgarian -0.0532 3.1841*** 0.0161 2 .9861*** 0.0289 2.3997*** 0.0338 2 .2425***
(0 .1923) (0 .3670) (0.1560) (0 .3749) (0 .0890) (0 .4164) (0 .0858) (0.4146)
public 0 .0476 0 .7045*** 0.0663 0 .6937*** 0.0285 0.5222** 0.0306 0.5202**
(0.0710) (0 .2152) (0 .0629) (0 .2139) (0 .0475) (0.2274) (0 .0463) (0.2228)
urban 0 .0446 1.1395*** 0.0715 1.1133*** -0.0478 1.1097*** -0.0453 1 . 1 1 1 1 ***
(0.0921) (0 .2286) (0 .0799) (0 .2299) (0 .0586) (0.2791) (0 .0572) (0.2730)
sofia_region 0.1418* 0 .5289 0 .1583“ 0.0573 0.0838 0.6409* 0.0859 -0.2490
(0 .0846) (0 .3327) (0 .0782) (0 .3546) (0 .0611) (0 .3298) (0.0600) (0.3620)
moth_educ -0 .9050***
(0 .2722)
-0 .9313***
(0 .2696)
-2 .0092***
(0.2379)
-1.9276***
(0 .2329)
average_sch 0 .4513***
(0 .1565)
0 .8518***
(0.1699)
constant -1 .3356*** 6.3307*** -1 .1843*** 1.3428 -1 .1075*** 8.4099*** -1 .0910*** -1.3727
(0.3978) (0 .6602) (0 .3149) (1 .8368) (0 .1900) (0.8149) (0 .1728) (2.2226)
N 729 729 729 729 709 709 709 709
R- 0.0511 0.2903 0.1130 0 .2987 0 .1159 0.2712 0.1213 0.2977
F 1 1 .1 0 18.46 11.89 17.79 7.68 22.53 8 .2 0 23.05
Log-likelihood -747.11 -1757.32 -722.67 -1752.98 -551.14 -1740.64 -548.99 -1727.52
F (excluded) 16.55*** 13 13*** 77 53*** 52.90***
p-value 0 .0 0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
Sargan test 0 .469 0.045
p-value 0.4933 0.8321
Partial R2 0 .0227 0.0356 0.1014 0.1336
DWH test 2.8615 2.5043 5.4962 6.8024
p-value 0.0907 0.1135 0 .0190 0.0091
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%  and 10% level respectively. 
IVi -  specification where mother education is used as an instrument; IV2-  over-identification specification - both 
mother education and average regional differences in schooling are used as instruments
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TABLE A 4.9
Returns to education in Bulgaria, by gender, 2003
Males Fem ales
OLS Heckman Probit Sem i-
parametric
OLS Heckman Probit Semi-
parametric
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4)
school 0.0512*** 0.0484*** 0.0199 0 .0475*** 0.0598*** 0.0580*** 0.0288 0 .0555***
(0 .0048) (0 .0052) (0.0277) (0 .0060) (0 .0046) (0 .0062) (0 .0285) (0 .0086)
exp 0.0069* 0.0068* 0.0030 0.0067* 0.0179*** 0.0192*** -0 .0272 0.0217**
(0 .0040) (0 .0040) (0.0195) (0 .0040) (0 .0050) (0.0067) (0 .0286) (0 .0094)
expsq -0 .0 0 0 2 ** -0 .0 0 0 2 ** 0 .0 0 0 1 -0 .0 0 0 2 ** -0 .0004*** -0.0004** 0.0008 -0 .0005*
(0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0004) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0007) (0 .0003)
1 -2  years 0.0739* 0.0890** -0.0985 0.0941** 0.0476 0.0732 -0.5179* 0.1207
(0 .0389) (0 .0402) (0.2277) (0 .0436) (0 .0422) (0 .0744) (0 .2784) (0 .1304)
3-5 years 0.1251*** 0.0995** 0.2206 0 .0912* 0 .1673*** 0.1910*** -0.4878* 0.2370*
(0 .0419) (0 .0447) (0.2720) (0 .0519) (0 .0414) (0.0692) (0 .2640) (0 .1226)
6 - 1 0  years 0.2546*** 0.2609*** -0.0512 0 .2632*** 0.1697*** 0.2049** -0 .6366** 0.2669
(0 .0495) (0 .0497) (0.2906) (0 .0505) (0 .0500) (0 .0940) (0 .2854) (0 .1662)
> 1 0  years 0.2799*** 0.3759*** -0 .5279** 0 .4055*** 0.2485*** 0.2829*** -0 .6251** 0.3427**
(0 .0435) (0 .0805) (0.2348) (0 .1234) (0 .0420) (0 .0869) (0 .2787) (0 .1584)
married 0.0216 -0.0133 0.1862 -0 .0250 -0 .0379 -0.0301 -0.1251 -0 .0 2 0 1
(0 .0308) (0.0389) (0.1768) (0 .0540) (0 .0292) (0 .0360) (0 .1805) (0 .0440)
bulgarian 0.1186** 0.1377*** -0.0960 0.1433*** 0.0582 0.0527 0.0937 0.0437
(0 .0462) (0 .0478) (0.2444) (0 .0519) (0.0447) (0 .0470) (0 .2356) (0 .0518)
public 0.1973*** 0 .1951*** 0.0092 0 .1944*** 0.0593** 0.0501 0.1175 0.0365
(0 .0316) (0 .0316) (0.1802) (0 .0317) (0 .0294) (0 .0336) (0 .1716) (0 .0445)
urban 0.1180*** 0 .0824** 0.2096 0.0712 0.0563* 0 .0466 0.1317 0.0334
(0 .0322) (0.0403) (0.1681) (0 .0517) (0 .0328) (0.0398) (0 .1762) (0 .0510)
sofia region 0.2358*** 0.4834** -0.9160*** 0 .5346** 0.1161** 0.2060 -0 .7577*** 0.2626
(0 .0711) (0 .1942) (0 .2431) (0 .2425) (0 .0506) (0.1999) (0 .2350) (0 .2579)
m ills -1.3150
(0.9273)
-0.5018
(0 .0560)
children 0.1024 0.0814
( z »
(0 .1989) (0 .1676)
-1.9023
(2 .1079)
-1 .7776
(2 .7801)
z ' y ) 2 0 .9164
2 .6860
(3 .3492) (4 .2924)
constant 0.0952 0.6346*** 1.5749*** 0 .6839*** -0 .1615** 0.2828*** 1.9665*** 0.3514**
(0 .0730) (0 .1179) (0.4084) (0 .1936) (0 .0756) (0.1074) (0 .4990) (0 .1785)
N 1296 1296 1418 1296 1186 1186 1609 1186
R2 0.3209 0.3223 0 .3224 0 .2970 0.2971 0.2975
F 52.66 48.81 45.55 39.76 36.82 34.32
Log-likelihood -831.75 -830.37 -158.53 -830.32 -694.87 -694.72 -160.34 -694.45
R am sey  test * 2= 3 .1 9  [0 .023] * 2= 1 .1 3  [0.3361
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Figures in 
squared brackets are p-values.
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TABLE A 4.10
IV estimates o f  returns to education in Bulgaria, by gender, 2003
Males Fem ales
IV First stage IV First stage IV First stage IV First stage
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4)
school 0.0996**
(0 .0496)
0.1144***
(0 .0310)
0.1051***
(0 .0143)
0.1056***
(0.0132)
exp 0.0116** -0.0552** 0.0124** -0 .0566** 0.0232*** -0.0970*** 0.0232*** -0 .0843***
(0 .0052) (0.0233) (0 .0048) (0 .0228) (0 .0046) (0 .0236) (0 .0045) (0 .0234)
expsq -0 .0 0 0 2 * -0.0007 -0 .0 0 0 2 -0 .0007 -0 .0004*** -0.0004 -0.0004*** -0.0007
(0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0005) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0005) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0006) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0006)
1 -2  years 0 .0596 0.4767** 0.0526 0.3872 0 .0247 0.4022 0.0245 0.3237
(0.0492) (0.2378) (0 .0468) (0 .2369) (0 .0437) (0.2548) (0 .0437) (0 .2529)
3-5 years 0.0927* 0.6313*** 0.0834* 0.5363** 0.1147** 0.9771*** 0.1141*** 0.9094***
(0 .0544) (0.2325) (0 .0498) (0 .2305) (0 .0446) (0 .2520) (0.0442) (0 .2482)
6 - 1 0  years 0 .2400*** 0.8209*** 0 .2282*** 0 .6811*** 0 . 1 1 2 1 ** 1.1047*** 0.1115** 0.9936***
(0 .0657) (0 .2627) (0 .0593) (0 .2595) (0 .0508) (0 .2807) (0 .0503) (0 .2782)
> 1 0  years 0 .2306*** 1.2590*** 0.2118*** 1.1611*** 0.1712*** 1.4816*** 0.1703*** 1.4128***
(0 .0780) (0.2325) (0 .0614) (0 .2302) (0 .0517) (0 .2933) (0.0508) (0 .2877)
married -0.0485 0.5690*** -0 .0572 0 .6317*** -0.0554* 1.1598*** -0.0556* 1.1614***
(0 .0454) (0 .1779) (0 .0402) (0 .1782) (0.0317) (0 .1790) (0 .0317) (0 .1782)
bulgarian -0.0043 2.2015*** -0 .0369 2 .1068*** -0.0521 2.3199*** -0.0533 2.2358***
(0.1194) (0.3063) (0 .0837) (0 .3068) (0 .0570) (0.3337) (0 .0555) (0 .3350)
public 0 .1437*** 0.4538** 0.1369*** 0 .4 2 6 0 “ -0 .0029 1.1625*** -0.0036 1.0894***
(0 .0424) (0.1874) (0 .0393) (0 .1861) (0 .0370) (0.1823) (0.0362) (0 .1816)
urban 0.0362 1.2031*** 0.0182 1.0694*** -0.0138 1.3770*** -0.0145 1.2502***
(0 .0697) (0 .1920) (0 .0516) (0 .1924) (0 .0412) (0 .2084) (0 .0404) (0 .2086)
sofia region 0.2464*** -0.0435 0 .2473*** -0 .0349 0.1436** -0 .5439 0.1439** -0 .5034
(0.0744) (0.2928) (0 .0765) (0 .2927) (0 .0666) (0.3851) (0 .0665) (0 .3850)
m o th ed u c 4 .2242***
(0.6775)
3.8407***
(0 .5797)
3 .3675***
(0.2027)
3.2341***
(0 .2035)
average_sch 0 .4508***
(0 .0911)
0 .4669***
(0 .0926)
constant -0.3743 9.7416*** -0 .5177* 3 .9589*** -0.6600*** 10.2563*** -0.6653*** 4 .1379***
(0 .4872) (0 .3672) (0 .3083) (1 .2103) (0 .1684) (0 .3848) (0 .1572) (1 .2641)
N 1296 1296 1296 1296 1186 1186 1186 1186
R1 0.1554 0.2969 0.1053 0.3141 0.2390 0.4234 0.2377 0.4359
F 24.28 34.59 23.73 35.93 29.60 101.80 30.37 98.42
11 -695.40 -2441.21 -725.97 -2428.11 -741.86 -2815.43 -742.83 -2802.45
F (excluded) 14.85*** 22.18*** 163.96*** 1 0 2 .0 1 ***
p-value 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0
Sargan test 0.363 0.025
p-value 0.5467 0.8755
Partial R 2 0.0140 0.0406 0.1480
DWH test 1.6596 10.039 12.1658 15.783
p-value 0.1976 0.0015 0.00049 0.00007
N otes: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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TABLE A 4 .16
Em ployees by economic sector in Bulgaria
E conom ic sectors 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total 1,900,940 1,899,874 1,927,690 2,079,932 2,152,301 2 ,1 7 7  226 2,267,727
Agriculture 89,650 79,534 78,539 74,935 72,017 69,983 66,120
Manufacturing 602,714 599,179 607,649 630,703 637,491 636,009 656,067
Electricity & water 59,285 59,234 59,112 58,748 58,316 56,978 55,533
Construction 98,053 97,053 95,336 108,110 119,618 141,829 166,259
Trade 210,678 222,722 239,072 282,492 301,573 312,272 336,810
Distribution & hotels 49,904 55,734 58,177 75,059 79,489 83,201 91,212
Transport & communication 164,248 163,419 162,152 159,742 162,981 160,153 162,115
Finance 27,891 27,486 27,655 29,125 30,934 33,599 37,995
Real estate 89,263 100,063 105,116 113,660 124,630 128,139 141,402
Public admin, Health & education 445,875 430,749 427,129 438,082 445,875 449,367 452,092
Others 63,379 64,701 67,753 109,276 119,377 105,696 102,122
Source: National Statistics Institute, Bulgaria
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TABLE A4.17
Descriptive statistic -  1986 Town and Village survey and 2001 LSMS
1986 2001
M ean SD Mean SD
Female 0.5019 (0.500) 0.4930 (0.5001)
Age 16-35 31.763 (2.823) 28.076 (4.674)
Age 35-55 46.167 (5.692) 45.116 (5.643)
Sectors
Agriculture 0.1176 (0.3222) 0.0514 (0 .2210)
Manufacturing 0.3252 (0.4685) 0.2308 (0.4215)
Construction 0.0680 (0.2518) 0.0452 (0.2078)
Trade 0.0561 (0.2301) 0.1133 (0.3171)
Science&  education 0.0548 (0.1547) 0.1070 (0.3093)
Reeions
Blagoevgrad 0.0338 (0.1807) 0.0466 (0.2108)
Bourgas 0.0540 (0.2259) 0.0758 (0.2648)
Varna 0.0561 (0.2302) 0.0626 (0.2423)
Veliko Tum ovo 0.0416 (0.1996) 0.0355 (0.1850)
Vidin 0.0149 (0 . 1211) 0.0104 (0.1016)
Vratza 0.0310 (0.1734) 0.0285 (0.1665)
Gabrovo 0.0223 (0.1478) 0.0209 (0.1430)
Kurjali 0.0259 (0.1588) 0.0188 (0.1358)
Kustendil 0.0256 (0.1579) 0.0334 (0.1797)
Lovetch 0.0225 (0.1483) 0.0174 (0.1307)
Montana 0.0242 (0.1536) 0.0348 (0.1833)
Pazardjik 0.0394 (0.1945) 0.0320 (0.1760)
Pemik 0.0223 (0.1478) 0.0160 (0.1255)
Pleven 0.0400 (0.1960) 0.0438 (0.2047)
Plovdiv 0.0839 (0.2772) 0.0987 (0.2984)
Razgrad 0.0219 (0.1462) 0.0167 (0.1282)
Rousse 0.0274 (0.1634) 0.0299 (0.1704)
Silistra 0.0203 (0.1411) 0.0104 (0.1016)
Sliven 0.0223 (0.1478) 0.0216 (0.1453)
Smolian 0.0205 (0.1416) 0.0174 (0.1307)
Blagoevgrad 0.0338 (0.1807) 0.0466 (0.2108)
Bourgas 0.0540 (0.2259) 0.0758 (0.2648)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Samples relate to working individuals.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RETURNS TO EDUCATION IN FOUR TRANSITION 
COUNTRIES: A QUANTILE REGRESSION APPROACH
5.1. Introduction
Understanding the heterogeneous pattern of returns to education across the conditional 
earnings distribution requires recognition of the effect that ‘ability’ and/or 
‘endogeneity’ bias can have on the estimated returns. The underlying hypothesis is 
that ability and education are two distinct factors in the construction of human capital 
and that there exist some sort of complementarily between these two factors. The 
human capital theory implicitly recognises that the return to education may be 
heterogeneous63. Inter alia educational returns can vary across schooling levels and 
even across individuals with the same schooling level. Typically mean based 
regression models, like OLS, constitutes only a limited aspect of possibly more 
extensive changes involving the entire earnings distribution (Bushinsky, 1994). To 
place this idea into context we can envisage a process in which individuals are likely 
to differ with respect to not only the perceived benefits of education, but also the cost 
of education and the choices subsequently made in the labour market. In such 
circumstances the return to education is unlikely to be a single parameter; instead it is 
likely to vary systematically according to differences in individual’s unmeasured 
characteristics, which in turn determine where in the overall earnings distribution an 
individual is placed. More generally any uncontrolled effect that is systematically 
correlated with an individual’s position in the earnings distribution and which is also 
correlated with education attainment implies that the return to education is likely to 
vary across the earnings distribution. Accounting for this heterogeneity, therefore, 
requires an estimation strategy that allows the returns to education to differ at different 
points in the earnings distribution.
In this Chapter we use the QR model to address three important empirical questions. 
First, we examine the extent to which the return to education varies across the
63 See Heckman et al., 1997; Blundell et al., 2000, Blundell et al., 2001.
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conditional earning distribution in four transition countries (Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia, 
and Tajikistan) at the same time period. Second, as male and female employment rates 
differ substantially, sample selection is potentially an important issue for this type of 
analysis. We consider the impact sample selection bias has on the returns to education 
in the QR framework by using Buchinsky’s (1998, 2001) power series estimator64. 
Third, we investigate the empirical implications of allowing education to be 
endogenous (individual self-selection in the education process) across the distribution, 
using a control function approach proposed by Lee (2007). The importance of 
controlling for endogeneity lies in the fact that it allows us also to discuss the role that 
changes in the distribution of unobserved ability play in the observed changes of the 
earnings distribution. Fourth, in many cases it may be important to correct for both 
sample selection and endogeneity in education. Finally, having data for each country 
for the same year allows us to compare returns to human capital across the countries. 
The results of our studies dealing with these economies may provide important 
information for the policy makers.
The current Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we comment on the data 
and methodology used in the QR estimates. Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 discuss the 
main results and conclusions.
5.2. The data
Our results are based on data from Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan. The 
Bulgarian data are taken from the Living Standard Measurements Survey (LSMS), 
conducted in 2003. Since the construction of the Bulgarian data and the definitions of 
the variables have already been explained in Section 4.2.1, this discussion is not 
repeated here. Exclusion of individuals who were not of working age and restricting 
the sample to respondents who reported earnings accounts for a substantial reduction 
in the sample size. The subset of the Bulgarian data used in the estimation consists of 
a sample of 1,296 working men and 1,186 working women. The Serbian sample is 
drawn from the Serbian Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS)65 in 2003.
64 Buchinsky (2001) applies the sample selection model in a QR framework to estimate w om en’s return to 
education in the U.S.
65 The basic survey was carried out in 2002 on a representative sample o f  households in Serbia (without K osovo  
and Metohija). The survey was repeated in 2003 on a panel sample. The 2003 survey was conducted in accordance
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The Labour Market module is in line with a simplified version of the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS), with special additional questions to capture various informal sector 
activities and provide information on earnings. The sample size in 2003 consists of 
2,548 individuals of which 2,450 report wages. The Serbian sample used in the 
analysis consists of 1,466 working men and 984 working women. The Russian 
NOBUS Survey (2003) provides our third source of data66. The NOBUS was 
conducted by the Russian Statistical Agency and the World Bank in 2003. It is a 
cross-sectional survey with large sample of around 45,000 households covering all 
Russian regions. The survey collects detailed information on household consumption 
and income, household demographics and labour market participation, access to 
health, education and social programs, and subjective perceptions of household 
welfare. The Russian working sample consists of 21,874 men and 24,318 women. 
Finally, the Tajikistan data are taken from the 2003 Tajikistan Living Standard Survey 
(TLSS)67, which was done by the Word Bank and UNICEF in collaboration with the 
National Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat). The working Tajik sample in 2003 
consists of 3,006 men and 1,832 women. The descriptive statistics for the countries 
and variables used are listed in Table 5.1.
There is an advantage in having data for each country for the same year. We have 
attempted to fit comparable specifications to the samples across the countries to put 
the analysis in a common framework68. In all four countries, we only retain 
individuals aged between 15 and 65 who are not currently full-time students and who 
supply information on their earnings. The dependent variable in the analysis is the 
logarithm of hourly earnings resulting from the primary occupation of the individuals 
and excludes earnings from secondary jobs, or from agricultural production, and non­
monetary benefits69. The schooling variable is defined as total number of school 
grades completed by the individual, which coincides with the number of years of
with the same methodological principles used in 2002 survey, with necessary changes referring only to the content 
o f  certain modules and the reduction in sample size. The aim o f  the repeated survey was to obtain panel data to 
enable monitoring o f  the change in the living standard within a period o f  one year, thus indicating whether there 
had been a decrease or increase in poverty in Serbia in the course o f  2003.
66 T h e  NO BUS is the translated Russian abbreviation for the National Survey o f  Household W ell-being and 
participation in Social Programs.
67 The data are freely available at http://www.worldbank.org/lsms.
68 Only in Russia an additional variable that captures a wage arrears effect is inlcued.
69 Hourly earnings in all four countries are defined as reported monthly net earnings divided by 4.34 and then 
divided by reported weekly hours o f  work.
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schooling. It takes on 18 different values: from 0 if the individual achieved no grade to 
18 in the individual finished postgraduate activity. The vector of exogenous control 
variables used in the estimations also includes potential experience70 (linear and 
quadratic terms), variables for individuals years of tenure with the current firm, and a 
set of regional variables in order to control for potential measurement issue that years 
o f schooling may result in different levels of human capital accumulation over 
different regions if  there are differences in schooling quality across regions. The 
regional dummies may also reflect differences in occupational structure, infrastructure 
quality, agglomeration economies etc. We have also included government sector 
variables as to control for the remaining effect of the old public sector wage structure. 
The Russian specifications are also supplemented with an additional variable that 
captures a wage arrears effect71.
There are differences in the characteristics of men and women with respect to 
education as revealed in the summary statistics of the variables. All countries exhibit 
average levels of schooling above 10, the highest value being that of Bulgaria (13.9 
for females). Moreover, in all four countries, the average length of time spent in 
education is higher for women than for men. For Bulgarian females for example, the 
average length of time spent in education is 0.8 years higher than for males. Average 
experience (which corresponds, in all countries, to Mincer’s potential experience, age 
-  schooling -  7) is generally above 19 and below 26 years. The high proportion of 
Serbian respondents has tenure in excess of 10 years, and this may point to a relatively 
less mobile labour market. The data also indicates that in all four countries women 
earn less than men and the gender differential is highest in Tajikistan. The lower is the 
proportion of Bulgarian respondents employed in public sector (around 30% for men 
and 39% for women). Not surprisingly, women’s employment is more concentrated 
than men’s in the public sector, and as a result women are less represented in private 
sector where both job opportunities and employment flexibility are less likely to be 
attractive to female workers. For instance, 69% of female employment in Russia is in 
the public sector compared to 60% of male employment. Only in Tajikistan the male 
employment in the public sector is higher.
70 Potential experience in all four countries is imputed as follows: age -  7 -  years o f  schooling.
71 W age arrears or unprecedented delays in the payment o f  wages have become an endemic feature o f  the Russian 
labour market. There are several forms wage arrears can take in Russia: 1) not paid wages 2) delayed but paid in 
full wages, 3) paid in time but not in full or 4) paid in part and not in time wages.
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TABLE 5.1
Descriptive statistics by countries, 2003 working samples
B u lg a r ia S erb ia R u ssia T a jik ista n
V ariab le D e sc r ip tio n M a les F em ales M a les F em a les M a les F em ales M a les F em a les
lh w age log  o f  hourly w a g e 1.622 1.460 4 .135 3 .9 7 4 2 .8 6 2 2 .605 3.555 2.911
(0 .5 5 8 ) (0 .5 1 9 ) (0 .7 1 3 ) (0 .6 9 7 ) (0 .8 1 2 ) (0 .7 3 0 ) ( 1 .0 2 2 ) (0 .9 4 7 )
sch oo l total num ber years 13 .056 13.875 11.421 11 .428 1 1 .337 11 .882 11 .596 10 .844
in education (3 .4 2 0 ) (3 .4 2 4 ) (2 .7 4 6 ) (3 .0 2 2 ) (2 .2 4 7 ) (2 .1 7 8 ) (2 .6 5 5 ) (2 .5 0 6 )
exp potential exp 19 .972 18.653 2 5 .1 6 4 2 4 .1 4 6 2 1 .5 8 7 2 1 .4 8 8 19 .444 18 .456
(1 2 .2 6 4 ) (1 1 .1 7 9 ) (1 2 .9 7 0 ) (1 2 .4 8 5 ) (1 1 .4 6 3 ) ( 1 1 .0 0 2 ) (1 2 .1 5 6 ) (1 1 .5 7 6 )
edbef91 =  1 i f  graduate before 0 .673 0 .6 7 4 0 .7 7 9 0 .7 8 7 0 .7 3 2 0 .7 5 0 0 .6 3 6 0 .6 2 7
1991 (0 .4 6 9 ) (0 .4 6 8 ) (0 .4 1 4 ) (0 .4 0 9 ) (0 .4 4 2 ) (0 .4 3 2 ) (0 .4 8 1 ) (0 .4 8 4 )
married = 1  i f  m arried 0 .6 8 0 0 .728 0 .7 4 9 0 .7 0 9 0.761 0 .6 2 4 0 .8 1 4 0 .633
(0 .4 6 7 ) (0 .4 4 5 ) (0 .4 3 4 ) (0 .4 5 4 ) (0 .4 2 6 ) (0 .4 8 4 ) (0 .3 8 9 ) (0 .4 8 2 )
tenure 1 = 1  i f  < 1  year 0 .2 7 0 0 .2 2 6 0 .218 0 .263 0 .1 5 0 0 . 1 2 0 0 .1 9 7 0 .1 7 8
(0 .4 4 4 ) (0 .4 1 8 ) (0 .4 1 3 ) (0 .4 4 1 ) (0 .3 5 7 ) (0 .3 2 5 ) (0 .3 9 8 ) (0 .3 8 3 )
tenure3 =  1 i f  1 -2  years 0 .1 7 7 0 .163 0 .0 2 9 0 .0 3 2 0 .2 0 1 0.191 0 .155 0 .1 6 0
(0 .3 8 2 ) (0 .3 6 9 ) (0 .1 6 9 ) (0 .1 7 5 ) (0 .4 0 1 ) (0 .3 9 3 ) (0 .3 6 2 ) (0 .3 6 7 )
tenure4 =  1 i f  3-5 years 0.191 0 .2 0 6 0 .0 8 0 0 .0 7 2 0 .1 3 5 0 . 1 2 0 0 .205 0 .1 9 9
(0 .3 9 3 ) (0 .4 0 4 ) (0 .2 7 2 ) (0 .2 5 9 ) (0 .3 4 2 ) (0 .3 2 5 ) (0 .4 0 3 ) (0 .4 0 0 )
tenure5 = 1  i f  6 - 1 0  years 0 .1 2 4 0 .1 4 2 0 .0 9 8 0 .118 0 .1 7 2 0 .1 6 9 0 .145 0 .138
(0 .3 3 0 ) (0 .3 5 0 ) (0 .2 9 7 ) (0 .3 2 3 ) (0 .3 7 7 ) (0 .3 7 4 ) (0 .3 5 2 ) (0 .3 4 5
tenure6 =  1 i f  > 1 0  years 0 .2 3 8 0 .263 0 .575 0 .515 0 .3 4 2 0 .4 0 0 0 .2 9 8 0 .3 2 4
(0 .4 2 6 ) (0 .4 4 0 ) (0 .4 9 5 ) (0 .5 0 0 ) (0 .4 7 4 ) (0 .4 9 0 ) (0 .4 5 7 ) (0 .4 6 8 )
public =  1 i f  in p u b lic  sector 0 .3 0 6 0 .3 9 0 0 .4 5 7 0 .5 0 6 0 .5 9 5 0 .6 9 4 0 .465 0 .443
(0 .4 6 1 ) (0 .4 8 8 ) (0 .4 9 8 ) (0 .5 0 0 ) (0 .4 9 1 ) (0 .4 6 1 ) (0 .4 9 9 ) (0 .4 9 7 )
arrears =  1 i f  arrears e ffec t “ - 0 .1 8 9
(0 .3 9 2 )
0 .1 3 8
(0 .3 4 5 )
“
region 1 = 1 i f  region  1 0 . 1 0 0 0 .1 1 6 0.143 0.191 0 .2 1 4 0 .2 2 2 0 .085 0 .108
(0 .2 9 9 ) (0 .3 2 1 ) (0 .3 5 0 ) (0 .3 9 3 ) (0 .4 1 0 (0 .415 (0 .2 8 0 ) (0 .3 1 1 )
region2 =  1 i f r e g io n 2 0 .1 4 8 0 .1 3 0 0.261 0 .2 7 3 0 .1 3 9 0 .1 4 0 0 .2 9 7 0 .2 6 6
(0 .3 5 5 ) (0 .3 3 6 ) (0 .4 3 9 ) (0 .4 4 6 ) (0 .3 4 6 ) (0 .3 4 7 ) (0 .4 5 7 ) (0 .4 4 2 )
region3 =  1 i f  region3 0 . 1 2 2 0 .1 1 8 0 .1 1 9 0 .0 9 2 0.131 0.131 0 .368 0 .395
(0 .3 2 7 ) (0 .3 2 3 ) (0 .3 2 4 ) (0 .2 9 0 ) (0 .3 3 7 ) (0 .3 3 8 ) (0 .4 8 2 ) (0 .4 8 9 )
region4 =1 i f  region4 0 .1 9 4 0 .2 2 6 0 .1 0 4 0 .0 9 8 0 .1 3 0 0 .1 2 7 0 .1 3 0 0 .1 2 7
(0 .3 9 5 ) (0 .4 1 8 ) (0 .3 0 6 ) (0 .2 9 7 ) (0 .3 3 6 ) (0 .3 3 3 ) (0 .3 3 6 ) (0 .3 3 3 )
region5 = 1 i f  region5 0 . 2 1 2 0 .1 8 5 0 .205 0 .1 9 6 0 .1 3 4 0.131 0 . 1 2 0 0 .103
(0 .4 0 9 ) (0 .3 8 9 ) (0 .4 0 4 ) (0 .3 9 7 ) (0 .3 4 1 ) (0 .3 3 7 ) (0 .3 2 5 ) (0 .3 0 4 )
region 6 = 1 i f  reg ion 6 0 .225 0 .2 2 4 0 .1 6 6 0 .1 4 9 0 .0 8 2 0.081
(0 .4 1 7 ) (0 .4 1 7 ) (0 .3 7 3 ) (0 .3 5 7 ) (0 .2 7 5 ) (0 .2 7 2 )
region7 =  1 i f  region7 - - - - 0 .1 6 9
(0 .3 7 5 )
0 .1 6 9
(0 .3 7 5 )
- _
N 1296 1186 1466 984 2 1 8 7 4 2 4318 3 0 0 6 1832
Source: Bulgaria, LSM S (2003), Serbia, LSM S (2003), Russia N O B U S (2003), Tajikistan, TLSS (2003).
Notes-. Standard deviations in brackets.
The control regional variables for Bulgaria are: region I - North W est, region 2- North East, region 3- Central, region 4 - South West, 
region 5- South East, region 6 - Sofia region;
For Serbia: region 1- Belgrade, region 2- Vojvodina, region 3- W est Serbia, region 4- Sumadija and Pomoravlje, region 5- East Serbia, 
region 6 - South-East Serbia;
For Russia: region 1-Central, region 2- North-W est, region 3- Siberia, region 4- South, region 5- Far-East, region 6 - Urals, and region 7- 
Volga; Tajikistan is divided into 4  regions: Leninabad (renamed into Sogd) in the northwest o f  the country, Khatlon in the southwest, 
Rayons o f  Republican Subordination (RRS) in the m iddle and to the w est o f  the country, and Gorno-Badakhshan Autonom ous Oblast 
(G BA O ) in the East. The capital, Dushanbe, in the RRS oblast, is a separately administrated area. The regional control variables for 
Tajikistan are: region 1- G BAO , region 2- Sogdian, region 3- Kahtlon, region 4- Dushanbe, and region 5-RRS;
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5.3. Methodology
5.3.1. Sample selection in the QR model
The estimation approach in the present Chapter is based on the quantile regressions. 
Since the QR methodology has been already explained in Section 4.2.5, this 
discussion is not repeated here. In this Section we focus on the sample selection bias 
in a QR framework as the selectivity correction in the QR models is less well 
developed and little consensus exist on the appropriate sample selection procedure. 
Importantly, the bivariate normality assumption between the error terms in the 
earnings and participation equation does not hold in the quantile regression model as 
the conditional mean of the quantile regression’s disturbance term need not be zero. 
Buchinsky72 (1998 and 2001) was the first to consider the problem of estimating QR 
in the presence of sample selection. He suggests an approach using the non-parametric 
procedure of Newey (1991, 2009) to deal with this problem. Specifically, Buchinsky 
(1998) assumes conditional independence between the error terms and the regressors 
given the probability of selection. As in the seminal work of Heckman (1974), the 
outcome equation and the latent selection function are linear in the covariates. The 
error terms in both equations are independent of the covariates (conditional on the 
selection probability), but in contrast to the model of Heckman their joint distribution 
is completely unrestricted (Huber and Melly, 2011).
The estimation procedure used can be briefly described as follows. In the first step the 
selection parameter is estimated from a standard Probit model73. In the second step, as 
suggested by Buchinsky (1998), we use a power series expansion of the inverse Mill’s 
ratio of the normalized estimated index which is designed to approximate the 
unknown quantile functions o f the truncated bivariate distribution of the error terms in 
the wage and participation equations74. The key assumption is the single index 
restriction on the error term. Buchinsky’s selection correction technique requires a 
valid exclusion variable. A range of familiar variables are used as covariates in the
72 Som e recent studies criticize Buchinsky method and prove that his assumptions are very strong. M elly (2006) 
argues that Buchinsky estimator is consistent only when all quantile regression lines are parallel. M elly (2006) also 
concludes that rejecting the hypothesis for hom ogeneity (that all slope coefficients are constant), biases the 
estimator o f  Buchinsky.
73 W e follow  Buchinsky (1998) modification that the error distribution is not assumed to take any parametric form.
74 The first order approximation will be sufficient i f  the error term is normally distributed. According to Buchinsky 
(1998) addition o f  more terms to the series expansion resulted, in som e cases, in severe multicollinearity problems.
75 This method is incorporated into the Machado and Mata technique by Albrecht et al. (2009).
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participation equation, including the presence of dependent children in the household 
which, as in Buchinsky (1998), is used to identify participation on the assumption that 
this variable is exogenous76. In the analysis, we follow the same identifying 
restriction.
To get unbiased estimates of fie for the male and female respondents the power series 
approximation term is introduced:
ln =  P e  (51)
where:
K  (g ,) = Quant0 (£* |Z,, g t > 0) ^  ^
The values of g t =yZt are used to expand he{gt) in a power series approximation. 
The procedure has been discussed in semi-parametric two-step estimation for sample 
selection bias at the mean (Section 4.2.4). The term h0(g i) includes information about
the unobservable that affects individual labour force participation decisions and it 
plays a similar role as the Mills ratio plays in the usual Heckman (1979) procedure, 
but is quantile-specific and more general so as not to assume normality.
5.3.2. Endogeneity in the QR model
In many empirical regression models, it is quite common to have a regressors that are 
endogeneous77. If schooling is endogenous, the returns to schooling obtained by 
standard quantile regressions may be misleading. Amemiya (1982) was the first to 
seriously consider QR in the presence of endogenous regressors. He shows the 
consistency and asymptotic normality of a class of two-stage median regression 
estimators. Subsequent work by Powell (1983) and Chen and Portnoy (1996) extend 
this approach but maintain the focus primarily on the conditional median problem 
(Melly, 2006). Arias et al. (2001) applied IV-QR in the same way as the classical
76 A  com monly made assumption in the literature is that fertility decisions are exogenous to decisions about labour 
force participation.
77 Such endogeneity may arise when this regressor and the dependent variable are determined simultaneously or 
when this regressor is a consequence o f  self-selection. Education is the result o f  constrained optimizing decision. 
Another possibility for endogenety in schooling is that the variable may be measured with errors. IV methodology 
can overcome the endogeneity bias by making use o f  natural experiments that enable the identification o f  variation 
in education that is exogenous to wages.
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Two-Stage Least Squares estimator78 the so called ‘fitted value’ approach. 
Chemozhukov and Hansen (2005), however, show that Arias et a l (2001) approach is 
inconsistent unless treatment effects are homogeneous. Chemozhukov and Hansen
79 • •(2006, 2008) approach is practical in the sense that it can be computed through a 
series of quantile regression steps. Abadie et a l (2002) considered quantile regression 
methods for estimating endogenous treatment effects focusing on a binary treatment 
case. Their estimator applies only to a restrictive case -  a binary treatment variable 
and a single binary instrument and imposes a monotonicity condition. Chen et a l
(2003) consider a partially linear median regression model with endogenous 
regressors. Chesher (2003) develops a general nonlinear model which may be viewed 
as an extension of the recursive causal chain models discussed by Strotz and Wold 
(1960). Chesher’s approach can be viewed as a ‘local, non-separable, nonparametric’ 
control function approach (Lee, 2007). Ma and Koenker (2006) propose two 
estimators assuming a finite-dimensional parametric restriction and integrating over 
the nonparametric estimates.
To control for endogeneity bias in a QR framework, we adopt the control function 
approach proposed by Lee (2007). As an alternative to existing methods in the 
literature, Lee’s (2007) methodology extends the control function approach to 
structural quantile regression model semi-parametrically. He shows that under suitable 
conditions, the estimator obtained from the control function approach is consistent and 
asymptotically normally distributed.
Formally Lee (2007) considers the following model, which is a semi-parametric 
quantile regression version of Newey (1999):
Y  = x p { v )  + Z x'r{v ) + U  (53)
78 Other empirical papers have followed a similar strategy; see Levin (2001) and Ribeiro (2001). The consistency 
and asymptotic normality o f  the QR estimator with instrumental variable (IV), in a two-stage framework has been 
obtained by Chen and Portnoy (1996). The author extends the results o f  Amemia (1982) and Powell (1983) for the 
last absolute deviation (LAD) estimator in a more general framework under weak hypotheses. Kim and Muller
(2004) criticise Arias et a l (2001), Garcia et al. (2001) approach, arguing that their m ethodology may be delicate 
for the general type o f  problem consider since using LS estimation in the first stage combined with Am em iya’s 
reformulation o f  the dependent variable may produce asymptotic bias and also it can destroy the robustness 
properties o f  the quantile regressions.
79 Their estimator has already been used in empirical implications, e.g. Hausman and Sidak (2004), Chevalier et al. 
(2006), Kondylis (2005), M elly (2005), Autor et al. (2006), Eren (2009), Galvao and Rojas (2009).
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X  = p ( a )  + Z' n: (a)  + V (5.4)
where Y is the dependent variable, X  is real-valued continuously distributed 
endogenous explanatory variable, Z  = (Z ], Z 2) is a (d z x 1) vector of exogenous
explanatory variables, U and V are real-valued unobserved random variables, f3(x)
an d y (r)a re  unknown structural parameter of interest, p ( a )  is an unknown 
parameter, n {a ) = \7T](a),7r2(a)] vector is a (d z x l)  vector of unknown parameters 
for some x and a  such that 0 < r  < 1, and 0 < a  < 1. For identification it is assumed 
that there is at least one component of Z that is not included in Z ,, and that there is at 
least one non-zero coefficient for the excluded components of Z. That is, d z] < d z and 
7T2(a )  *  0 , where d z] is the dimension of Z x. The model is completed with the 
following assumptions:
Qu\X,Z I X* = Qu\V,Z (^ " I V’ = Qu\V (r  I v) = (y') ( 5  5 )
Qv\z(<X l z) = ° (5-6)
where Ar (.) is a real- valued, unknown function of V, Qu\X,z(T I x ’z ) denotes the T th
quantile o f U conditional on X  = x , and Z  — z .  The first equality in (5.5) holds when 
v is the value of V that satisfies v = x  -  /u(a) -  z 'n { a ) . The second equality in (5.5) 
suggests a quantile independence of U  on Z conditioned on V (Lee, 2007).
The estimation procedure consists of two steps. The first step is construction of 
estimated residuals Vj =X, -  {i = \,...,n) by a linear quantile regression of X on
(1, Z), where (ju,7x) is a solution to
min n~]J ^ p a(X i - f i - Z \ n )  (5.7)
i=\
where p a is the ‘check’ function such that pa{u) = \u\ + (2a-\)u  for 0 < a  < 1. The 
second step is estimation of a partially linear quantile regression of Y on (X\ Zi, V)
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using the estimated residuals Vj in place of unobserved V/ s via power series 
estimation80 (Lee, 2007).
In the return to education estimates, the reduced-form schooling residuals V are 
interpreted as ‘individual ability’ and U  is not assumed to be independent of V. The 
approach corrects for endogeneity by adding a residual power series as additional 
explanatory variables and therefore is interpreted as a variant of the control function 
approach (e.g., Newey, 1999; Blundell and Powell, 2003). Under suitable conditions, 
Lee (2007) shows n~xn consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimator81.
Finding an instrument that is orthogonal to the disturbance term in the earning 
equation has been a topic of great debate. As in chapter four, in the control function 
approach, we utilise the regional human capital concentration as an instrument. The 
choice of the instrument is motivated by data availability and by our objective of 
maintaining the same specification across countries. The relevance of the instrument is 
tested at the mean of the first-stage regression. Durbin-Hausman Wu test (DWH) 
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) is used to test the hypothesis of endogeneity of
schooling82.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the cross-sectional district variation in average schooling by 
countries. In all four countries, we find high concentration of more endowed workers 
within the capitals. In Bulgaria, for instance, respondents in Sofia region have on 
average 14.5 years spent in education, which is significantly higher compared to the 
North-West region. Similarly, in Serbia, individuals in West region appear to be the 
most disadvantaged.
80 This two-step estimator resembles closely the approach o f  Buchinsky (1998) which we apply in our quantile 
specification, where the sample selection bias is corrected for non-parametrically by a two-stage procedure. The 
author also imposes no functional form restrictions on the stochastic relationship between the reduced - form 
residual and the disturbance term in the primary equation conditional on observable explanatory variables. This 
residual term captures the effect o f  any unobserved ability variables such as ability which influence individual 
productivity.
81 See Lee (2007) for details.
82 The DWH test was conducted at the mean as no equivalent test exists for the QR model. We do not need to go  
beyond testing for endogeneity in the linear model even when we estimate QR model in the end. The reduced form 
model in either case is the same and we still want to test the underlying hypothesis that the error terms in the 
reduced form model are uncorrelated regardless to whether we are estimating a QR or OLS model.
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FIGURE 5.1: Regional variations in the average schooling by countries
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5.4. Empirical results
Tables 5.2 to 5.5 provide the main results concerning the returns to education across 
the wage distribution. The unadjusted results are presented in the first row followed by 
the unadjusted estimates where schooling is interacted with an indicator whether 
individuals have graduated before 1991, sample selection and endogeneity adjusted 
QR estimates. This allows comparison of the results from correction methods. We 
report the QR estimates for three values of 0 (10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles) for 
males and females respectively. The full set of estimates is presented in Appendix 
Tables A5.l-A5.20. The interpretation of the QR coefficients is analogous to the OLS 
regression, where the coefficients measure the influence of the regressor variables on 
the conditional mean of the dependent variables. In the quantile case the coefficients 
represents the influence of the regressors on the conditional 0 -quantile of the 
dependent variable. In Tables 5.6 and 5.7 we also test to see whether differences 
across the quantiles are statistically significant. The second and the third columns 
represent the F-test for the equality o f coefficients at the 10th and 90th percentile for
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males and females, followed by a joint test of equality of coefficients at all quantiles. 
The estimated returns to education are also plotted by countries and by gender for 
each percentile along with the 95 % confidence interval for each point estimates 
(Figures 5.2 to 5.5). Superimposed on the plots is a dashed line representing the OLS 
estimate of the effect of education on earnings. Each side of the OLS estimate is a 
dotted line which shows the associated 95% confidence interval o f the estimate. It is 
important to be able to contrast the QR results with those for the mean regression 
technique which allows their comparison.
5.4.1. Unadjusted QR estimates
In the QR estimates where we treat schooling as exogenous (the first rows of Tables 
5.2 to 5.5), the effect of education on earnings is positive and statistically different 
from zero at each of the reported percentiles. Specifically, the unadjusted estimates of 
the returns to education are higher at higher points of the conditional earning 
distribution for both males and females in Bulgaria and for females in Tajikistan. For 
instance, the return to education in Bulgaria increases from 3.9% to 6.2% in the male
iL
specification and from 4.7% to 7.2% in the female specification between the 10 and 
90th quantiles (see Table 5.2).83 To put it differently, the earning increments associated 
with education is higher for those individuals whose unobservable characteristics 
place them at the top of the conditional earnings distribution. The results for Bulgaria, 
reported here are consistent with previous estimates reported in the literature. Martins 
and Pereira (2004) and Flabbi et al. (2008), for example, report higher returns to 
education at the top end of the conditional wage distribution. The more extreme case 
of this increasing pattern is female Tajikistan case. In Tajikistan the return at the first
th *quanitle for females is no greater than 6% and it reaches 12% at the 90 quantile. 
Compared to the corresponding returns for Tajik males, where we find little 
heterogeneity, the returns to education for females tend to increase rapidly, suggesting 
that inequality is more pronounced for females than males in terms of educational 
returns.
83 The difference between the returns to education at the 10th and 90th in Bulgaria for males is significant at 5% 
level (the F- statistic for males is 4.65**).
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TABLE 5.2: Returns to education by quantiles, Bulgaria, 2003
M a les F e m a les
0=0.10 0=0.50 0=0.90 0=0.10 0=0.50 0=0.90
Cl) U n a d ju sted  O R  e stim a tes
Education 0 .0395*** 0 .0 5 3 7 * * * 0 .0 6 2 6 * * * 0 .0 4 7 2 * * * 0 .0 6 1 2 * * * 0 .0 7 2 2 * * *
(0 .0 0 5 0 ) (0 .0 0 4 4 ) (0 .0 0 9 5 ) (0 .0 0 6 2 ) (0 .0 0 5 7 ) (0 .0 0 8 7 )
P seudo  R 2 0 .1 4 0 0 0.2071 0 .1 9 7 8 0 .1 5 6 7 0 .2 0 3 7 0 .2 0 8 6
N 1296 1296 1296 1186 1186 1186
(2 )U n a d iu s te d  O R  estim a tes  w ith  in tera c tio n s
E ducation 0 .0 5 1 6 * * * 0 .0 5 0 5 * * * 0 .0 5 5 6 * * * 0 .0 3 7 8 * * * 0 .0 5 7 7 * * * 0 .0 6 8 6 * * *
(0 .0 0 9 0 ) (0 .0 0 7 9 ) (0 .0 1 6 4 ) (0 .0 1 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 0 ) (0 .0 1 4 8 )
E d u c* b e fl9 9 1 -0 .0 1 5 3 0 .0 0 5 4 0 .0 1 4 8 0 . 0 1 1 2 0 .0061 0 .0 0 3 9
(0 .0 1 0 5 ) (0 .0 0 9 2 ) (0 .0 1 8 5 ) (0 .0 1 2 2 ) (0 .0 1 1 8 ) (0 .0 1 7 5 )
B efo re  1991 0 .1 5 5 3 -0 .0 6 8 5 -0 .2 4 4 6 -0 .0 1 2 5 -0 .1181 0.0071
(0 .1 5 7 8 ) (0 .1 3 0 7 ) (0 .2 4 7 7 ) (0 .1 8 9 7 ) (0 .1 8 0 7 ) (0 .2 6 5 2 )
P seudo  R 2 0 .1 4 2 0 0 .2 0 7 3 0 .1 9 9 6 0 .1 5 8 8 0 .2 0 4 3 0 .2 0 9 4
N 1296 1296 1296 1186 1186 1186
(3  S a m p le  se lec tio n  a d ju s te d  OR e s tim a te sa
Education 0 .0336*** 0 .0 5 0 2 * * * 0 .0 6 2 7 * * * 0 .0 4 8 1 * * * 0 .0 5 7 4 * * * 0 .0 8 7 9 * * *
(0 .0 1 0 9 ) (0 .0 0 8 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 5 ) (0 .0 1 7 1 ) (0 .0 1 3 0 ) (0 .0 1 4 5 )
P seudo  R2 0 .1 4 0 8 0 .2 0 7 3 0 .1 9 9 7 0 .1 5 7 2 0 .2 0 4 0 0 .2 0 9 3
N 1296 1296 1296 1186 1186 1186
(4 )E n d o e en e itv  a d ju s te d  OR e s tim a te sh
Education 0 .04 6 5 * * 0 .0 5 1 1 * * * 0 .1 0 7 0 * * * 0 .0 4 5 1 * * 0 .0 4 9 9 * * * 0 .10 7 1 * * *
(0 .0 1 8 4 ) (0 .0 1 3 1 ) (0 .0 3 1 3 ) (0 .0 2 1 6 ) (0 .0 0 9 5 ) (0 .0 2 0 2 )
P seu d o  R 2 0 .1 6 0 8 0 .2 2 0 3 0 .2 1 7 3 0.1581 0 .2 1 6 2 0 .2 1 4 0
N 1296 1296 1296 1186 1186 1186
Notes-. a QR estimates with the second order power series correction terms; b QR estim ates with the fifth order 
polynom ials o f  the reduced form residuals; (i) Bootstrapped errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance  
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively ; (ii) Full results are given in Appendix 5.1; (iii) A  tests on excluding our 
potential instrument (average regional schooling) from the reduced form equations conducted at the mean, yield an F- 
statistics o f  19.39***and partial R2 o f  0 .0149 for males, and F= 17.54***and partial R2 o f  0 .0147 for females; (iv) 
The DW H test conducted at the mean in males specification is 24.966, p-value=0.0000 and 17.985, p-value=0.00002  
in fem ales, so w e do reject the null hypothesis in both specifications; (v) Sargan test, when com bining mothers 
education and regional average schooling results in a p-value= 0 .152 for m ales and p-value= 0 .696 in female 
specification, which is failure to reject the null hypothesis.
FIGURE 5.2: Returns to education by quantiles, Bulgaria 2003
Females, 2003
.06
.04
.06
Notes: The y-axis measures the return to education coefficients; the x-axis depicts the selected quantiles o f  the 
conditional w age distribution for m ale and fem ales. The horizontal line plots the OLS estimate and its 95%  
confidence interval.
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TABLE 5.3
Returns to education by quantiles, Serbia, 2003
M a les F e m a les
<9=0.10 (9=0.50 0=0.90 0=0.10 0=0.50 0=0.90
( l)U n a d iu s te d  O R estim a tes
Education 0 .0 8 2 1 * * * 0 .0 6 7 2 * * * 0 .0 6 7 4 * * * 0 .1 0 2 5 * * * 0 .1 0 3 9 * * * 0 . 1 0 1 2 ***
(0 .0 1 3 3 ) (0 .0 0 6 4 ) (0 .0 2 1 3 ) (0 .0 1 5 7 ) (0 .0 0 8 2 ) (0 .0 2 0 2 )
P seu d o  R 2 0 .1 0 0 3 0 .0 7 4 0 0 .0 6 8 4 0 .1 6 8 3 0 .1 4 4 3 0 .1 2 8 2
N 1466 1466 1466 98 4 984 984
(2 ) U n a d ju ste d  O R  e s tim a tes  w ith  in terac tion s
Education 0 .0 4 3 7 0 .0 3 7 6 * * 0 .09 7 5 * * 0 .0 6 7 3 * * 0 .12 8 4 * * * 0 .1 5 9 6 * * *
(0 .0 3 6 5 ) (0 .0 1 9 1 ) (0 .0 4 8 9 ) (0 .0 2 7 8 ) (0 .0 2 5 4 ) (0 .0 5 5 2 )
E d u c* b e fl9 9 1 0 .0 3 4 2 0 .0 3 3 7 * -0 .0 3 8 9 0 .0 3 9 6 -0 .0361 -0 .0 6 2 8
(0 .0 3 8 4 ) (0 .0 2 0 3 ) (0 .0 5 3 6 ) (0 .0 3 1 6 ) (0 .0 2 7 4 ) (0 .0 5 7 7 )
B efore  1991 -0 .5 6 0 9 -0 .4 1 3 7 0 .5 6 9 4 -0 .4 0 0 2 0 .4 1 0 2 0 .8 3 7 9
(0 .4 8 3 3 ) (0 .2 5 2 3 ) (0 .6 3 3 9 ) (0 .4 0 4 9 ) (0 .3 5 7 5 ) (0 .7 2 5 9 )
P seudo  R 2 0 .1 0 2 3 0 .0 7 5 0 0 .0 7 0 0 0 .1 7 0 5 0 .1 4 5 9 0 .1 3 2 0
N 1466 1466 1466 9 8 4 98 4 984
(3 ) S a m p le  se le c tio n  a d iu s te d  O R estim a tesa
E ducation 0 .0 8 3 2 * * * 0 .0 6 7 6 * * * 0 .0 6 3 3 * * 0 .1 034*** 0 .1 0 8 3 * * * 0 .1 1 2 4 * * *
(0 .0 1 2 6 ) (0 .0 0 6 4 ) (0 .0 2 0 8 ) (0 .0 1 5 5 ) (0 .0 0 9 4 ) (0 .0 2 2 6 )
P seu d o  R 2 0 . 1 0 2 2 0 .0 7 5 8 0 .0 7 1 8 0 .1 6 8 7 0 .1 4 6 7 0 .1 3 2 0
N 1466 1466 1466 9 84 9 84 984
(4 )E n d o ee n e itv  a d iu s te d  O R  e s tim a tes1’
E ducation 0 .0 1 8 2 0 .0 8 7 9 * * * 0 .16 3 1 * * 0 .0261 0 .1 1 0 7 * * * 0 .2 0 9 6 * * *
(0 .0 3 0 6 ) (0 .0 0 9 0 ) (0 .0 3 3 5 ) (0 .0 3 3 4 ) (0 .0 1 2 8 ) (0 .0 4 2 6 )
P seu d o  R 2 0 .1 0 5 8 0 .0 8 0 9 0 .0 8 1 6 0 .1 8 1 8 0 .1 5 9 8 0 .1431
N 1466 1466 1466 98 4 984 984
N otes: “ QR estimates with the second order power series correction term s;b QR estimates with the fifth order polynom ials 
o f  the reduced form residuals; (i) Bootstrapped errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level; (ii) Full results are given in Appendix; (iii) A tests on excluding our potential instrument (average regional 
schooling) from the reduced form equations conducted at the mean, yield an F-statistics o f  37.56*** and partial R2 o f  
0.0251 for males, and F= 14.71 *** and partial R2 o f  0 .0149  for females; (iv)The DW H test conducted at the mean is 
51.154, p-value=0.000 in m ales specification and 27.105, p-value 0 .000, and w e do reject the null hypothesis in both 
specifications.
FIGURE 5.3: Returns to education by quantiles, Serbia 2003
Males, 2003 Females, 2003
.12
.10
8
N otes: The y-axis measures the return to education coefficients; the x-axis depicts the selected quantiles o f  the conditional 
w age distribution for m ale and females. The horizontal line plots the OLS estimate and its 95% confidence interval.
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TABLE 5.4
Returns to education by quantiles, Russia, 2003
M a les F e m a les
(9=0.10 (9=0.50 (9=0.90 (9=0.10 (9=0.50 (9=0.90
(1) U n a d ju sted  O R estim a tes
E ducation 0 .1 1 7 4 * * * 0 .0 8 0 8 * * * 0 .0 7 0 9 * * * 0 .1 2 0 5 * * * 0 .1 0 3 5 * * * 0 .0 8 5 9 * * *
(0 .0 0 4 5 ) (0 .0 0 2 3 ) (0 .0 0 3 5 ) (0 .0 0 3 3 ) (0 .0 0 2 5 ) (0 .0 0 3 1 )
P seu d o  R 2 0 .1 5 1 4 0 .1 3 8 7 0 .1 3 2 4 0.1321 0 .1 4 4 9 0 .1 3 4 3
N 21 8 7 4 2 1 8 7 4 2 1 8 7 4 24 3 1 8 24 3 1 8 24 3 1 8
(2 ) U n a d ju sted  O R  e s tim a tes  w ith  in tera c tio n s
E ducation 0 .1 2 4 4 * * * 0 .0 8 3 4 * * * 0 .07 6 9 * * * 0 .1 0 7 9 * * * 0 .0 9 7 8 * * * 0 .0 8 5 0 * * *
(0 .0 0 9 2 ) (0 .0 0 4 5 ) (0 .0 0 6 8 ) (0 .0 0 6 7 ) (0 .0 0 4 2 ) (0 .0 0 5 8 )
E d u c * b e fl9 9 1 -0 .0 0 7 4 -0 .0 0 3 7 -0 .0 0 9 4 0 .0 1 8 6 * * 0 .0 0 7 9 * 0 .0 0 0 9
(0 .0 1 0 8 ) (0 .0 0 5 2 ) (0 .0 0 7 8 ) (0 .0 0 7 7 ) (0 .0 0 4 8 ) (0 .0 0 6 7 )
B efore  1991 -0 .0391 -0 .0 5 8 0 0 .1 0 2 9 -0 .2 4 0 6 * * -0 .1 3 6 7 * * -0 .0 8 0 9
(0 .1 2 7 4 ) (0 .0 6 2 9 ) (0 .0 9 4 2 ) (0 .0 9 8 0 ) (0 .0 6 0 6 ) (0 .0 8 4 3 )
P seu d o  R 2 0 .1 5 1 8 0 .1 3 9 2 0 .1 3 2 5 0 .1 3 2 4 0 .1 4 5 0 0 .1 3 4 5
N 2 1 8 7 4 2 1 8 7 4 21 8 7 4 2 4 3 1 8 2 4 3 1 8 2 4 3 1 8
(3 ) S a m p le  se le c tio n  a d iu s te d  OR e s tim a tesa
E ducation 0 .1 4 6 3 * * * 0 .0 8 5 4 * * * 0 .0 6 7 7 * * * 0 .19 4 0 * * * 0 .1 5 1 9 * * * 0 .12 1 6 * * *
(0 .0 0 6 9 ) (0 .0 0 3 7 ) (0 .0 0 5 5 ) (0 .0 2 8 3 ) (0 .0 1 5 7 ) (0 .0 2 1 2 )
P seu d o  R 2 0 .1 5 6 5 0 .1 4 1 2 0 .1 3 3 6 0 .1 3 2 4 0.1451 0 .1 3 4 4
N 2 1 8 7 4 2 1 8 7 4 2 1 8 7 4 2 4 3 1 8 2 4 3 1 8 2 4 3 1 8
(4 )E n d o een e itv  a d iu s te d  O R  e s tim a tesb
Education 0 .1 1 6 9 * * * 0 .08 2 9 * * * 0 .1 2 8 7 * * * 0 .08 5 8 * * * 0 .10 3 0 * * * 0 .1 2 6 8 * * *
(0 .0 1 4 3 ) (0 .0 0 5 3 ) (0 .0 2 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 0 9 ) (0 .0 0 6 2 ) (0 .0 1 7 0 )
P seudo  R 2 0 .1 5 1 7 0 .1391 0 .1 3 3 4 0 .1 3 3 8 0 .1 4 6 4 0 .1 3 6 8
N 2 1 8 7 4 2 1 8 7 4 2 1 8 7 4 2 4 3 1 8 2 4 3 1 8 2 4 3 1 8
(5 )E n d o e e n e itv  a n d  se lec tio n  a d iu s te d  O R  e s tim a tesc
E ducation 0 .1 3 4 1 * * * 0 .0 8 9 4 * * * 0 .1 3 7 3 * * * 0 .1 5 6 0 * * * 0 .1 6 6 3 * * * 0 .1 8 3 4 * * *
(0 .0 1 5 0 ) (0 .0 0 6 6 ) (0 .0 1 9 9 ) (0 .0 2 7 4 ) (0 .0 1 9 0 ) (0 .0 2 9 4 )
P seu d o  R 2 0 .1 5 6 8 0 .1 4 1 6 0 .1 3 4 8 0 .1 3 4 3 0 .1 4 6 8 0 .1 3 7 0
N 21 8 7 4 2 1 8 7 4 2 1 8 7 4 2 4 3 1 8 2 4 3 1 8 2 4 3 1 8
Notes'. a QR estim ates with the second order power series correction terms; b QR estim ates with the fifth order 
polynom ials o f  the reduced form residuals;c QR estim ates with the second order power series correction terms and fifth 
order polynom ials o f  the reduced form residuals;
(i) Bootstrapped errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; (ii) Full results 
are given in Appendix; (iii) A  tests on excluding our potential instrument (average regional schooling) from the reduced 
form equations conducted at the mean, yield an F-statistics o f  28.91 and partial R2 o f  0.0013 for males, and F= 
22.65** and partial R 2 o f  0 .0009 for females; (iv) The DW H test conducted at the mean is 85.734, p-value =0.0000 in 
m ales specification and 140.062, p-value 0 .0 0 0 0  for fem ales, and w e do reject the null hypothesis.
FIGURE 5.4: Return to education by quantiles, Russia 2003
Males. 2003 Fem ales . 2003
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N otes: The y-axis measures the return to education coefficients; the x-axis depicts the selected quantiles o f  the conditional 
w age distribution for m ale and fem ales. The horizontal line plots the OLS estimate and its 95% confidence interval.
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TABLE 5.5
Returns to education by quantiles, Tajikistan, 2003
M a les F e m a les
0=0.10 0=0.50 0=0.90 0=0.10 0=0.50 0=0.90
( l)U n a d iu s te d  O R  e stim a tes
Education 0 .0 3 7 0 * * 0 .0 4 5 7 * * * 0 .03 9 8 * * 0 .0 5 7 5 * * * 0 .1 1 3 9 * * * 0 .1157***
(0 .0 1 5 1 ) (0 .0 0 8 8 ) (0 .0 1 6 5 ) (0 .0 0 6 1 ) (0 .0 1 2 4 ) (0 .0 2 1 3 )
P seu d o  R 2 0 .0 8 0 2 0 .0 9 7 4 0 .0 8 1 5 0 .0 7 6 5 0 .1 3 5 3 0 .1 8 7 0
N 3 0 0 6 3 0 0 6 3 0 0 6 1832 1832 1832
(2 )U n a d iu s te d  O R  e s tim a tes  w ith  in tera c tio n s
E ducation 0 .0 4 6 6 * * 0 .0 7 2 9 * * * 0 .1 0 0 7 * * * 0 .0 5 4 7 * * * 0 .1 2 4 6 * * * 0 .15 1 1 * * *
(0 .0 2 2 9 ) (0 .0 1 2 7 ) (0 .0 2 4 7 ) (0 .0 0 9 3 ) (0 .0 1 5 6 ) (0 .0 2 7 8 )
E d u c* b e fl9 9 1 -0 .0 1 4 5 -0 .0 5 0 2 * * * -0 .0 6 5 7 * * 0 .0 1 2 8 -0 .0 2 5 9 -0 .0 6 4 8 *
(0 .0 2 6 9 ) (0 .0 1 4 8 ) (0 .0 3 0 7 ) (0 .0 1 2 1 ) (0 .0 1 9 7 ) (0 .0 3 4 7 )
B efo re  1991 -0 .0 6 6 6 0 .4 9 6 3 * * * 0 .7 5 2 8 * -0 .0 9 7 0 0 .4 0 7 4 * 0 .86 1 5 * *
(0 .3 3 3 3 ) (0 .1 8 6 4 ) (0 .3 8 5 8 ) (0 .1 5 1 6 ) (0 .2 4 0 8 ) (0 .4 2 1 9 )
P seu d o  R 2 0 .0 8 1 5 0 .0 9 9 4 0 .0 8 2 7 0.0771 0 .1 3 6 4 0 .1 9 0 4
N 3 0 0 6 3 0 0 6 3 0 0 6 _ 1832 1832 1832
(3) S a m p le  se lec tio n  a d iu s te d  O R  e s tim a tes“
E ducation 0 .0 7 4 1 * * * 0 .07 9 4 * * * 0 .0 5 5 4 * * * 0 .0 5 9 1 * * * 0 .1 1 4 8 * * * 0 .1253***
(0 .0 1 6 2 ) (0 .0 1 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 8 5 ) (0 .0 0 7 9 ) (0 .0 1 4 1 ) (0 .0 1 9 6 )
P seu d o  R 2 0 .0 8 9 6 0 .1 0 4 8 0 .0 8 6 3 0 .0 7 6 6 0 .1 3 6 0 0 .1903
N 3 0 0 6 3 0 0 6 3 0 0 6 1832 1832 1832
(4 )E n d o e e n e itv  a d iu s te d  O R  e s tim a tesb
E ducation 0 .0 3 4 6 0 .0 4 6 9 * * * 0 .0 7 8 4 * * 0 .0 3 3 2 * * 0 .0 8 3 2 * * * 0 .1 660***
(0 .0 2 6 8 ) (0 .0 1 2 9 ) (0 .0 2 9 0 ) (0 .0 1 4 3 ) (0 .0 1 9 7 ) (0 .0 3 5 6 )
P seu d o  R 2 0.0801 0.0991 0 .0 8 3 5 0 .0 6 7 6 0 .1 3 7 4 0 .1 8 9 7
N 3 0 0 6 30 0 6 30 0 6 1832 1832 1832
(5 )E n d o se n e itv  a n d  se le c tio n  a d iu s te d  O R e s tim a tesc
E ducation 0 .0 4 2 1 * 0 .0 7 9 1 * * * 0 .1 0 5 9 * * * 0 .0 5 0 6 * * * 0 .0 8 7 0 * * * 0 .1752***
(0 .0 2 3 4 ) (0 .0 1 2 3 ) (0 .0 2 9 8 ) (0 .0 1 9 1 ) (0 .0 2 1 3 ) (0 .0 3 8 4 )
P seudo  R 2 0 .0 9 4 2 0 .0 9 5 9 0 .0 9 0 6 0 .0 6 8 7 0 .1 3 8 8 0 .1 9 4 0
N 3 0 0 6 3 0 0 6 3 0 0 6 1832 1832 1832
N otes: a QR estimates with the second order power series correction terms; b QR estimates with the fifth order polynom ials o f  
the reduced form residu als;c QR estimates with the second order power series correction terms and fifth order polynom ials o f  
the reduced form residuals;
(i) Bootstrapped errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; (ii) Full results are 
given in Appendix, (iv) A tests on excluding our potential instrument (average regional schooling) from the reduced form 
equations conducted at the mean, yield an F-statistics o f  168.61*** and partial R2 o f  0.0533 for males, and F= 336.02 *** and 
partial R2 o f  0 .1558 for females; (iv) The DW H test conducted at the mean in m ale specification is 158.921, p-value= 0 .0000  
and 83.235, p-value= 0 .0000 in fem ale, so w e do reject the null hypothesis.
FIGURE 5.5: Returns to education by quantiles, Tajikistan 2003
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N otes: The y-axis measures the return to education coefficients; the x-axis depicts the selected quantiles o f  the conditional 
w age distribution for m ale and fem ales. The horizontal line plots the OLS estim ate and its 95% confidence interval.
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One can also see that the horizontal lines in the figures, which plots the OLS estimate 
and its 95% confidence interval, indicates that the estimated mean returns to schooling 
for Bulgaria, Russia and Tajikistan are not representative of the effect education has 
on earnings at all points in the earnings distribution. One possible explanation for the 
high premium estimated at the top of the distribution in Bulgaria and for females in 
Tajikistan is that the degree holders at the top of the distribution would be expected to 
be of higher ability, thereby biasing the estimated educational premium. Arias et al. 
(2001) have interpreted a positive ability-retums relationship as evidence that 
education and ability are complements in the human capital generation process, which 
if true suggests that more able individuals in these countries benefit most from 
educational investment. However, there might be other explanations for this pattern. 
Because personal abilities and skills (cognitive and non-cognitive) are unobserved by 
researchers, it is difficult to isolate the effect that drives the heterogeneous pattern of 
returns to education across the wage distribution. For example, workers with identical 
education do not necessarily have to have the same level of productivity because of 
the influence of unobserved variables that are systematically correlated with both 
measured education and an individual’s place in the earnings distribution.
In the set of countries considered here, the Russian unadjusted estimates do not 
increase as we move up to the distribution. For both males and females, the return to 
schooling is higher in the lower part o f the earnings distribution than at the top end of 
the distribution. For instance, the returns to education for males fall from 11.7% to 
7.1% between the 10th and 90th quantile and for females the equivalent fall is from 
12.1% to 8.6% (see Table 5.4). These differences are also significant, as an F-test 
decisively rejects the equality of the estimates at the 10th and 90th percentiles for both 
male and female workers (see Table 5.6). At the top end of the earnings distribution, 
the estimated returns to education for both males and females are below than for the 
average earnings. However, we should note that the endogeneity and selectivity 
adjusted point estimates in Russia are quite different and show considerable 
homogeneity across the distribution for women (see the next Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4).
Mwabu and Schultz (1996) and Arias et a l (2001) interpret the negative ability- 
retums relationship as evidence of education and ability being substitutes, which 
implies that maximising the returns to education may require increasing educational
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opportunities for less able individuals in Russia. Flabbi et a l  (2008) also find 
evidence for a higher return to education in the lower part of the earnings distribution 
in Russian in the early (1991-1996) and late transition (1997-2002) periods. Similarly, 
Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2005) find that the university wage premium in 
Russia is higher in the lower part of the earnings distribution than in top part of the 
earnings distribution. There are, however, a number of alternative explanations for this 
pattern in the literature. First, a demand-side effect could drive down the return to 
education at different points in the earnings distribution because of an oversupply of 
well-educated workers in the economy (the supply effect dominates the demand effect 
at higher points in the earnings distribution). Second, a negative relationship between 
‘ability’ and the return to schooling could also reflect differences in the educational 
attainment of the labour force (Hermstein and Murray, 1994). Similarly, lower returns 
to education at the higher end of the earnings distribution suggests there are factors 
leading to high-paying employment that act independently of education-generating 
human capital process. It is also possible to interpret the results in terms of a “state” or 
“foreign” ownership effect. State ownership is much more relevant to the lower tail of 
the wage distribution and relatively low paid workers earn more in state owned firms. 
This state ownership effect tends to die away as there is movement up through the 
earnings distribution (Machado and Mata, 2001). Finally, as Table 5.1 shows the 
public sector is much bigger in Russia than in the other three countries and this might 
suggest that redistributive policies may play a greater role there than elsewhere in 
supporting those with low human capital endowments.
The QR results also provide evidence of heterogeneity in returns to education across
thcountries as well as within countries. Whereas the return for females at the 90 
percentile is 7.2% in Bulgaria, it reaches 11.6% in Tajikistan. For males, the estimated 
unadjusted returns at the 10th percentile vary from 3.9% in Bulgaria, to 8.2% in 
Serbia, 11.7% in Russia and 3.7% in Tajikistan.
Finally, the unadjusted results indicate that, in general, educational returns are higher 
for females than for males. For instance, the point estimates at the 90th percentile in 
Serbia show return to education of 6.7% for males and 10.1% for females. The 
differences are also significant in Tajikistan, where at the 90th percentile the 
estimated returns to education is 3.9% for males and 11.6% for females.
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We use testing procedures based on the QR statistics to formally test for the presence 
o f heterogeneity in the returns to education and to test that the difference between 
quantiles is statistically significant84. The test of whether the estimated returns to 
education differ across each of these quantile levels is significantly different for 
female workers in Bulgaria, Tajikistan and Russia (see Table 5.6). Whereas for 
females in Tajikistan, the impact of education at the 90th quantile is two times higher 
than the 5.7% return found at the lower end of the distribution, we find little 
heterogeneity in how the quantiles of wages vary with schooling in Serbia. The F-test 
for equality at the 10th and 90th percentiles is insignificant for male’s specifications in 
Serbia and Tajikistan. The confidence intervals for both males and females estimates 
in Serbia tend to overlap at most points in the earnings distribution the OLS estimates 
(see Figure 5.3).
TABLE 5.6
Inter-quantile hypothesis testing of unadjusted QR estimates
C ountries 90th equal to 10tb j A ll quantiles equal
__________ M a le s ____________________ F e m a le s _________ I___________M a le s ____________________ F e m a le s _________
U n a d ju s te d  Q R  e s t im a te s
Bulgaria F( 1,1281) = 4 .65" F( 1,1171) = 5.71**’ F (4 ,1281) =1.76 F (4,l 171) =3 .58’"
Serbia F( 1,1451) = 0.49 F( 1,969) = 0.00 F(4,1451) = 0.40 F(4,969) =  0.38
Russia F( 1 ,21857) =71.10*** F (l, 24302) =58.43*** F(4,21857) =27.53*** F(4, 24302) =21.71***
Tajikistan F( 1,2991) = 0.02 F( 1,1817) = 8.10*** F( 4,2991) = 0.28 F( 4,1817) = 4.44***
N otes: The F-test for the equality o f  unadjusted QR coefficients at the 90th and 10lh and the F-test for the equality o f  all 
quantiles in unadjusted QR. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level;
5.4.2. Unadjusted results with interactions fo r  education
We next adopt the same specifications for testing the presence of an interaction effect 
between schooling and an indicator of whether individuals have graduated prior 1991. 
During the transition toward a market oriented wage system, new wage regimes were 
more likely to be applied to newly graduated workers (those who obtain their 
education after 1991) and consequently, we should expect higher returns to education 
for them. The dummy variable that captures whether individuals received their 
education prior 1991 is included along with the interaction terms. Even if we place the 
start of the transition period in 1991, as done for instance by Flabbi et al., (2008), 
these individuals have been exposed to some extent to new education curricula and 
systems. In most of the countries, however, coefficients on the interaction terms
84 Following Buchinsky (1995), this test is performed after an inter-quantile regression, which re-estimates the 
model taking the difference between the coefficients across the wage distribution p  -  fig2 = 0 •
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between schooling and pre-1991 are insignificant and only for males in Tajikistan at 
the upper part of the distribution, we find significant and negative interaction term, 
which basically indicates lower returns for workers graduated before 1991, than for 
the newly graduated respondents. For females in Russia, the interaction terms are 
positive and significant at 5% lever at the bottom of the distribution.
5.4.3. Sample selection adjusted QR results
There are at least two indications why sample selection may be a concern for our 
samples. First, about 52% of females in the Russian sample, 60% of females in 
Bulgarian sample and only 38% of females in Serbian and 28% of females in 
Tajikistan samples are in employment. Second, from the descriptive statistics, it 
appears that working and the non-working women differ in their educational 
attainment. For instance, in Bulgaria working women report on average 13.9 years in 
education compared to the 12.6 years for their non-working counterparts.
However, sample selection adjusted QR estimates indicate that the two power series 
correction terms are not significant for either males or females workers in Bulgaria 
and for males in Serbia. Moreover, comparing returns to education coefficients to the 
corresponding unadjusted quantile estimates in these two countries, the differences are 
not statistically significant. Selectivity terms in the series estimator are significant at 
the conventional levels of significance in the female specification in Serbia at the 25th, 
50th and 75th percentiles. By way of contrast, in Russia there is compelling evidence of
thstrong sample selection effect across the distribution. The coefficient at the 10 
percentile for males increases from 11.7% in the unadjusted estimates to 14.6% once 
selectivity is taken into account and from 12.1% to 19.4% for females. We should 
note that the sample selection estimates may depend on the first stage selection
Of
equation obtained for a parametric probit model . Correcting for selection has a 
dramatic effect on the returns to schooling for males in Tajikistan, increasing the 
estimates from 3.7% to 7.4% at the 10th percentile. If  true this finding would suggest 
that for males in Tajikistan, education is important for determining participation in the 
labour force but thereafter has little effect on the earnings o f individuals.
85 Buchinsky (2001) shows that semi-parametric estimates for the first stage selection equation are considerably 
different than those obtained from a parametric model. Since this is not focus o f  the current study and considering 
that semi-parametric method is highly computer intensive (for example, the estimation using Klein and Spady 
(1993) estimator on a first step takes between 15 and 17 hours), we apply the probit model on a first-stage.
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Overall, the selectivity adjusted point estimates across the various quantiles in 
Bulgaria and Serbia are quite close, suggesting little heterogeneity, and this is support 
by the inter-quantile tests. In the case of Serbia, we do not reject that returns to 
education, based on selectivity adjusted estimates, are constant over the earnings 
distribution. The test of whether the selectivity corrected returns to education differ 
across each of these quantile levels is significantly different only for female workers 
in Bulgaria and Tajikistan and for males in Russia (see Table 5.7).
TABLE 5.7
Inter-quantile hypothesis testing of selectivity adjusted QR estimates
Countries 90th equal to 10th A ll quantiles equal
M ales Fem ales M ales Females
Selectivity adjusted QR estim ates
Bulgaria
Serbia
Russia
Tajikistan
F( 1,1279) = 4 .82"  F ( l,l  169) = 2.53 
F (l,1 4 4 9 )=  1.03 F (l, 967) = 0.16  
F (l, 21856) = 70.73*** F( 1,24300) = 31.46*** 
F ( l,2989) =0.71 F( 1,1815) = 8.08***
F (4 ,1279) = 2.10** 
F (4,1449) = 0.43 
F(4,21856) =21.94*** 
F(4,2989) = 2.18
F (4,l 169) =1.55 
F(4,967) = 0.32 
F(4, 24300) =1.24  
F (4 ,1815) = 3.75***
Notes: The F-test for the equality o f  unadjusted QR coefficients at the 90 lh and 10,h and the F-test for the equality o f  all 
quantiles in unadjusted QR. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
5.4.4. Endogeneity adjusted QR results
The fourth set of results pertains to endogeneity adjusted estimates. A fifth order 
polynomial of the reduced form residuals is applied to estimate the rate of returns to 
education at different values of 6 86. The results are sensitive to the choice of the order 
of residual polynomial used in the analysis. Before comparing the results of these 
estimates, we test whether our instrument meets the two conditions: relevance and 
exogeneity. The relevance of the instrument is tested at the mean in the first-stage 
regression. There is significant and positive relationship between regional average 
schooling and individual’s level of schooling. The F-statistics on the excluded 
instrument in the reduced-form schooling estimates indicate that schooling is strongly 
correlated with the instrument for both males and females and in all four countries. 
For instance, the test on excluding our potential instrument from the reduced form 
equation in Bulgaria, yields an F-statistics o f 19.39 and partial R2 of 0.0149 for males 
and F= 17.54 and partial R2 of 0.0147 for females. Similarly, for Serbia the F- 
statistics of 37.56 for males and 14.71 for females compare favourably with those
86 Lee (2007) provides a condition which restricts the growth rate o f  the power series k. The necessary smoothness 
condition is that r > 5 ■
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reported in Bound et al. (1995).
The validity of our endogeneity adjusted estimates however, depends on the exclusion 
restriction that average regional schooling has no direct effect on individual’s current 
earnings. Having more than one potential instrument will enable us to undertake a 
Sargan instrument validity test and to provide support for our empirical approach. 
Unfortunately in most of the countries dealt with in this Chapter we only have one 
identifying instrument and are, therefore, unable to undertake a similar test. In the case 
o f Bulgaria only we are able to identify mothers within the household having higher 
degree. The over-identifying test was passed for both male and female Bulgarian 
samples, which provides some support for the approach adopted here.
For all four countries, the DWH test undertaken at the mean leads to a strong rejection 
of the null hypothesis of exogeneity of schooling, and we conclude that the 
endogeneity adjusted QR results differ from the unadjusted QR estimates. An 
examination of the results in Tables 5.2 to 5.5 suggests that the effects of adjusting for 
the endogeneity of schooling is most marked at the top end of the earnings 
distribution. For instance, in Bulgaria, the estimated returns for both males and 
females rise to nearly 11%. We observe a similar trend for females in Tajikistan,
thwhere correcting for endogeneity increases estimated returns to education at the 90 
percentile to 16.6%. For males in Tajikistan, we do find insignificant wage premium 
at the bottom of the distribution. In Russia, the returns to schooling are quite different 
compared to the unadjusted results. Again, this effect tends to be more pronounced in 
the top end of the distribution than in the bottom end o f the distribution. We can see at 
the highest percentile (90 ) the return to schooling in Russia is 12.7% for females and 
12.8% for males, while the equivalent comparison at the 10th percentile is a return of 
8.6% for females and 11.7% for males. Moreover, for males the return decreases
thsharply as we go up the distribution, though with an increase at the 90 centile (see 
Table A5.12). The endogeneity adjusted estimates for females in Russia show a rising 
return (see Table A5.13). For males and females in Serbia, returns to education tend to 
be insignificant at the bottom of the distribution, once the endogeneity is accounted 
for.
155
5.4.5. Sample selection and endogeneity adjusted QR results
In many cases it may be important to correct for both sample selection and 
endogeneity in education. We do control for both biases in the case of Russia and 
Tajikistan, as sample selectivity were found to be significant in those countries. After 
controlling for sample selection due to labour force participation as well as 
endogeneity of schooling decision, the estimated coefficients are overall larger than 
the unadjusted ones, thus allowing us to conclude that the differences between 
estimates is attributed to selection and endogeneity biases. For instance, the estimated 
returns to education at the 90th percentile for females in Russia rises from 8.6% in 
unadjusted QR estimates to 18.3% once selectivity and endogeneity are considered. 
Similarly, in Tajikistan the effect is more pronounced in the top end of the 
distribution, where the estimated coefficients rise from 3.9% to 10.6% for males and 
from 11.6% to 17.5% for females.
5.5. Conclusions
In this Chapter we analyse the dispersion of the returns to education at four different 
transition countries, attempting to test for evidence of individual heterogeneity in 
returns to education. Based on the empirical estimations, the following main 
conclusions can be drawn:
The unadjusted estimates suggest that the return to education varies as we move 
across the earnings distribution. There is a tendency for returns to increase and to 
remain higher in the upper tail o f the distribution in Bulgaria and for females in 
Tajikistan. We interpret these increasing returns as an indication that ‘ability’, when 
broadly defined, and education complement each other. The reason for heterogeneity 
in the returns to education is likely to be due to the fact that differences in ‘ability’ 
translate into higher pay differentials between high-ability and low-ability workers. A 
little heterogeneity was found in the case of Serbia. While in three of the countries the 
rate of return to education either rises or stays constant as we move up the distribution, 
the unadjusted estimates for Russia show that it falls sharply.
Overall, specifications with the interaction terms between schooling and indicators for 
education obtained prior 1991 indicate insignificant coefficients on the interaction
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terms. Significant and negative interaction term are found in Tajikistan for males at 
the upper part of distribution and for females at the 90th percentile which suggest 
significantly lower return to education for those graduated before 1991.
Comparison of the unadjusted QR estimates and estimates corrected for selectivity 
suggests that estimates of the returns to education for both males and females in 
Russia and for males in Tajikistan were sensitive to the inclusion of the power series 
approximation terms. The significance of the power series approximation terms in 
these two countries indicates that it was necessary to perform the sample selection 
correction. In Russia there was compelling evidence of strong sample selection effect 
at the bottom of the distribution where the estimated coefficients increase to 12.8% for 
males and 12.7% for females. The two power-series correction terms were not 
significant for either males or females in Bulgaria.
Overall, the endogeneity adjusted estimates were higher as compared to unadjusted 
returns to education87 and we conclude that failure to account for endogeneity seems 
to create slight downward bias estimates of the returns to education. For all four 
countries the DWH test, undertaken at the mean, leads to a strong rejection o f the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity in education, therefore the endogeneity adjusted results 
differ from the unadjusted QR estimates.
The resulst for Russia are sensitive to specification. The negative wage premium, 
found in unadjusted results was no more evident when both endogeneity and 
selectivity issues are taken into account.
87 It is common results in the empirical literature that estimated return to education increase as a result o f  treating 
education as an endogenous variable.
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TABLE A 5.12
Endogeneity adjusted QR estimates o f  returns to education for males, Russia 2003
0=0.10 0=0.25
M ales
0=0.50 <35 II O -J 0=0.90
school 0 .1 1 6 9 " ’ 0 .1170’’’ 0 .0829’*’ 0 .0500’’’ 0.1287*’’
(0 .0143) (0 .0068) (0.0053) (0.0075) (0 .0 2 1 0 )
exp -0.0068* -0.0048* 0.0013 0.0072*** 0.0085*’*
(0 .0037) (0 .0025) (0.0019) (0 .0 0 2 1 ) (0 .0029)
expsq 0 .0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 0 1 *" -0 .0 0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 0 2 ***
(0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 )
married 0 .0848’" 0.1320*" 0.1208*** 0.1185*" 0.1143"*
(0.0277) (0 .0178) (0 .0139) (0 .0154) (0 .0209)
1 -2  years 0 .1301’" 0 .1672’" 0.1474"* 0 .1016’** 0 .0936’"
(0.0325) (0.0225) (0 .0174) (0 .0195) (0 .0267)
3-5 years 0.2782*" 0 .2800’" 0.2422**’ 0.1848*** 0 .1684’"
(0.0367) (0.0250) (0 .0194) (0 .0216) (0 .0297)
6 - 1 0  years 0 .3763’*’ 0.3515*" 0 .3103 ’’’ 0 .2439’** 0.2033*’*
(0.0358) (0 .0241) (0 .0189) (0 .0209) (0 .0286)
> 1 0  years 0 .3044’" 0.3372*" 0.3377*" 0.2753"* 0.2336***
(0 .0345) (0 .0227) (0 .0179) (0.0195) (0 .0267)
arrears -0.6309*’* -0.4853*" -0.3502*" -0.2957**’ -0.2830*"
(0 .0248) (0 .0169) (0 .0137) (0.0148) (0 .0203)
public 0 .1051’’* 0 .0448’" -0.0117 -0.0448*’’ -0.0802***
(0.0204) (0 .0138) (0 .0106) (0 .0 1 2 0 ) (0 .0166)
Central 0 .2703’** 0 .2691’’’ 0.2175*" 0.2383**’ 0.2840*"
(0.0333) (0 .0232) (0 .0177) (0 .0 2 0 0 ) (0 .0274)
North-W est 0.6176*’* 0.6587*** 0.6124**’ 0 .6119’** 0 .5980’**
(0.0364) (0 .0254) (0 .0194) (0 .0219) (0 .0300)
Siberia 0.2949*’* 0.3317*" 0.3405*** 0.3723"* 0 .4281’**
(0 .0369) (0 .0258) (0 .0197) (0 .0223) (0 .0305)
Far-East 0 .7340’" 0.7587*** 0.7392*** 0.7379**’ 0.7395*"
(0 .0368) (0 .0256) (0 .0196) (0 .0 2 2 1 ) (0 .0303)
Urals 0.4924*’* 0 .5023’" 0 .5210’** 0.6187"* 0.8020***
(0 .0423) (0 .0293) (0.0224) (0.0253) (0 .0346)
Volga 0 .1 1 5 8 " ’ 0.1831*" 0.1776*** 0.1737*" 0.1289***
(0.0349) (0 .0243) (0 .0186) (0 .0 2 1 0 ) (0 .0288)
r1 0.0080 -0.0179*’* -0 .0 0 1 2 0 .0035’ 0 .0067
(0.0052) (0 .0049) (0 .0015) (0 .0 0 2 1 ) (0 .0075)
r2 -0 .0006 0.0017" 0 .0 0 0 0 0.0036*’* -0 .0060"
(0.0007) (0 .0008) (0 .0006) (0 .0009) (0 .0025)
r3 -0 .0 0 0 2 0 .0 0 0 6 ’*’ 0 .0 0 0 1 * -0 .0 0 0 2 " -0.0014*"
(0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0004)
r4 0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 0 1 **’ -0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 0 1 *** -0 .0 0 0 1 ***
(0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 )
r5 0 .0003’’’ -0 .0 0 0 2 *** -0 .0 0 0 1 *** -0 .0 0 0 2 *" -0 .0003"
(0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0009) (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 )
Constant 0.1613 0.6178*" 1.4116*** 2 .1676’** 1.4471*’*
(0.1306) (0 .0761) (0 .0627) (0 .0900) (0 .3111)
N 21874 21874 21874 21874 21874
P seu d o  R 2 0.1517 0.1421 0.1391 0.1339 0.1334
Notes-. Standard errors in parentheses * p  < 0 .10 , ** p  <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01
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TABLE A5.13
Endogeneity adjusted QR estimates o f  returns to education for fem ales, Russia 2003
0 = 0.10 <9=0.25
F em ales
<9=0.50 0=0.75 <9=0.90
school 0 .0858’” 0.1074"* 0 .1030” * 0.1242"* 0.1268***
(0.0109) (0.0057) (0 .0062) (0 .0051) (0 .0170)
exp 0 .0055” 0.0054**’ 0.0071*” 0.0093**’ 0.0113***
(0.0028) (0 .0 0 2 0 ) (0 .0019) (0 .0018) (0 .0023)
expsq -0 .0 0 0 2 ” -0 .0 0 0 1 ” -0 .0 0 0 1 *** -0 .0 0 0 1 *” -0 .0 0 0 2 **’
(0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 )
married -0 .0380” -0.0473*** -0.0400*” -0 .0214” -0.0173
(0.0153) (0.0114) (0 .0 1 1 1 ) (0 .0108) (0 .0134)
1 -2  years 0.0822*" 0.1008*** 0.0883*’* 0.0599*** 0.0834*"
(0.0265) (0.0197) (0 .0192) (0 .0187) (0 .0230)
3-5 years 0.1842*” 0.1830*** 0 .1 6 7 2 " ’ 0 .1250 ’*’ 0.1422*"
(0.0297) (0 .0 2 2 0 ) (0 .0216) (0 .0 2 1 2 ) (0 .0258)
6 - 1 0  years 0.2653*” 0.2594*** 0 .2 2 9 8 " ’ 0.1614*** 0.1778"*
(0.0286) (0.0215) (0 .0208) (0 .0205) (0 .0247)
> 1 0  years 0.3305*” 0.3200**’ 0.2664**’ 0.1689*** 0.1811***
(0 .0273) (0 .0205) (0.0198) (0 .0198) (0 .0232)
arrears -0 .2612’** -0.2347"* -0.2075*** -0.1852*** -0.2352*”
(0 .0208) (0 .0157) (0.0156) (0 .0155) (0 .0183)
public 0 .0395” -0.0420*** -0.0672*** -0.1045*" -0.0803*”
(0.0164) (0 .0124) (0 .0118) (0 .0132) (0 .0143)
Central 0 .1234” * 0.1358*” 0.1836*’* 0.2134*” 0.2715***
(0.0253) (0.0188) (0 .0183) (0 .0178) (0 .0 2 2 0 )
North-W est 0.4758*” 0.5485*” 0.5875*** 0.5792*** 0 .5860’**
(0.0278) (0.0207) (0 .0 2 0 1 ) (0 .0196) (0 .0241)
Siberia 0.2295*" 0.2963**’ 0.3133*" 0.3410*** 0.4188*"
(0.0281) (0 .0 2 1 0 ) (0 .0204) (0 .0199) (0 .0245)
Far-East 0.6841*” 0.7181**’ 0.7606**’ 0.7956"* 0 .8323’**
(0.0282) (0 .0 2 1 0 ) (0 .0204) (0 .0199) (0.0245)
Urals 0.2312*** 0.3302**’ 0 .4092” * 0.5307*” 0.7075*”
(0 .0322) (0 .0240) (0 .0233) (0.0227) (0.0280)
V olga 0.0784"* 0.1108*” 0.1130*** 0 .1 2 4 9 ’*’ 0 .1377’"
(0.0266) (0 .0198) (0 .0193) (0 .0188) (0 .0232)
r1 0 .0 2 1 1 *" 0.0033 0.0083"* 0 .0060” -0.0014
(0.0051) (0.0027) (0 .0018) (0 .0023) (0.0064)
r -0 .0 0 1 2 ” 0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0017*** -0 .0042”
(0 .0006) (0 .0006) (0 .0007) (0.0005) (0 .0 0 2 1 )
r3 -0.0004* 0 .0 0 0 1 -0 .0 0 0 2 ” -0 .0003" -0.0007*
(0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0004)
r4 0 .0 0 0 0 * -0 .0 0 0 0 ” -0.0000 -0.0000 -0 .0 0 0 0 *
(0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 )
r5 -0 .0004 0 .0 0 1 2 ” 0.0000 0.0026*" -0 .0003"
(0.0007) (0 .0008) (0 .0006) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0025)
constant 0 .2505” 0.4537*” 0.8938*" 0.9852*" 1.2191*"
(0.1098) (0 .0655) (0 .0755) (0 .0705) (0 .2538)
N 24318 24318 24318 24318 24318
P seu d o  R 2 0.1338 0 .1434 0.1464 0.1429 0.1368
Notes'. Standard errors in parentheses * p  <  0.10, ** p  < 0 .05 , *** p  <  0.01
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TABLE A5.14: Endogeneity and selectivity adjusted QR estimates o f  returns to
education for males, Russia 2003
0=0.10 <9=0.25
M ales
0=0.50 0=0.75 0=0.90
school 0 .1 3 4 1 " ’ 0 .1182’’* 0 .0 8 9 4 " ’ 0 .0518’” 0 .1373’’*
exp
(0 .0150)
-0 .0174’"
(0 .0071)
-0.0118*’*
(0 .0066)
-0.0019
(0 .0068)
0.0056"*
(0.0199)
0 .0081"
expsq
(0 .0042)
0.0004"*
(0 .0027)
0 .0 0 0 2 "
(0.0025)
-0.0000
(0 .0 0 2 1 )
-0 .0 0 0 2 ***
(0.0032)
-0 .0 0 0 2 "
married
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
0.1696*"
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
0.1688***
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
0.1404***
(0 .0 0 0 0 )
0.1303**’
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
0.1046*"
1 -2  years
(0.0348)
0.2359*’’
(0.0216)
0.1916***
(0 .0 2 0 1 )
0.1394*"
(0 .0168)
0.0929*"
(0.0251)
0.0671*
3-5 years
(0 .0433)
0.5543*’’
(0.0280)
0.4331***
(0 .0256)
0.3266"*
(0 .0213)
0.2330*"
(0.0321)
0.1692*"
6 - 1 0  years
(0.0650)
0.3866*"
(0.0421)
0.3499*’*
(0.0385)
0 .2951’’’
(0 .0319)
0.2216*"
(0.0486)
0 .1 8 3 5 " ’
> 1 0  years
(0.0366)
0.2809*’’
(0 .0233)
0.3288***
(0.0219)
0 .3084’"
(0 .0180)
0.2581***
(0 .0272)
0 .2 2 2 0 *"
arrears
(0.0342)
-0 .6834’’*
(0 .0 2 1 2 )
-0.4742*’*
(0 .0203)
-0.3416**’
(0 .0165)
-0.2959*"
(0.0249)
-0.2450***
public
(0 .0464)
0.1403"*
(0 .0298)
0.0499***
(0 .0276)
-0.0047
(0 .0229)
-0.0397*"
(0.0348)
-0.0906"*
Central
(0.0238)
0.1864**’
(0 .0151)
0.2383*"
(0.0140)
0.2134***
(0 .0118)
0.2315***
(0 .0180)
0.2811*’*
North-W est
(0 .0374)
0.6852***
(0 .0245)
0.6903**’
(0 .0225)
0.6343**’
(0 .0188)
0.6231**’
(0 .0286)
0.5948*"
Siberia
(0 .0375)
0.2005*’*
(0 .0246)
0.3058"*
(0 .0227)
0.3185**’
(0 .0193)
0.3641**’
(0 .0291)
0.4363*"
Far-East
(0.0420)
0.7424***
(0 .0275)
0.7632"*
(0 .0254)
0.7347*’*
(0 .0213)
0.7304***
(0 .0326)
0.7350"*
Urals
(0 .0364)
0.4165***
(0 .0239)
0.4775**’
(0 .0 2 2 1 )
0.5098**’
(0 .0187)
0 .6 0 4 0 ’"
(0 .0284)
0.7990***
Volga
(0 .0437)
0.0701
(0 .0284)
0 .1551’**
(0 .0263)
0 .1659’’’
(0 .0 2 2 2 )
0.1651**’
(0 .0336)
0.1273*"
(z »
(z'y)2
(0 .0372)
1.5644*"
(0.0243)
1.6206"*
(0 .0224)
1.2421**’
(0.0189)
0.8481*"
(0.0288)
0.8020***
(0 .2394)
-0.3017***
(0 .1566)
-0.2804*’*
(0 .1432)
-0.2095*"
(0 . 1 2 2 0 )
-0.1429**’
(0 .1893)
-0.1255*"
r1
(0 .0348)
0.0066
(0 .0230)
-0.0150***
(0 .0 2 1 2 )
-0 .0006
(0 .0183)
0.0042*
(0 .0285)
0 .0056
r2
(0 .0051)
-0.0007
(0 .0045)
0 .0016"
(0.0018)
-0 .0 0 0 1
(0 .0018)
0.0036***
(0 .0070)
-0 .0070’**
r3
(0.0007)
-0.0000
(0 .0008)
0.0005*"
(0.0006)
0 .0 0 0 1
(0 .0007)
-0 .0 0 0 2 "
(0.0024)
-0.0015***
r4
(0 .0 0 0 2 )
0.0000
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
-0 .0 0 0 1 ’**
(0 .0 0 0 0 )
-0.0000
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
-0 .0 0 0 1 *"
(0.0004)
-0 .0 0 0 1 ’**
r5
(0 .0 0 0 0 )
0 .0 0 0 1
(0 .0 0 0 0 )
0.0007*
(0 .0 0 0 0 )
0.0000
(0 .0 0 0 0 )
0 .0006"
(0 .0 0 0 0 )
-0 .0 0 2 0 "
constant
(0.0007)
-1.9858**’
(0 .0 0 0 2 )
-1.6817*"
(0.0003)
-0.4601
(0 .0009)
0.9224***
(0 .0005)
0.1017
N
(0.3909)
21874
(0 .2552)
21874
(0 .2388)
21874
(0 .2089)
21874
(0 .4338)
21874
P seudo  R 2 0.1568 0.1469 0.1416 0 .1357 0.1348
Notes'. Standard errors in parentheses * p  <  0 .10, ** p  <  0.05, *** p <  0.01
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TABLE A5.15: Endogeneity and selectivity adjusted QR estimates o f  returns to
education for females, Russia 2003
<9=0.10 <9=0.25
F em ales
<9=0.50 <9=0.75 0=0.90
school 0 .1560’" 0 .1753’** 0 .1663’’’ 0 .1722’’’ 0.1834*’*
(0 .0274) (0.0173) (0.0190) (0 .0182) (0 .0294)
exp 0.0405*" 0.0376*** 0 .0371’" 0.0313*** 0 .0360"
(0.0128) (0.0081) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0 .0 1 1 2 )
expsq -0 .0009" -0 .0008 ’** -0.0007*" -0.0005*" -0.0007***
(0 .0003) (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 0 2 )
married -0 .6523" -0.6336*’* -0.5760**’ -0 .4187" -0.4593*
(0 .2228) (0.1423) (0.1517) (0 .1485) (0 .1985)
1 - 2  years 0 .1 8 9 2 " ’ 0.1984*** 0.1692*" 0 .1215’** 0.1523***
(0 .0436) (0.0282) (0.0301) (0 .0297) (0 .0403)
3-5 years 0.2313"* 0.2063"* 0.1823*** 0.1442*" 0.1518"*
(0 .0309) (0 .0 2 0 1 ) (0 .0217) (0 .0215) (0 .0293)
6 - 10  years 0 .3533’" 0.3330*" 0.2912*" 0.2091*" 0.2235*"
(0.0393) (0.0256) (0.0273) (0 .0269) (0 .0359)
> 1 0  years 0.5666*** 0.5354*** 0.4567*** 0 .3131 ’** 0.3369*"
(0.0856) (0 .0548) (0.0581) (0 .0571) (0 .0759)
arrears -0.4930*** -0 .4509’*’ -0.4040**’ -0 .3326’*’ -0.3959*"
(0.0858) (0 .0547) (0.0582) (0 .0571) (0 .0762)
public 0.3046" 0 .2145’’* 0.1643* 0.0690 0.1124
(0.0998) (0 .0635) (0.0674) (0 .0664) (0.0888)
Central 0.1692**’ 0 .1709’" 0.2148**’ 0.2350"* 0.2896*"
(0.0281) (0 .0182) (0.0196) (0 .0193) (0.0267)
North-W est 0 .4975’** 0.5554**’ 0.5942*** 0.5830*’’ 0.5924*"
(0.0277) (0 .0180) (0 .0193) (0.0190) (0.0261)
Siberia 0.2922*" 0.3439**’ 0.3613*** 0.3790*** 0.4567***
(0 .0344) (0 .0 2 2 2 ) (0 .0237) (0 .0233) (0.0319)
Far-East 0.6853*" 0.7168*** 0.7673*" 0.7952*** 0.8311***
(0 .0279) (0 .0182) (0 .0195) (0.0191) (0 .0263)
Urals 0.2811*" 0.3612*** 0 .4469’** 0.5542**’ 0.7304*’*
(0 .0346) (0 .0225) (0 .0240) (0.0236) (0 .0325)
Volga 0.1371*** 0.1592*" 0.1647*’* 0.1610*** 0.1791***
(0 .0335) (0 .0216) (0 .0232) (0.0228) (0 .0311)
(z » 3.2952*** 3.0091"* 2.7943*" 1.7889" 2.1967"
(1 .0601) (0 .6773) (0 .7258) (0.7155) (0 .9618)
(z'y)2 -0.9155*** -0.7796*** -0.7526**’ -0 .3456 -0 .5439"
(0 .2675) (0 .1716) (0 .1871) (0.1853) (0 .2534)
r' 0 .0 2 0 2 ’*’ 0 .0046" 0.0092*** 0.0062*" -0 .0009
(0 .0051) (0.0023) (0 .0016) (0 .0 0 2 2 ) (0 .0069)
r2 -0.0011 0.0000 -0 .0 0 0 2 -0 .0018’*’ -0 .0046"
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0 .0007) (0 .0004) (0 .0 0 2 2 )
r3 -0.0003 0 .0 0 0 1 -0 .0 0 0 2 ’’’ -0.0003*** -0.0008
(0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0004)
r4 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 )
r5 -0 .0006 0.0007 0.0000 0 .0006’ -0 .0 0 1 0 *
(0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0008) (0.0006) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0025)
constant -2.7314*" -2.3333"* -1 .6836" -0.8510 -0.9281
(1 .0277) (0 .6607) (0.7107) (0 .6967) (0.9608)
N 24318 24318 24318 24318 24318
P seu d o  R 2 0.1343 0.1440 0.1468 0.1432 0.1370
Notes'. Standard errors in parentheses * p  <  0.10, ** p  <  0 .05, *** p  < 0.01
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ESSAY TWO
THE GENDER WAGE GAP -  
EVIDENCE FROM TRANSITION COUNTRIES
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CHAPTER SIX
GENDER WAGE DIFFERENTIAL - A REVIEW OF DECOMPOSITION 
METHODS AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
6.1. Introduction
The labour economics literature exhibits a long interest and tradition in examination of 
the gender wage differential. Since the introduction of the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition method in the 1970s different decomposition methods have been 
developed that try to shed light on the components of the wage differential. This 
Chapter provides an overview of the literature related to the different decomposition 
techniques and associated estimation problems. As there is large literature on the gender 
wage differential, we concentrate on the commonly used methods. It also introduces the 
literature that analyses gender wage differential in transition economies.
The Chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 discusses what we consider to be 
evidence on gender wage differential and reviews the difficulties and the problems 
associated with the decomposition methodology. In Section 6.3 we pay attention to the 
main decomposition techniques applied in the literature. Our emphasis is on the recent 
methodological developments of quantile regression techniques. In Section 6.4 we 
discuss the literature on gender wage differentials in transition economies. Finally, we 
conclude with a few comments on a research agenda in Section 6.5.
6.2. Gender wage gap and estimation problems
Labour market discrimination exists whenever workers with identical productive 
characteristics receive different rewards for their attributes because of the population 
group to which they belong (Valmori, 2008). Economic models of discrimination may 
be divided into two main classes -  competitive models in which agents act individually 
and collective models in which one group acts collectively against another. Almost all 
of the theoretical works by economists has been within a competitive framework. These
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models emphasize two types of discrimination. The first is prejudice, which Becker 
formalizes as a “taste” by least some members of the majority group against interacting 
with members of the minority group. The second is statistical discrimination by 
employers in the presence of imperfect information about the skills or behaviour of 
members of the minority group (Altonji and Blank, 1999). Wage discrimination means 
that one group, in our case women, are paid systematically less than another group -  
men, when both have equal productively related characteristics. Employment 
discrimination arises when probability of employment for any given level of 
productivity related characteristics, varies across groups. Occupational discrimination 
occurs when women are restricted from entering certain occupations and are crowded 
into others for reasons other than their personal preferences (Paci and Reilly, 2004). The 
focus of the current research is on the wage discrimination between men and women.
A reason why economists study labour market discrimination is based on an efficiency 
argument. According to D ’Amico (1987) one consequence of labour market 
discrimination is that it generates clear losses of efficiency, since scarce resources are 
over allocated to relatively unproductive members of the favoured group (men) and 
under allocated to more-productive members of the minority group (women). This 
implies that the society’s aggregate output will fall below its potential size. In addition 
to society loss of efficiency, market discrimination also imposes costs on the members 
of the discriminated group. These personal loses include a lower per capita real income, 
poorer living conditions and lower social status relative to the situation that would have 
existed in the absence of discrimination (Guimaraes, 2001).
The question that most researchers are interested in is why do women earn less than 
men? Several economic theories address the above question such as the human capital 
theory, the compensating theory and the job matching theory. The traditional approach 
in analysing the determinants of the wage gap is to consider both the role of gender 
differences in human capital endowments and labour market discrimination. The human 
capital theory (Mincer and Polachek, 1974) posits that the earnings of individual 
workers are a function of their past investment in human capital. The characteristics of 
men and women in the labour market differ with respect to work experience, the level of 
education and skills, occupational status and sector of employment. For example gender 
differences in how long individuals participate in the labour market tend to reflect the
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household responsibilities o f women. Equally, women may be expected to invest less in 
education because of intended discontinuities in labour market participation. Mincer and 
Polachek (1974) argue that it is optimal for women to invest less in education than men 
since women specialize in household production and the rearing of children and 
therefore envisage labour force participation as discontinuous. Given that each of these 
characteristics have some association with the level of earnings, it is necessary to 
distinguish what proportion of the overall pay gap is due to differences in individual 
characteristics and what proportion is due to sex discrimination within the labour 
market.
In addition to differences in human capital endowments, labour market discrimination is 
often identified as a source of gender wage differences. Blau and Ferber (1986) consider 
that labour market discrimination exists when “two equally qualified individuals are 
treated differently on the basis o f their sex”. Thus, in accordance with the theory o f 
labour market discrimination, gender disparities in earnings arise from the unequal 
treatment of equally productive men and women. Some scholars have focused on 
gender segregations across occupations as an important factor underlying gender 
differences in earnings. This type of segregation exists when men and women are 
employed in different types of occupations: those typically occupied by men and those 
typically occupied by women (Preston, 1999). The segregation theory suggests that 
gender differences in pay stem from the fact that female dominated occupations 
generally pay more poorly than those dominated by males (Boraas and Rodgers, 2003). 
To explain occupational segregation, Terrell (1992) distinguishes between labour 
supply and labour demand factors. On the labour supply side, the human capital 
approach views occupational distribution as a function of occupational choice. The 
basic idea is that, given their traditional role within the family, women tend to invest 
less in human capital than men and select occupations on the basis of this role and these 
investments. On the labour demand side, occupational segregation is explained by 
employer’s discrimination of women in their hiring practices in certain occupations.
Most explanations focus on one of these two themes. The first is Smith’s theory of 
equalizing differences. Women might select themselves into less stressful occupations 
or pick different career paths than men (Glinskaya and Mroz, 2000).
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The starting point o f discrimination analyses is to set up a simple wage regression 
model and to obtain consistent estimates of the parameter of main interest. The 
underlying economic model is a human capital one. The empirical model is based on the 
Mincer’s earnings function in which logarithmic wages are regressed on measures for 
individual characteristics: work experience, or time out of work periods, education (pre­
labour market schooling) and other background variables. The ways in which different 
factors contribute to the gender wage gap has been most clearly addressed by Oaxaca- 
Blinder decomposition technique (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). The Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition uses the coefficients from human capital wage specification to 
decompose the gender wage gap into a component accounted for by differences in mean 
characteristics and the component accounted for by differences in the returns to those 
characteristics (see Section 6.3.1). These two components have been referred to as the 
‘explained’ and ‘unexplained ‘components, also classified respectively as the 
‘endowment’ and the ‘treatment’ effects. Researchers take the ‘unexplained gap’ -  the 
difference in wages after controlling for a host of personal and job characteristics in 
wage regressions, as evidence of discrimination. While the presence of unexplained 
differences in male/female is certainly consistent with the presence of discrimination, it 
does not provide a very direct test of the hypothesis. If discrimination affects human 
capital investments and personal choices that individuals make or if it is affecting job 
choice, then the ‘unexplained gap’ will understate discrimination because some of the 
control variables themselves reflect the impact o f discrimination. On the other hand, the 
specifications used in many wage regressions are limited and researchers typically have 
only very crude proxies to measure skills and ability (such as year of education) or 
experience (such as age minus education). If  there are omitted variables that are missing 
from regressions that relate to the human capital and personal tastes o f the individual 
and those are correlated with individual variables, then the ‘unexplained gap’ will 
overstate the impact o f discrimination; since it will reflect both the impact of omitted 
and unmeasured productivity variables as well as any effects of discrimination (Altonji 
and Blank, 1999).
Many studies examine the role of differences in years of education on the gender gap 
using standard regression techniques. Among younger workers, there is no longer any 
difference in average years of education between men and women, although older 
women continue to have lower average education levels (Blau and Kahn, 1997). As
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male/female education levels have converged, this has narrowed the wage gap, as 
confirmed in Blau and Kahn (1997) and O ’Neill and Polachek (1993). Some papers 
have shown that women’s gain in education is a major factor behind decrease in relative 
male/female wage differential. According to Altonjii and Blank (1999), even when 
women have been improving their relative skills in the labour market, certain aggregate 
labour market trends have been moving against them. In particular, changes in returns to 
skill have favoured more skilled workers and lowered the wages of less skilled workers. 
Since women on average are in less-skilled jobs, these shifts should have lowered the 
wages of women relative to men. Blau and Kahn (1997) find that among more educated 
workers, the return to skill have increased more among men than women. On the other 
hand, among less educated women, the returns to skill have declined less than among 
less educated men. These changes suggest that it is important to differentiate labour 
market experience by skill level.
The accumulation of work experience is perhaps the most important factor in the 
distribution of earnings across workers. The increase of wages is the combined effect of 
the accumulation of general skills, the return to job seniority that may reflect both 
worker investments in job specific skills, and incentive devices used by firms. There are 
a number of reasons to expect gender differences in both the accumulation of and 
returns to experience. Historically, women have had quite different patterns of labour 
force participation and job mobility than men. The standard model of human capital 
investment predicts that investments in general training will be lower for individuals 
with fewer working hours and less working experience. As women have increased their 
labour force participation over time, however, women’s accumulated labour force 
experience has also increased.
Many datasets have no information on actual experience and hence researchers use 
potential experience as a proxy for actual experience. Potential experience is likely to 
overstate actual experience for women because of the amount of time that women spend 
out of work force. The major problem with the potential measure is that it correlates 
poorly with the actual female labour force experience. This may be particularly relevant 
in the case of estimation of wage regressions for samples of females as well as young 
workers. These two groups may have in fact working life cycles characteristics by more 
frequent interruptions (Heather and Bedard, 2004). Given that women are likely to
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acquire less labour force experience than men through the effects of family formation, a 
failure to account for these factors may have important consequences. It has been found 
in the literature that the use of potential experience measure has the effect of increasing 
or exaggerating the unexplained or discriminatory component. For example, the 
discrimination effect in Wright and Ermisch (1991), using Oaxaca-type decomposition, 
falls from 0.35 to 0.23 in moving from the use o f potential to actual female labour force 
experience.
Other studies have attempted to improve upon the Mincer proxy by incorporating some 
adjustment for the intermittency of female labour participation. Specifically, Zabalza 
and Arrufat (1985) use the probit coefficients of the structural model of employment 
status to predict for each female in the sample the probability of being employed in each 
year from the survey date back to the year she first left full-time education. The 
approach assumes that the relationship determining an individual’s employment status 
is stable over time (Kidd and Shannon, 1997). Wright and Ermisch (1991) find that the 
imputed experience measure is highly correlated with the actual labour market 
experience and the Oaxaca decomposition of the gender wage gap are similar when 
either actual experience or imputed experience is used.
There are two main themes in the recent research on the role of experience, tenure and 
job mobility on the gender wage gap. First, a number of studies examine the effect of 
using more complete measures of actual experience (as opposed to potential) and 
estimate how much of the narrowing of the gender gap is due to convergence in the 
actual experience levels of male and female workers. Second, some other papers 
examine differences in job mobility between men and women. These differences in 
mobility patterns have been related to differences in job training between men and 
women.
There is also debate in the literature on the explanatory variables to be included in the 
earning equation88. The general evidence is that the greater number of control variables 
is, the greater the explained portion and the smaller the unexplained portion or the 
average adjusted pay gap should be. With the addition of more variables, the pay gap
88 See Cain (1986) and Blau and Ferber (1986).
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associated with discrimination diminishes (Gunderson, 1989). Any supply side variable 
that may result in differences in wages should enter the earning equation. This includes 
personal productivity related characteristics, such as ability, education, experience, also 
employee’s preferences for non-pecuniary aspects of the job. In practice choice of 
control variables is likely to be constrained by their availability in the chosen source of 
data. For example, direct measures of employee’s preferences and supply elasticity’s are 
rarely available. Job characteristics and occupations can be used as proxies for 
individual differences in tastes, but concentrating women into some jobs and
occupations may reflect discrimination, so some studies postulate that such variables 
may be endogenous and should not be included in the vector o f characteristics from 
which the explained component is calculated. Blau and Ferber (1986) show that
including occupational and job related controls could underestimate gender
discrimination by masking any discriminatory origins of gender differences in
occupation and job-related outcomes. In general decomposition methods can be quite 
sensitive to the choice of explanatory variables and the inclusion of occupation and 
sector control variables adds considerably to the explanatory power of the model, 
generating a much reduced unexplained pay gap. However, several reviews of the 
approach argue that correcting the gender pay gap for differences in occupational 
activity using detailed occupational classifications will produce an underestimation of 
discrimination (Cain, 1986). For instance, Kidd and Shannon (1996) conclude that using 
36 occupational categories instead of 17 increases the fraction of the wage gap 
attributed to occupational choice from 17.8% to 27.3%. For these reasons most studies 
prefer to use relatively broad classifications of around 6 to 12 categories. The sensitivity 
of these estimates, however, raises some concerns about the implications of the 
occupational control variables.
A potential problem with most of these studies is the assumption that occupational 
attainment is exogenous. As argued by Macpherson and Hirsch (1995), if men and 
women with higher unmeasured skills are more likely to be sorted into male jobs and 
those with lower skills into female jobs, then the exogenity assumption is violated. 
Moreover, there are reasons that unobserved individual characteristics may not only 
influence worker’s decision about which job to take, but they may also affect earnings. 
Men place greater emphasis on earnings and less on job attributes than do women. This 
difference arises because of the gender division of labour in the home (Sorensen, 1989).
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The main source of endogeneity that the literature on gender wage gap has addressed is 
the correlation of the unobserved individual specific effects and the regressors in the 
model. Kim and Polachek (1994) show that the problem remains even after using 
detailed controls for the differences in human capital and background characteristics. 
One way to deal with the endogeneity problem is to include instrumental variables in 
the estimation, and the fixed effects estimators are applied to deal with the unobserved 
heterogeneity.
Many researchers have further disaggregated the two components of the decomposition 
into separate contributions of the variables. Jones (1983) demonstrates that Blinder’s 
(1973) method for separating out the contribution of the constant term to discrimination 
is flawed in the presence of a set of dummy variables, as the magnitude of the estimated 
constant term depends on the left-out reference group. Conventional decomposition 
methodology cannot identify the separate contributions of dummy variables to the wage 
decomposition because it is only possible to estimate the relative effects of a dummy 
variable and the discrimination component is not invariant to the choice of the “left-out” 
reference group (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999). Horrace and Oaxaca (2001) show that the 
method for estimating gender wage gap by industry proposed by Fields and Wolff 
(1995) suffers from an identification problem, as its results vary according to the choice 
of the left out reference group. According to Gardeazabel and Ugidos (2005) failure to 
identify the contribution of individual dummy variables to the wage discrimination 
raises one additional problem -  it is not possible to compare results from different 
studies as they may use different left out groups. Trying to overcome this issue, a recent 
study by Yun (2004) provides a way to apply the Blinder-Oaxaca (Blinder, 1973; 
Oaxaca 1973) decomposition to a non-linear function for both aggregate and detailed 
decompositions. The proposed detailed decomposition method does not depend on the 
functional form as long as the dependent variable is a function of a linear combination 
of independent variables and the function is once differentiable.
6.3. A review of decomposition techniques
In this section we present a selective review of decomposition techniques and different 
approaches in the literature. We focus on the methodological aspects of estimating the 
gender wage gap and do not aim to review the respective estimation results. Our
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emphasis is also on more recent decomposition techniques of the gender wage gap. The 
section is organised in three parts. In the first subsection, different decomposition 
methods concerned with the gender wage gap that looked at the mean earnings are 
introduced. In the second subsection, decomposition techniques which take into account 
differences across wage distribution are presented. Semi-parametric and non-parametric 
decomposition methods are discussed in subsection 6.3.3. The sample selection problem 
in the gender wage gap is discussed in subsection 6.3.4. Finally, our motivation for the 
chosen methodology is outlined in subsection 6.3.5.
6.3.1. Decomposition methods at the means o f  the data
The standard econometric method to account for the gender wage gap is to estimate 
separate earning equations for males and females, taking the logarithm of their earnings. 
Few studies explicitly test whether the data supports separation. Male and female 
equations take the following form:
where m stands for male and /  for female, In Wm and In Wf  are the levels of natural 
logarithm of earnings, X'm and X'f  are vectors of observable characteristics o f men and 
women, and (3 f  are vectors of parameters.
The differential is then decomposed according to the most standard approach in the 
literature known as the Blinder-Oaxaca procedure (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973). They 
express the average gender mark-up in the following form:
where the bar indicates mean values. This allows the overall average differential in 
wages between two groups to be decomposed into a part attributable to differences in 
measured characteristics and a part attributable to differences in the estimated 
relationship between men and women (i.e., the gender differences in returns), evaluated 
at the mean set of female characteristics. The first term on the right hand side of 
equation (6.3) is a measure of the explained part of the raw wage gap and it is non-zero
(6 .1)
(6 .2)
\n{Wm)-\n{Wf ) =
= In W~m ~ In Wf = ( Xm - X f )pm + X f ( f m - f i f )
V   V ' ' V
raw wage gap explained part unexplained part (6.3)
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if  the two groups do not have equal characteristics. This part can also be interpreted as 
the wage gain women would experience if they had the same characteristics, on 
average, as men. The portion due to differences in coefficients, that is the second term 
on the right hand side of equation (6.3), is the unexplained part of the average wage gap. 
It is the wage gain women would experience, given their mean characteristics, if they 
were remunerated like men. This portion of the differential is defined in Oaxaca (1973) 
as a measure o f wage discrimination. It refers to the difference between how the male 
equation would value the characteristics of females and how the female wage equation 
values them in reality. Initially, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method was 
developed for cross section wage models. However, assuming time constant parameters, 
application to longitudinal wage models follows straightforwardly.
The wage decomposition suggested by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) has been 
subject to criticism on at least two points. Their method is based on the endowment 
prices of one of the sexes (the male in most applications), thereby introducing a 
potential asymmetry in the effects depending on which gender is considered as the 
reference group, the so called ‘index’ number problem. In most studies the wage 
structure of males is assumed as non-discrimination with the arguments that in economy 
men come from the largest group of workers and therefore face virtually no 
discrimination. The choice of the male wage structure as a non-discriminatory reference 
is equivalent to considering discrimination as the disadvantage of any group with 
respect to the most favoured group.
Although the statistical technique appears to separate out an ‘explained’ from an 
‘unexplained’ component of the gender pay gap, there are good reasons to believe that 
the distinction is in fact rather more blurred. This is referred to as the ‘feedback effect’ 
problem in the literature. The assumption of the model is that controlling for gender 
differences in characteristics means that one can produce an estimate of how similar 
workers would potentially be treated in the labour market and thereby claim that any 
remaining pay difference is attributable to discrimination.
Depending on which wage structure would prevail in the absence of discrimination, 
researchers have subsequently introduced different weighting schemes to estimate the 
discrimination component. Cotton (1988) argues that the non-discriminatory structure
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should be determined by the larger group, so the weighting factor should reflect the 
proportion of the largest gender group in the sample. The idea, that discrimination not 
only lowrers the wages of females, but also leads to higher wages for the males, forms 
the starting point of such methods. Cotton (1988) identifies the separate effects of 
discrimination of different groups. Derivation of the method builds on Becker’s (1957) 
assumption that in absence of discrimination, the wage differences arise due to 
differences in productivity characteristics. Neumark (1988) develops an alternative 
procedure from a particular Beckerian discrimination model. Both the Cotton and 
Neumark papers generalize methods suggested by Oaxaca (1973).
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994), following Cotton (1988) and Neumark (1988) provide a 
unifying framework for all previous decompositions. They analyse the empirical 
consequences of using the female, the male or the Cotton and Neumark wage structure 
as the non-discriminatory structure. The adoption of the female wage structure as a 
competitive standard leads to a larger discriminatory and smaller productivity 
differential than the use of male coefficient estimates. The Cotton and Neumark 
(pooled) method also yields quite different estimates of the productivity differential. 
These differences imply a division of the discriminatory wage differential into a male 
overpayment and female underpayment.
Specifically, the Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) propose using the cross product matrices 
of the sample characteristics as weights for the estimated parameters and p f  as 
follows:
In Wm -  In W ,  =  ( X m - X f ) p  + X m{ f i m - P ' )  +  X f { 0 '  - 0 f ) ( 6  4 )
where In Wm and In Wf  are the logarithm of earnings for males and females, X m and X f  
are vectors with the average characteristics for both genders, /?mand pf  are the estimates
of relevant coefficients, /?*is the non-discriminatory coefficient structure obtained from 
the pooled regression of males and females. The non-discriminatory wage structure is 
given as ft* = Qj3m + (\ -  Q ) f i f  . Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) show that Neumark’s
solution is the same as their own in the case when the weighing matrix, Q , is defined as
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Q = ( X ' X )  x( X ' mX m),  where X  and X m are the matrices of observed productivity 
characteristics for the pooled sample and for the male sample.
A number of studies have recently employed a more innovative method for 
decomposing the gender wage gap suggested by Juhn-Murphy-Pierce (1993). Interest in 
this approach comes from the claim that gender inequality in pay is due to three factors: 
differences in productivity-related characteristics, differences in reward to workers with 
equal characteristics and cross-national differences in the overall shape of the wage 
structure. Juhn-Murphy-Pierce (1993) (JMP) have proposed a simple extension to the 
Oaxaca decomposition by taking into account the distribution of the residuals. As in the 
Oaxaca-Blinder approach the estimated coefficients from the male wage regression are 
taken as the competitive price vector. The decomposition of the raw wage gap then 
includes three components related to differences in endowments, in estimated 
coefficients and in residual wage distribution. The wage differentials can be expressed 
as:
A In W = p m ( X ;  -  X  I )  + (f i .  -  p ,  ) X f  + (em -  ef )
'  v  '  ' ------------------ v------------------'  ' ----------- V-----------/
endowm ent renum eration unobservable
effect effect effect (6.5)
where X e represents the mean characteristics for each quantile 6 .
The JMP method was applied by various researchers to examine wage structure effects 
on the difference in wages between two groups of workers over time or by countries. In 
the case of comparison of gender earnings differential between two countries, the 
decomposition technique distinguish the effect of gender specific factors from those 
associated with the underlying wage structure of both economies. The wage equation 
for a male worker from country j  can be defined as:
in w ;  = p jx ™  + (6.6)
where s'J —a'JOJ  and 6J  is country j  residual standard deviation of wages. The 
vector 6™ can be interpreted as the standardised unobservable component of
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productivity. Non-discriminatory returns are assumed for both genders so that: 
P™ = P fj = P  . The male-female log wage gap for country j  is given by:
D  = A In W  = p j  ( X J  - X j )  + a j  (0J - 0 ' )  = p j A X j  + o-. A0, (6.7)
The gender wage differential between two countries j  and k can be defined as:
D r D k = Pj - A X k) + ^ X k ( P j ~P k)  + ~ AOk K t  + Ae j (<?j ~ ° k ) (6-8)
^ v '■ J  ^ Y — I- - ^ v   ^  ^ v
observed effect price effect gap  effect unobserved effect
where D k is defined in the same way as D }.
According to the decomposition in equation (6.8) a difference in the gender wage 
differential D  between two countries k and j  is decomposed into four components. The 
first component reflects the contribution of inter-country differences in observed human 
capital endowments to the gender gap. The second term measures the impact of 
different prices across countries for observed productivity characteristics. The third 
term, the gap effect, captures the effect of the international difference in the relative 
wage position of males and females after controlling for observed human capital 
endowments. Finally, the unobserved effect measures differences in the return to 
unobservable skills.
However, there are some potential drawbacks of the JMP decomposition. The first is the 
strong interpretation of changes in the distribution of male wage residuals. Changes 
could be interpreted as changes of prices. They may as well capture measurement error, 
sample composition, equation misspecification and the distribution of unmeasured male 
productivity characteristics. Second, the use of prices derived from the male wage 
regression implies that the same set of prices applies to females. Hence, it is assumed 
that inequality affects men and women equally and the wage structure is, therefore 
measurable for both men and women by the prices derived from the male sample 
(Kunze, 2000). Third, Suen (1997) states that the use of the standard deviation of 
residual wages to measure the price of skills and the average percentile rank to measure 
the quantity is subject to bias. He argues that the decomposition is unbiased only when
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percentile ranks are independent of the standard deviation. Fourth, Fortin and Lemieux 
(1998) show that residual improvements in the relative position of women and the 
estimated wage structure effects critically depend on which distribution is assumed to 
be the distribution of reference (hence whether the male, pooled or female sample 
distribution).
Brown et al. (1980) decompose the wage gap across the entire distribution of 
occupations and allows for endogeneity of the distribution of women across
* 8 9occupations . Their technique goes one step beyond the Oaxaca decomposition by 
treating average wages as a weighted average of wages across occupations. Thus, while 
the Oaxaca technique decomposes the aggregate wage differential into two elements 
(coefficients and endowments), Brown et al. (1980) do this but also identify the impact 
of occupational distribution. The authors argue that differences in the occupational 
distribution of men and women are an important source of the gender wage differential. 
Indeed individuals with similar characteristics who have attained different occupations 
often earns different wages. The main idea is to measure how much o f the gap is 
explained by gender differences in wages within occupations and how much is 
explained by occupational gender segregation. Brown et al. (1980) suggest that by 
including dummy variables for occupations in a wage regression, previous 
decomposition methods take differences between the occupational distributions of men 
and women as given and thereby ignore the inherent potential discrimination.
In this case the gender wage gap can be rewritten as the difference in the weighted 
average log-wages taken across K occupations as follows:
In W M - \ n W F = '£dPJM \nWjM - ^ P f  In W f (6 m
j= \ 7=1  ^ ' '
where Pf*, P F are the portions o f men and women in occupation j  , j  = 1,..., K , 
and In W M, In W F are log mean wages within occupation j ;
Equation (6.9) is extended by adding and subtracting the term P F In WjM
89 Various empirical studies have applied Brown et  al.  (1980) approach, providing estimates o f  within occupation and 
across occupation wage disparities relative to different econom ies (e.g. Dolton et  al., 1994; Kidd and Shannon, 1996; 
Meng and Miller, 1995).
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InW u - I n W F = Y S P ? - P f ) X r W " ( W / - \ n W f )  (6 ]0)
V  -V- J
Inter-occupational Intra-occupational
The first term of the right hand side of equation (6.10) measures the part o f the gap due 
to differences in occupational distribution between male and females. The second term 
indicates the part of the gap that is due to differences in mean wages within occupations. 
If the portion of men and women were the same in each occupation, which is the non­
segregation case, the first term would be equal to zero.
Let the wage IV-of individual i in occupation j  be expressed as:
In Wtj = a  j + X tjPj + Ey ( 6 H )
where ^  represents the characteristics of the individual, « ; and /?y.are parameters to be
estimated, and £Lj is a random error term. If estimates of a yand p  are obtained using
OLS, then the mean wages in occupation j  are: In Wj = dj  + X j p j
and the mean wages across all occupations are: In W = 'Zl XPj&J +PjXJ0 J)
where Pj is the fraction of employees in occupation j .
Then, the wage decomposition proposed by Brown et al  (1980) can be written as:
InWM -InWF = £> /(«"  -d,F) + 2 > /x ;0 » "  -jj1) + YJPfP7{Xf
WD PD
QD 0D (6 . 12)
where P f  represents the portion of women in the sample who would be in occupation
j  if women faced the same occupational structure as men. The components /  and WD 
are defined as unjustified differences in within-occupation wages, PD is the justifiable 
within occupation wage differential and QD and OD represents the justifiable and 
unjustifiable portions o f occupational segregation (Brown et a l , 1980). The terms that 
are justifiable capture the wage differentials due to differences in characteristics
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between men and women, while those which are unjustifiable capture the wage 
differential which is unexplained and is normally attributed to discrimination.
Decomposing the term due to the inter-occupational effect, Brown et a l  (1980) use the 
predicted distribution of women across occupations in the absence of discrimination
a model of occupational attainment90 to be estimated. Brown et al. (1980) specify a 
reduced form multinomial logit model to capture how variables affect the probability of 
individual i working in occupation j . This probability may be defined as:
where N  is sample size, J  is number of occupational groups, and x t is a vector of
exogenous variables affecting supply and demand factors. Estimates of the parameters 
of this model are obtained for male observations and the female data and are then 
substituted into the estimated model producing for each woman a vector o f predicted 
probabilities of belonging to each occupation. These predicted probabilities of being in 
each occupation are summed over observations to produce the predicted occupational
A p
distribution of women Pj .
This approach supposes that in a world without discrimination women would be 
distributed across occupations according to the male occupational mechanism. Both 
terms could be decomposed further into an explained and an unexplained component as 
follows:
based on the non-discriminatory occupational structure for women ( P f ). This requires
P.. = prob(yi — oc j ) = (6.13)
Explained
part
K K
Intra - occupationalInter-occupational
(6.14)
90The definition o f  occupational attainment refers to a model for explaining how individuals achieve certain 
occupational levels. This differs from the sociological models o f  status attainment. Brown et al. (1980) define an 
individual occupational attainment as a function o f  em ployer’s willingness to hire that person and o f  individuals 
desire to work in specific occupation. W illingness o f  employer to hire an individual depends on personal 
qualifications such as education, training and experience.
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U nexpla ined
part
M______  f J=l_______  (
Inter-occupational Inlra-occupational
where P F is the vector of predicted proportions of women in occupations j  in the male 
occupation outcomes model; x  are the mean values of characteristics for occupation j ; 
p. are the estimated wage equation coefficients for occupation j ;
An alternative to the multinomial logit model discussed above is the ordered probit 
model (see McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975). The advantage of a multinomial logit model 
is that it fits the data better than the ordered probit model, when fit is measured in terms 
of the success at predicting membership of occupations (Meng and Miller, 1995). On 
the other hand, the ordered probit model has fewer parameters to be estimated. In this 
model the ordering among outcomes of the categorical variable is significant, whereas 
the multinomial logit model ignores this information. However, Meng and Miller (1995) 
compare decomposition based on the multinomial logit and ordered probit models and 
show that their findings are not sensitive to the chosen model. Miller and Volker (1985) 
further argue that neither the multinomial logit model nor ordered probit model is 
necessarily superior.
6.3.2. Accounting fo r  distributional effect
Most empirical studies concerned with the gender wage gap analyse mean wage 
differences which fails to take into account differences across the wage distribution. 
Earning differences are very complex and vary over the wage distribution. As discussed 
in Chapter five, we have to consider that the wage structure is not constant over the 
range of wages (e.g. Buchinsky, 1994) and education may have different effect on 
wages of individuals at the top of the wage distribution than on wages of individuals at 
the bottom of the distribution. In other words more educated individuals may experience 
more unequal wage distribution. If more educated workers experience greater wage 
spreads, increased educational levels may also contribute to an increase in wage 
inequality. A much richer story about the role of gender in the labour market emerges 
once we move away from an exclusive focus on outcomes for “average” men and 
women. In particular, the presence of a ‘glass ceiling’ leads us to expect the gender 
wage gap to be larger amongst workers earning relatively high wages, while the
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existence of ‘sticky floors’ might suggest the opposite91. The extent to which disparity 
in men’s and women’s productivity-related characteristics accounts for the gender wage 
gap also appears to differ between high- and low-wage workers (Baron and Clark, 
2008).
The QR technique introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) extends the notation of 
OLS in a location model to a more general class of linear models in which the 
conditional quantiles have a linear form. Kuhn (1987) points out that conventional mean 
regression has its limitations in measuring discrimination. The distributional approach 
provides more comprehensive information. He shows empirically that U.S. women at 
higher wage levels are more likely to be discriminated against. Buchinsky (1994, 1998) 
further advances the application of QR in the U.S. labour market in the context o f wage
• 09estimation and returns to education . In contrast to the OLS approach, the QR 
procedure is less sensitive to outliers and provides a more robust estimator in the face of 
departures from normality (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). QR models may also have 
better properties than OLS in the presence of heteroscedasticity93.
Useful features of the QR model can be summarized as follows: 1) the model can be 
used to characterize the entire conditional distribution of a dependent variable given a 
set of regressors; 2) the QR model has a linear programming representation which 
makes estimation easy; 3) the QR objective function is a weighted sum of absolute 
deviations, which gives a robust measure of location, so that the estimated coefficient 
vector is not sensitive to outlier observations of the dependent variable; 4) when the 
error-term is not normal, the QR estimates may be more efficient than least squares 
estimates; 5) potentially different solutions at distinct quantiles may be interpreted as 
differences in the response of the dependent variable to changes in the regressors at 
various points in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable (Buchinsky,
1998); 6) the method allows to deal explicitly with the heterogeneity problem, which is 
common in estimating wage functions (for more detail see Bushinsky (1994) and 
Chamberlain (1994)). For instance, if some coefficients are changing with the quantiles 
then this is indicative of some form of heteroskedasticity. Therefore in the quantile
91 See Booth et a l ,  2003; Aralampalam et al., 2007.
92 See our discussions in essay one.
93 See Deaton (1997).
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regression model we can address the heterogeneity o f the unobservable effects in an 
informative and constructive way. A disadvantage of quantile regression is its possible 
lack of consistency and monotonicity of estimated conditional quantile functions, i.e. 
the predicted pth conditional quantile can be smaller than the predicted (p+1)th quantile 
(Buchinsky, 1998).
Many authors have developed alternative methods to decompose the entire wage 
distribution and to describe differentials at different quantiles taking into account 
differences in human capital and other observed characteristics. Several popular ones 
include a reweighting methods, which essentially generates a counterfactual wage 
distribution (DiNardo et al., 1996); another approach is based on conditional quantile 
regression and re-sampling (Machado and Mata, 2005; Autor et a i ,  2006; Melly, 2005, 
2006); and an alternative approach uses a semi-parametric hazard functions to obtain the 
conditional densities of wages (Donald et al., 2000).
DiNardo et a l  (1996) extend the Oaxaca (1973) analysis in order to estimate 
counterfactual wage densities by using kernel methods applied to weighted samples. 
The authors analyse the impact of workers attributes and labour market institutions at 
different points of the wage densities for different periods. Their counterfactual analysis 
is based on the question ‘what density would have prevailed if individual attributes had 
remained at their 1986 level and workers had been paid according to the wage schedule 
observed in 1995’? By comparing this counterfactual density of wages with the actual 
one, DiNardo et al. (1996) show the role of individual attributes on the observed 
changes in the wage distribution over the period. A drawback of the DiNardo et al. 
(1996) approach is that the use o f kernel density estimation to the weighted sample does 
not allow one to isolate the effect of changes in individuals attributes from the returns to 
those attributes. Guimaraes (2001) argue that DiNardo et a l (1996) apply different 
weights to the distribution of the covariates in order to estimate the counterfactual 
densities, but no return to individual covariates is estimated.
Albrecht et al. (2003) find that while the average gender wage gap is relatively small in 
Sweden, the gap increases throughout the wage distribution and is larger in the upper 
tail. They also show an increasing impact of education across the wage distribution and 
conclude that the ‘glass ceiling’ effects limit the earnings potential of women in the
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upper part of the wage distribution. Moreover, the wider unexplained gap at the top of 
distribution mainly holds for highly educated workers (De la Rica et al., 2008). 
Conversely, the wage gap is sometimes larger at the bottom of the distribution for low 
educated workers. An analysis of mean differences between male and female earnings is 
limited because it could lead to the conclusion that the gender wage gap is of minor 
importance and that the size of the wage gap is constant throughout the wage 
distribution. Furthermore, the traditional approach is based on the assumption that the 
importance of explaining factors do not vary with the wage rate (Albrecht et al., 2003).
There are good reasons to believe that male and female wages along the whole wage 
distributions are not equally affected by human capital and institutional settings. Garcia 
et al. (1998) and Mueller (1998) decompose the wage difference in the Oaxaca-Blinder 
manner using the QR estimates at average characteristics. Garcia et al. (1998) consider 
decomposition of the Spanish gender wage gap at a given conditional quanitle evaluated 
at the unconditional means of a vector of explanatory variables. However, it is not clear 
whether it is the right strategy to use average characteristics to decompose the wage gap 
at different quantiles given that characteristics also vary over the distribution. In this 
context, Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005) state that it is more appropriate to measure 
discrimination at unconditional quantiles. They show that it might be considered to 
weight the difference in return to a certain characteristic (for example primary 
education) at a given quantile according to the proportion of individuals with this 
characteristic at that quantile. Based on this methodological approach, their findings for 
the Spanish wage gap contradict the results of Garcia et al. (2001). Bonjour and Gerfin
(2001) use hazard function approach proposed by Donald et al. (2000) to decompose 
the wage gap in Switzerland. They find that the gender wage gap is not constant 
throughout the wage distribution and is larger at the bottom of the distribution.
Several recent papers use the Machado and Mata (2005) QR decomposition technique to 
analyze the gender gap in log wages across the distribution. This technique allows one 
to decompose the difference between male and female log wage distributions into a 
component due to the difference in the distribution of observable characteristics 
between genders and a component due to the difference in the distribution of rewards to 
these characteristics between genders. Such studies include Albrecht et al. (2003) for
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Sweden, De la Rica et al. (2008) for Spain, Arulampalam et al. (2007) for several 
European countries.
The Machado and Mata (2005) (MM) method can be viewed as a generalization of the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition which decompose differences between groups in 
average outcomes into differences in average characteristics and differences in rewards 
to those characteristics. The MM method is designed to simulate counterfactual 
distributions. For example, what would the distribution of full-time log wages for 
women have been if working women had the same distribution of labour market 
characteristics as men or if their human capital characteristics were rewarded the same 
as men? The general idea of the MM method is parametric model estimation for the 
quantiles of the conditional distribution. Specifically, the idea is to generate two 
counterfactual densities. The first is the female log wage density that would arise if 
women were given men’s labour market characteristics, but were paid according to the 
female wage structure. The proposed method is based on the estimation of marginal 
wage densities implied by counterfactual distributions for some or all workers’ 
measured characteristics. The counterfactual decomposition of changes in the wage 
density is obtained by means of QR and re-sampling methods. The MM approach can 
be seen as an extension of DiNardo et al. (1996) and Blau and Kahn (2006).
Recently Melly (2006) proposes a numerically identical to the MM estimator based on 
the construction of a counterfactual distribution of feniale wages that would have 
prevailed if women had been endowed with their own characteristics but were paid like 
men. The conditional distribution is integrated over the range of covariates to obtain an 
estimate of the unconditional distribution. Melly’s approach can be classified as semi- 
parametric as he assumes that the conditional quantiles satisfy a parametric restriction 
but no distributional assumption is needed and the covariates are allowed to influence 
the whole conditional wage distribution.
There are some limitations and problems in measuring discrimination from a 
distributive point of view. In some cases, problems arise from the conceptual confusion 
of the distributive aspects of measurement with the distributive effect o f discrimination. 
Also, there are problems that arise in using counterfactual distribution functions in wage 
discrimination estimation. For instance, Del Rio et al. (2008) provide an illustration of
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the problem when counterfactuals are used, and show that when moving from the 
observed wage distribution to the wage distribution without discrimination some female 
workers may change their relative position. This could imply that any earnings 
differential, evaluated at each quantile, would not show the true differences in 
discriminatory experiences of female workers.
The decomposition methods suggested by Fortin and Lemieux (1998) and Donald et al.
(2000) share the same shortcoming as Machado and Mata (2005) in that they do not 
provide a way of dividing up the composition effect into the contribution of each 
individual covariate. Firpo et al. (2007) propose a two-stage procedure to perform the 
Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition on any distributional measure and not only the 
mean. The first-stage in their approach consists of decomposing the distributional 
statistic of interest into a wage structure and a composition component using a 
reweighting approach, where the weights are parametrically or non-parametrically 
estimated. This first-step of the Firpo et al. (2007) decomposition is semi-parametric 
because it does not assume any functional form for the earnings distribution. The idea of 
the first-stage is similar to the DiNardo et al. (1996). Firpo et al. (2007) also provide the 
assumptions required for identification in the case o f other distributional statistics 
besides the mean. In the second stage, they divide the wage structure and composition 
effects into the contribution of each covariate using the recentered influence function 
(RIF) method. The recentered influence function is a linear approximation to the 
nonlinear function of distributional statistics of interest such as a quantile. This allows 
identifying the specific characteristics, differentiated across men and women, which 
lead to widening of the gender earnings gap. The RIF method generates unconditional 
quantile estimates, while the commonly used QR gives conditional quantile estimates. 
The advantages of the RIF method are twofold: first unconditional quantiles are usually 
of real interest in economic applications; second, this approach allows one to estimate 
the marginal effects of explanatory variables on the targeted unconditional quantiles 
(Chi and Li, 2008). Central to the RIF’s unconditional quantile method is an influence 
function. The influence function represents the influence of an individual observation on 
a distributional statistic of interest such as quantile (see Firpo et al., 2007).
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6.3.3. Sem i- and  non-param etric estim ation m ethods
The standard methods for estimating empirical models often assume that the functions 
of interest and the distribution of unobserved random variables are normally distributed. 
Such assumption simplifies estimation and statistical inference, however, such inference 
based on convenient but incorrect assumptions about functional forms and distributions 
can be highly misleading (Horowitz, 2009). Recently, semi-parametric and non- 
parametric techniques have been extensively used in a number of empirical 
applications94. One merit of this procedure is the perception that the conditional mean 
may not provide an adequate account of the impact of gender on the log wage. In 
particular if  large outliers exist, the median might provide a more accurate reflection of 
central tendency in the data than the mean95.
Breunig and Rospabe (2007) find that the semi-parametric analysis illuminates several 
features o f the male-female wage gap in France, which are not evident from a 
parametric analysis. They use the methodology developed by DiNardo et al. (1996) to 
examine the density of wages. Applying nonparametric kernel density estimation they 
construct counterfactual density that would prevail for women if they had men’s 
distribution of characteristics. They find that there are important differences in the shape 
of the densities of male and female wages. Proportion of females in the low part of the 
wage distribution is more than twice as great as for males. The authors conclude that the 
effect of characteristics in explaining the wage gap is strikingly different at different 
points in the distribution.
A recent paper by Barsky et al. (2002) proposes a non-parametric alternative to the 
Blinder-Oaxaca method that reweights the empirical distribution of the outcome 
variable using weights equalizing the distribution of explanatory variables. The 
technique is similar to the method developed by DiNardo et al. (1996). The non-
94 See Buchinsky (1994) and Gosling et al. (2000).
95 Koenker and Basset (1978, 1982) and Powell (1983) have demonstrated the consistency and asymptotic normality 
o f  the estimated coefficients, providing the statistical basis for the use o f  conventional test statistics. One important 
point is that precision o f  the parameter estimates in the QR model is dependent on the density at each quantile. 
Specifically, at quantiles located either at the bottom or at the top end o f  the distribution, where the density o f  data 
points is low, the coefficients are more difficult to compute. In addition, the corresponding test statistics have less 
statistical power, and the null hypothesis when false may not be rejected as often as it should. The asymptotic formula 
for the computation o f  the variance-covariance matrix as developed by Koenker and Basset (1982) is known to 
understate the true variance-covariance matrix in the presence o f  heteroskedastisity, and the more conventional 
approach adopted to compute the matrix is through a bootstrapping method.
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parametric approach permits investigation of the role of earnings in accounting for the 
wage gap at multiple points along distribution. The advantage of their method is that it 
provides a robust alternative to the standard parametric decomposition, avoiding 
problems of specification error and uncertainty of functional form.
6.3.4. Selectivity bias in the decomposition analysis
As argued by Olivetti and Petrongolo (2006), if selection into employment is non- 
random, then it makes sense to worry about the way in which selection may affect the 
resulting gender wage gap. In particular, if women who are employed tend to have 
relatively high-wage characteristics, low female employment rates may become 
consistent with low gender wage gaps simply because low-wage women would not 
feature in the observed wage distribution (Dolton et al., 1989). Many empirical studies 
that control for selectivity bias in the gender wage differential follow the Heckman 
parametric procedure96, which assumes bivariate normality in the relationship between 
the error terms in the earnings and participation equations and which depends crucially 
on this distributional assumption.
However, two substantial problems exist in the Heckman procedure. The first problem 
is the requirement for an adequate set of instruments to identify the selection effects. 
We need a variable that affects the participation decision but not the level of wages. 
This is a recurring problem in the literature and many cross-sectional data sets may be 
poorly endowed with necessary instruments. The type of instruments used in the 
literature relate to dependent children (their number or age) and other household-level 
measures. Nevertheless, the correction mechanism has been the subject of criticism, 
given the sensitivity of the selection estimates to the identifying restrictions used 
(Manski, 1989). The second problem relates to the parametric assumption of normality 
in the construction of the selection term. A violation of normality assumption introduces 
a miss-specified selection term and this has implications for any inferences offered on 
the estimated selection effects.
96 See Arabsheibani and Lau (1999) and Dolton and Makepeace (1987).
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The literature that deals with correction for selectivity bias in QR models is less well 
developed than for the mean regression model. Moreover, it is surprising that, apart 
from Albrecht et al. (2009) and Picchio and Mussida (2010), Badel and Pena (2010) and 
Chzhen and Mumfrod (2011), there are no studies that correct the gender gap across the 
wage distribution for the selection due to workforce participation. Buchinsky (1998) for 
instance, exploits the work of Newey (1992) on the mean regression in approximating 
the selection term by using a power series expansion of the inverse Mill’s ratio of the 
normalized index. This is designed to treat the selection effect as an omitted variable 
that can be proxied by a polynomial expressed in terms of the conventional inverse 
Mills ratio. These high order terms are then included in the QR models and the 
sampling variance o f the estimates are obtained through bootstrapping. Thus the first 
order approximation will be sufficient if  the error term is normally distributed. In any 
case the estimator is consistent since the order of approximation increases with the 
sample size.
Albrecht et al. (2009) estimate gender wage gap in the Netherland having corrected for 
selection of women into market work following Buchinsky’s (1998) semi-parametric 
approach. They conclude that were all Dutch women working full-time, the gender 
wage gap would be much higher. The selection corrected gender wage gap is found to 
be predominantly related to women receiving lower rewards for their characteristics 
than men. Similarly, Beblo et al. (2003) show selection-corrected wage gaps for 
Germany and conclude that selectivity correction may have a significant impact both on 
wage estimates and on pay gap decompositions. Nicodemo (2009) decomposes the 
wage gap between husbands and wives across the earning distribution after allowing for 
self-selection of married women into employment in five Mediterranean countries 
(Spain, France, Greece, Italy and Portugal). She finds a substantial wage gap in each 
country, with the greatest portion being due to differences in rewards, and that sticky 
floors are more predominant than glass ceilings. Badel and Pena (2010) find that self­
selection into the labour force in Columbia is crucial for the wage gap estimates -  if all 
women participate in the labour force the observed gap would be roughly 50% larger at 
all quantiles. After allowing for selection into full-time employment by British women, 
Chzhen and Mumford (2011) find a substantially larger gender earnings gap -  the 
selection corrected gap is found to be twice the raw gap and is related to women 
receiving lower rewards for their characteristics than men. Recent study by Picchio and
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Mussida (2010) propose a new semi-parametric estimator of densities in the presence of 
sample selection and finds that when sample selection is taken into account the gender 
wage gap in Italy widens, especially at the bottom of the distribution. By contrast, 
Breunig and Rospabe (2007) conclude that correcting for sample selection does not 
change their results. Selection only contributes to narrowing the observed gender wage 
gap in France by about 1.5% and this change is not significant.
Huber and Melly (2011) criticize Buchinsky series estimator. Their preliminary results 
show that the series estimator is not consistent when there is heteroskedasticity. One 
implication of the Buchinsky (1998) independence assumption is that all quantile 
regression curves are parallel, which restricts the usefulness of considering several 
quanitle regressions. In the majority of the applications of quantile methods, researchers 
are particularly interested in the heterogeneity of the coefficients across the distribution. 
In addition, under the independence assumption the quanitle slope coefficients will be 
identical to the mean slope coefficients. Huber and Melly (2011) show that the quantile 
coefficients are useful to test the independence assumption, although they are 
inconsistent when this assumption is not satisfied. They also show that Buchinsky’s 
assumptions were wrong and the estimator is inconsistent. However the authors do not 
suggest any alternative estimator. They only propose a test for the independence 
assumption for the identification of sample selection models.
6.3.5. Choosing decomposition methodology
Given our data, we are able to cope with some but not all of the methodological issues 
discussed above. In line with the more recent work on gender wage differentials, we 
will adopt the QR method as it allows us to estimate the marginal effect of the 
covariates on the wages at various points of the distribution, instead of only at the mean. 
We will decompose the gender wage gap across the distribution, as proposed by 
Machado and Mata (2005) and taking into account the ‘index’ number problem 
suggested in Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1988 and 1994). Their 
empirical findings show that the use of female wage structure as the competitive 
standard produces a larger discriminatory differential than the use of male coefficient 
estimates. From our point of view, the most important is that the estimation method 
chosen allows us to take account of differences across the wage distribution and the
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non-discriminatory wage structure from the pooled sample of males and females. 
Although, we found Brown et al. (1980) decomposition method appealing because of its 
focus on occupational segregation and ability to provide within-occupation wage 
differentials, it has been difficult to find conclusive examples in the literature that the 
method is applicable across the earnings distribution.
Finally, in the quantile regression framework little consensus exists on the appropriate 
sample selection procedure and as discussed above the evidences of the effect of 
selection on the observed wage gap are mixed. Some studies claim that selection is 
crucial for the gender wage gap. Others conclude that the male/female wage disparities 
in the selection process are not large enough to explain the gender wage gap. Generally, 
researchers who find no obvious selection biases in the mean regression tend not to 
consider the issue in the quantile regression framework. As no significant selection 
effect was detected in the case of Bulgaria and Serbia (see Essay one) and to be 
consistent in our cross-country analysis, we leave the selectivity issues to future 
research.
6.4. Gender wage gap in transition -  review of the literature
In accordance with the official policy of gender equality, pay differentiation based on 
gender was restricted under central planning in ex-communist economies. As we have 
already discussed in Chapter three, wages were set according to industry specific wage 
grids varying only with the difficulty of the job and with the worker’s education and 
experience and not with gender (Munich et al., 2005). The fall o f communism in 
transition countries ended the wage regulation, which increased returns to education but 
also caused an increase in wage dispersion (Svejnar 1999). In most countries, the 
transition process leads to a decrease in the mean wage and an asymmetric change in the 
tails of the wage distribution. Real wages at the bottom decile of the wage distribution 
in each transition economy decreased substantially while real wages at the top decile of 
the wage distribution decreased relatively less97 (Skoufias, 2003). Today, wage grids 
and restraining gender earnings differential are used only in the ‘budgetary’ sector 
(public administration, health, education) and room for pay discrimination is more open 
in the unregulated non-budgetary sector (Jurajda 2003). Svejnar (1999) provides an
97 In some countries such as Hungary and Croatia, the real wages o f highly paid workers increased.
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overview of labour markets in Central and East European countries during transition. 
According to all these studies, transition economies show significant gender wage 
differential and one important determination of the differences is the degree of gender 
segregation by job and occupation. Further reasons have been provided to explain why 
the gender wage gap exists in transition countries and why it widens at the bottom 
and/or at the top of the wage distribution. It has been argued that women, especially 
those at the bottom of the wage distribution, might be perceived to have or might have a 
smaller work force attachment (Booth and Francesconi, 2003). Evidence from early 
transition periods suggests that women in some transition economies have actually 
improved their economic position relative to men despite the rise in overall earnings 
inequality (Rutkowski, 1996). Others point out these structural shifts toward a market 
economy, involving the shift from heavy to light industry and expansion of the service 
sector, were expected to simulate the demand for female labour (Einhom, 1991).
In terms of the gender pay gap, the Soviet Union was one of the most heavily 
researched. Empirical studies from the post-Soviet era shows that, on average women 
continued to earn less than two-thirds of the wage of their male colleagues. A study by 
Ofer and Vinokur (1992) uses emigration data from the 1970s and finds that 51% of the 
wage differential is due to discrimination. Similarly, Katz (1999) uses data from the 
Soviet city of Taganrog for 1989 and 1992 and finds that the ratio of female to male 
hourly wages is 75% and that 84.6% of the difference on the hourly wage gap is due to 
discrimination. Newell and Reilly (1996) use the first round of the Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS) and report that the women’s hourly wages are 30% less 
than men’s wage and that 88% of total hourly wage gap between men and women is due 
to differences in the estimated parameters. The authors note that almost all the overall 
gender pay gap is unexplained by the model and they ascribed most of the unexplained 
gap to unequal gender treatment within a set of one-digit occupational groups.
Compared to the Newell and Reilly’s (1996) results, Arabsheibani and Lau (1999) find 
lower levels of discrimination against women. Their empirical findings propose that 
59% of the difference in the wage gap is due to discrimination. The difference in their 
results can be explained by their use of the 1994 wave of RLMS and sample selection 
correction. Similarly, Ogloblin (1999) examines the Russian gender pay gap using 
rounds 1994 to 1996 of the RLMS. It is difficult to compare their results with the earlier
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work of Newell and Reilly (1996), as the later study includes industry-level 
information. Ogloblin (1999) also adjusts the earnings measure for employment status 
and corrects for selectivity bias associated with the wage arrears. He computes the 
monthly gender pay differential at 39 % and less than one-fifth is interpreted as an 
unexplained part. However, the author concludes that over 90% of the corrected gender 
wage gap is attributable to gender segregation.
Brainerd (1998) explore the gender pay gap in early transition Russia. The author 
reports that in 1991 the earnings of men are 24.8% higher than the earnings of women 
with similar characteristics and that the differential increases to 44.6% in 1994. 
According to her findings, this is due to the increase in overall wage inequality and that 
gender-specific factors appear to explain little of the poor labour market outcomes of 
women in Russia’s transition. Glinskaya and Mroz (2000) use the RLMS to re-examine 
the gender pay gap in urban areas. The raw estimates for 1993 and 1994 are comparable 
to those reported in Brainerd (1998) and the authors concludes that observable 
differences in characteristics between the gender groups explains almost none of the 
differential and the changes across time. They argue that most of the changes are 
attributable to changes in upper tail of the male wage distribution. Newell and Reilly
(2001) find similar results and indicate that most of the hourly gender pay gap is not 
attributable to gender differences in characteristics. Using quantile regression methods, 
Newell and Reilly (2001) find higher gender pay gap at the top end of the conditional 
wage distribution than at the bottom end.
In another study, Gerry et al. (2002) examine the impact of wage arrears on the gender 
pay gap using RLMS over the period 1994 to 1998. The authors pool all rounds to 
enhance efficiency of their estimates. They report 29% average hourly wage differential 
between men and women, which they attribute to treatment differentials rather than 
gender differences in endowments. According to their results, wage arrears and 
payments in kind attenuated the gender pay gap and this effect is particularly 
pronounced among the lowest paid. Ganguli and Terrel (2005) test the hypothesis that 
the gender gap is lower at the beginning of transition process than in today’s Ukrainian 
economy, because of the egalitarian principles of a communist state. The authors find 
that the gender pay gap is higher in the top half of the distribution than at the bottom 
half and that a glass ceiling is persistent across all three points in time. Using the
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Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition method and data from the ULMS, they 
conclude that differences in rewards rather than differences in productive characteristics 
explain most of the gender wage gap throughout the distribution.
Further evidence of the gender wage differential in transition economies was found by 
Krugman (1998) and Arabsheibani and Madirimov (2002) for Uzbekistan, and Namazie
(2002) for Kyrgyzstan. According to their results discrimination explains a large 
proportion of the gender wage gap in Central Asian Republics. Newell and Reilly
(2001) report an increase of the wage gap between the 90th and 10th quantiles in 1996 
for Kazakhstan. The authors also show that the wage differential is higher at the top end 
of the conditional wage distribution than at the bottom end in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and 
Russia.
In the case of Bulgaria, Brainerd (2000) notes that a relatively decentralized wage- 
setting system has evolved despite national agreements to establish wage floors and 
ceilings. According to Jones (1991) the large increase in the dispersion of wages in 
1989 was due to new legal agreements, i.e. the new system of basic wages that gives 
managers more control over determining the wages of their employees. Moreover, 
Jolliffe (2002) uses Bulgarian Integrated Household Survey from 1995 and indicates 
that males’ wages are 24% higher than females’ wages. An Oaxaca decomposition of 
this differential shows that differences in characteristics, such as education, experience 
and sector of employment, explain very little of the wage differential. Using 1995, 1997 
and 2001 Integrated Household surveys, Newell and Reilly (2001) find that
• th •discrimination effects in Bulgaria are significantly higher at the 90 percentile. 
Giddings (2002b) analyses the gender differential in Bulgaria’s early transition, using 
survey data from 1986 and 1993. Her results indicate that the gender earnings gap 
decreased in the early years of the Bulgaria’s transition because women were better 
educated and were disproportionately represented in growing industries such as 
commerce and services. Using the Integrated Household Survey from 2001, Kolev
(2002) also provides gender wage gap estimate for Bulgaria of 26 % at the 50th quantile 
of the conditional wage distribution.
The Croatian gender wage gap is examined by Nestic (2010). He utilises data from the 
Labour Force Survey in 1998 and 2005 and applies both OLS and QR techniques to
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assess gender wage gap across the wage distribution. The gender wage gap is found to 
be relatively low at the lower part of the wage distribution and gets larger as one move 
towards the top of the distribution. Finally, Kecmanovic (2009) analyses the gender 
wage gap in Serbia and finds a decrease in the wage differential after 2001, 
accompanied by an increase in the ‘unexplained’ component of the gap. He also find 
that the gender wage gap between 2001 and 2005 falls at each of the quantiles of the 
wage distribution, but discrimination that women face in the labour market has 
worsened during the examined period.
The review of the literature that examines changes in the wage position of women over 
the transition period has been inconclusive98. There is no consensus within the literature 
that gender wage gap either remained stable or revealed a downward trend over 
transition period. In Table 6.1 we attempt to summarise the main findings regarding the 
changes in the gender wage gap over time in transition countries. For example, Brainerd 
(2000) finds that during the first years of transition, the gender wage gap in Hungary, 
Poland, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic decreased between 0.05 and 0.12 log 
points. The author also finds an increase in the gap of 0.15 and 0.27 log points for 
Russia and Ukraine. In contrast to Brainerd (2000), Ganguli and Terrel (2005) find that 
the raw gender wage gap in Ukraine declined from 0.40 log points in 1986 to 0.34 log 
points in 2003. As we have discussed above, Giddings (2002b) finds that gender wage 
gap decreases in Bulgaria, despite an overall increase in the earnings inequality. 
Furthermore, Hunt (2002) documents a 10% point decrease in the gender wage gap in 
East Germany over the period 1990-1994. Similarly, Jolliffe and Campos (2005) find 
that the gap in Hungary decreased from 0.31 in 1986 to 0.19 in 1998. Grajek (2003) 
shows that gender wage gap in Poland decreased over 1987-1996. Nestic (2010) finds 
declining gender wage gap in Croatia between 1998 and 2008. However, the 
counterfactual gender wage gap in Croatia is found to be almost two times higher than 
the raw gap and it even increased during the period examined. In contrast, Newell and 
Reilly (2001) provide an overview of the evolution of the gender wage gap in eleven 
countries of East Europe and Former Soviet Union (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Latvia, Russia, Ukraine,
98 See Brainerd (2000) and Newell and Reilly (2001) for a selection o f  Central and Eastern European countries and 
the countries in the Commonwealth o f  Independent States (CIS); Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) for Slovenia, Jurada 
(2003) for the Czech and the Slovak Republic; Ogloblin (1999) for Russia.
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Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) and find that gender earnings gap remained relatively 
stable during the 1990s. Rutkowski (2001) shows that in the later stages of transition, 
the gender wage gap increased, although it remained rather modest by the international 
standards. Paci and Reilly (2004) suggest that the relatively small gender wage gap in 
most transition countries is connected with the higher human capital endowments of 
women compared to men, such as education.
TABLE 6.1
Changes in gender wage gap in transition countries- summary of results
Reference Country C hange in the raw gender  
w age gap
Brainerd (2000) Hungary, Poland, Czech and Slovak 
Republics (1988-1994)
Decreased by 0.05-0.12 log points
Brainerd (2000) Russia and Ukraine (1992-1994) Increased by 0.15-0.27 log points
Giddings (2002b) Bulgaria (1986-2003) Decreased by 0.09 log points
N ewell and Reilly (2001) 11 countries (1984-1996) Stable
Hunt (2002) East Germany (1990-1994) Decreased by 0.10 log points
Grajek (2003) Poland (1987-1996) Decreased by 0.10 log points
Ganguli and Terrell (2005) Ukraine (1986-2003) Decreased by 0.06 log points
Jolliffe and Campos (2005) Hungary (1986-1998) Decreased by 0.12 log points
Kecmanovic (2009) Serbia (2001-2005) Decreased by 0.08 log points
Nestic (2010) Croatia (1998-2008) Decreased by 0.04 log points
S ou rce: Authors’ literature review.
Most studies report narrowing of the gender wage differentials for transition countries 
except Russia and Ukraine. The literature review also supports the fact that there are 
very few studies, which exclusively investigate the gender wage gap in Bulgaria, Serbia, 
and Russia. It has been difficult to find a study that empirically investigates the gender 
wage gap across conditional distribution in Tajikistan.
6.5. Conclusions and comments on a research agenda
The aim of the present Chapter has been to review the empirical literature and to discuss 
the main decomposition methods used in the gender wage gap estimates. This Chapter 
reviews different methodological techniques that have been used to estimate the wage 
differential at the mean and across the conditional wage distribution. An overview of the 
empirical literature related to the gender wage gap in transition countries has been 
provided.
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The ways in which the gender wage gap is decomposed are diverse. We have 
concentrated on the most commonly used decomposition methods. An important finding 
in the literature is that the estimates at the mean provide an incomplete summary of the 
pattern of earnings across the entire wage distribution. The Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition, based on the ordinary least squares, allows us to obtain an exact 
decomposition of the average wage gap between males and females. However, in the 
context of the QR the unconditional quantile wage is equal to its quantile wage 
conditional on the vector of individual characteristics at that percentile level plus some 
individual error terms, which are not zero. Moreover, the evidence of distributional 
approach literature points out that in most of these studies returns to human capital 
characteristics and the raw gender differential increase as one moves along the wage 
distribution. One of the shortcomings of the Machado and Mata (2005) methodology is 
that it uses the Blinder-Oaxaca type decomposition approach, which has been subject to 
criticism. In most applications the coefficient estimates from the male wage regressions 
are used as a reference non-discriminatory wage structure. Hence a pooled approach, 
obtained from the male and female wage structure is required.
Finally, most of the studies of the East European countries show a narrowing of the 
gender wage differential after the introduction of market reforms. Gender differences in 
productive characteristics explain only a small portion of the wage gap. The consensus 
is that the gender wage gap has either remained stable or has actually decreased in 
Central Europe while it has increased in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The 
majority of the empirical studies in the case of Russia indicate that differences in the 
endowment component between males and females weakly contribute to the wage 
differential. Some other scholars suggest that the pay gap between men and women is 
relatively low by international standards and that women have actually benefited 
throughout the systematic change from communist to market economy.
We find that previous studies on gender wage gap at different points of the distribution 
in the case of Bulgaria, Russia, Serbia and Tajikistan are limited and thus motivate our 
empirical analysis. The most challenging point for us is the application of the 
appropriate decomposition method. In the next Chapter we will apply a newly 
developed econometric technique which allows us to take into account differences 
across the wage distribution and the ‘index’ number problem as suggested by Neumark
211
(1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1988 and 1994). We believe that our estimates of the 
relative positions of women and men overall distribution of earnings in these particular 
countries might have potentially important policy implications.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
GENDER WAGE GAP ACROSS THE DISTRIBUTION: 
EMPIRICAL EVINDENCE FROM FOUR 
TRANSITION COUNTRIES
7.1. Introduction
Explaining the persistence in gender earnings differential is essential to the 
advancement of women’s interests in all economies. It is interesting to see how 
Bulgaria, Russia, Tajikistan and Serbia are compare to the European benchmarks of 
gender equality in the labour market now, after almost two decades of transition 
reforms. In order to obtain a more detailed insight into the gender earnings differential, 
we employ the method of QR, which allows us to control for individual characteristics 
over the entire conditional wage distribution. A special emphasis has been placed on the 
findings of the relatively higher gender differential amongst higher earners (the so 
called ‘glass ceiling effect’) and amongst low earners (the ‘sticky floors effect’). By a 
‘glass ceiling’ effect we refer to a greater earnings gap at the top end of the distribution, 
suggesting that female workers in the upper-income brackets have lower relative pay 
than their male counterparts. In contrast, a ‘sticky floor’ refers to the scenario where 
females at the bottom of the distribution are at a greater disadvantage and the gap is 
wider at the bottom (Booth, 2009; Arulampalam et al., 2007). In order to measure the 
gender wage differential, the observed wage gap is split into two parts -  a part due to 
differences in characteristics and part due to differences in returns to these 
characteristics.
This Chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, the study considers the 
case of four formerly communist economies -  Bulgaria, Russia, Tajikistan and Serbia, 
countries for which not considerable amounts of data and research on gender wage gap 
are available. Secondly, it extends the popular Machado and Mata (2005) 
decomposition procedure to address the ‘index’ number problem suggested by Neumark 
(1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1988 and 1994). We use the coefficient estimates from 
the pooled wage regressions as the reference remuneration that is the non-
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discriminatory wage structure. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed procedure 
has not been used to estimate the gender wage gap across the conditional distribution in 
the countries of interest. Thirdly, our focus is on two time periods 2003 and 2007 (2001 
and 2003 for Bulgaria), thus allowing us to observe changes in the size of the wage gap 
over time. The more recent data utilised in the Chapter allows us to broaden 
understanding of the way gender differences evolved during the entire process of the 
economic transition from a planned to a market economy and to a democratic society. 
Finally, we have attempted to fit comparable specifications to the samples across 
countries in order to compare the results.
This Chapter is organized in the following way. Section 7.2 outlines the labour market 
institutional background and labour market trends in the countries of interest. We 
introduce some stylized facts with which to begin investigating whether transition has 
increased or reduced gender differences in the labour market. In section 7.3, we 
comment on the data used in the estimations. Section 7.4 outlines our method for 
decomposing gender wage gap. Finally, sections 7.5 and 7.6 discuss the main empirical 
results and conclusions.
7.2. Institutional background
In all four transition countries, gender equality was a proclaimed policy goal during the 
communist era and evidence shows that the difference in wages between women and 
men were low at that time (Brainerd, 2000). The prevailing view in the literature is that 
on the eve of transition, occupational segregation in Eastern Europe was lower than in 
developed market economies (Maltseva and Roshchin, 2006). As discussed in Chapter 
two, wages in these economies were set according to industry specific wage grids 
varying only with the difficulty of the job and with worker’s education and experience 
but not with gender (Munich et al., 2005). Moreover, wages were biased in favour of 
blue collar industries, so that workers in manufacturing were paid better than workers in 
health and education (Orazem and Vodopivec, 1997). In most countries, the transition 
process led to a decrease in mean wages and an asymmetric change in the tails of the 
wage distribution. Skoufias (2003) argues that real wages at the bottom decile of the 
wage distribution in each transition economy decreased substantially while real wages
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at the top decile of the wage distribution decreased relatively less". Another important 
feature of the Soviet-type economies was an excess demand for labour driven by 
economic plans targeting rapid industrialization and extensive growth of the economy. 
During the communist era all able individuals of working age were, by law, obligated to 
be employed. A well-known feature of the communist systems was their ability to 
integrate women almost fully into the economy (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992). 
Female labour was needed to satisfy the excess demand for labour and official policies 
encouraged women to enter the labour force in many ways. As a result, women in the 
region had higher rates of economic activity than in any other part of the world (United 
Nations, 1991). However, the male-female relative labour market has changed and 
changes in earnings and in employment structure hit males and females differently 
(Grajek, 2003).
The very high female labour force participation that had been previously attained 
dropped considerably just after the start of transition (Malysheva and Verashchagina, 
2008). Both men and women experienced a decline in economic activity rate and the 
reduction was larger in Central Eastern European countries than in those that constituted 
the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The reason was that many state-owned enterprises in 
the latter group of countries resorted to the practise of so-called labour hoarding in order 
to prevent mass unemployment and withdrawal from the labour market (Namazie, 
2003). Despite men’s higher rates, in all countries where women’s activity rate was low, 
men’s rate was also low (see Table 7.1). This suggests a sluggish labour market rather 
than merely overt gender discrimination (UNDP, 2006).
TABLE 7.1: Economic activity rates for women and men by countries
1990
Women Men
1995
Women Men
2000 
Women Men
2004
W omen Men
2007
Women Men
Bulgaria1 50.3 59.7 47.9 56.8 44.7 56.2 45.4 56.1 47.5 58.2
Serbia - - 51.8 67.8 48.9 65.8 47.0 64.6 42.8 59.7
Russia2 61.0 77.4 48.4 63.3 48.3 61.1 46.6 55.8 48.5 57.9
Tajikistan - - - - - 52.2 74.0 - -
Source: UNECE Gender Statistics Database.
Notes: Economically active includes all residents who are either employed or unem ployed (aged + 15) 1 Data for 1990 refer to 
1 9 9 3 .2 Data for 1990, 1995 and 2000 refer to persons aged 15-72.
Women in the East also fared comparatively worse than men in terms of 
unemployment, which, as discussed in Essay one, rose at the beginning of the 1990s
9‘ln som e countries such as Hungary and Croatia, real wage o f  highly paid workers increased.
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from the practically non-existent level experienced before transition. Stefanova and 
Terrel (2007) provide empirical evidence that women had lower job-finding rates once 
they become unemployed and were therefore more subject to a long-term 
unemployment. At the same time, educational attainment of women in the post­
communist countries was very high. The fact that education was financed by the state 
provided women with high chances of access to it. This tendency still holds and female 
outnumber males in university attendance in countries like Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan (Paci, 2002).
The dominant view in the literature, as we have summarized in Chapter six, is that the 
gender wage gap has been stable or declining over the transition period. The gap is 
documented as standing about 20%, primarily based on evidence from Central 
European countries (Malysheva and Verashchagina, 2008). The UNECE data on 
monthly earnings indicate that the wage gap in 2003 ranges from 18% in Bulgaria to 
36% in Russia.
Today, wage grids and restrained gender earnings differential are used only in the 
budgetary sector (public administration, health, education) and room for pay 
discrimination is relatively open in the unregulated non-budgetary sector (Jurajda, 
2003). Having in mind these changes, we can group the factors that influence the trends 
in the gender wage differential into the following: those related to changes in the overall 
wage structure, changes in labour market skills and productivity and changes in gender 
specific factors, such as remunerations of skills. The changes of labour market 
institutions experienced over the period also have potentially had an impact.
One of the most negative aspects of Bulgarian's transition has been a great decrease in 
real income level. In particular, in areas where more women than men are employed, 
wages are, as a rule, significantly lower than average pay levels for the country as a 
whole. The wages of Bulgarian women in industries and services in 2002 were about 
70% of those of men in the same sectors. In spite of proclaimed gender equality100
l00The Labour code (1986, amended 2001) prohibits all forms o f  discrimination, privileges, and limitations based on 
nationality, origin, gender and race. The amendment to the Code in 2001 introduced the principle o f  equal pay for 
women and men (Article 243). By the end o f  2003 certain amendments to the Labour Code introduced the definitions 
o f  indirect discrimination. Moreover, when advertising job vacancies employers do not have the right to set 
requirements relating to gender and age.
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women experienced specific treatment by the authorities which resembled occupational 
segregation and promotional discrimination (Grajek, 2003). Jolliffe (2002) suggests that 
in the case of Bulgaria, changes in the wage structure have disproportionately harmed 
the position of women. Possible reason suggested for this is that lower paid professions 
were being increasingly feminized. Another reason is that women were unable to fully 
realise their professional potential, even when they share the same professions as men, 
because they have to take care of their children. In addition there are discriminatory 
practices in the labour market with regard to some groups of women (for example, 
young women with short professional experience, pregnant women, women with small 
children, and women over 45 years)101.
Under the Soviet system, one of the major political goals was to achieve equality
between men and women. Women enjoyed substantial rights at the workplace, but
occupational segregation based on gender remained a pronounced feature of the Russian
labour market. The state assumed that women were different kind of workers from men,
marked out by their biological capacity to be mothers. This assumption found its
strongest expression in the banning of women from certain professions because
participation in them might impair their ability to produce healthy children (Attwood,
1999). The definition of Soviet women as ‘worker-mothers’, who were expected to
bear primary responsibility for running the household, meant that women tended to be
seen as ‘second-class’ workers (Ashwin, 2000). Despite high levels of education and
professional training, women in Russia also faced the phenomenon of the ‘glass ceiling’
in which they were unable to advance to leadership positions (Central European and
Eurasian Law Initiative, 2006). As a whole women were typically located in the lower
part of the wage distribution and a compression at the bottom of the distribution was
therefore likely to raise their average earning relative to men (Kazakova, 2007). This is
consistent with Brainerd (2000) who shows the widening wage structure in the early
Russian transition was the major determinant of the increase in the gender wage gap.
Studies of the wage gap during the Soviet transition suggest that it has remained more
102or less constant, with women continuing to earn between 60-70% of men’s wages .
101 Sziraczki and Windell (1992) suggest that the deteriorating position o f  wom en in Bulgaria may be results o f  
discriminating practices. They report results from a survey o f  managers who were asked whether they had a 
preference for men or women when hiring for production or professional work. W hile 25% reported a preference for 
hiring women for skilled production work, 54% reported preference for hiring men.
102 See Lapidus (1993).
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The Russian Constitution103, which sets the principles of equal rights and equal 
opportunity, does not prohibit the possibility of legal limitations on human rights based 
on sex. Russian law contains provisions that provide for differential treatment of men 
and women, primarily in the area of employment. For example, the Labour Code both 
includes the principle of equality and suggests restrictions on women of childbearing 
age from holding certain jobs that are considered physically difficult, harmful or 
dangerous and a prohibition on work that requires heavy lifting104. The Labour Code 
refers to an Index o f  Heavy Work and Work in Harmful or Dangerous Labour 
Conditions which are Forbidden to be Fulfilled by Women105 that presently lists 456 
specific types of work to which women’s access is limited or prohibited. This list, 
which has existed since Soviet times, was renewed and reduced in 2000 but since then it 
has remained unchanged (American Bar Association and Central European and 
Eurasian Law Initiative, 2006). The 2006 American Bar Association Report further 
indicates that many employers in Russia are reluctant to hire women who are perceived 
to have family obligations. Women report that they have been specifically asked during 
interviews if they are married, have children, or intend to have children (Lokshina and 
Lukashevski, 2003). In addition, wage differential was especially great for female 
employees aged 20-40, which is precisely the age when women have to take their child 
care responsibilities. These policies and attitudes resulted in a sustaining gender wage 
gap in the country. According to recent figures, women’s salaries are on average 64% of
Similarly, women’s capacity in Tajikistan to earn higher incomes was severely limited 
because of inequality in access to land and financial resources, good jobs and education. 
Access to education in Tajikistan was also hampered by traditional perceptions of the 
role of women in the society. According to the World Bank (2005) report women’s 
wages in 2003 were only 45% of those of men. The Constitution of the Republic of 
Tajikistan (Article 35) declares equal rights for women and men in the field of 
employment. The Labour Code prohibits discrimination in labour remuneration. The 
new Gender Equality law was adopted in December 2004 to address discrimination
103 Constitution o f  the Russian Federation, Article 19, part 1, Article 33 and Article 46.
104 Labour Code, Article 253. Prior to 2001, the Labour Code prohibited women from undertaking certain types o f  
work.
105 Index o f  Heavy Work and Work in Harmful or Dangerous Labour Conditions which are Forbidden to be Fulfilled 
by Women, adopted by Russian Federation Government Resolution No. 162, from February 25, 2000.
106 Women and men in Russia, Federal Service o f  Government Statistics 108 (2004).
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against women. Despite these policies, there still exists gender segregation -  prevalence 
of women in certain spheres of economy, mostly with low wages, such as agriculture, 
public health services and education. Thus, 85.5% of women are employed in these 
branches with 75.1% in agriculture. Salaries in these activities were approximately 4-7 
times lower than in industrial branches (industry, construction, transport, and 
communication)107.
Serbia signed the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination against 
women and has taken steps to achieve the Convention’s objectives108. The situation in 
the country, however, remained complex because the population comprises of several 
diverse ethnic origins, languages and religions. One of the characteristics of Serbian 
labour market was the large wage disparities among workers with the same or similar 
qualifications in different sectors. Some scholars indicate that women in Serbia mostly 
work in poorly paid jobs and they are frequently employed in the informal economy. 
Those sectors that suffer discrimination, like textiles, have lower wages relative to the 
wages in male privileged industries (see Krstic and Reilly, 2000). Evidence shows an 
increasing gender wage gap in Serbia: while in 1996 employed women earned 15 % less 
than men, the gender wage gap increased by 26 % in 2000 (Krstic and Reilly, 2000).
7.3. The data
The results in this Chapter are based on data from Bulgaria, Russia, Tajikistan and 
Serbia. The Bulgarian data are taken from the Living Standard Measurements Survey 
(LSMS), conducted in 2001 and 2003. The Russian data are taken from rounds 12 and 
16 of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) in 2003 and 2007. The 
Tajikistan Living Standard Survey (TLSS) of 2003 and 2007 provide our third source of 
data. Finally, Serbian data are taken from the Serbian Living Standard Measurement 
Survey (LSMS) in 2003 and 2007. In all four countries, we sample individuals aged 
between 15 and 65. Since the construction of the data and the definitions of the 
variables have already been explained in Section 3.3.1, this discussion is not repeated 
here. However, for Russia some discussion is required as the data used in this chapter
l07Tajikistan - Shadow Report on the realization o f  the convention on the elimination o f  all forms o f  discrimination 
against women, Dushanbe, 2006.
108 CEDAW (Committee on the Elimination o f  Discrimination against W omen), Consideration o f  Reports submitted 
by States parties under Article 18 o f  the Convention on the elimination o f  all forms o f  discrimination against women: 
Serbia, Initial Report o f  States Parties, CEDAW , New York, NY
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are different. Samples are tested to see whether the data sets support separation. The 
reported /-statistics in the descriptive tables indicate that the separation of the data 
between male and female samples is statistically significant for a number of individual 
characteristics (see Appendix Tables A7.1 to A7.4).
We have fitted comparable specifications to the samples across four countries to place 
the analysis in a common framework. The dependent variable is hourly earnings. The 
control variables used in the estimations include education (variables for university, 
secondary and primary school), potential experience (linear and quadratic terms), 
variables for individuals years of tenure with the current firm, controls for marital 
status, public sector employment, and a set of regional variables to pick up regional 
effects.
The Bulgarian data used in the estimation consists of a sample of 729 men and 709 
women in 2001 and 1,296 men and 1,186 women in 2003. Appendix Table A7.1 reports 
a complete list of variables used in the analysis. For both years, the average log hourly 
wage rate is higher for men. Education is represented by variables measuring the 
completion of indicated levels of schooling. The levels consist o f primary, secondary 
and university education. In 2001, 13.7% of employed men and 20.7% of employed 
women have a university degree. This increases to 16.7% for males and 25.6% for 
females in 2003. The earnings density functions, estimated using an Epanechnikov 
kernel estimator, show that the male wage distribution in 2001 is characterized by much 
lower dispersion than the one in 2003 (see Figure A7.1).
The quanitle-quantile plots (Q-Q plot)109 of Bulgarian male/female wage distributions in 
2001 and 2003, presented in Figure 7.1, facilitates a comparison o f the empirical wage 
distributions for both male and female samples.
109 The Q-Q plot is a graphical method for comparing two distributions to see how well they match or where 
differences occur. The graph relates quantiles o f  the variable on the vertical axis to quantiles o f  the variable on the 
horizontal axis. A point on the symmetry line indicates that quantile o f  one distribution has the same value as the 
corresponding quantile o f  the other distribution.
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FIGURE 7.1: Comparing empirical wage distributions, Q-Q plot, Bulgaria
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Source: Bulgaria LSM S, 2001 and 2003 data. The plots are created by using qq diagnostic plot in STATA.
Most of the observations in 2001 and 2003 are above the diagonal line, implying that 
wages for male workers in Bulgaria are higher than wages for female workers at 
comparable quantiles o f the wage distribution. However, the Q-Q plot in 2001 reveals 
that some low-eamings women have higher wages than men. The plots also indicate 
that wage inequality is somewhat stronger at low and high income levels in 2003.
The Russian data used in this chapter are taken from the Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS), which is designed to measure the effect of economic and 
political reforms on the economic welfare of the Russian population. For comparison 
purposes we use round 12 and round 16 of the RLMS. In Appendix Table A7.2, we 
report the descriptive statistics for the samples and the variables used in the empirical 
analysis. The Russian sample consists of 1,907 working men and 2,261 working women 
in 2003, and 1,917 working men and 2,315 working women in 2007. There are 
differences in the characteristics of men and women with respect to both educational 
qualifications and job status. The data indicates that women earn less than men, with an 
unconditional mean wage gap of 29% in 2003 and 22% in 2007. Tenure decreases 
between 2003 and 2007 for both male and female workers. This may point to a 
relatively mobile labour market. We can see that in both 2003 and 2007 a higher 
proportion of women than men complete university degree. A significantly higher 
proportion of working men are married (82%). The wage arrears effect is higher for 
males than females and decreased in size between 2003 and 2007. Not surprisingly, 
women have higher participation in the public sector. The Q-Q plots of male/female 
wage distributions in Russia show that not all of the data points are to the left of the 
main diagonal (see Figure 7.2). We also see that income inequality is stronger for low
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and high earners. Moreover, in 2007 there are some low-eamers women with higher 
wages than men.
FIGURE 7.2: Comparing empirical wage distributions, Q-Q plot, Russia
Quantile-Quantile Plot, 2003 Quantile-Quantile Plot, 2007
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Source: Russia RLM S, 2003 and 2007 data.
The Tajikistan sample used in the analysis consists of 3,006 working men and 1,832 
working women in 2001 and 4,133 working men and 2,240 working women in 2007 
(see Table A7.3). Similarly to the other countries examined, the descriptive statistics for 
Tajikistan indicate that in both years men are paid much more than women. We can also 
see that a higher proportion of men have completed a university degree (21%-23% for 
men compared to 13-15% for women). Around 66% (68%) of males (females) live in 
rural areas, which could be a barrier to equal opportunities in Tajikistan because the 
traditional stereotyping of female and male roles are different in the rural compared 
with urban areas. In addition, there are more opportunities for women to get better 
education, better paid jobs, and to participate in the decision-making process in urban 
areas. The Q-Q plot for Tajikistan reveals that all of the observations in 2003 are above 
the diagonal line, confirming that wages for male workers are higher than wages for 
females across the distribution. In 2007, at the higher quantiles the male/female wage 
differential is even larger. As a result we can expect larger differential between male 
and female wages among the higher-paid than among the lower paid workers.
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FIGURE 7.3: Comparing empirical wage distributions, Q-Q plot, Tajikistan
Quantile-Quantile Plot, 2003  Quantile-Quantile Plot, 2007
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Source: Tajikistan TLSS, 2003 and 2007 data.
10
8
6-
Z
4-
2-
0
0 2 4  6
log(Female wage)
8 10
Finally, the Serbian sample consists of 1,466 working men and 984 working women in 
2003, and 2,983 working men and 2,014 working women in 2007. Appendix Table 
A7.4 reports the means and standard deviations of the main variables used in the study. 
We observe an increase in the average wage from 2003 to 2007 which is higher for 
women than for men. In both years, females are better educated than males. The 
majority of public sector employees are women. Also in both years, at the higher 
quantiles of the wage distributions, male wages are higher than female wages (see 
Figure 7.4).
FIGURE 7.4: Comparing empirical wage distributions, Q-Q plot Serbia
Q uantile-Quantile Plot, 2003  Q uantile-Quantile Plot, 2007
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Source: Serbia, LSM S, 2003 and 2007 data.
An important feature of these data is that in all four countries (the 2003 Tajikistan 
sample is an exception) women are more likely than men to be employed in the public 
sector. Since public-sector wages tend to be higher, this implies that gender differences 
in wages are probably more muted than they might be otherwise (Appleton et al., 1999). 
Overall, apart from Tajikistan, women employees are systematically more educated than 
their male counterparts.
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7.4. Methodology
This chapter utilises the Machado and Mata’s (2005) technique to decompose the 
difference in male and female log wage distributions into a component due to 
differences in labour market characteristics between men and women and a component 
due to difference in the rewards men and women receive for their labour market 
characteristics. Based on Koenker-Basset (1978), Machado and Mata (2005) propose a 
method to extend the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. Their main 
methodological procedure is to simulate the conditional marginal wage distribution 
estimated through quantile regressions run separately for men and women110. The 
general idea of their methodology is to generate the female wage distribution that would 
emerge if women retained their own labour market characteristics but were “paid like 
men”. We extend this procedure by generalising the simulation and adopting the 
Oaxaca-Ransom methodology, therefore taking into account the ‘index’ number 
problem suggested in Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1988 and 1994). 
Neumark (1988) shows that the non-discriminatory wage structure can be estimated 
from an earnings equation estimated over a pooled sample of men and women, rather 
than using the male or female wage structure as a base. This is the non-discrimination 
equation, which is the benchmark in the estimation of the Oaxaca and Ransom 
decomposition. The question we address by the proposed Machado and Mata-Oaxaca- 
Ransom (MM-OR) decomposition is how much would the male-female wage gap 
change across the distribution if men and women were paid according to a common 
wage structure, but their work related attributes remain as they are. A positive wage gap 
implies that the returns to women’s characteristics are lower than those of men, and a 
negative gap implies the reverse.
Formally, our estimation decomposition procedure involves the following steps:
Step 1: Generate a randomly drawn sample of size N  from a uniform distribution 
U [0,1] ^....K^.This will give a series of numbers telling us which percentiles are to be
estimated.
Step 2: Using the male and female datasets, we estimate, for each percentile derived in 
the first step, regression coefficients for men, women and the pooled sample:
110 The wage distribution o f  the second group is simulated basing on the wage distribution and the characteristics o f  
the first group, and these steps are repeated n times.
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Pu, (0)> Pi. (0)> Pi, (#)>* = 1 N , where ^ um (0) are u f  quantile regression estimates
taken from the log hourly earnings equation for males; f i f {6)  are u f  quantile 
regression estimates taken from the log hourly earnings equation for females, and ft* (0 )
are u f  quantile regression estimates taken from the log hourly earnings equation for all 
workers.
Step 3: For each percentile, characteristics of a randomly drawn sample of 10,000 men 
and women (with replacement) are used to predict wages by using the estimated 
coefficient vectors(3™(6 ), f i f  (0) and f3* (0). This process generates sets of predicted
wages covering the whole distribution and enables us to calculate the wage distribution 
for males, females and for both males and females together. The vectors of 
characteristics for males { Xf } f =l and females {Xf } l !, are then used to predict (log)
hourly earnings for males {wf  = X f  and females = X f  Pfft }f=\ • These
predicted wages are equivalent to a random sample of size N  drawn from the marginal 
wage distributions for males (wm) and females (w/ ). Counterfactual densities for male 
and females workers being rewarded equally are found as {wfm = x ? p ' } f mx and 
{ w f  = X  f  p*u ] f=x which are the densities that would arise if women and men retained
their own labour market characteristics but were paid like a randomly chosen individual 
from the entire sample111.
Step 4: The difference between the quantiles of the simulated distributions can be used 
to quantity gender difference across the distribution. Using the calculated distributions, 
we decompose the gender wage gap into the contribution of the coefficients and the 
contribution of the covariates as:
111 Note that the original counterfactual density is generated as [yf  = x f  /J U m  is the density that would
arise if  women retained their own labour market characteristics, but were paid like men. The decomposition could 
also be made with the counterfactual { y f  =  X™ ft  f  } * which is a counterfactual earning density that would have
prevailed if  women were given m en’s labour market characteristics, but remained to receive returns to those 
characteristics like women.
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Qe& r \ P m- w f \ p f ) =
= & [(*" I &"-%*" \ h + W J  \ P ' - w f  \Pf )]+Q eW fm IP' - f t *  I p'\+ resid  (7.1)
V V /--------------------  V-------------------/
male advantage fem ale disadvantge charactetitics component
V
coeeficiet effect
where Qe is the 6th percentile of the earnings distribution and (w' |/?y)is the estimated
marginal earnings distribution for the ith individual based on the j th quantile regression 
estimates.
The first two terms of the right hand side of equation (7.1) identifies the part of any 
wage difference explained by differences in the returns that male and female receive for 
a given set o f characteristics (the coefficient effect)112. The third term of equation 7.1 
identifies the part o f the hourly wage difference at the 0 th centile, explained by 
differences in the characteristics of male and female workers (the characteristics effect). 
This is the portion of the wage differential that may be attributed to differences in the 
characteristics possessed by men and women. The difference between 6 th quantile of 
the marginal wage densities between male and female distributions weighted by the 
characteristics of workers randomly chosen in the economy does contain an additional 
component, which we treat as a residual. The residual term is typically of second order 
of importance and tends to became smaller with a larger number of simulations. 
Standard errors for the reported components of the decomposition were obtained using a
i i ^
standard bootstrapping method .
7.5. Empirical results
7.5.1. Explaining changes in relative wages
To shed a light on the role the overall wage structure has played in the changing gender 
gap, we summarise the changes in male and female wage inequality in Bulgaria, Russia, 
Tajikistan and Serbia in Table 7.2. The 90/10 log wage ratio is given as a measure of 
overall wage dispersion and the 90/50 and 50/10 log wage ratio provide an indication of 
whether changes in wage dispersion occurred predominantly in the upper or lower half
112 Specifically, the technique allows the discrimination component to be disaggregated into overpayment o f  male 
workers (male advantage) and underpayment o f  female workers (female disadvantage). W e do not attempt in our 
study to decom pose into these two components.
113 Bootstrap estimates are based on 800 replications.
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of the wage distribution. Analysing these measures allows one to identify which part of 
the distribution contributes more to the overall earnings inequality. A positive sign for 
the change in the wage distribution is associated with an increase in earnings dispersion 
whereas a negative sign indicate that wage dispersion has decreased over time.
TABLE 7.2: Summary measures of the log wage distribution
M en W om en
Year 90/10 90/50 50/10 90/10 90/50 50/10
B u learia
2 0 0 1
2003
% change
1.487
1.384
-7%
0.714
0.760
6 %
0.772
0.624
-19%
1.288
1.193
-7%
0.659
0.662
0 %
0.629
0.531
-16%
2003 2.154 0.972
R ussia
1.182 2.115 1.039 1.076
2007 1.785 0.858 0.927 1.853 1.003 0.850
% change -17% - 1 2 % -2 2 % - 1 2 % -3% -2 1 %
2003 2.708 1.609
Taiikistan
1.099 2.457 1.476 0.981
2007 2.863 1.477 1.386 2.446 1.322 1.124
% change 6 % -8 % 26% 0 % - 1 0 % 15%
2003 1.588 0.812
S erbia
0.777 1.560 0.770 0.790
2007 2.189 0.944 1.245 1.946 0.916 1.030
% change 38% 16% 60% 25% 19% 30%
Note: The log wage at the 90lh percentile o f  the wage distribution minus the log wage at the 10th 
percentile o f  the distribution. In a similar way were calculated the 90/50 and 50/10 measures.
Changes in relative wages differ between countries. If we take the ratio of male earnings 
at the top decile to earnings at the bottom decile (90/10) for the 2003, then this decile 
ratio has a value of 1.39 in Bulgaria, rising to 2.15 in Russia, 2.71 in Tajikistan and 1.59 
in Serbia, which shows that earnings dispersion is distinctly greater in Tajikistan and it 
is lowest in Bulgaria.
Over the period examined, the wage structure has widened substantially for both males 
and females in Serbia. In particular, the increase in wage inequality is stronger for male 
workers at the lower tail of the earnings distribution, where we estimate that the log 
50/10 percentile ratio for male labour earnings increased from 0.78 in 2003 to 1.25 in 
2007. This is a 60% increase in the 50/10 ratio, which is sizeable for a 4-years period. In 
Tajikistan, the increase in the wage inequality for both genders has been stronger in the 
lower earnings tail (50/10), where we find a 26% increase for male workers and 15% 
increase for female workers. In Bulgaria and Russia for both males and females, the 
50/10 log hourly wage ratio actually shrinks. Specifically, the 50/10 log hourly wage
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ratio in Bulgaria has decreased by 19% for males and 16% for females and similarly the 
Russian 50/10 log hourly wage ratio shows a decrease of around 21%.
To put the analysis into a perspective, one can see that wages at the 90th percentile of 
the Bulgarian male distribution in 2001 are about 93 log percentage points higher than 
wages at the 10th percentile. The corresponding figures in the year 2003 are 122 log 
percentage points. For Serbia, the 90/10 ratio seems to have flattened out in 2007. The 
wages at the 90th percentile of the male wage distribution are about 76 percentage points 
higher than the wages at the 10th percentile, whereas in 2003 the difference between the 
90th and 10th percentile was 104 percentage points. We may conclude that between 2003 
and 2007 there has been a marked reduction in the earnings inequality in Russia. 
Overall, taking the period as whole, in all four countries changes in the lower part of the 
wage distribution (50/10 log hourly ratio) are higher than changes in the upper part.
7.5.2. Gender wage gap decomposition results
The results of the wage decomposition are presented in Table 7.3. In the first three 
columns, we present the raw wage gap estimates for each year and the changes over 
time. The raw wage gap is calculated as the difference in log hourly wages between 
males and females at certain points of the wage distribution. In the next columns, we 
give the estimates of the proportion of the gap due to difference in the returns that 
workers receive for a given set of characteristics (the coefficients) and to the effect to 
different observable characteristics or ‘endowments’ across groups (the covariates), and 
residual terms that are due to the differences between the actual and simulated densities. 
The bootstrapped standard errors for these contributions are given in parenthesis. The 
estimated coefficient effects are graphed in Appendix Figure A7.5. A value greater than 
100% for the proportion of the observed raw gap, explained by the differences in returns 
to characteristics, implies that women have characteristics that compensate them for 
‘discrimination’ (Arulampalam et al., 2007). Estimates at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 
90th percentile are reported.
There are substantial variations in the decompositions across the countries. Estimates of 
the changes in the raw wage gap between both years indicate what has been happening
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to the gender wage premium114. The observed negative changes in the raw wage gap 
across the distribution for Bulgaria, Russia and Serbia imply that the gender wage 
differential has fallen over time. This is most pronounced in Russia at the higher 
percentiles where the raw gap decreases by 41%. Similarly, the raw wage gap in Serbia 
is systematically higher for the 2003 sample compared to the 2007 sample. The 
previous literature (Brainerd, 2000; Adamchik and Bedi, 2003, Newell and Socha, 
2007) attribute this change to improvements in gender specific skills and increase in 
returns to human capital. In contrast, estimates of the changes in the raw wage gap 
between 2003 and 2007 in Tajikistan indicate that the observed differential has risen. In 
2007, at the bottom of the distribution the observed raw gap increased by 56% (at the 
25th percentile level the raw wage gap increases from 0.588 log points in 2003 to 0.916 
in 2007). This confirms our initial findings of increased wage inequality in the lower tail 
(50/10) of the distribution (see discussions in Section 7.5.1). The findings for Tajikistan 
are in line with Johnes (2002) who shows that gender wage gap in the country is quite 
large in comparison with many other economies.
Several features are worth mentioning. In all countries, both coefficients and covariates 
contribute to the actual evolution of the gender wage gap and their effect is significantly 
different from zero. The largest fraction of the gender wage gap is attributable to the 
differences in coefficients across the whole wage distribution. In some cases, residuals 
also have relative high portion of the total gap. In Serbia, for example, at the bottom 
part of the distribution, the model does not seems to work very well as the residuals 
account for a significantly high portion of the total gap.
For both years and in all four countries, the estimated coefficient effect is significant 
and positive across the entire distribution, suggesting that men are paid more than 
women. The coefficient effect is systematically higher for the 2001 Bulgarian sample 
compared to the 2003 sample, ranging from 0.187 log points in 2001 to 0.141 in 2003 at 
the 10th percentile. In addition, it appears that in both years, women at the bottom part of 
the wage distribution in Bulgaria are subject to less discrimination as the coefficient 
component is much larger at the top end; hence women in high paying jobs suffer from
114 The raw wage gap is sometimes called the unadjusted gap to differentiate it from the conditional (adjusted) gender 
wage gap, which is estimated by taking into account differences between male and female labour market 
characteristics. For example, a gap o f  0.4 at the /-th percentiles is interpreted as one group having a log-wage 40% 
higher than the other at that percentile.
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higher wage gaps than those in the lower-middle portions o f the conditional wage 
distribution. The results are in line with Paci and Reilly (2004), who show that 
discrimination effect in Bulgaria in 2001 appears relatively stable for the 10th and 50th 
percentile but exhibit a tendency to rise at the 90 percentile.
TABLE 7.3
Wage decomposition of changes in parameters o f the distribution
Raw G ap D ecom position o f  changes
Bulgaria________________________________  2001__________________  2003
Percentiles 2001 2003 Changes C oefficients C ovariates R esidual C oefficients Covariates Residual
10th 0.041 0.069 0.028 0.187 -0.129 -0.016 0.141 -0.068 -0.004
(0.0155) (0.0108) (0.0116) (0.0083)
25th 0.208 0.114 -0.094 0.260 -0.090 0.038 0.154 -0.071 0.031
(0.0107) (0.0075) (0.0092) (0.0064)
50th 0.236 0.163 -0.074 0.308 -0.083 0.011 0.208 -0.077 0.032
(0.0092) (0.0066) (0.0101) (0.0068)
75th 0.262 0.186 -0.076 0.318 -0.082 0.026 0.269 -0.077 -0.006
(0.0107) (0.0072) (0.0120) (0.0082)
90th 0.267 0.266 -0.001 0.329 -0.072 0.010 0.320 -0.070 0.016
(0.0160) (0.0108) (0.0158) (0.0108)
Russia 2003 2007 C hanges 2003 2007
10,h 0.241 0.232 -0.009 0.219 -0.036 0.058 0.235 -0.021 0.018
(0.0363) (0.0234) (0.0232) (0.0172)
25th 0.318 0.259 -0.059 0.324 -0.007 0.000 0.273 0.013 -0.028
(0.0223) (0.0172) (0.0185) (0.0121)
50th 0.346 0.310 -0.036 0.320 0.017 0.009 0.273 0.033 0.005
(0.0188) (0.0141) (0.0174) (0.0129)
75th 0.322 0.270 -0.052 0.287 0.034 0.000 0.231 0.034 0.004
(0.0225) (0.0161) (0.0207) (0.0161)
90th 0.279 0.164 -0.114 0.265 0.037 -0.023 0.189 0.027 -0.051
(0.0318) (0.0215) (0.0273) (0.0200)
Tajikistan 2003 2007 C hanges 2003 2007
10th 0.511 0.654 0.143 0.453 0.091 -0.034 0.551 0.217 -0.114
(0.0211) (0.0146) (0.0237) (0.0188)
25th 0.588 0.916 0.329 0.518 0.109 -0.040 0.658 0.255 0.003
(0.0162) (0.0117) (0.0194) (0.0144)
50th 0.629 0.916 0.288 0.571 0.110 -0.052 0.710 0.265 -0.059
(0.0160) (0.0112) (0.0174) (0.0132)
75th 0.847 0.981 0.134 0.649 0.103 0.095 0.733 0.248 -0.001
(0.0216) (0.0146) (0.0197) (0.0138)
90th 0.762 1.055 0.293 0.626 0.095 0.041 0.680 0.329 0.046
(0.0281) (0.0191) (0.0299) (0.0225)
Serbia 2003 2007 Changes 2003 2007
10th 0.163 -0.174 -0.338 0.141 -0.063 0.086 0.001 -0.147 -0.028
(0.0161) (0.0115) (0.0326) (0.0229)
25th 0.130 0.039 -0.091 0.147 -0.056 0.039 0.129 -0.121 0.031
(0.0097) (0.0071) (0.0153) (0.0229)
50th 0.153 0.041 -0.112 0.167 -0.044 0.030 0.148 -0.107 0.000
(0.0087) (0.0065) (0.0113) (0.0078)
75th 0.131 0.065 -0.066 0.143 -0.035 0.023 0.164 -0.103 0.004
(0.0110) (0.0073) (0.0135) (0.0094)
90th 0.204 0.069 -0.135 0.199 -0.027 0.031 0.153 -0.065 -0.019
(0.0187) (0.0129) (0.0209) (0.0149)
N otes: Bootstrapped standard errors in brakets. The differential is calculating by every 5lh percentile. W e present the main percentile 
results. The estimation using the proposed decom position technique takes between 12 to 48 hours for each sample.
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In both years, the counterfactual gap in Bulgaria is wider than the raw gap and this 
reflects the situation where women possess some advantages in characteristics, mainly 
education, as it is often the case in Central European economies115. Specifically, when 
females are more productive, more educated but are paid less than males the coefficient 
effect is greater than the raw gender wage gap. As the gap is getting larger once we 
move towards the top of the distribution, it indicates possible presence of a ‘glass 
ceiling’ in Bulgaria suggesting a barrier to further advancement of women once they 
have attained a certain level of payment. Similarly, the larger ‘unexplained’ component 
than the raw differential in Serbia, especially pronounced in 2007, is in line with 
Kecmanovic (2009), who finds that Serbian women are significantly more endowed 
compared to men. In Tajikistan, the estimated coefficient effects increase in both years 
as one moves from the 10th to the 70th quantile and slightly drops after that, which 
means that in jobs with options for generally higher levels of wages, it is more and more 
difficult for women to get the same wage as that of men. These results are not surprising 
having in mind Tajikistan institutional background and labour market characteristics. 
Nowadays, traditional stereotyping indicating the role of women and men in the Tajik 
society remains widespread, and often causes difficulties for women trying to balance 
professional and family duties116. The influence of Islam has strengthened since the end 
of the Soviet rule, and the general view is that women’s place is in the home has 
remained.
Do endowments explain the gender wage gap? The decomposition results indicate that 
the gender wage differential in Bulgaria, Russia and Serbia is mainly attributed to 
differences in return, that is the ‘male advantage’ and the ‘female disadvantage’ and to a 
lesser extent to the employee’s endowment. The relatively higher unexplained wage 
differential in Russia is in line with Newell and Reilly (2001) results, where they 
conclude that most of the differential in transition countries is not explained by the 
observable characteristics component. In Bulgaria and Serbia, female employees
115 The counterfactual gap, which is lower than the raw gap is found in Albrecht et al. (2003) for Sweden, De la Rica 
et al. (2008) for Spain.
116 In the Soviet period, girls were required to attend school and wom en were encouraged to go on to higher education 
and work outside the home. However, since 1991, poverty and high unemployment have increased the pressure on 
women to marry as early as possible, especially in rural communities. A lso, according to UNICEF Regional Report 
(1999), violence against women and threats against wom en is a major barrier to the empowerment o f  women and 
their equal participation in society.
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actually have more favourable characteristics than do their male counterparts117. For 
instance, Bulgarian women in 2003 have an advantage of nearly 100% at the bottom of 
the distribution with their own endowments compared to with men’s endowments. 
Similar negative covariate effect across the whole earnings distribution was observed 
for Serbia. In Russia, women in 2003 are more ‘endowed’ only at the bottom end of the 
distribution, where the coefficient component o f the gap is much lower as compared to 
the upper tails. However, the estimated covariate effect in Russia changes to positive at 
the top end of the distribution, indicating favourable male characteristics of about 16%. 
Significant positive covariate effect across the whole wage distribution is found in 
Tajikistan, where on average males dominate with their endowment component, and 
this was confirmed by our descriptive statistics118. One interesting findings for 
Tajikistan is that the increased gender raw wage gap in 2007 is due mainly to the 
increased contribution of the covariate effects, which is indication that changes in 
individual observed characteristics tend to increase the wage inequality. For example, in 
2007 at the top end of the distribution, 31% of the raw gap in Tajikistan was due to 
characteristic component whereas in 2003 covariates contributed with only 12%.
To summarise our findings over time, in three of the countries, the estimated coefficient 
effects of the gap are lower in 2007 than those in 2003. In Figure 7.5, we compare by 
country, the estimated differentials for the two time periods. No confidence intervals are 
plotted to avoid surcharging the figure. The gender wage gap in Bulgaria declined by 
more than 25% at the lowest decile, and by less than 3% at the highest decile. The gap 
narrowed considerably at the bottom of the distribution in Serbia. In contrast, the gender 
wage gap in Tajikistan increased between 2003 and 2007 -  by 22% at the bottom of the 
conditional distribution and by 9% at the top end. This is partly due to the increase in 
the observable covariate effect. On average, the gender wage gap narrowed by 23% in 
Bulgaria, 26% in Serbia and 14% in Russia, while it increased on average by 19% in
117 The covariate effect is negative in all percentiles and for both years, which indicates that women are with higher 
endowment component. A  negative observed characteristics effect also shows that changes in the differences between 
men and women in observed characteristics, such as education served to diminish the gap. In other words, additional 
years o f  education, for example, benefit women to improve their relative earnings.
118 W e can see that higher proportion o f  men than women have completed secondary technical and university degree 
(See Table A7.3). In this regard it worth mention that according to Gender Statistics in the Republic o f  Tajikistan, 
fewer girls than boys attended school, particularly after primary school. This is related with the parental fears for their 
daughter’s safety as they mature, and this fear is greater in urban than in rural arrears. Enrolment has also fallen due 
to the rising cost o f  education. Giving the choice o f  education a boy or a girl child, it seems that parents may be more 
willing to invest in a son’s education than a daughter’s (World Bank, 2000).
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Tajikistan. These results point to substantial heterogeneity with regard to the changes in 
the gender wage gap along the distribution over the observed period and the relevance 
of the factors that are responsible for these changes. The increase in educational 
attainment in favour of female workers might contribute to the decline in the gender 
wage gap in Bulgaria, Russia and Serbia. However, very little is known about the 
factors that are responsible for distributional changes as our decomposition technique 
does not identify a separate contribution of the variables. A large part of the changes in 
the gender wage gap remains unexplained.
FIGURE 7.5: Comparing estimated coefficient effects of the gap by years
Gender wage gaps in 2001 and 2003, Bulgaria Gender wage gaps in 2003 and 2007, Russia
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Notes: The differential is calculating by every 5 lh percentile.
Finally, one immediate question that might arise is why there is different degree of 
gender wage differentials among countries. Although we consider human capital and 
work experience as a major determinants of gender pay gap, one possible answer to the 
question is that the degree of gender specific policies and antidiscrimination laws differ
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from country to country. However, the effect of these policies on the earnings depends 
on the effectiveness of the legislations and this is difficult to be captured by our model.
7.6. Conclusions
The main novelty in respect to this Chapter lays in the extension of the Machado and 
Mata (2005) framework for decomposing the gender wage gap and accounting for the 
‘index’ number problem. Applying the method to data from Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia 
and Tajikistan, positive discrimination effect was found across the whole earnings 
distribution, indicating that in all these countries otherwise identical men and women 
receive different returns to their characteristics. Together, changes in personal 
characteristics, coefficient effects as well as residual wage changes, work toward a 
reduction of the gender wage gap in Bulgaria, Russia and Serbia. In contrast, observable 
characteristics change in a way to increase gender wage gap and we conclude that the 
rise in wage inequality in Tajikistan is driven by the increased characteristics effect in 
favour of men.
Despite the existence of legal provisions aimed at gender equality, in all four countries 
men are paid more than women. The estimated differential is not constant along the 
conditional wage distribution and the decomposition method applied, provided more 
informative insight than the decomposition at the mean. The coefficient effect was 
found to be larger at the top of the distribution than at the bottom in both Bulgarian 
samples, which indicates possible presence of a ‘glass ceiling’ effect in the country. The 
magnitude of the coefficient effect in Bulgaria decreased slightly between 2001 and 
2003. In Russia, the changes in the gender wage gap, between 2003 and 2007 have been 
negligible and the gap in 2007 was especially pronounced for the lower paid females. 
The observed positive and significant differential found in Russia was larger in the 
middle of the distribution. The estimated differential for Tajikistan confirmed Johnes 
(2002) findings that the gender wage gap in the country is one of the highest among the 
countries in transition. In the case of Serbia, the gender wage gap has decreased in 2007, 
but the discrimination component of the gap was still pronounced especially at the 
higher part of the wage distribution. However, compared to the rest of the countries 
examined in this Chapter, women in Serbia seemed to fare quite well in terms of their 
relative earnings.
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Very little of the measured wag gap in Bulgaria, Russia and Serbia can be explained by 
the variables used in the model and this is in line with previous findings in the literature. 
The large proportion of the gap in Tajikistan -  some about 80% -  appears to be the 
result of the ‘unexplained’ component, 20% of which may be labelled as female 
disadvantage.
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FIGURE A7.1: Kernel density o f  the wage distribution, Bulgaria, 2001 and 2003
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FIGURE A7.2: Kernel density of the wage distribution, Russia, 2003 and 2007
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FIGURE A7.3: Kernel density of the wage distribution, Tajikistan, 2003 and 2007
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FIGURE A7.4: Kernel density estimates of wage distribution, Serbia, 2003 and 2007
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Note: Density functions estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel estimator; w e apply K olm ogorov-Sm im ov  
test o f  the equality o f  distributions. From the tests it was apparent that the wages across gender do not have 
the same distribution functions.
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FIGURE A7.5: The estimated coefficient effect by countries
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ESSAY THREE
PUBLIC -  PRIVATE WAGE DIFFERENTIAL: 
AN ANALYSIS BASED ON CONDITIONAL WAGE
DISTRIBUTION
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CHAPTER EIGHT
PUBLIC-PRIVATE WAGE DIFFERENTIAL -  THEORETICAL 
REASONS AND DIFFERENT ESTIMATION APPROACHES
8.1. Introduction
Public sector employment accounts for a significant share of total employment and it 
plays an important role in economic performance. It is often considered that public 
sector workers are better paid than private sector workers. The idea that public sector 
workers are overpaid can possibly be attributed to the inelasticity of demand for 
public services, the inflexibility of public sector wages to market conditions, and the 
bargaining power of public sector union. However, it is argued in this Essay that 
looking at the average wages between the public and private sector provides a 
misleading picture. The recent empirical evidence shows that the highest premium 
for public sector employees is found at the lower tail of the earnings distribution than 
at the top where the differential is often negative. Similarly, the findings typically 
show a higher wage premium for women compared to men119.
The empirical findings in this study contribute to the literature in several ways. First, 
as the evidence from transition economies are not sufficiently comprehensive, 
empirical examination of the public-private wage differential in Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Russia and Tajikistan is required. As we have discussed, these countries moved from 
totally centralized economy to a free market economy and this led to dramatic 
increase in the private sector employment. This might indicate a reallocation of 
labour resulting from the new process of wage determination. Second, while most of 
the studies on the public sector wage differential focus only at the mean of the wage 
distribution, we use QR decomposition procedure to analyse the entire conditional 
wage distribution. The differential identified by the proposed analysis accounts for 
important compositional differences between two sectors and allows us to quantify 
the size of the public sector differential at different points in the earnings 
distribution. Third, given that there is a choice being made by workers whether to
119 This literature includes, for instance, Disney and Gosling (1998), Blackaby et al. (1999), Elliott and Bender 
(1997) for UK, M elly (2005) for Germany; Poterba and Rueben (1994) for the U.S.; Mueller (1998) for Canada; 
Lucifora and Meurs (2006) for Italy, France and UK; Bonjour and Gerfin (2001) for Switzerland.
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work in the public or private sector, we allow at the same time for endogeneity of the 
sector choice and for heterogeneous public sector gap at different points of the 
distribution. Finally, we adopt a time-wise decomposition framework in order to 
identify the main factors contributing to the change in the ratio of the Bulgarian and 
Russian public to private sector earnings over time. It was not possible, however, to 
obtain a longer time span of data for each country, as required by the analysis over 
time. Due to a lack of pre-1990 data information for Serbia and Tajikistan, it was not 
possible to perform the time-wise decomposition analysis for these two countries. By 
focusing on two periods, we compare the sector wage differentials before transitional 
reforms (1986 in Bulgaria) or early transition (1994 for Russia) with those in the late 
transition. As far as it is known, the present study is the first that both controls for 
endogeneous sector choice and analyses the public sector pay gap across the 
distribution in the selected transition countires. The empirical analysis will be of 
interest for policy makers, practitioners and in particular those interested in what has 
been happening to the public and private sector workers payment in these countries.
This Chapter provides an overview of the empirical literature related to the public- 
sector wage differential. Section 8.2 explains theoretical background of the public- 
private wage differences, pointing out several factors which might induce differences 
between wage rates in the public and private sector. Section 8.3 discusses the main 
research methodologies used to estimate the differential. Section 8.4 reviews 
previous empirical studies in this field and finally Section 8.5 provides some 
conclusion remarks.
8.2. Theoretical explanations for public-private differential
In the literature, a number of reasons have been given for the existence of earnings 
differentials between public and private sector. First, the public sector organisations 
usually have different aims and are subject to political constraints rather than profit-
1 90 • •maximization . In addition, public sector decision makers could attempt to 
implement an equal pay policy for their own employees -  with the objective of
120 The private sector labour market is one that is generally based on the premise that firms want to be a 
successful as possible and aim to maximise their profit. Profit will be not maximised in the case where firms are 
overcompensating employers for their work and so wages in the private sector generally reflect the value o f  the 
em ployees to firms.
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reducing the degree of wage discrimination elsewhere in the economy (Gregory and 
Borland, 1999). Wages in the public sector may also be used to achieve equity and 
fairness. Second, the institutional environment for wage setting may differ between 
two sectors (Cai and Liu, 2010). There could be an imperfect labour market in the 
public sector. Union density is often higher in the public sector than in the private 
sector (Bender 1998). On the other hand, public sector may be able to pay more since 
wages are only subjected to a price floor because of private sector competition 
(Mueller, 1998). Gunderson (1979) notes that the main difference between the two 
sectors is that the profit constraint on wages is replaced by the ultimate political 
constraints of competing with budget allocations with other interest groups and with 
taxpayers over the size of the government’s budget. He explains that employers 
justify higher pay by having the employees participate in vote-producing activities. 
The author indicates that there is a significant influence of the relatively inelastic 
labour demand curve in the public sector labour market which unions exploit to gain 
higher wages for public sector workers (Bender 1998). Moreover, wages of public 
and private sector employees can differ because they are paid differently and because 
they have different skills or work in different jobs. Public sector workers do 
systematically different jobs from those in the private sector. For example, some jobs 
are often seen as ‘public sector job ’: public administration, nursing, teaching or 
security (police, armed force etc.).
Many studies (Schager, 1993; Katz and Kreuger, 1993) indicate that male low skilled 
worker earned more in the public sector than in the private sector. Although 
unskilled workers in the public sector typically received much higher rates of pay 
than public sector counterparts, as we move up the conditional hierarchy to more 
skilled and highly qualified jobs, the wage advantages slowly declines so that at the 
top of hierarchy public sector workers are much less well paid than their private 
sector counterparts. The wage structure is also much more compressed in the public 
sector than in the private sector (Elliott and Bender, 1997). Moore and Raisian 
(1991) give other reasons for explaining the differential. They explain that the 
premium is due to skill differentials which, in the long-run, should be the only reason 
for wages differential. Other reasons include short run market disequilibria, unions 
taking advantage of the low labour demand elasticity, political action by unions to 
increase demand for public sector goods and relative discrimination.
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Gregory (1990) indicates four reasons for the existence of public sector wages being 
different than private sector wages in Britain. The first is the adherence of the ‘Good 
Employer Obligation’ policy for the past 100 years. The second reason is the 
‘Bargaining Power of Public Sector Unions’. Public sector unions have a very strong 
bargaining position. On the other hand, according Gregory (1990), public sector 
wages may be lower than private sector due to the nature of public service 
employment. Public sector employees often have greater job satisfaction, job 
security, longer holidays, and more generous pensions than their private sector 
counterparts. The reason is that wages could be subject to ‘Government and National 
Economic Policy’. Borjas (2003) states that given the remarkable changes in the 
wage structure that occurred over the past 20 years, it is unlikely that the wage 
structure evolved in similar ways in both sectors, and therefore there could be sizable 
differences in the trend of the public-private sector pay gap for workers in different 
skill groups.
Earnings gap may also reflect differences in the nature o f compensation packages in 
the sectors, with the public sector in former communist countries typically offering 
more fringe benefits. In addition, there are differences in the existing formalized 
agreements between the public and private sector. Civil servants and public 
employees normally enjoy generous benefits. Private sector workers most often 
benefit from pension provisions only if they belong to large firms and different 
formulas, eligibility rules and funding mechanisms determine actual benefits. The 
study by Estrin et al. (1997) show that new private enterprises in Poland provide 
significantly fewer numbers of benefits to employees than state-owned firms. Thus, 
non-wage benefits raise the effective wage paid to the public sector workers. As a 
result, it may force private firms either to provide the adequate social provision or to 
compensate for lower non-wage benefits by paying higher wages (Adamchik and 
Bedi, 2000).
As the theoretical discussion on explanations for public-private wage differential, 
given in this Chapter focuses on what has been observed in western economies, an 
important question is do we necessarily expect the same arguments to apply equally 
to centrally planned economies in their pre-transition stage. They did not operate like 
western labour markets and characteristics of sectors in the case of transition
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economies are different from those common for stable western economies. If in 
stable economies, public sector employee’s decision to work in the public sector is 
explained by relatively generous fringe benefits and job security that the sector 
offers, in the case of transition, most often additional monetary compensations in a 
form of informal payments motivate individuals to work in this sector (Chukmaitova, 
2011).
To summarise, wage differential between the public and private sector may be 
explained by several factors. On the one hand, the occupational composition of the 
public and private sector workforce differs. On the other hand, the distinction 
between both sectors lies in the different use of the incentive-based payments. 
Generally, public sector provides more non-wage benefits, such as better job 
protection or lengthier paid vacations, and better pension schemes. Finally, centrally 
planned market structure and wage settlements are important elements. While wages 
in the private sector are based on profit considerations, wages in the public sector are 
decided by the government.
8.3. Different estimation approaches
A variety of approaches to compare earnings of individual workers in the public and 
private sector have been applied. Several studies, such as Ehrenberg and Goldstein 
(1975), Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1983), Ehrenberg and Smith (1981) and Gyourko 
and Tracy (1988), include a measure of taxes or government ability to pay in the 
wage equation. A similar argument could be made with the inclusion of grants from 
central to local governments as in Ashenfelter (1977). Other studies use the effect of 
unions on public sector wages, although there is very little formal modelling of the 
effects of public sector union on wages. Some studies utilise occupation-level or 
individual level data to examine differences in average earnings between public and 
private sector workers at a particular point in time. Other studies use the same 
occupational-level data, but have focused on changes over time in relative earnings 
of public and private sector employees. One approach is to include dummy variables 
for worker’s sector of employment in the earnings regression. The problem with this 
method is that it models the effect o f sector as an ‘intercept’ effect -  returns to other
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productivity related characteristics and job attributes are restricted to be equal across 
sectors.
An alternative approach involves estimating separate earnings regression for public 
and private sector employees and decomposing the wage differential into effects of 
differences in average worker characteristics and job attributes between sectors, and 
differences in the returns to worker characteristics and job attributes between sectors. 
However, the allocation of workers to the public or private sector may not 
necessarily be exogenous to the wage formation process. There is a choice that 
workers have to make whether to work in the public sector or in the private sector. A 
worker will choose to be in the public or private sector depending on the greatest 
advantage earned in each of these sectors. More educated individuals prefer to work 
in the private sector, where their performance and skills are better rewarded 
(Adamchik and Bedi (2000) show this for Poland). More experienced individuals 
prefer public sector employment, as documented by Falaris (2004) for Bulgaria. 
Women may also prefer to work in the public sector, where flexibility in hours 
worked is higher. Therefore, the wage equation is not independent of the selection 
(sectoral choice) process (Choudhury, 1994). This is the well documented self­
selection issue121 that has been treated in the public-private sector wage differential 
literature by Van Ophem (1993) and Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993), and Dustmann 
and van Soest (1998). The econometric solution to this problem is to estimate a 
sector choice equation together with the wage equations relating to each sector.
To choose appropriate identifying variable the literature attempts to ascertain 
whether certain characteristics of individual employees increase the probability that 
they will seek employment in the public sector. Bender and Elliott (1997) argue that 
identification of the selection equation for sector of employment may be difficult to 
achieve. To identify the selection equation most studies of worker’s choice of sector 
of employment have used a variable such as age or education and such variables are 
more appropriate as explanatory variables in the earnings regression. The probability 
to work in the public sector increases with experience and education. Most authors 
simply use the same human capital variables in the wage equation and in the sector
121 This problem is very similar to the one raised by Heckman (1976) for w om en’s wage equation, where 
participation in the labour market is assumed to depend on their reservation wage.
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choice equation, sometimes with arbitrary exclusion restrictions. Others use parent’s 
occupational status or whether father was a civil servant or not, motivating that child 
learns through imitation of adults living in their neighbourhood (Melly, 2006). 
Falaris (2004) use as an instrument the amount of land received as a part of 
Bulgaria’s property restitution programme. Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) use the 
industry of pre-1992 employment, the number of children and marital status as 
instruments in the selection equation. Heitmueller (2004) uses union perception as 
identification in the sector choice equation. In most studies, the data is not rich 
enough to provide appropriate instruments and identification assumptions are 
sometimes doubtful. One important non-observable sector choice variable is 
individual risk aversion. A recent study by Pfeiffer (2008) based on German data 
show more risk adverse individuals seek public employment and that such risk taking 
is rewarded with higher payment in the private but not in the public sector. Bargain 
and Melly (2008) show that public sector premium or penalties are much smaller 
when correcting for selection. Moreover, their results indicate that across quantiles, 
the usual result that public sector compresses the wage distribution partly disappears 
when controlling for selection. Dustmann and Van Soest (1998) conclude that 
correcting for non-random selection is important, but only useful if appropriate 
instrumental variables are available.
However, there is a lack of consensus in the literature on the role that sample 
selection effects might have on sector wage gap estimates. For instance, Choudhury 
(1994) and Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993) show the selection terms for choice of 
sector to be insignificant in the private sector wage equation and significant in the 
public sector equation, whereas Borland et a l (1998) find selection to be important 
only for female private sector employment. Some other authors argue that controlling 
for one type of selection in the earnings equation only and ignoring non-labour force 
participants may still lead to biased estimates (Co et al., 1999). Additionally, 
findings from decomposition analysis applying sample selection correction will be 
sensitive to the interpretation of the role of the selectivity term in the wage equation. 
Controlling for selection, Disney and Gosling (2003) find that public sector premium 
becomes insignificant for men and remains positive for women. More educated men 
seem to select themselves into the public sector on some negative characteristics, as 
cross-section estimates of the public pay gap is negative and becomes positive once
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selection is controlled for (Vinay and Turon, 2007). In these studies, identification of 
the public wage premium in the presence of non-random selection is achieved with 
either functional form assumptions or with some instrumental variable procedure 
appealing to variables such as family background or variations in public sector status 
arising from privatisation (Disney and Gosling, 2003) as instruments for selection 
into the public sector. Stelcner et a l  (1989), Adamchik and Bedi (2000) and 
Heitmuller (2004) use an endogenous switching regression model which allows 
controlling for the possible sample selection bias. Results of these estimations show 
that selection bias between working and not working is not an issue, but the selection 
of workers between public and private employment is not random (Leping, 2006).
A second set of issues related to findings from decomposition is that estimated size 
o f the public sector wage premium appears to be sensitive to the number and type of 
explanatory variables included in earnings equation. Increasing the number of 
explanatory variables in the wage regression generally increase the proportion of the 
raw wage differential between public and private sector that is attributed to 
differences in worker characteristics, and reduces the size of the public sector wage 
premium due to differences in returns between sectors (Bender and Elliott, 1997).
The size of the public sector wage premium also is affected by whether particular 
explanatory variables are included in the earnings regression. Some studies indicate 
that including establishment size as an explanatory variable in the earning regression 
reduces the estimated size of the public sector wage premium122. Moulton (1990) and 
Poterba and Rueben (1999) find that the size of the public sector wage premium is 
sensitive to whether detailed controls for worker’s occupational classification are 
included in the earnings regression.
Another type of problem arises where employees’ earnings are affected by the 
unobserved job attributes. The effect of differences in unobserved job attributes 
between sectors will be captured by differences in the intercept terms in the earnings 
regression. Where compensating payments for job attributes differ between sectors, 
estimates of the extent of over-payment of public sector employees will be biased
122 See Belman and Hey wood, 1990, 1993.
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(Gregory and Borland, 1999). Therefore it is necessary to use a method of controlling 
for differences in the productivity related characteristics and job attributes of public 
and private sector employees.
8.4. Previous studies
8.4.1. Previous studies in transition countries
The public-private wage differential has been investigated across different countries 
and time periods. However, much less is known about the public wage setting 
behaviour in the case of transition countries123. The sector wage differential in 
transition countries have been estimated by Adamchik and Bedi (2000), Reilly 
(2003), Jurada (2003), and Leping (2006). Existing evidence on sector differential is 
provided by Rutkowski (1996), Coricelli et al. (1995) in Poland, Lokshin and 
Jovanovic (2003) in Yugoslavia, Falaris (2004) in Bulgaria, Voinea and Mihaescu 
(2012) in Romania. Adamchik and Bedi (2000) find private sector wage advantage in 
Poland, which is particularly pronounced at university level. For males, they observe 
positive selection in both public and private sectors. Voinea and Mihaescu (2012) 
find that compared to the private sector, public sector workers in Romania earn, on 
average, about 10% more. A possible explanation according the latter authors is the 
higher prevalence of the informal economy in the private sector. Workers in the 
private sector receive informal payments -  twice as many employees are paid with 
the minimum wage in the private sector compared to the public sector. Disney (2007) 
indicates that in transition economies, where a public sector with regulated pay and 
unregulated private sector co-exist, the public pay effect may be negative. He also 
adds that an essential difficulty in many transition studies of this kind is that 
household or labour force survey data used to investigate pay structure are 
disproportionately collected from households that are predominantly formal sector or 
salaried (tax-paying) earners.
In the case of Bulgaria, Falaris (2004) treats the sector o f employment as endogenous 
and corrects for selectivity in the wage equation. He finds evidence of positive 
selection in the public sector wage equations for men and women in 1995 but 
negative selectivity in the private sector wage equation for women. The author
123 For a survey in developing countries see Van der Gaag et al. (1988).
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concludes that men and women who work in the public sector receive highest 
financial benefit, but private sector employed women suffer an implied wage penalty. 
Falaris (2004) also states that in the private sector women perform mostly low skill 
work requiring neither experience nor schooling; however women receive positive 
returns to both experience and schooling in the public sector.
Estimating public-private wage differential in Estonia, Leping (2006) finds negative 
differential during the early transition, which substantially decreased over time. The 
author shows that employees with low potential wages tend to gain more from 
working in the public sector compared to workers with high potential wages. Women 
in Estonia also appear to benefit more from working in the public sector than men. 
Furthermore, Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2005) find that public sector 
employees in Ukraine are significantly underpaid compared to workers in the private 
sector. The average wage gap is 24%-32% and is largest (up to 60%) among the most 
productive and highly paid workers. Moreover, the gap has not diminished in the 
period 1997-2003 despite similar rates of voluntary separations and labour mobility 
in sectors.
Reilly (2000) provides evidence for private sector premium in Serbia using Yugoslav 
Labour Force Survey data from 1995 to 2000 for male employees. The results 
suggest that the hourly wage premium for a private sector job at the median of the 
conditional wage distribution is over 20% in 1995, not significantly different from 
zero in 1996, 1997 and 1999, and nearly 24% in 1998. The QR estimates show 17% 
premium for those at the median and almost 70% premium for private workers at the 
top of distribution. Similarly, Lokshin and Jovanovic (2003) find on average private 
sector premium of 9.4% for males and 4% for females in the former Yugoslavia. 
Their explanation is that part of this gap may be offset by the benefits public sector 
employees receive. Lausev (2009) studies public-private wage differentials in Serbia 
over the period of transition from 1995 to 2006. The author finds that earnings are 
more equally distributed in the public sector than in the private sector. He finds 
significant private sector premium across the distribution from 1998 to 2002. 
However, that initially growing private sector markup disparity over the period tends 
to transfer into public sector wage premium. Ognjenovic (2011) shows that with 
advance of the transition, the public sector in Serbia generates wage premium for
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those who work in that sector compared to the employed in the private sector. The 
public sector overpaid both men and women and the estimated wage premium for 
women is lower compared to that for men (22.3% and 25.4% respectively). The only 
group of workers who are penalized for working in the public sector are those with 
higher education.
In the case of Russia, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) investigate wage differentials 
between the state and the private sector in the city of Moscow in 1997. They show 
that workers in private sector earn 16% higher wages than workers in the state sector. 
Wage structure differs across the sectors for both genders. The private sector wage 
premium for women is higher than for men. In addition, the probability of 
employment in private sector decreases with age and tenure. Gimpelson and 
Lukiyanova (2009) show that for the 2000-2004 period wages in public sector are on 
average 40% lower than in the private sector. Very few studies investigate the 
public-private sector over time. There are some evidence of widening wage gap 
between the public and private sectors during the transition period in Hungary and 
other CEE countries (Kertesi and Kollo, 2002 and Keane and Prasad, 2001).
Overall, the evidence from transition are mixed, with a wage premium in favour of 
the private sector (Adamchick and Bedi, 2000; Leping, 2006), or wage premium for 
the public sector workers (Falaris, 2004, Voinea and Mihaescu, 2012 and 
Ognjenovic, 2011). The literature review also supports the fact that there are very 
few studies which exclusively investigate the public-private wage gap in Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan, and there is none for Tajikistan. The need to conduct a 
comprehensive research about the public sector wage differential taking the cross­
country perspective is therefore quite important.
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8.4.2. Previous studies in Western countries
It is interesting to contrast how the situation we have described for the transition 
countries compares with those in some western economies, and more specifically 
with that in United Kingdom (UK). A common finding in the UK is that public 
sector workers typically earn more than comparable workers in the private sector. 
Most studies in the UK use two main data sources: the New Earning Survey (NES) 
available since 1970 and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) available from 
1991 onwards124. Earlier studies by Elliott and Murphy (1987), Gregory (1990) and 
Elliott and Duffus (1996) have used NES data to track movements in the relative pay 
of employees in the public and private sectors. Distinguishing between manual and 
non-manual workers, public corporations and the private sector, Elliott and Murphy 
(1987) establish that male manual workers earned pay premiums of up to 20% and 
female manual workers are paid penalties of up to 9%. Non-manual males were close 
to parity or had marginal penalties whereas equivalent females sustained penalties of 
up to 20% (Bender and Elliott, 1997).
Research in the mid-1980s and early 1990s show the importance of breaking down 
the public sector into subsectors of central and local government and public 
corporations because of the changing composition of some parts of the public sector, 
particularly in the UK. Foster et al. (1984) show that in the UK since the 1970s, 
public corporations have had the highest wages, while central and local government 
wages are found to be very volatile. Gregory (1990) uses NES data, covering a 
similar period (1970 to 1982) and splits the public sector into the same three groups 
(central government, local government and public corporations). The author does not 
control for age and occupational composition and shows quite different results -  with 
all groups earnings pay premium except men in manual occupations in central and 
local government who sustained pay penalties of 6.8% and 8.3% respectively. By 
looking at the differential over time, it becomes smaller, while there is little evidence 
of this with the public corporation-private sector premium. Rees and Shah (1995) 
using General Household Survey (GHS), find that for both males and females the 
public sector wage differential is positive. The authors decompose the positive wage 
differences into pay premiums and worker characteristics (education, age, job tenure,
124 Note that the N ew  Earnings Survey was replaced by the Annual Survey o f  Hours and Earnings in 2004.
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health, and marital status and pension provisions). They conclude that male 
differential is due to the greater productive characteristics of public sector male 
workers. Although the pay premium is positive for all groups, the implication is that 
men in the public sector could raise their wages by switching employment to the 
private sector, but women doing the same would lose around 30% of their current 
pay (Allington and Morgan, 2002). Rees and Shah (1995) also find substantial 
changes in the wage structure in both sectors over time, partially explaining the wide 
variation in the estimated decomposition.
The second GHS study by Elliott et a l  (1996) indicates a substantial female 
differential of 17.7 % but the male differential is now revealed smaller at 4.1 %. 
Study by Potebra and Rueben (1999), and Mueller (1998) show that wage 
distributions are compressed in the public sector and public sector workers enjoyed a 
wage premium at the lower tail of the distribution, but a wage penalty at the upper 
tail. Elliott and Duffus (1996) analyse changes in the relative pay of public sector 
employees over the period 1970 to 1992. The study finds a considerable dispersion in 
the earnings growth of those occupations, and despite the substantial real earnings 
growth enjoyed by some of the occupations over the period, the pay of almost all 
public sector groups declined relative to that of the private sector over the period 
1980 to 1990.
Bender and Elliott (1997) use the NES and the BHPS to investigate the pay 
differential across the public and private sector in UK over the period 1991 to 1994. 
They conclude that there is a divergence between return to sector-specific 
occupational characteristics. They also find evidence that educational and regional 
returns become more similar between two sectors over the period. This narrowing 
seems likely to be due, in part, to the reforms in wage settings in some parts o f the 
public sector but it is also due to developments in the private sector, such as the sharp 
narrowing of regional wage differences in that sector. The authors conclude that by 
the end of the examined period, public sector workers are on average ‘overpaid’ 
relative to similarly qualified private sector workers.
Bender (2003) estimates separate wage equations for public and private sector 
distinguishing males and females, and taking into account the possible sample
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selection due to the sector choice of employees. A decomposition technique based on 
Belman and Heywood (1993) is applied that takes differences in wage distribution 
into account. Bender (2003) finds that males at the lower end of the public sector pay 
distribution are better off than their private counterparts whilst high-paid private 
sectors males earn more than high-paid public employees. Those female public- 
sector workers who are at the low end of the distribution are paid less than similarly 
placed private sector females. Moreover, much of the difference in average wages is 
due to differences in returns rather than characteristics. This is in contrast to Rees 
and Shah (1995) findings.
Further extension in the literature is the use of QR methods to examine whether 
public sector pay ‘premia’ or ‘penalties’ differ across the sector earnings distribution. 
A series o f papers for the UK have used QR approach to explore the earnings gap 
across the distribution (Disney and Gosling, 1998; Blackaby et al., 1999; Yu et al., 
2005; Lucifora and Meurs, 2006). It is often concluded that the public sector pay 
distribution is more compressed than the private sector pay distribution, and this 
should lead naturally to QR methods finding different penalties or premia across the 
distribution (Disney, 2007).
In a study covering the period 1991 to 1995, Disney and Gosling (1998) investigate 
the benefits that public sector workers with different educational qualifications might 
expect from switching employment to the private sector. Using GHS and NES data, 
they find that most male public service groups would earn more. Comparing 
percentile pay for different groups of male and female workers in the public and 
private sector, they conclude that the top 25% of male graduates in the public sector 
earned a pay premium while the reminder experienced penalties and would have 
been much better off switching to the private sector. Blackaby et a l (1999) use 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) data to consider the distribution of public sector pay for 
the period 1993 to 1995. They find positive and only slightly decreasing public 
sector premium along the entire wage distribution for both males and females. 
Specifically, the percentile pay differential spreads of 1.5% to -1.9% for men and
th3.3% to 0.1% for women. Men in the top two pay percentiles and women in the 50 , 
70th and 80th pay percentiles all paid penalties by remaining in the public sector.
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Study by Yu et al. (2005) shows that after controlling for characteristics associated 
with productivity, wages are higher for well paid employees in the private sector and 
vice versa for the lowly paid in the public sector. Mean regression results indicates 
that the mean return to working in the public sector is positive or the average wage 
rate is higher among public sector workers. Yu et al. (2005) results show that the 
effect of public sector employment is large and positive at lower quantiles (above 10
iL
% for the 10 quantile) and still generally positive at the median, but it is negative at
ththe 90 quantile. The wage distribution is much more compressed among public 
sector workers: low wages (i.e. at the lowest decile) are higher in the public sector, 
whereas high wages (i.e. at the highest decile) are lower in the public sector 
compared to the private sector (Yu et a l,  2005). The authors show that on average, 
public sector workers are better paid than private sector workers, but at the same 
time, the chances of obtaining a high pay are higher in the private sector: a high- 
wage employees in the public sector may be able to get a better pay in the private 
sector.
Comparing the public sector pay gap across Britain, France and Italy, Lucifora and 
Meurs (2006) conclude that differential is sensitive to the choice of quantile, which 
reject the hypothesis of constant wage differential and that the pattern of the 
premium varies with both gender and skill. The wage gap estimates show that female 
are better off being in the public sector, particularly at the lowest deciles, whilst the 
opposite is true for men at the highest deciles. Lucifora and Meurs (2006) argue that 
differences in unobserved characteristics may be more important for these employees 
and conclude that the Tow floor effects’ is what distinguishes private sector pay of 
skilled women in Britain.
Among more recent studies focusing on the European context, Portugal and Centeno 
(2001) use the 1995 wave of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to 
compare public-private wage differential in the European Union member countries. 
The authors find that the wage gap is wider in Portugal, Ireland, Luxemburg, Spain 
and Italy. By contrast, in Denmark, Belgium, Germany and Austria, the differential 
turns out slightly negative.
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8.5. Summary and conclusions
In this Chapter, we have described the theoretical explanations for the differences 
between the wages in the public and private sector. We have reviewed the empirical 
literature related to the earnings differential between public and private sector. The 
main findings from the reviewed studies can be summarised as follows:
• The studies that compare the average earnings outcomes in the public and private 
sectors generally find positive wage differential for the public sector employees.
• Most recent research has concentrated upon the nature and shape of the public 
sector wage distribution and has found a premium associated with public sector 
employment in the lower tail of the wage distribution.
• There is consensus of findings in the Western literature that there is a public sector 
wage premium but it differes between men and women i.e. public sector workers 
receive returns to their productivity and job-related characteristics which are 
associated with higher earnings premium, or on average, civil servant earn more than 
comparable workers in the private sector. The premium varies across the earnings 
distribution, and it is sensitive to both specification and choice o f econometris 
procedure.
• Research on the public-private wage differential in transition countries is rather 
limited and in contrast to the Western literature the findings are mixed. The existing 
empirical studies highlighted different patterns albeit from diffemet countries and 
different time periods, with a wage premium in favour of the private sector after 
economic liberalization (Adamchick and Bedi, 2000; Leping, 2006), or wage 
premium for the public sector workers (Falaris, 2004 and Voinea and Mihaescu, 
2012). The evidence from the QR shows that there is a negative wage differential for 
the higher quantiles, but not significant wage difference for the lower quantiles. 
However, with the advance of transition, the public sector generates wage premium 
compared to the employed in the private sector (Ognjenovic, 2011).
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• The earlier studies ignore the potential source of bias that could arise from selection 
process between sectors. However, there is a lack of consensus in the literature on 
the role that sample selection effects might have on the sector wage gap estimates. 
Bargain and Melly (2008) show that public sector premium or penalties are much 
smaller when correcting for selection. Disney and Gosling (2003) confirm that public 
sector premium becomes insignificant for men and remains positive for women after 
the selection is controlled for. Hyder and Reilly (2005) conclude that the differential 
based on correcting for endogenous sector choice provide a few insights on the 
magnitude of the public sector premium across the distribution. According to 
Dustman and Van Soest (1998) correcting for non-random selection is important, but 
it is only useful if appropriate identifying variable is available.
• Relatively few empirical studies have investigated changes in the public-private 
wage differential over time. In particular, articles for transition countries are 
contradictory and do not provide sufficient evidence on how transition process has 
affected public-private wage differentials.
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CHAPTER NINE
PUBLIC-PRIVATE WAGE DIFFERENTIAL - 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON CONDITIONAL WAGE
DISTRIBUTION
9.1. Introduction
In the context of transition economies, the dramatic economic changes raised a 
number of issues on the direction toward which the two sectors were moving. The 
transition led to a marked decrease in both output and employment in the public 
sector. One major aspect of the economic reforms was to encourage development of 
a non-state sector in the economy. Various forms of non-public ownership such as 
private-owned, joint-venture, foreign-invested, share-holding and self-employed 
became alternatives to former state-owned companies (Demurger et a l,  2010). There 
was a huge amount of restructuring of employment by industrial sector in medium 
and large enterprises in the early 1990s (Sorm and Terrell, 2000). In the Czech 
Republic for example, industry (i.e., manufacturing plus utilities) shed about one- 
fifth of its workforce by 1993 and another 10% between 1993 and 1998125 (Ham, 
2000). Employment grew rapidly in construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotels 
and restaurants. The expansion of the private sector ownership created new job 
opportunities. During such transformation, earnings in the private sector can be 
expected to be higher. However, pushed into the informal sphere of the economy, 
private sector in most transition countries, effectively avoided the wage regulating 
provisions (Jovanovic and Lokshin, 2004).
The motivation for this study is to complement previous research on public-private 
wage differentials in transition countries and to extend the analysis by providing 
empirical evidence on the evolution of the public-private pay gap across the 
distribution and over time. We use decomposition framework applied to the QR 
estimates to answer the question of whether employees in the public sector in
125 By comparison, the net declines in the stock o f  jobs in these sectors over a similar period, 1994 to 1997, were 
much smaller in Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland and Romania. (Faggio and Konings,1999).
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Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan fare better than those who stayed in the 
private sector. Given the fact, that there is a choice being made by workers whether 
to work in the public or private sector, the endogenous sector choice is considered. 
We also analyse what has been happening to the public sector hourly wage 
differential at different points in the conditional earnings distribution over time by 
providing further evidence from Bulgaria and Russia. The main contribution in this 
Chapter is correcting for endogenous sector choice considering the entire wage 
distribution.
The structure of the rest o f this Chapter is as follows. Section 9.2 looks at the public 
and private sector employment and earnings in the countries of interest. Section 9.3 
describes the data and in Section 9.4 the econometric methodology is presented. 
Section 9.5 reports the main empirical findings and finally the conclusions and some 
policy implications are given in Section 9.6.
9.2. Public and private sector employment and wages
We have already discussed that one important conceptual point we should bear in 
mind in assessing developments in labour relations over the region is that in most 
transition countries there was an enormous change in the ownership structure of 
enterprises and organization which led to decline in the share of total employment 
taken by the public sector. The changing patterns in the labour markets included a 
great number of people becoming self-employed after losing their jobs and the 
growing informal sector jobs. The evolution of the private sector was a result o f two 
processes -  privatization, by which formerly state owned enterprises were 
transformed into private ownership and creation of completely new firms. Although 
the size of the private sector has expanded quite rapidly in most transition countries, 
this is not true in the case such as Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The 
private sector contribution in Bulgaria and Tajikistan for example, were only 10% of 
1990 GDP, much lower as compared to other countries such as Poland and Hungary 
(see Figure 9.1). Salaries and working conditions within public services were 
allowed to deteriorate in the early 1990s (Standing, 1997). Thus, the pertinent 
question that needs to be addressed is whether there are wage differential between
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the public and private sectors in selected countries and what the implications of these 
differences are.
FIGURE 9.1: Private sector as % of GDP 1990
30
Source: World D evelopm ent Indicators (2000) The W orld Bank.
9.2.1. Bulgaria
To better understand institutional setting in Bulgaria, we briefly discuss the selection 
of workers into the public sector and how wages are formally settled in both sectors. 
Bargain and Melly (2008) argue that structural differences between sectors may not 
necessarily translate into pay level differences. In general, the system of wage 
formation in Bulgaria is underpinned by several factors like legislation, sector 
collective bargaining and supplementary company bargaining, the labour market and 
decisions of company management (Ribarova, 2009). The most important issues 
subject to negotiation, such as the minimum wage, the average wage in the public 
sector and the mechanisms of wage setting and determination are discussed at 
national level and can consequently be finalized at the branch or at the regional level. 
Wages are completely centrally set in the activities of the public sector and are 
entirely subsidized by the state budget (Garibaldi et al., 2001a). Recruitment for 
public sector occupations in Bulgaria is decentralised and is based on examinations. 
Wages in the public sector consists of two parts -  basic and additional. The basic 
salary is calculated on the basis of the officiaTs duties. The appointment body 
defines the wage levels of the basic remuneration of the civil servant taking into
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account the job level and the evaluation for the individual fulfilment of the 
obligations after the last attestation. A wage increasing mechanism exists and is 
based on results of the activity. For the employees under the labour contract some 
elements of additional pay are negotiated (seniority, overtime work). Some bonuses 
are awarded because of difficult or dangerous working conditions (Mihaylova,
2008).
In the private sector, no form of collective bargaining is envisaged and wages tend to 
be set at the firm level (EFT, 2000). In addition, market forces have determined 
private sector payment in Bulgaria. Wages in the private sector showed more 
variation than in the public sector. Although private sector firms tend to pay higher 
wages than those in public sector, higher wages in the private sector were offset by 
lower levels of bonuses and non-wage benefits. Employment in the public sector 
yields at least the minimum wage, whereas reported private-sector wages suggested 
an average monthly income below the minimum wage (Beleva et al., 1995).
As already discussed, after the transition started wages in the state sector were no 
longer determined centrally, rather they were influenced by negotiations between the 
emerging independent labour unions, employers and the government (Falaris, 2004). 
Jones and Simon (2005) hypothesize that non-competitive forces influenced wage 
determination process during the planning period. These forces operated through 
various channels at industry, firm, and regional levels. Based on the Stalinist model 
of development, with its bias towards heavy industry, there might be industry wage 
effects. Moreover, coalitions of managers and workers were especially strong in the 
biggest firms so that their political influence should translate into a firm-size wage 
premium. Wages in sectors, such as light industry, trade, agriculture and public 
services, tended to be low and even lower in smaller firms (Jones and Simon, 2005). 
The last authors also argue that individual differences in human capital in Bulgaria 
were not expected to play a major role in accounting for wage differences during the 
planning period and because wages were fixed centrally, employees in more skilled 
occupations might receive lower wages.
Bulgaria lagged behind most other Eastern European countries in privatisation. Since 
1991, the country drafted a series of ambitious privatisation programmes and liberal
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laws for foreign investment. Privatisation was pursued along three separate lines: 
restitution of land and urban property to former owners; cash sales of assets and mass 
(voucher) privatisation. Bulgaria was actually among the first o f the Central and 
Eastern European countries to adopt legislation to attract foreign investors. The Law 
on Foreign Investment, passed in 1991, was among the most liberal in the region, 
providing national status to all foreign investors, allowing for 100% foreign 
ownership, setting very low barriers and offering easy registration. However, as of 
mid-1996, per capita foreign investment in Bulgaria was less than 6% of that in 
Hungary and 12% of that in Czech Republic, and it was less than in Albania and 
Romania (OECD, 1997). The main reason for the low levels of foreign investments 
was the poor infrastructure and communications. Bulgaria represented a small 
domestic market with limited endowments of natural resources. Land restitution was 
problematic and controversial. According to the National Statistics Institute (NSI) 
data, in 1996 only 18% of the land was officially returned to the owners. An 
unusually high degree of political instability was another important problem for the 
privatisation process in Bulgaria.
In the early years of transition and especially in the communist period, the private 
sector in Bulgaria consisted primarily of small firms. Near the end of the period of 
central planning, the private sector employed only 6.5% of the workforce which 
increased to 20% in 1992 (Beleva et al., 1995). After the crisis of 1996 and 1997, 
stabilization and mass privatization, the private sector in Bulgaria became a larger 
part of the economy (Falaris, 2004). There was evidence of emergence of significant 
concentration of ownership in individual Bulgarian firms (Jones and Klinedinst, 
2006). At the end of 1996, 313 547 private firms were registered versus 20 177 in the 
public sector. Approximately 61% of all private firms were in the trade industry 
(OECD, 1997). There was a massive structural change in the relative proportion of 
public and private sector employment as shown in Figure 9.2 and Table 9.1. 
Employment in the public sector decreased from 81% in 1986 to 25% in 2008. 
Throughout the period 1986 to 2008 public sector employment dropped by 69%. 
Similarly, employment in private sector rose from 19% in 1986 to 75% in 2008 (see 
Figure 9.2). The huge restructuring and mass privatization process in public 
enterprises during the transition might have caused differences in the growth rates of 
public and private sector wages. Therefore, we could expect that the transition
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process in Bulgaria may have had an influence on the public-private wage 
differential.
FIGURE 9.2: Employment as % of total, by sectors in Bulgaria, 1986-2008
90%
1986 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
■ Public Private
Source: Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (N SI) and authors own calculations for 1986.
The decline in the public sector employment was larger for men than for women. 
Between 1993 and 2006 employment in the public sector dropped from nearly 80% 
to 33% for women and from 75% to 23% for men. Generally, women in Bulgaria 
have a higher share of the public sector employment than that of men (see Table 9.1).
TABLE 9.1: Public and private sector employment by gender in Bulgaria
M ales 
Public Private
Females 
Public Private
1993 75.1 24.7 80.1 19.8
1995 67.2 32.5 75.1 24.6
2000 41.8 57.7 49.9 49.6
2001 37.2 62.3 43.1 56.3
2002 33.4 66.0 39.8 59.9
2003 31.6 68.0 38.0 61.7
2004 27.8 71.9 34.8 65.0
2005 25.3 74.4 33.3 66.6
2006 23.1 76.9 32.8 67.2
Source: UNECE Statistical D ivision Database.
Notes: Percent o f  corresponding total for both sectors. The public 
sector covers all sub-sectors o f  general government (m ainly central, 
state and local government units, together with social security funds 
imposed and controlled by those units) and public corporations, i.e. 
corporations which are subject to control by government units (usually 
defined by the government ow ning the majority o f  shares). The 
private sector covers private corporations (including those in foreign 
control), households, and non-profit institutions serving households.
The massive labour shedding, outlined above, was partly associated with reallocation 
of labour across industries and with the privatization process. As shown in Table 9.2, 
with the exception of financial services, until 1992 reduction in employment was
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sizeable across sectors. Employment dynamics by sector started to be more 
diversified in 1993. While employment decline in industry and construction 
continued throughout the observed period, job gains were registered in most service 
sectors and agriculture which was due to the land reform in the country (Garibaldi et 
al., 2001a).
TABLE 9.2: Distribution of employment growth by industry: 1986-19961
Percentage change 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Industry -9.0 -17.9 -13.2 -8.3 -3.7 -2.2 - 1.2
Construction -6.8 -25.0 -19.1 2.3 -8.1 -2.4 -5.6
Agriculture -6.8 -7.6 -0.3 3.2 5.7 4.3 0.2
Forestry - 11.1 -22.0 -0.9 -17.1 -7.0 -0.2 8.9
Transport -2.1 -7.8 -13.3 1.9 -4.3 9.3 -2.0
Communications 2.6 -0.7 - 1.8 1.1 0.2 1.8 2.8
Trade -5.4 -8.0 -4.0 0.9 11.1 -3.3 -0.1
Others2 14.8 -4.9 - 1.6 13.4 5.5 6.5 35.3
Public utilities -5.1 - 12.6 -15.0 -3.2 14.4 8.0 9.2
Science -6.6 -25.8 -22.0 -30.7 -16.9 -9.7 -8.4
Education -1.5 -1.7 -1.9 -0.1 -3.0 -0.6 1.1
Arts 3.6 -18.6 - 10.6 20.8 -0.7 34.0 1.5
Health care 3.0 -6.3 -1.5 - 1.8 -2.6 0.5 2.2
Finance -3.7 10.0 29.8 5.1 19.4 16.0 1.1
Government - 10.1 -7.4 2.6 29.7 12.1 1.1 1.5
Others3 - 11.0 -37.1 -31.4 7.4 -28.7 37.9 -26.0
Total -6.1 -13.0 -8.1 - 1.6 0.6 1.3 0.1
Coefficient o f  variation 1.1 0.8 1.5 9.0 15.9 8.2 -
Source: Bulgarian Authorities.
Notes: 1 The classification o f  em ploym ent by sectors was changed in 1997 to the NACE. 
2 Refers to restaurants and hotels . 3 Refers to local community services.
The distribution of real wages by sectors provides some further lights on the dynamic 
behaviour of the Bulgarian economy. As we already discussed in Chapter 3, Section
3.2, real wages were found to have significantly declined. The real wages in 1998 
reached 40% of their level in 1989, with a cumulative fall of 60% (Garibaldi et al, 
2001b). Changes in the real wages were mainly due to inflation shocks in particular in 
1996-1997 (see Figure 9.3). After the strong erosion in 1996-1997 there was an increase 
in the real wages with about 52%. The positive trend was a result of changes in the wage 
policy from restrictive to simulating (significant increase of the minimum wage, gradual 
increase of salaries in the budget sphere, introduction of the Currency Board in 1997, 
which decreased the inflation below 10%, and the economic growth (annually 4-6%)). 
Whereas workers employed in the communication sector continued to enjoy the 
highest wages across sectors in 1999, the real wages in the service sector experienced 
dramatic downward shift between 1996 and 1998 (see Table 9.3).
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FIGURE 9.3: Real wage dynamics in Bulgaria, 1995-2006, Index 1995=100
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Source: Statistical Yearbook, NSI
TABLE 9.3: Real wages by sector in Bulgaria, 1991-1999
In B u lgarian  levs 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
A gricu lture and forestry 177 176 158 1 2 2 116 84 80 103 129
Industry 2 2 0 263 2 40 189 184 161 134 142 152
C onstruction 23 4 264 242 195 170 123 98 108 1 2 0
Transport 2 35 2 79 41 8 312 198 161 137 146 153
C om m u nication s 223 2 56 172 194 174 126 131 157 193
Trade 189 2 29 21 9 172 170 131 99 92 1 0 1
O ther serv ices 208 2 19 20 9 158 144 99 79 98 116
A verage  m on th ly  w a g e 1 2 1 2 241 237 192 165 126 108 121 138
Source: Bulgarian Authorities.
N otes : 1 Average monthly w age in constant prices. Units o f  measure-Bulgarian levs.
According to the National Statistics Institute (NSI) data, earnings growth in the two 
sectors generally has followed quite similar patterns after 2000 and the average 
wages in the public sector were higher than in the private sector (see Figure 9.4). 
That difference increased progressively and was largest in 2008, when the average 
wages in the public sector were 28% higher than that in the private sector.
FIGURE 9.4: Wages in the public and private sector in Bulgaria, 2000-2008
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Source: Bulgaria NSI data.
Since the onset of the economic crisis in mid-2008, wages in the public sector 
workers have been frozen despite rather low ratios of government debt to GDP 
(around 15% in 2009, Eurostat 2010). Between 2009 and 2011, the Bulgarian 
Government demanded a 10% reduction of costs in ministries and public funded 
bodies, resulting in job cuts and wage freeze for employees working in these 
institutions (Glassner, 2010). Thus, both public and the private sector policies will 
need to adjust to the new environment.
9.2.2. Serbia
In 1990, a law governing transformation of social ownership was introduced in 
Serbia, followed by legislative measures designed to safeguard the inflow of foreign 
capital. By the end of the year, 23% of the ‘social owned’ capital entered 
privatization process126 (Lokshin and Jovanovic, 2003). In 1994 amendments to the 
1991 privatisation law introduced the ‘obligatory revaluation of privatised property’ 
which took inflation into account. Following implementation of the 1994 legislation, 
only about 4% of socially-owned capital was actually privatised (Djuricin, 1997). 
The privatization process was slowed and in some sense it was reversed. In the first 
quarter of 1992, state control of capital was reintroduced. This move converted about 
40% of social capital into a state-controlled capital (Lokshin and Jovanovic, 2003).
In July 1997, the Serbian Government adopted the Act on Ownership 
Transformation, which remained in effect until early 2001 (Bayliss, 2005). Under 
this legislation, most firms in Serbia were privatised ‘autonomously’. However, 
around 600 large and another 1,500 medium-sized social sector firms, which were 
responsible for most o f the losses in the Serbian economy, were not privatised. This 
was largely because the privatisation legislations did set financial limits on the 
amount that could be transferred (Uvalic, 2001). The laws adopted by the Serbian 
Government in 1994 and 1997 weakened the privatization process and the 1994 law 
almost completely ‘re-socialized’ privatized equity (Cerovic, 1999).
All these contradictory efforts left Serbia in the late 2000 with two main economic 
sectors: a dominant state and socially-owned enterprise sector and a private sector.
126 T h e  p r iv a tiza tio n  m o d e l in  S erb ia  w a s  e m p lo y e e  sh a re-o w n ersh ip  that a llo w e d  firm  e m p lo y e e s  to  acq u ire  th e  
fir m ’s sh ares  at h u g e  d isc o u n t (3 0 -7 0 % ) b a sed  on  th e  f ir m ’s b o o k  v a lu e  and  w ith  an 10 y ea rs  p a y m en t term .
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While the state sector was thoroughly accustomed to soft budget constraints, making 
it inefficient, the private sector (mainly composed of small and medium size 
enterprises) was more profitable (Hansson et al., 2001). Because the private sector 
has been constrained by overregulation, much of its economic activity has taken 
place in the informal sector (Lokshin and Jovanovic, 2003).
As in other transition countries, the proportion of private sector employees in Serbia 
increased steadily since 1995 (see Table 9.4). In 1995, 6.3% of men and 9.6% of 
women were working in the private sector and by 2000 the proportion reached nearly 
12% for men and 17% for women (see Figure 9.5). The sector shares were almost 
equal in 2004-2006 (Lausev 2009).
TABLE 9.4: Sectoral distribution of employment in Serbia, 1995-2000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
State 88 .9 % 8 8 .9 % 8 6 . 1 % 84 .1 % 8 2 .4 % 8 0 .4 %
Private 7.7% 7.1% 8 .9% 1 1 .2 % 1 2 .8 % 14.5%
Mixed 3.1% 3.6% 4 .6 % 4 .3 % 4 .3 % 4 .7 %
Cooperative 0 .3% 0 .5% 0 .5 % 0 .4% 0 .5% 0 .5 %
Source: Lokshin and Jovanovid (2003).
FIGURE 9.5
Changes in proportion of private sector employees in Serbia by gender, 1995-2000
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According to the recent official data, employment in the public sector in Serbia has 
had a rising trend over the second phase of the transition. In 2008 spending on wages 
of employees in the public sector was more than 25% of total public expenditure and 
more than 40% of females and 30% of males in 2007 were employed in the public 
sector (Ognjenovic, 2011). Public and socially-owned enterprises traditionally
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provide stable jobs, and they exhibit very low labour turnover rates. By 2006, fewer 
than 5% of all workers in non-private ownership firms had been recruited in the past 
12 months, while over two-third had been with the same employer for over 10 years 
(OECD, 2008).
Wage setting in the Serbian public sector is the result of tripartite bargaining of 
social partners with a dominant role of the government, with a fixed base wage and 
wage scales based on educational attainment, working conditions and level of 
responsibilities. Specifically, wages in the budget sector and public enterprises are 
defined by coefficient multiplies of sector specific base wages with precise 
coefficients defined for each job title. While industry-based collective agreements 
determined the base wages, the scales were negotiated at the firm level and 
determined by so-called collective agreements. About 86% of total wages received 
by state sector workers come from regular payments, and approximately 15.5% come 
from subsidies on transportation and meals, whereas in the private sector, only about 
4% of total wages come from such subsidies, and 96% come from regular payments. 
Payments in kind, credits from employers and other kind of payments constitute less 
than 1% of total wages in Serbia (Lokshin and Jovanovic, 2003).
Private sector wages in principal followed the movement of wages in the public 
sector, while wages at the bottom end of the earnings distribution moved upward 
very slowly (Ognjenovic 2011). Moreover, as we mentioned above, the private sector 
employees were offered no benefits. In rare cases, private sector employees were 
given a choice between a higher wage without benefits and a lower wage with 
benefits (social security and health benefits, in particular).
9.2.3. Russia
A particular reason that makes Russian case interesting is the large public sector in 
the country that can put strong pressure on private sector wages. The number of 
public-owned companies in Russia is continuously growing (see Figure 9.6) and the 
federal government share in the public sector of the economy remains the most 
important in terms of its impact on the national economy. According to the official 
data, 14.4 million public sector employees in Russia (22% of total employment)
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receive their wages from the budgets of various state organisations (Gimpelson and 
Lukiyanova, 2009).
FIGURE 9.6: Total number of public-owned companies in Russia, 1998-2003
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Classification of ownership in Russia can be grouped into three major categories: 
state sector, which includes mainly state-owned firms, municipal firms, collective 
farms and other collective agricultural enterprises; private sector, which is dominated 
by private businesses including production co-operatives, partnerships, family-run 
private businesses, private farms, one-owner enterprises, employees working for 
private individuals and other forms of self-employment; semi-private sector, which is 
an intermediate group containing mostly joint-stock companies, consumer 
associations and other firms with mixed ownership (Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 1999).
Russia’s mass privatization officially began on October 1, 1992 and its first stage 
concluded on July 1, 1994. The immediate goal of the program was to remove 
politicians’ control over firms so that firm’s output and management practices would 
respond to the preferences of consumers and shareholders. Under this program by 
late 1994, 68% of retail trade firms, 70% of restaurants and 78% of service 
establishments were privatized (Brainerd, 2002). In 1991, 84% of men and 90% of 
women were employed in the state sector (Clarke and Kabalina, 1999). The number 
of employees in the public sector fell sharply in the years that followed (see Figure 
9.7). As a consequence of privatization, in 2008, 83% of firms were completely 
private. Those firms hired 57% of total employed workers (Gora et al., 2010).
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FIGURE 9.7: Employment by form o f  ownership in Russia, 1990-1997
■ State Private M ixed
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Source: Goskom stat, Russian Statistical Y earbook, 1998.
Notes: The state category includes m unicipal enterprises; mixed includes privatized 
enterprises in which the state retains a stake in the charter capital and also includes 
social organizations and funds, jo in t ventures and enterprises owned by foreign 
individuals.
The wage-setting framework in the public sector in Russia is completely different 
from that in OECD countries. Wages in both sectors usually consist of two parts -  
guaranteed (basic) and variable component. The basic component of the budgetary 
sector wage is defined by the Federal authorities via politic-bureaucratic bargaining 
over the statutory minimum wage and Unified Tariff Scale (UTS). The minimum 
UTS grade is linked to the minimum wage level which is fixed uniformly by the 
federal legislation and does not vary across the regions. The UTS and the minimum 
wage upward adjustments emerge irregularly as a consequence of politico-economic 
bargaining and expected budget revenues. Further adjustments emerge spontaneously 
through the variable part as a response to market forces (Gimpelson and Lukiyanova,
2009). The variable part includes various bonuses or wage premiums which 
indirectly reflect the financial performance of the firm. The public sector (containing 
public universities and schools, hospitals, museums, research institutions, etc, which 
are funded from the federal or local budgets), though heavily regulated by the 
government, follows the same two-tier wage-setting logic as the private sector. In the 
public sector, the variable part is linked to revenues of regional budgets and if  the 
latter get richer, public sector workers (funded from these budgets) enjoy higher 
earnings (Gimpelson and Kapeliushnikov, 2011). Various types of bonuses,
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allowances and benefits continue to occupy a substantial part of the overall 
remuneration package for most civil servants. These benefits include housing, 
medical services, vacations, day care, subsidized food and other goods. While as a 
whole there was a reduction in these benefits over the course of transition (Tratch et 
at., 1996), their provision differs between sectors.
Private sector employers in Russia are governed by the same labour legislation that 
regulates the state employers. The Labour Code and Employment Law have no 
special exceptions for private or small businesses.
Serious financial constraints127 throughout the 1990s forced the Russian government 
to cut even the most essential social programmes and to hold down the growth of 
salaries in the public sector. As a result remuneration of civil servants was 
downgraded to the level where in many cases it ceased to serve as a motivating 
factor. Average salary of an average Russian civil servant amounted to an equivalent 
o f $200 in the mid-1990s which increased to $400 in 1998 and then declined to 
$180-200 following financial crisis and devaluation of the ruble (Kotchegura 2010). 
However, the real wage growth in the public sector accelerated since that.
The private sector strengthened during the period and substituted for the public 
sector. The share of both males and females working in the private sector reached 
about 60% in recent years (Denisova et a l, 2007). The flow from unemployment to 
work in the private sector increased from 15% to 25% for males and from 10% to 
17% for females after 2000, which indicates that more unemployed found jobs in the 
private sector compared to the public sector (Gimpelson and Kapeliushnikov, 2011).
For the present analysis, an issue of central importance is the wage-setting behaviour 
of newly privatized firms. Table 9.5 shows that the average monthly wages among 
workers in the state enterprises is less than the average monthly wage for workers in 
state joint stock companies, which is substantially lower than the average monthly 
wage of workers in the private sector. Over the period 1993 to 1998, workers in the 
state enterprises earned 78% to 83% of the wages of their counterparts in the state
127 The main feature o f  the economic situation was a huge external debt ($145 billion on average) and continuing 
slump in production and investment.
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joint stock companies (Brainerd, 2002). There were significant difference in earnings 
between the state and private sector (see Table 9.5).
TABLE 9.5: Wages by type of ownership in Russia, selected years
In Russian rubles 1993 1994 1997 1998
A verage monthly wages
State enterprises 15,958 102,200 660,336 723,631
State joint stock companies 19,302 106,318 842,101 914,154
Private 33,308 159,664 1,302,977 1,240,059
Source: Survey conducted by Russian Centre for Public Opinion and Research (VTsIOM).
Brainerd (2002) indicates as a potential source of the difference in wages between 
sectors the differences in hours worked. According to the RLMS data, average hours 
in the state sector in 1994 were 158.2 per month compared to 166.5 in the private 
sector. Another potential source of compensation differences between sectors is in 
the provision of nonwage benefits to employees by firms. As we have discussed, 
Russian enterprises had traditionally provided a wide range of services and benefits 
to their workers, either free of charge or highly subsidized prices.
Finally, it worth mentioning that Russia entered the 1990s with a huge old-age 
pension problem. The state was the sole source of pensions, paid on a pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) basis. The pension provision established by 1956 and 1965 laws128, covered 
only people employed in the public enterprises or collective farms. There were no 
additional private or occupational pensions. The system was characterised by low 
cost for employers (4-12% of payroll depending on the sector), low retirement age 
and special preferences for certain group of people. Retirement age were low by 
developed country standards at age 55 for women and age 60 for men. Many small 
firms used a so called “simplified” taxation regime and did not pay a unified social 
tax. As a result people hired by small firms were limited in their future pension rights 
because of the lower contributions paid by the employer. People working at different 
state firms tended to receive unequal social packages and even at the same 
organization, those with greater seniority had access to better quality services (Gora 
et al., 2010).
128 1965 Law on state pensions for wage and salary earners and 1965 Law on state pensions for 
collective farmers.
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9.2.4. Tajikistan
The public sector of the Central Asian states still exhibits many of the characteristics 
of the former Soviet Union. Although the size of the public sector relative to the 
GDP has been reduced in all countries, governments continue to exert a strong 
influence on most aspects of economic activity through budgetary operations, quasi- 
fiscal operations performed by the state-owned financial and non-financial 
enterprises and extensive regulation on several aspects o f economic and social 
activity (Gurgen 1999).
Tajikistan is a highly agrarian country, with agriculture accounting for 60% of the 
total employment and around 30% of the GDP (Lerman and Sedik, 2008). The 
development of Tajikistan’s private sector effectively began in 1985, when the 
Soviet Union allowed the creation of corporatives. The country has enacted laws 
aimed at developing the market economy. Several laws dealt with privatization and 
private sector development -  Registration of Enterprises (1991), Privatization of 
State-Owned Enterprises (1992), Joint Stock Companies (1992), Foreign Investment 
(1992), Entrepreneurship (1992), Bankruptcy (1992) and Enterprises (1993). The 
Property Law, enacted in 1990 divided properties into three categories: state 
property; collective property, such as labour collectives, cooperatives and joint stock 
companies; and ‘property of the citizen’ -  private property, such as individual 
economic activity and small enterprises. Privatisation in Tajikistan has mainly taken 
the form of ownership transfers to labour collectives or leasing arrangements. 
Despite Government intention to promote private sector development, there were 
several constraints that inhibited its development, such as entry and exit rules, labour 
regulations, limited access to business information, lack of competition and access to 
credits. The share of private sector in the GDP was estimated at about 20-30% in 
1998 and 40% in 2001 (Ghasimi, 1994).
Similarly to the other transition countries, there was clear evidence of an emerging 
private sector activity in Tajikistan. In 1985, 16% of workers were employed in the 
private sector, while in 1998 the private sector employment increased to 33% (see 
Table 9.6). According to the 2004 Labour Survey data, 27.5% of all employed were 
occupied in the state enterprises, whereas 60.8% were in the private sector, including
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family business and personal plots of land. Employment in the private sector was 
higher in rural areas and marked 63.1%, in comparison with 51.6% employed in
urban areas129.
TABLE 9.6: Sectoral distribution of employment in Tajikistan, 1985-1998
1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Government 69.8% 64.7% 54.5% 52.2% 52.5% 50.1% 47.2% 45.3% 42.0% 42.7%
Collective farms 14.1% 13.6% 14.9% 14.9% 16.1% 18.1% 15.7% 15.4% 21.0% 21.0%
Cooperatives - 2.7% 2 .6% 2.6% 2.4% 2.4% 1.3% 0 .8% 0.9% 0.7%
Private fanning 16.1% 18.9% 18.9% 20.9% 22.6% 22.6% 29.7% 32.9% 33.3% 33.1%
S o u rc e :  State Statistical Committee.
N otes : C ollective farms and cooperatives referred to the state sector.
Public sector wages in Tajikistan were low and not competitive, both in comparison 
with other countries and with the private sector wages. While there were increases in 
the government wage levels since the late 1990s, they have not kept pace with the 
increase in the nominal GDP and total government expenditures and were 2.7% of 
the GDP in 2003-2004 (IMF, 2001)130. The average government wage (including 
other employment related supplements) in 2004 was about 74 Somoni ($25) per 
month, just above the poverty line. Average wage for teachers and health care sectors 
was even lower. The highest average monthly wages belonged to people working in 
the finance and banking sector (see Table 9.7). Government workers however, had 
nonmonetary fringe benefits. These benefits include generous travel allowance, cars 
and mobile phones. Other benefits are off-budgets such as land plots for rural 
teachers. A key benefit for most government workers was discounted gas and 
electricity, but this benefit was removed in 2003 following significant energy price 
increase (IMF, 2001).
129
See Analytical Report on survey o f  labour force in the Republic o f  Tajikistan (2005), Dushanbe, State 
Statistics Committee o f  the Republic o f  Tajikistan.
130 The figure indicates implausible low wage bill.
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TABLE 9.7: W ages by sector in Tajikistan, 2000-2004
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
In Tajik som oni (SM)
Total econom y 15.6 23.5 32.6 44.6 60.8
O f which:
Agriculture 7.8 13.7 18.9 27.0 35.0
Industry 47.1 71.2 92.5 114.2 144.1
Transport 31.0 48.9 69.6 101.1 147.6
Construction 38.9 55.4 74.8 100.0 150.8
Finance and banking 76.7 90.5 118.5 174.9 230.9
Private enterprises - 35.0 62.3 88.6 136.4
General government 23.9 29.9 49.2 63.3 74.2
Health care 6.7 8.9 12.7 17.1 22.8
Education 11.6 17.3 25.6 34.4 43.4
In percen tage
Total econom y 34.1 50.9 38.5 37.1 36.3
O f which:
Agriculture 44.6 76.0 38.3 42.6 29.5
Industry 31.5 51.2 29.8 23.5 26.2
Transport 33.3 57.8 42.5 45.2 46.0
Construction 5.0 42.4 35.0 33.8 50.8
Finance and banking 56.8 18.0 30.9 47.6 32.0
Private enterprises - - 77.7 42.3 54.0
General government 4.7 25.5 64.2 28.7 17.3
Health care 50.5 31.5 43.4 34.8 33.2
Education 51.7 49.2 48.4 34.5 26.1
Source: State Statistical Committee. 
N otes: In 2004, SM3 exchanged for US1.
According to the Law on the Civil Service, the monthly salary of a state worker 
consist of a basic rate and a qualification increase based on a class grade, working 
years, honours, awards, and academic achievements (generally 30% of the monthly 
salary is paid for academic achievements). The qualification increase is distributed as 
follows: between 1 and 3 years in state service would result in 5% salary increase; 
more than 3 years in service -  5-10% increase; more than 5 years in service -  10- 
20% increase; more than 10 years in service -  20-30% increase and more than 20 
years in service relates to 45% increase.
The short overview of the changing employment and sector wage formation brings 
us to formulate a few hypotheses related to the public-private wage gap in all these 
countries. We may draw a conclusion that transition process may have caused 
differences in the growth rates of public and private sector wages, provided that the 
two sectors have responded to the economic changes differently in terms how wages 
were set to attract skilled workers. In addition, the non-wage advantages, such as
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pension plans and other benefits may have compensated for lower wages in the 
public sector.
9.3. Descriptive analysis
We now look at the public and private sector employment conditions and wages in 
more details. Our analysis draws on data from the 1986 and 2003 Bulgarian 
household surveys, 2003 Serbian LSMS, 1994 Russian RLMS and 2003 Russian 
NOBUS Survey, and 2003 Tajikistan LSMS. The data are restricted to the sample of 
employees and omits all observations for which there was any missing information. 
We exclude from the analysis own account workers, and never worked categories. 
Since construction of the data and definitions of the variables for the four transition 
countries, have already been explained in Section 3.3.1, such discussion is not 
repeated here.
As in previous chapters, the analysis in the current Chapter focuses on the natural 
logarithm of hourly wage rate. We distinguish between two main sectors: public 
(state) and private. We define public sector workers in Bulgaria as equal to 1 if the 
individual is employed in a government public sector or army and 0 if employed in a 
private company. The type of ownership of the company in which individuals 
perform their main job is used to define public sector variable in the case of Russia 
and Serbia. The binary variable takes value 1 if respondents are employed in the state 
owned enterprises or public associations and 0 if they are employed in the private 
and foreign ownerships firms. The public sector variable in Tajikistan takes value 1 
if individuals are paid public workers or employed in the state administration and 
state-owned enterprises and 0 if individuals are employed in private firms including 
agriculture, collective farms, joint ventures and foreign firms. In order to identify the 
various factors involved in the wage determination in the public and private sectors, 
a range of other variables were also included in the analysis. The vector of regressors 
in Bulgarian, Serbia, Russian and Tajikistan earning equations includes experience 
and its square, job tenure with the current employer, education, marital status, 
managerial responsibility and region of residence. In contrast with some previous 
studies of wage determination in transition countries and following Falaris (2004), 
our main results do not include controls for industry or occupation in the wage
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equations. Especially in the private sector and to a lesser extent in the public sector, 
workers have some choice over the type of heir work. When moving from the public 
sector to the private sector, workers often change their occupations. Therefore, these 
variables are likely to be endogenous and testing and correcting for simultaneous 
equation bias arising from the endogeity of occupations is not feasible because we do 
not have a good exogenous instrument, consistent for all four countries. Only in the 
case of Bulgaria (1986), a sensitivity analysis is undertaken by including information 
on occupation in the decomposition estimates.
We should mention some other factors that may affect sector wage differences and 
which have not been incorporated into our analysis. In particular, wages are 
incomplete measure of the total return to labour. Workers may be willing to accept 
lower earnings in exchange for some other nonwage benefits. Superannuation and 
paid maternity leave entitlement may be particularly important considerations. Other 
sector differences that have not been accounted may include job security and 
flexibility, pensions, fringe benefits, working conditions and other non-wage forms 
of pecuniary compensations. Despite the availability of detailed information in the 
data files, we can never fully capture all workers specific differences. One potentially 
important variable not included in our analysis is union status. The variable is not 
presented in three of the samples. As in Venti (1987) we consider this exclusion on 
the ground that it is preferable to let union effects implicitly to enter the model in 
reduced form rather than deal directly with the endogeneity of union status. In 
addition, we consider the fact that unions’ negotiation power is relatively low in most 
of the transition countries (Cazes, 2002)131.
The descriptive statistics for the variables used are listed in Appendix Tables A9.1 to 
A9.4. Most important for the purposes of our analysis is a comparison of wages 
across the two sectors. While males in Serbia earn higher wages in the private sector, 
the public wage premium is higher for females, who earn on average 7% more in the 
public sector than their private sector counterparts (see Table A9.1). In Bulgaria, 
both men and women employed in the public sector earn more than the private sector
131 According to available data, the percentage o f  trade union membership ranges from about 34% in Poland to 
74% in Russian Federation. The level o f  coordination was high until the m id-1990s due to tax based income 
policy imposed by the government. When the tax-based income policy was abolished in 1995, the coordination 
ability o f  the trade unions has decreased (Cazes, 2002).
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workers. The average difference is particularly larger in 2003, when the public sector 
workers earn about 34% higher wages than workers in the private sector (see Table 
A9.2). In contrast, the average hourly earnings are higher in the private sector than in 
the public sector for both males and females in the 1994 Russian and 2003 Tajik 
samples.
Further, the 2003 raw wage distributions in the public and private sectors by 
countries are described in Table 9.8. In Bulgaria, for both men and women, all major 
percentiles record higher wages in the public sector. By contrast, for men in Serbia, 
apart from the 10th and 25th percentiles, wages are higher in the private sector. Wages 
are higher in the private sector at the top percentile levels and for both males and 
females in Tajikistan. Based on the ratio of the 90th to the 10th deciles, we find that 
apart from males in Bulgaria, the private sector wages for both genders in Serbia, 
Russia and Tajikistan seem to be more dispersed (see Table 9.8).
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Overall, in all four countries, public sector employees are on average better educated 
and have more labour market experience than private sector employees. These 
differences in education and work experience might be expected to result in higher 
average wages for the public sector employees. For instance, 28% of public sector 
male employees in Bulgaria in 2003 have completed university degree, compared to 
11% for private sector workers (see Table A9.2). In both sectors, male employees in 
Tajikistan achieve a higher university level than female employees.
In Figure 9.8, we show the distribution of hourly earnings for university graduates 
males and females by countries. Public sector pay is higher for university male and 
female graduates in Bulgaria and for females in Serbia. However, men with 
university degree in Russia and both men and women inTajikistan earn more in the 
private sector.
FIGURE 9.8
Log hourly earnings for university graduates by sector and by country in 2003
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In all four countries, we have documented existence of differences in the public and 
private sector wages, but the interesting question is whether it persists even after 
controlling for relevant characteristics determining the wage process. We do this in 
the rest o f the present Chapter.
9.4. Empirical methodology
9.4.1. Dummy variable method
In order to estimate the public-private sector wage differential, we utilise the QR 
approach. We start with the following quantile regression equation:
Q Wi (r I x) = xtP T + Pubiz T p  ^
where w(. is the log-hourly wage for worker i, Pub{ is a dummy variable, which takes 
value 1 if the individual works in the public sector and 0 if employed in the private 
sector, x, is a vector of individual characteristics for worker /, /?r and %T are
parameters of the model for estimation of the r lh quantile. We focus on the 
coefficient attached to Pub{, which is the return on public sector employment.
Earnings functions are estimated separately for men and women. All other things 
equal, if the public sector coefficient is positive there is a wage premium for working 
in the sector. It has to be kept in mind that using this approach imposes a restriction 
that the returns to observed characteristics are the same for the two sectors and that 
public-private differences depend only on a shift factor. Therefore, a further 
decomposition analysis will follow which decompose the sector wages into a 
component due to differences in labour market characteristics between the sectors 
and a component due to differences in the rewards public and private sector workers 
receive for those labour market characteristics.
9.4.2. Machado and Mata decomposition based on Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) 
approach
As in the previous chapter on gender wage differential, we are able to compare the 
sector wage differential at various points in the distribution. This comparison 
provides a much richer description o f the wage differential and allows us to see 
whether there are differences in the differential at different points of earnings
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distribution. We also investigate how the returns to various characteristics have 
changed over time at various points in the conditional earnings distribution. 
Specifically, we examine development of the public-private wage gap in selected 
countries at conditional quantiles of the wage distribution based on the extended 
version of Machado-Mata procedure (2005), described in Section 7.3, where for the 
non-discriminatory wage structure we have followed the Neumark (1988) and 
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) procedure. This technique is a natural choice since it is 
well suited to capture heterogeneity in both the coefficients and covariates across the 
entire wage distribution. Moreover, because there is a substantial wage differential 
between men and women, in both the public and private sectors, we decompose the 
sector pay differential separately for each gender.
The marginal earnings distributions produced by the MM method and how these are 
used in the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition can be briefly described as follows:
Step 1 : Generate a random drawn sample of size m from a uniform distribution
U[0,  \ \ u r ..,um.
Step 2: Estimate for the public and private sector separately and for all workers 
combined the quantile regression coefficients:P f fb(6 ) ,P fnv(0), P*U.(P), i — 1....
where P£ub(0) are u f  quantile regression estimates taken from a (log) hourly
earnings equation for public sector workers; P f nv{0) are u f  quantile regression 
estimates taken from the hourly earnings equation for private sector workers, and
A * u •Pu (0) are u\ quantile regression estimates taken from the hourly earnings equation
for all workers. The coefficients in the vector p u are taken as a baseline wage
structure in which characteristics in the public and private sector are rewarded 
equally.
Step 3: Sampling with replacement, a random sample of size m is taken of public and 
private sector workers characteristics that were used to estimate quantile regression 
coefficients. The vectors of characteristics for public {X?ub}f=x and private {Xpr,v}”>=]
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sector workers are then used to predict (log) hourly earnings in the private 
[wp"v = X p,,v p p v}^x and public {wp“b = X  pub j3p“b}™=x sectors. These predicted wages 
are equivalent to a random sample of size m drawn from the marginal wage 
distributions of private (wpr,v) and public (wpub) sector workers. Counterfactual 
densities for public and private sector workers being rewarded equally in both sectors 
are found as {wfpub = X tpub and {wfpriv = X tpnv .
Step 4: Differences in 0th percentiles of the estimated marginal wage distribution are 
then used to decompose the public-private sector wage gap into an effect due to 
characteristics in the public and private sector being rewarded differently (coefficient 
effect) and an effect due to differences in the distribution o f worker characteristics in 
the two sectors (characteristic effect). The difference in the logarithm of hourly 
earnings between public and private sector workers at the 6th percentile is given by:
Q0(wpub\P pub- w priv\Ppriv) =
= Q0[(wP“b I Ppub- w cfpub \p*) + [(wcfpriv | f t  - w priv \Ppriv)]+Qe[{wcfpub | p ' - w cfpriv | j3*\+resid (9.1)
l ------  --- J  ^ r “ V J Y
public advantage private disadvantge characterstics
■ ' ' V J
coefficiet
where Qe is the 9 thpercentile of the earnings distribution and (w '\P J)is  the
estimated marginal earnings distribution for the ith sector based on the j th quantile 
regression estimates.
The first term of the right hand side of expression (9.1), the coefficient component, is 
a measure of the wage advantage enjoyed by public sector workers and is comprised 
of two components that indicates the degree of which characteristics of employees in 
the public and private sectors are rewarded differently relative to the baseline wage
structure given by the coefficients contained in the vector P  for each qantile. The
second term of the right hand side o f equation (9.1), the characteristic component, is
a measure of the difference in logarithm of earnings in the public and private sector
attributable to differences in the characteristics or composition of employees in the
A +
public and private sectors as reflected by being rewarded according to the P
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baseline wage structure. Standard errors for the reported components of the 
decomposition were obtained using a standard bootstrapping method132.
9.4.3. Correcting fo r  endogenous sector choice
Given that there is a choice being made by workers whether to work in the public or 
private sector, there is a potential for the sample selection bias. This bias is due to the 
possibility that sorting of employees between sectors is not random and occurs on the 
basis of unobserved productivity-related characteristics. Either through the process of 
self-selection by individuals or by employers, the location of individuals in either 
sector may not be interpretable as a random process (Hyder and Reilly, 2005). The 
probability of being selected within a particular sector depends on the individual’s 
characteristics (observed and unobserved) as well as on characteristics of the 
employer.
The problem has been typically addressed by jointly estimating equations for a 
worker’s sector of employment and earnings, relying a set of exclusion restrictions 
(Depalo and Giordano, 2010). For instance, the issue of sample selection bias for 
sector choice has been addressed by Hyder and Reilly (2005), where the sample 
selection correction term for sector choice is included in the wage equations 
estimated for the separate samples of public and private sector workers. The authors 
however, conclude that the differentials based on correcting for selection bias 
provide few new insights on the magnitude of the public sector premium across the 
conditional wage distribution.
The present analysis formulates and estimates a model of sectoral attachment of 
individuals (the binary choice model between the public (D=l) and private sector 
work (D=0) is considered). A worker will be employed in a particular sector, if  the 
offered wage exceeds the reservation wage. We follow Buchinsky’s (1998) approach 
for the selection correction in a quantile regression model by using the power series 
expansion of the inverse Mill’s ratio of the normalized estimated index. Since the 
probit depends heavily on the distributional assumption, we also estimate the sector 
choice equation by single index model (Ichimura, 1993). Probit should be used in the
132 B ootstrap  estim ates are based  on 8 0 0  rep lica tion s.
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first step on the selection when errors are normally distributed; the single index 
estimator should be used otherwise (Badel and Pena, 2010).
There are two issues that need to be addressed. First, there is the identification o f the 
selection effect and the crucial assumption is the presence of instrument and the 
exclusion of this instrument from the outcome equation (Melly, 2006). Various 
family structure and social background variables have been used and their use for 
identification purposes is criticised as being arbitrary. We construct our identifying 
variable as a share of public sector workers within a certain industry, calculated by 
different regions133. The resulting variable reflects the share of individuals who 
answered public/state enterprise in a specific industry sector and in a specific macro­
region (for example, we generate 133 industry sector-macro region cells in Russia -  
19 industries by 7 regions). This allows for a possible regional variation in the public 
sector employment. Importantly the constructed instrument must be correlated with 
choice of sector, but should not affect the worker’s wage. Second, we have discussed 
in Section 4.2.4 that Buchinsky (1998) correction of sample selection in the context 
of quantile regression requires higher order selection terms be included in the model. 
There is however, the added complication that the constant term in the quantile wage 
regression is not identified in this instance, as it is conflated with the constant term of 
the higher order power series used to control for sample selection. The problem is 
one of distinguishing between the intercept and the first term in the power series 
approximation to the selection correction term. Buchinsky (2001) provides a detailed 
discussion of ways to identify the constant along the lines suggested by Andrews and 
Schafgans (1998). In our study an assessment of the importance of the selectivity of 
the sector choice is made following Buchinsky (1998) based on Andrews and 
Schafgans (1998) idea of ‘identification at infinity’. The intuition is as follows: if  we 
choose a subsample of workers with labour market characteristics such that the 
probability of being in a given sector is arbitrary close to 1, we can use this 
subsample to estimate the intercept in the earnings equation, without adjusting for 
selection.
133 We also tried to use as identifying variable a number o f  jobholders and the number o f  public sector em ployees 
in the household, follow ing the assumption that personal example from close family member may convince an 
em ployee to choose a career in the public sector. However, the variables were insignificantly different from zero 
in the selection equation for all countries.
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Specifically, Andrews and Schafgans (1998) estimator replaces Heckman’s (1990) 
indicator function by a smooth function. The authors introduce a weighting scheme 
for those observations, where observations exceeding this threshold are weighted by 
a smooth monotone [0,1] valued function s(-), such as distribution function:
ZW-zfiDrfxlfcr,)
A = - — ;------------------------ (9.2)
; '= 1
where s(-) is a non-decreasing [0,l]-valued function that has three derivatives 
bounded over R and for which s(x) = 0 for x < 0 and s(x) = 1 for x > b for some 
0 < 6  < o o ; ( # , / ? )  are root-n consistent preliminary estimators of (0Q,/?0) and the 
parameter yn is the bandwidth or smoothing parameter, yn -> °o  as n - » oo 
(Schafgans and Zinde-Walsh, 2002).
As suggested by Andrewes and Schafgans (1998), we adopt the following smoothing 
function s(-):
s(x) =
1 -  exp(----- — ) for  x  e (0, b)
b - x
0 for  jc<0 (9.3)
1 for x > b
where b is set equal to 1. The bandwidth or smoothing parameter yn is chosen in
such a way that yn —> oo as n -» oo , which should guarantee that only observations
for which the probability of selection is close to one are included (Schafgans 2000). 
The obvious disadvantage of the intercept estimator is that only a few observations 
are used for identification. A further handicap is that there exists no formal rule to 
determine the threshold values for b .
9.4.4. Decomposing public sector wage gap accounting fo r  endogenous sector 
choice
In order to analyse the public-sector wage differential accounting for endogenous 
sector choice, the MM-OR decomposition algorithm is modified. Following Badel 
and Pena (2010), we calculate the selection effect as the difference between the 
distributions of observed and the potential wages of public and private sector
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workers. We generate random samples of public and private sector workers using the 
public and private sample selection adjusted coefficients combined with the labour 
market characteristics of all workers -  not just those who work in the public sector. 
The two selection effects are given as:
Q e ( w pub) - Qe (w clfpub) -  selection effect for public sector workers and 
Qe ( w priv ) - Q e ( w ctfpriv) -  selection effect for private sector workers;
w fpub = p p“bx ]  + ectf and w fpnv = Pf™ X* + ec,f with Q0{ectf ) = 0
where wpuband w pnv are the observed distributions of public and private sector 
workers; w f ^ a n d  w(c//pnv are simulated counterfactual distributions for the public
and private sector workers using public and private sector selection adjusted 
coefficients and being sampled from the whole population of workers.
The endogeneity corrected differential or the differential that we would observe if the 
employees sorted randomly between sectors conditional on their characteristics is 
decomposed as follows:
[ Q e  i ™ PUb ) ~  Q e  W fP"b )] - [ Q e “ Q e  ^  )] (9>4)
Further, the selection effect can be decomposed into a portion due to observable 
labour market characteristics and a portion due to unobservable characteristics by 
modifying the MM-OR algorithm. This produces another two distributions: the 
distribution of public sector’s wages (respectively the distribution of private sector’s 
wages) that would have prevailed if prices accounted for selection, and workers had 
the distribution of labour market characteristics of public (private) sector workers -  
not of all workers.
Qe (w P‘“> ) -  Qe ) = \ . Qe ( ™P"b ) ~  Qe )] ~ [Qe ~ Qe )1 (9.5)
where wsi - pub = p ^ bx f ub + es- pub with Q0(es- pub) = 0
Note that in this exercise p pub needs to be estimated controlling for sample selection
bias. The first term in the brackets is interpreted as the effect o f unobservable, while 
the second term is interpreted as the effect of observables. Specifically, the
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difference between the public sector workers adjusting for selection counterfactual 
and the potential distribution tells us how much of the selection effect can be 
explained by differences in the distribution of characteristics between those who are 
in the public sector and those who are not. The selection effect for the private sector 
is given in a similar way:
Q e ( ™ PriV ) - Qe { % C,fpriV ) = [ Q e ~ Q e (w'-^ )] - [ Q e ~ Q e pHv )1 (9 6)
where w*-priv = f pnv X  pnv + e s- pnv with Qe (es- priv) = 0
The endogeneity corrected differential due to the unobservable characteristics is 
given as the difference between the effect of unobservables for public and private 
sector workers:
[Q e  ( X PUb ) -  Q e  ( " S- PUb )] - [ Q e  ~ Q e )] ( 9  J )
Finally, the endogeneity corrected differential due to the observable characteristics is 
given as the difference between the observable components for public and private 
sector workers:
9.4.5. Accounting fo r  the evolution over time
Finally, to analyse what had happened to the sector earnings differential at different 
points in the conditional earnings distribution over time, we modify the 
decomposition procedure following the framework outlined in Donohue and 
Heckman (1991) and first suggested by Smith and Welch (1986). Specifically, the 
proposed framework identifies the main factors contributing to the changes in the 
ratio of the public to private sector earnings in Bulgaria and Russia for two periods.
The changes in the conditional earnings distribution from time period t to time period 
t+1 in the wage gap between public and private sector can be examined using a 
decomposition framework outlined in Donohue and Heckman (1991):
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a a ,
& t w r  i A* -  «£r i A*) -  («¥*■* i A’ -  «?*" i A’)]+
& t w r  i a :, -  «s™ i a :, > -  i a* -  i a* m+
aw™ ,f"’ i p r b -*> rb i p r b) - ( ^ ,b i A‘ -  i A-))+
{ (» ,f r  i A‘ -  ^  i A ') - ( ^ f r  i p r  -  % r  i Ap"v)>] + (9.9)
& [ { « *  i A'+, -  r : r  i A t )  -  w f r  i A” -  » ; f r  i A '* )} +
{ « ?  i As? -  «&■* i Ali) -  («?T i p r b - r r  i A’)}]
where (vq | /?/) is the estimated marginal earnings distribution for the i'h sector based
on the distribution o f characteristics in that sector at time t and the f h quantile
regression estimates at time s.
Following Donohue and Heckam (1991) each component o f the right hand side of 
(9.9) can be given the following interpretation:
1) | p* -wff™  | p*) -  (wfpub | p] - w f pnv | P*)] shows the change in relative
hourly earnings attributable to between sector changes in the characteristics of public 
and private sector workers, evaluated at the baseline wage structure;
2) [ ( iv ; r  l A l , - ^ l A l , ) - ( » , t “‘ lA‘ - » ,cr i A ‘)] shows the change in relative 
hourly earnings explained by changes in the baseline wage structure, holding 
characteristic differences constant at t+1 levels;
3) { ( r r  i p r h -  % r b i p r > -  w r  i p :  -  r fpub \ p : »+ 
u r r  i p :  -  r fprv i p *) - (w,tr i pr - % r  i pr )i
shows the change in relative hourly earnings produced by within sector changes in 
characteristics when each group’s wage structure is measured relatively to the 
baseline wage structure;
4)
cfpriv p ;  -
n  p u b  _
P  t + 1
cfpub i Pip ub w
cfpriv  
1 +  1
cfpub
i p r )} + 
/?/)}]
2 9 1
shows the effect on the relative hourly earnings differential produced by changes in 
the wage advantage of public sector workers and the wage disadvantage of private 
sector workers, holding sector characteristics constant at t+1 levels;
While these individual components are of interest in identifying the individual source 
of any change in the relative hourly earnings of public and private sector workers, it 
is relatively easy to demonstrate that the addition of the first two components in the 
decomposition represents the change in relative hourly earnings due to changes in the 
characteristic component of the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition, while the addition 
of the last two components gives the changes attributable to changes in the 
coefficient component of the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition (O’Leary et al., 2010).
9.5. Empirical results
9.5.1. Dummy variable estimates
The first method used is a simple dummy variable approach. We have regressed the 
logged hourly earnings on a set of explanatory variables and on the public sector 
dummy with quantile regression. Table 9.9 reports only the coefficients attached to 
the public sector. The whole set of results is given in Appendix Tables A9.5 to 
A 9 .ll. A separate analysis on male and female workers have been undertaken and 
estimates at the 10th, 25th, 50th,75th and 90th percentiles are reported.
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The estimates indicate that the wage premiums vary by quantiles. The public sector 
males in Bulgaria enjoy significant wage premium at all decile points of the earnings 
distribution. In 2003 the premium for Bulgarian men increases as going from lower 
to the higher quantiles -  the premium is about 14% at the 10th percentile and above 
22% at the 90th percentile. For females in Bulgaria and Serbia, the premium at the 
top end of the distribution appears to be insignificant. By contrast, the public sector 
males in Serbia and both males and females in Russia and Tajikistan, suffer a 
significant wage penalty at the higher part of the distribution. For instance, public 
sector employment for male employees in Russia shows a wage premium of 7.7% at 
the 10th percentile and significant wage penalty is evident at the 75th and 90th 
percentiles. A common result (apart from estimates for males in Bulgaria) is that at 
the very high quantiles, there is no premium from the public sector employment.
Reported results for other characteristics are also interesting and can briefly be 
described as follows. A significant and positive return to potential experience across 
the whole earnings distribution is found for females in Russia and for both males and 
females in Tajikistan. The returns to experience also vary over the distribution, 
tending to be higher at the top of the distribution than at the bottom for females in 
Russia and Tajikistan and are insignificant in Bulgaria and Serbia. The estimates of 
returns to qualifications at each quantile reveal that a higher rate of return is 
generally found for workers o f both sexes with university qualification. Public sector 
employees with university qualification, for example, are paid more than those with 
secondary qualification. There is strong negative wage arrears effect in Russia. 
Significant and positive wage premium is found for workers with more than 10 years 
tenure within the firm in Bulgaria and Russia.
These results however, are correct only if the returns to human capital characteristics 
are the same in both sectors. To see whether the model should be estimated 
separately for each group of workers, we experiment by estimating a fully interacted 
model where all characteristics are interacted with the public sector dummy and we 
test if the interaction terms are significantly different from zero. The F-statistics on 
the joint significance of the interaction variables reject the hypothesis that workers in
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both sectors are subject to the same wage determination process134. Therefore, the 
separate quantile regressions in each sector are utilising in decomposing the public- 
private sector wage difference into a part explained by different distribution of 
characteristics and a part explained by different coefficients.
9.5.2. Decomposition results
As a benchmark, we first estimate the public-private sector wage differential 
assuming that the sector choice is exogenous. Estimates of the public-private sector 
hourly earnings differential for each sample are reported in Table 9.10. The table 
shows the raw public-private wage gap, the contribution of the coefficients and the 
covariates to the difference between the 6'h quantile of the public sector wage 
distribution and quantile of the private sector wage distribution and residual terms 
due to the differences between the empirical and simulated densities. The 
bootstrapped standard errors for these contributions are given in parenthesis. 
Separate analysis on male and female workers have been undertaken and estimates at 
the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile are reported.
There are substantial variations in the public sector wage differential across 
countries. First, the raw public-private wage gap generally decreases as one move up 
the earnings distribution in Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan. This indicates that 
employees in these countries with low potential wages tend to gain more from 
working in the public sector than workers with high potential wages. The raw gap is 
positive across the entire wage distribution in Bulgaria, Russia and for women in 
Serbia. In Serbia and Tajikistan at the top of the distribution, the raw gap is negative. 
For men in Tajikistan it starts at 41% for the first decile of earnings and drops to 
minus 41% at the 90th percentile.
134 The F-test on the joint significance o f  the interaction variables, conducted on a standard OLS, yield an F- 
statistics o f  2.54 for males and 4.98 for females in 2003 Bulgarian sample.
TABLE 9.10: Public-private wage decomposition results, 2003
B U L G A R IA M A L E S F E M A L E S
P e r c en tile R aw  G ap C o e ffic ie n ts C o v a r ia te s R esid u a l R a w  G a p C o e ffic ie n ts C o v a r ia te s R esid u a l
1 0 th 0 .263 0 .2 0 6 0 .1 1 9 -0 .0 6 2 0 .2 6 9 0 .0 7 5 0 .2 2 6 -0 .0 3 2
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 0 8 )
2 5 lh 0 .405 0 .2 1 4 0 .1 5 6 0 .0 3 5 0 .3 1 0 0 .0 8 5 0 .2 1 3 0 . 0 1 2
(0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 0 8 ) (0 .0 0 8 ) (0 .0 0 6 )
5 0 th 0 .463 0 .2 2 4 0 . 2 0 2 0 .0 3 7 0 .2 8 8 0.081 0 .2 1 9 -0 . 0 1 2
(0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 0 6 ) (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 0 7 )
7 5 th 0 .445 0 .1 9 9 0.231 0 .015 0 .2 9 5 0 .043 0 . 2 1 0 0 .0 4 2
(0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 0 7 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 0 7 )
9 0 th 0 .3 5 7 0 .1 3 5 0 .2 4 2 -0 . 0 2 0 0 .2 2 3 0 .023 0 .2 0 9 -0 .0 0 9
(0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 6 ) (0 .0 1 1 )
S E R B IA M A L E S F E M A L E S
1 0 th 0 .068 -0 .0 2 7 0 .1 0 8 -0 . 0 1 2 0 .4 1 2 0 .1 5 4 0 .2 3 9 0 .0 1 9
(0 .0 2 4 5 ) (0 .0 1 6 0 ) (0 .0 2 0 6 ) (0 .0 1 5 6 )
2 5 lh 0 .0 7 9 -0 .0 0 1 0 .0 4 5 0 .035 0.361 0 .1 1 8 0 .2 1 5 0 .028
(0 .0 1 1 1 ) (0 .0 0 7 9 ) (0 .0 1 1 5 ) (0 .0 0 8 2 )
5 0 th 0 .0 2 7 -0 .0 1 5 0 . 0 2 0 0 . 0 2 2 0 .283 0 .1 0 1 0 .1 8 4 -0 . 0 0 2
(0 .0 0 9 0 ) (0 .0 0 5 9 ) (0 .0 1 0 2 ) (0 .0 0 7 3 )
7 5 th -0 .1 1 9 -0 . 1 0 2 -0 . 0 2 0 0 .003 0 .1 8 9 0 .0 4 5 0 .1 5 8 -0 .0 1 4
(0 .0 1 3 0 ) (0 .0 0 8 9 ) (0 .0 1 1 1 ) (0 .0 0 7 9 )
9 0 th -0 .223 -0 .1 6 4 -0 .0 3 9 -0 . 0 2 0 0 .1 0 9 -0 .0 6 0 0 .171 -0 . 0 0 2
(0 .0 1 8 7 ) (0 .0 1 2 4 ) (0 .0 2 0 5 ) (0 .0 1 4 1 )
R U S S IA M A L E S F E M A L E S
1 0 th 0.231 0 .1 3 0 0 .135 -0 .0 3 4 0 .183 -0 .0 1 4 0 .183 0 .0 1 4
(0 .0 2 3 8 ) (0 .0 1 7 3 ) (0 .0 1 8 2 ) (0 .0 1 3 3 )
2 5 Ih 0 .1 6 2 0 .045 0 .1 2 8 -0 .0 1 1 0 .1 3 4 -0 .0 7 2 0 .1 8 4 0 . 0 2 2
(0 .0 1 5 7 ) (0 .0 1 0 9 ) (0 .0 1 5 9 ) (0 .0 1 0 6 )
5 0 th 0 .1 4 8 0 .0 0 9 0 .1 2 1 0 .018 0 .118 -0 .0 7 7 0 .165 0 .0 3 0
(0 .0 1 3 4 ) (0 .0 0 9 2 ) (0 .0 1 1 2 ) (0 .0 0 8 1 )
7 5 lh 0 .0 8 7 -0 .0 1 5 0 .1 1 6 -0 .0 1 4 0 .133 -0 .0 6 7 0 .1 5 7 0 .043
(0 .0 1 2 8 ) (0 .0 0 9 0 ) (0 .0 1 2 6 ) (0 .0 0 9 2 )
9 0 th 0 .1 6 8 -0 .0 3 6 0 . 1 1 2 0 .0 9 2 0 .0 9 0 -0 .081 0.151 0 . 0 2 0
(0 .0 1 3 1 ) (0 .0 0 9 5 ) (0 .0 1 6 9 ) (0 .0 1 2 1 )
T A J IK IS T A N M A L E S F E M A L E S
1 0 ,h 0 .4 0 5 0 .1 7 9 0 .1 8 8 0 .038 0 .3 3 6 0 .1 1 8 0 .1 2 6 0 .0 9 2
(0 .0 2 4 7 ) (0 .0 1 7 4 ) (0 .0 1 7 3 ) (0 .0 1 2 7 )
2 5 th 0 .288 0 .0 3 3 0 .1 5 9 0 .0 9 6 0.251 0 .0 3 5 0 .1 7 7 0 .0 3 9
(0 .0 1 5 3 ) (0 .0 1 0 7 ) (0 .0 1 6 4 ) (0 .0 1 1 2 )
5 0 th -0 .1 5 4 -0 .2 2 8 0 .1 3 4 -0 .0 6 0 0 .183 -0 .1 3 9 0 .2 2 8 0 .0 9 4
(0 .0 1 8 2 ) (0 .0 1 2 1 ) (0 .0 1 4 5 ) (0 .0 1 0 1 )
7 5 th -0 .5 8 8 -0 .4 7 6 0 .0 5 4 -0 .1 6 7 -0 .4 4 6 -0 .5 4 6 0 .308 -0 .2 0 8
(0 .0 2 0 0 ) (0 .0 1 3 6 ) (0 .0 2 8 9 ) (0 .0 1 8 7 )
9 0 th -0 .405 -0 .451 -0 .0 0 9 0 .055 -0 .471 -0 .7 4 2 0 .2 5 5 0 .0 1 6
(0 .0 2 6 7 ) (0 .0 2 0 1 ) (0 .0 3 1 9 ) (0 .0 2 2 7 )
Notes-. Standard errors in brakets. The differential is calculating by every 5th percentile. The main percentile results are presented.
In Bulgaria, the estimated public sector wage differential in 2003 tends to be positive 
across the entire earnings distribution for both male and female employees, 
indicating that a positive wage premium is given to the public sector employees. It 
also decreases over the distribution. For instance, the sector wage differential for 
males decreases from approximately 21% at the 10th percentile to 14% at the 90th 
percentile level and respectively from 7.5% at the 10th percentile to 2.3% at the 90th
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percentile for females. These findings of positive public-private pay differential are 
in line with Falaris (2004), who shows that men and women who work in the public 
sector in Bulgaria are the ones who derive the greatest financial benefit from such 
employment. A possible reason for the public sector wage premium is that public 
sector workers in Bulgaria are better educated and take managerial positions more 
frequently than in the private sector workers. Moreover, competition for employment 
in the public sector in Bulgaria remains high because of the attached benefits such as 
pension rights. In adition, the advantage enjoyed by public sector workers tends to be 
higher for men than for women. For instance, the public sector wage differential for 
men at the 10th is 20.6% compared to 7.5% differential for women at the same 
percentile level. In addition, for both men and women in Bulgaria, the wage 
differential caused by differences in observed characteristics is positive along the 
distribution and we may draw a conclusion that the advantage from greater 
productive characteristics of public sector workers in Bulgaria justifies the positive 
wage differential we found. These results are broadly in line with Voinea and 
Mihaescu (2012), who show that in Romania public sector offers higher wages. 
Decomposing the wage premium into the effect of personal characteristics, 
coefficients and residuals, the authors find that half of the premium can be attributed 
to personal characteristics.
An examination of the estimated coefficient effect of the gap for Serbia reveals a 
number of interesting patterns. The differential is negative across the entire earnings 
distribution for men indicating a comparative advantage enjoyed by private sector 
males. This is in line with Ognjenovic (2011) who shows that the average worker in 
Serbia in 2003 employed in the public sector was underpaid compared to his or her 
counterparts in the private sector. This evidence suggests that public sector provides 
lower returns to skills for workers at the bottom of the distribution. Moreover, our 
estimates indicate that employment in the private sector is more beneficial for ‘high- 
paid’ men. At the top of the male distribution, a large proportion of the gap (74%) is 
due to differences in returns and this is in line with Lokshin and Jovanovic (2003) 
who show that male workers in the private sector in Serbia earn on average 9.4% 
higher wages than those in the public sector. Serbian women seems do better in the 
public sector as positive public sector wage differential is found at much higher 
percentile levels. For instance, at the 10th percentile of the earnings distribution, there
2 9 7
is a wage premium for public sector employment of 15.4% for females compared to a 
wage penalty of 2.7% for males. At the very top of the estimated conditional 
earnings distribution, however, women like men, tend to face a wage penalty from 
being employed in the public sector. For instance, the wage penalty at the 90th 
percentile is about 6% for females and 16% for males. These findings are broadly in 
line with Leping (2006), who shows positive wage differential at the lower part of 
the distribution in Estonia and negative for the median and higher parts of the 
distribution. Similarly, Blackaby et al. (1999) find positive public sector premium at 
the bottom of the distribution and negative at the top end for the UK. In addition, the 
estimated characteristics effect for males tends to be positive at the bottom and 
negative at the top, indicating favourable private sector characteristics for top 
earners. The characteristics effect for females actually outweighs the coefficient 
effects. It is difficult to infer about relative importance of the coefficient and 
covariate effects in male estimates for Serbia as the presence of a large residuals 
term.
Interestingly, females working in the public sector in Russia face a negative wage 
premium across the entire wage distribution. For example, women in the public 
sector at the top of the distribution earn around 8% less than those at the same 
percentile in the private sector. These findings are comparable with the results of an 
earlier analysis of the public sector differential in Russia. According to Brainerd 
(1998) wages of women employed in the state sector were 7.5 % lower than wages of 
women employed in the private sector in 1994 and 20.2% lower in 1997. Nesterova 
and Sabirianova (1998) find a wage premium of 20.8% for private sector workers in 
1994. Similarly, Gimpelson and Lukiyanova (2009) report a wage penalty for public 
sector workers in Russia over the period 2000-2004. The authors show that in 46 
regions in Russia, wages are markedly higher in the private sector and consequently 
conclude that to eliminate the negative wage gap, wages in the public sector should 
be linked to the private sector wages at regional level.
In contrast, males’ wage premium declines more or less monotonically from high 
positive values at the lower end of the distribution to negative values at the higher 
end of the distribution. Male workers in Russia who are at the lower tail o f the 
distribution earn about 13% more in the public sector than the corresponding private
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sector counterparts. However, those at the upper tail earn up to 4% less. These results 
are in line with some other findings (Blackaby et al., 1999) and show that low 
earning males tend to gain more in the public sectors but higher earners tend to be 
better in the private sector. For both males and females in Russia, the effect of 
observable individual and job characteristics is positive and stable across the 
distribution. This suggests that public sector employees in Russia have individual 
characteristics that are more conducive to higher remuneration. This was confirmed 
by the descriptive statistics, where we found Russian public sector workers are more 
likely to have university degree (see Table A9.3). Public sector workers have on 
average 22 years of potential experience compared to 20 years for private sector 
workers. Longer tenure, associated for public sector workers, might suggests lower 
inter and intra-sector mobility. Finally, the duration of working hours in the public 
sector is shorter by 2 hours. Higher education and longer tenure and experience, 
other things being equal, tend to increase relative wages for public sector workers. 
Meanwhile, shorter working hours may have the opposite effect.
In Tajikistan for both males and females, we find a wage premium for the public 
sector at the lower part of the conditional wage distribution and significant wage 
penalty at the upper part of the distribution. A woman at the 10th percentile level 
earns approximately 12% more than a woman at the same percentile in the private 
sector wage distribution. The difference declines rapidly toward higher percentiles 
and we can see that at the median of the public sector wage distribution women earn 
13.9% less than those at the same percentile of the private wage distribution and the 
magnitude of the negative effect is larger at the top of the conditional wage 
distribution. At the top of the distribution, the advantage enjoyed by private sector 
workers is higher for women than for men. Moreover, the part explained by 
characteristics is not constant across the distribution and for males it decreases 
monotonically as we move across the conditional earnings distribution. A potential 
explanation to this negative and significant differential found at the top end of the 
distribution, is that fringe benefits and job security in Tajikistan are all known to be 
better for workers in the public sector and these non-wage benefits potentially could 
raise the effective wage paid to the public sector workers.
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It is tempting to conclude that public sector in Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan runs the 
risk of being unattractive to highly qualified workers and that Tow-wage workers’ 
might select themselves in the public sector. A commonly cited reason for public 
wage penalty at the upper end of the conditional wage distribution is public 
opposition to high pay for public servants (Katz and Kreuger, 1991; Lucifora and 
Meurs, 2006), while private sector is not subject to such opposition. This allows the 
private sector to use high pay to attract high-skilled workers. Some other studies find 
that overall satisfaction in the public sector is higher than in the private sector 
(Gardner and Oswald, 1999; Jurges, 2002). Jiirges (2002) argues that the positive 
wage premium to private sector employment might in part be explained as a 
compensating differential. Since job satisfaction appears to be closely related to job 
quits, shirking or absenteeism, private sector employers might pay higher wages in 
order to reduce turnover (Jurges 2002). Similarly, Adamchik and Bedi (2000) argue 
that higher wages in the private sector may be compensating for the lower level of 
social benefits. Krishnan (2000) adds that in the absence of regulation or union 
pressure on wages, there are a number of different models consistent with the 
existence of a private sector premium. First, in a standard competitive model, wage 
premiums are likely to be observed if workers differ in their reservation wages or in 
ability (observable only to the employer), thus creating dispersion in the offered 
wage. In any empirical analysis, introducing controls for such differences should 
therefore eliminate evidence of a premium. The relatively higher risk aversion of 
workers might also induce premiums, if firms keep wages stable despite changing 
labour market conditions in order to protect workers against fluctuations in income. 
However, we are not able to account for all potential factors that might cause the 
private sector wage premium at the top o f the distribution found in these countries. 
As our data have no information on work efforts (which are often lower in the public 
sector) or non-wage benefits (often higher in the public sector) the estimates are 
likely to underestimate the true public sector premium. Finally, as Leping (2006) 
notes, we should keep in mind that illegal employment and tax evasion have been 
problems during the early transition period, and as these problems occurred in the 
private sector, actual labour income in the private sector might be underestimated 
both by official wage statistics and probably by reported wages in the surveys.
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9.5.3. The sector wage gap  correcting fo r  endogeneity
Endogenous sector choice
To describe the selection process between both sectors, we estimate probability to 
work in the public sector conditionally on a set of personal characteristics. The first 
results presented in this section pertain to the probit and single index analysis for the 
public sector choice process. Tables 9.11 to 9.14 provide results from the standard 
probit and single index (Ichimura, 1993) semi-parametric estimates (SLS) of the 
sector choice decision. The constant and the coefficient on the first reported 
continuous variable (years of potential work experience) are not identified in the 
single index model so they are normalized by setting them equal to the corresponding 
values in the probit model, thereby making the results of the two models comparable. 
At the bottom end of these tables the pseudo-likelihood ratio statistic is reported. The 
analysis is carried out separately by gender.
Bulgarian workers with higher education such as university and college degree are 
more likely to desire employment in the public sector. Secondary level of education 
for both males and females does not have significantly different effect on probability 
of being employed in the public sector. Potential experience plays a positive and 
significant role for females but it is not statistically significant for males. In line with 
Falaris (2004), in both models males and females in Bulgaria have a higher 
probability of employment in the public sector if they have more work experience 
within the firm. Secondary levels of education do not have significantly different 
effects on the probability of being employed in the public sector. Being married is 
positively associated with being in the public sector for males but it is insignificant in 
the female probit specification. The constructed identifying variable is insignificant 
in the probit estimates. However, it is statistically significant in the single index 
model. Finally, whether or not individuals live in the capital seems to have no impact 
on the incidence of public sector employment for females in Bulgaria.
Following Badel and Pena (2010), we test the null hypothesis of normal errors, given 
the existence of the single index which is consistent under both null and alternative 
hypothesis. The null hypothesis of normal errors (Bera-Jarque-Lee test (1984)) is 
clearly rejected at the 5% significance level for males; hence the residual terms are
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not normally distributed and the single index model should be used in the first step of 
selection for males. However, the null hypothesis is not rejected in the female’s 
probit model and the power series expansion using the probit estimates is used.
TABLE 9.11: Estimates of the incidence of public sector employment, Bulgaria 2003
P r(p u b lic= l) M ales Females
Probit SLS Probit SLS
exp 0.0165 0.0273*
(0.0126) (0.0144)
expsq -0.0002 0.000 -0.0002 0 .000***
(0.0003) (0 .000) (0.0003) (0 .000)
university 0.7270*** 1.290*** 0.7796*** 0.959***
(0.1471) (0.237) (0.1695) (0.240)
college 0.7139*** 1.889*** 0.9998*** 1.427***
(0.2419) (0.328) (0.1959) (0.332)
secondary 0.0862 -0.059 -0.0105 0.012
(0.1203) (0 .121) (0.1434) (0.118)
1-2 years 0.1577 0.493*** 0.2291 0.339***
(0.1400) (0.137) (0.1514) (0.138)
3-5 years 0.5579*** 1.599*** 0.5420*** 1.168***
(0.1293) (0.273) (0.1397) (0.271)
6-10 years 0.9454*** 2.697*** 0.9767*** 1.902***
(0.1420) (0.453) (0.1511) (0.439)
>10 years 1.3799*** 3.452*** 1.6013*** 2.416***
(0.1257) (0.574) (0.1441) (0.547)
married 0.1963** 0.215*** -0.0049 0.160**
(0.0970) (0.074) (0.1018) (0.073)
urban 0.0905 -0.019 0.0741 0.012
(0.1038) (0.086) (0.1173) (0.088)
sofia -0.1586 0.529*** 0.2669 0.286
(0.1925) (0.171) (0.2143) (0.180)
instrument -0.0042 -0.009*** -0.0019 -0.006***
(0.0026) (0 .002) (0.0027) (0 .002)
constant -1.7201*** -1.7201 -1.7771*** -1.7771
(0.1776) (0.1955)
N 1296 1296 1186 1186
Pseudo-likelihood -645.6011 -590.6521
Pseudo R2 0.1915 0.2551
Bera-Jarque-Lee test
LM chi2(2) 9.196 0.737
Prob > chi2 0.0100 0.691
Notes'. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0 A 0 , * *  p <  0.05, * * * /? <  0.01. The SLS estimator is 
Ichimura’s (1993) estimator and it is performed by using s ingle .ado  programme for STATA. The 
constant and the potential experience coefficients in the single index model are normalized. The 
SLS procedure is highly computer intensive. For comparison, the estimation using the SLS 
estimator takes between 10 to 16 hours, w hile the estimation o f  the probit model, with the same 
specifications, takes a few  seconds. The Bera-Jarque-Lee test is performed by using bjltest.ado  
programme for STATA.
In Serbia, university education increases the probability of being employed in the 
public sector for both males and females. However, there is an insignificant effect for 
the secondary and primary education levels and this is in line with Lokshin and 
Jovanovic (2003) findings. For women, (potential) experience significantly increases 
the probability of employment in the public sector. Similar to the findings in 
Bulgaria, the probability of being employed in the public sector increases with
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worker’s tenure. The null hypothesis of normal probit errors is rejected for both 
genders (see Bera-Jarque-Lee test in Table 9.12). The SLS estimates are not reported 
as the estimation of the single index model with the data at hand was highly 
computer intensive and took much more time as compared to the other samples135. 
Note that the probit estimates are consistent under normally distributed errors.
TABLE 9.12: Estimates of the incidence of public sector employment, Serbia 2003
P r(p u b lic= l) M ales Females
Probit Probit
exp 0.0024 0.0398**
(0.0140) (0.0162)
expsq -0.0002 -0.0007***
(0 .0002) (0.0003)
university 0.6479*** 0.6383**
(0.2307) (0.3119)
gymnasium 0.0577 -0.0242
(0.2913) (0.3585)
secondary (4 years) 0.2979 0.0601
(0.2027) (0.2835)
secondary (1 -2 years) 0.4552* 0.1368
(0.2722) (0.3644)
primary 0.1175 0.0533
(0.2105) (0.2653)
1-2 years 0.4331** 0.8009***
(0.2184) (0.2688)
3-5 years 0.5610*** 0.8844***
(0.1434) (0.1907)
6-10 years 0.7232*** 0.9279***
(0.1417) (0.1627)
>10 years 1.1191*** 1.2633***
(0.1186) (0.1390)
married -0.0096 0.0831
(0.0964) (0.1083)
urban -0.0807 -0.0176
(0.0752) (0.1028)
Belgrade -0.1997 -0.1654
(0.1283) (0.1578)
Vojvodina -0.2365** -0.2491*
(0.1105) (0.1438)
West Serbia -0.2857** -0.0051
Sumadija and Pomoravlje
(0.1308) (0.1826)
-0.0633 0.0371
(0.1115) (0.1546)
East Serbia -0.0938 -0.1585
(0.1348) (0.1799)
instrument 0.0016* 0.0067***
(0.0009) (0 .0012)
constant -0.8450*** -1.7733***
(0.2462) (0.3329)
N 1466 984
Pseudo-likelihood -910.4473 -538.1005
Pseudo R2 0.1020 0.2090
Bera-Jarque-Lee test
LM chi 2(2) 13.029 4.939
Prob > chi2 0.019 0.0845
135 We also tried a reduced specification o f  the employment selection equation for Serbia to see i f  the 
convergence problem was associated with particular variables and trying to reduce the computational time. 
However, the convergence has not been resolved.
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TABLE 9.13: Estimates o f  the incidence o f  public sector employment, Russia 2003
P r(pu b lic= l) M ales Females
Probit SLS Probit SLS
exp -0.0046 -0.0055
(0.0034) (0.0034)
expsq 0 .0001* 0 .000*** 0 .0002** 0 .000***
(0 .0001) (0 .000) (0 .0001) (0 .000)
university 0.0413 0.021 -0.0430 -0.019
(0.0304) (0.023) (0.0313) (0.031)
college -0.1350** 0.001 -0.0772 -0.090**
(0.0529) (0.043) (0.0517) (0.054)
secondary -0.0055 -0.013 -0.0776*** -0.094***
(0.0229) (0.018) (0.0247) (0 .022)
primary 0.0036 -0.006 -0.0400 -0 . 110***
(0.0316) (0.026) (0.0395) (0.038)
married -0.0007 -0.010 0.0716*** 0.020
(0 .0246) (0.015) (0 .0201) (0.019)
1-2 years 0 .2021*** 0.019 0.1664*** 0.626***
(0.0308) (0.024) (0.0323) (0.037)
3-5 years 0.4280*** 0.045** 0.3931*** 0.631***
(0.0343) (0.024) (0.0369) (0.043)
6-10 years 0.6392*** 1.475*** 0.6725*** 2.527***
(0.0333) (0.066) (0.0362) (0.115)
>10 years 0.7412*** 1.543*** 0.8233*** 3.210***
(0.0311) (0.075) (0.0337) (0.145)
arrears 0.1174*** 0.031 0.1876*** 1.336***
(0.0240) (0.018) (0.0288) (0.061)
Central region -0.0590* 0.133*** 0.0620* 0.283***
(0.0319) (0.023) (0.0336) (0.037)
North West 0.0200 0.062 0.0766** 0.215***
(0.0352) (0.027) (0.0369) (0.039)
Siberia -0.1234*** 0.014 -0.0254 0 .122***
(0.0355) (0.028) (0.0370) (0.040)
Far-East 0.1879*** -0.107*** 0.1944*** 0.673***
(0.0362) (0.028) (0.0386) (0.049)
Urals -0.2052*** -0.146*** -0.1430*** -0.595***
(0.0402) (0.034) (0.0427) (0.034)
Volga -0.0737** -0 .210*** -0.0632* -0.224***
(0.0338) (0.027) (0.0355) (0.036)
instrument 0.0162*** 0.050*** 0.0204*** 0.088***
(0.0003) (0 .002) (0.0004) (0.004)
constant -0.9533*** -0.9533 -1.3305*** -1.3305
(0.0476) (0.0516)
N 21874 21874 24318 24318
Pseudo-likelihood -12848.138 -11436.95
Pseudo R2 0.1297 0.2362
Bera-Jarque-Lee test
LM chi2(2) 384.16 626.19
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
N otes: Standard errors in parentheses * p  <  0 .10 , **p  <  0 .05 , ***  p  <  0 .01. The SLS estimator is 
Ichimura’s (1993) estimator and it is performed by using single .ado  programme for STATA. The constant 
and the potential experience coefficients in the single index model are normalized. The estimation using  
the SLS procedure took approximately 2 days for each gender. The Bera-Jarque-Lee test is performed by 
using bjltest.ado  programme for STATA.
In Russia, university education does not seem to have significant effect on the 
probability of being employed in the public sector. Simply acquiring higher 
education does not increase chances of public sector employment in Russia. Male 
employees with college degree and females with secondary education are less likely 
to be employed in the public sector. This result might be reflected by the type of
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work available in both sectors. Other estimates reveal that the probability of working 
in the public sector is lower for employees in Urals and Volga regions. Females in 
the Central region are more likely to desire public sector employment. The 
constructed identifying variable is significant and positive in both male and female 
specifications. Hence, it appears that this instrument is successful at enabling 
identification. The null hypothesis of normal probit errors is clearly rejected at the 
1% significance level in both male and female probit specifications and for this 
reason the set of quantile regression estimates are based on series expansions using 
the SLS estimates (see Table 9.13).
In Tajikistan’s probit specification, not all levels of educational attainment are 
statistically significant. University educated workers are more likely to desire 
employment in the public sector. This variable shows significant and positive sign in 
both probit and single index models. Females with secondary general education are 
less likely to be in the public sector. The probability of being employed in the public 
sector also increases with worker’s tenure. In addition, workers in Dushanbe, 
Khalton and Gbao regions are less likely to be offered public sector jobs. The 
coefficients on the identifying variable show significant and positive sign. Finally, 
the null hypothesis of normal errors is rejected for both males and females; hence the 
residual terms are not normally distributed. The estimated single index is used to 
form a series approximation for the unknown selection bias term.
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TABLE 9.14
Estimates o f  the incidence o f  public sector employment, Tajikistan 2003
P r(pu b lic= l) M ales Females
Probit SLS Probit SLS
exp -0.003 0.019*
(0.008) (0 .011)
expsq 0.000 0 .000** 0 .000** 0.000
(0 .000) 0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
university 0.569*** 0.613*** 0.549*** 0.865***
(0.104) (0.078) (0.153) (0.090)
secondary technical 0.067 0.173* 0.367 -0.111
(0 . 121) (0.095) (0.237) (0.092)
secondary special 0.017 0.208** 0.460*** -0.129
(0.116) (0.085) (0.154) (0.082)
secondary general -0.100 -0.032 0.025 -0.127**
(0.091) (0.059) (0.104) (0.064)
primary 0.130 0.183 0.235 0.269
(0 .202) (0.127) (0.186) (0.179)
1-2 years o f  tenrue 0.193** 0.189** 0.109 -0.149
(0.113) (0.079) (0.165) (0.080)
3-5 years o f  tenure 0.389*** 0.345*** 0.203 0.016
(0.108) (0.076) (0.160) (0.077)
6-10 years o f  tenure 0.679*** 0.587*** 0.352** 0.854***
(0.115) (0.084) (0.171) (0.096)
>10 years o f  tenure 0.878*** 0.796*** 0.582*** 0.960***
(0 . 110) (0.078) (0.161) (0.096)
married 0.040 -0.072 -0.152* -0.034
(0.088) (0.050) (0.082) (0.048)
urban -0.041 -0.029 -0.029 -0.097*
(0.066) (0.053) (0.093) (0.051)
Dushanbe -0.549*** -0.449*** -0.270* -0.999***
(0.103) (0.068) (0.130) (0.104)
Khalton region -0.749*** -0.712*** -0.587*** -1.319***
(0 . 102) (0.066) (0.135) (0 . 122)
Rrg region -0.059 -0.063 -0.004 -0.103
(0.123) (0.088) (0.158) (0.075)
Gbao region -0.532*** -0.448*** -0.259* -0.980***
(0.118) (0.081) (0.155) (0 . 121)
instrument 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.025***
(0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .002)
constant -0.424*** -0.424 -0.585*** -0.585
(0.163) (0 .221)
N 3006 3006 1832 1832
Pseudo-likelihood -1630.839 -926.815
Pseudo R2 0.2145 0.2633
Bera-Jarque-Lee test
LM chi2(2) 13.517 7.990
Prob > chi2 0.0011 0.0183
N otes: Standard errors in parentheses * p  <  0 .10 , ** p  <  0.05, * * * p  <  0.01. The SLS estimator is 
Ichimura’s (1993) estimator and it is performed by using single.ado  programme for STATA. The constant 
and the potential experience coefficients in the single index model are normalized. The Bera-Jarque-Lee 
test is performed by using bjltest.ado  programme for STATA.
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Endogeneity corrected sector wage differential
Once wages are consistently estimated for the endogenous sector choice, differences 
in the public and private sector are decomposed. The simulated differentials 
corrected for endogenous sector choice, presented in Tables 9.15 to 9.18, are the 
differentials that we observe in each country if the employees were sorted randomly 
between sectors conditionally on their labour makret characteristics. Further, we 
present the gap that remains due to the unobservable characteristics and gap due to 
observable characteristics, as described in Section 9.4.4. The bootstrapped standard 
errors for these contributions are given in parenthesis. Bootstrap estimates are based 
on 800 replications. The parameter estimates of the intercept of the wage functions 
follow the Andrews and Schafgans (1998) estimator, with the smoothing function 
s(-) as given in Section 9.4.3 and b set equal to one. The second stage quantile 
regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A9.12-A9.18136.
In Figures 9.9 to 9.12, we compare by country, the uncorrected simulated public 
sector wage differential with the endogeneity corrected differential. The uncorrected 
differentials are taken from Table 9.10 and summarises the estimated coefficient and 
covariate components, and excludes residual terms137. No confidence intervals are 
plotted to avoid to surchange the figures.
FIGURE 9.9
Uncorrected and endogeneity corrected sector wage differential in Bulgaria, 2003
Public-private wage differential in Bulgaria, males, 2003 Public-private w age differential In Bulgaria, fem ales, 2003
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Notes: The uncorrected differential is the differential simulated without correcting for endogeneity, equals the 
coefficient and covariate components from Table 9.10, and excludes residual terms. The corrected differential is the 
differential that we would observe if  the employees were sorted randomly between sectors conditional on their 
characteristics.
136 Analysis o f  these estimates is beyond the scope o f  the chapter.
137 This is the predicted wage distribution based on the M M-OR procedure conditional on the variables o f  interest 
and does not equals the actual wage distribution as it excludes the residual terms.
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Overall, the estimates indicate that non-random sector selection is an issue in the 
calculation of the sector wage differential. The inclusion of the selectivity corrected 
power series terms in the computation of the sector wage gap seems to produce 
different estimates compared to the uncorrected wage gap estimates. We note that the 
endogeneity corrected differential for males in Bulgaria is much lower than the 
uncorrected one. The premium for the public sector workers decreases throughout 
the wage distribution and is negative at the top. It therefore follows that when the 
random sector choice is allowed for, men at the top of the wage distribution are 
rewarded better in the private sector. The reverse is true for females, where the 
corrected differential is higher than the uncorrected one (see Figure 9.9). Hence, a 
randomly drawn woman employed in the private sector is predicted to earn less in 
that sector than would be earned in the public sector. Allowing for the endogeneity in 
sector choice, the advantage enjoyed by public sector workers is higher for females, 
which is in contrast with the uncorrected estimates, where we found the advantage 
enjoyed by public sector workers was higher for males. Hence, correcting for
endogenous sector choice it is more worthwhile for women to remain in the public
1-10
sector than for men .
TABLE 9.15: Decomposition of public-private wage differential in Bulgaria 
correcting for endogeneity, 2003
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
MALES
Gap due to unobservables 0.315 0.378 0.873 0.563 -0.300
(0.0094) (0.0091) (0.0124) (0.0416) (0.0309)
Gap due to observables 0.008 0.046 0.625 0.578 0.028
(0.0092) (0.0087) (0.0184) (0.0451) (0.0361)
F E M A L E S
Gap due to unobservables 0.289 0.296 0.562 0.285 0.151
(0.0077) (0.0062) (0.0080) (0.0183) (0.0212)
Gap due to observables -0.025 -0.001 0.201 -0.113 -0.158
(0.0072) (0.0067) (0.0103) (0.0176) (0.0186)
Notes: The bootstrapped standard errors in brakets. The differential is calculating by every 5th percentile. 
The main percentile results are presented.
The effect of the unobservable is positive across the distribution and turns to negative 
at the 90th percentile for males. For females, the unobservable gap is lower as
thcompared to the gap for males with a more obvious decline at the 90 percentile. A
138 See Lucifora and Meurs (2004) for similar results.
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large part of the selection effect is due to unobservables. Comparing the present 
results with those presented in Table 9.10, accounting for differences in observables 
between public and private sector and considering that workers were sorted randomly 
between sectors, has more of an impact on the sector wage gap, especially at the 50th 
and 75th percentiles (see Table 9.15).
The endogeneity corrected sector wage differential for males in Serbia is lower than 
the uncorrected one. It also is negative across the entire wage distribution (see Figure 
9.10). The gap declines monotonically toward higher percentiles and shows that the 
premium in the public sector decreases throughout the wage distribution. Similar to 
the uncorrected estimates, men at the top of the distribution are still rewarded better 
in the private sector. At the top of the distribution, a large proportion of the gap is 
due to the differences in unobservable characteristics. The effect of observables is 
positive across the male distribution and insignificantly different from zero at the top 
(see Table 9.16). In contrast, the estimated endogeneity corrected sector wage 
differential for females is slightly larger at the bottom of the distribution. The 
advantage enjoyed by public sector workers is much higher for women than for men.
TABLE 9.16: Decomposition of public-private wage differential in Serbia correcting
for endogeneity, 2003
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
MALES
Gap due to unobservables 0.038 0.039 -0.028 -0.190 -0.463
(0.0173) (0 .0121) (0.0088) (0.0192) (0.0269)
Gap due to observables 0.032 0.058 0.139 0.103 0.004
(0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0173) (0.0278)
FEMALES
Gap due to unobservables 0.023 -0.423 -0.431 -0.483 -0.463
[ a ( ^ v a ( ^ ‘) H a ( i o - a ( « ?-'’m)] (0.0572) (0.0700) (0.0527) (0.1248) (0.1916)
Gap due to observables -0.577 -0.777 -0.672 -0.737 -0.674
(0.0388) (0.0108) (0.0079) (0.1340) (0.1557)
N otes: The bootstrapped standard errors in brakets. The differential is calculating by every 5th percentile. 
The main percentile results are presented.
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FIGURE 9.10
Uncorrected and endogeneity corrected sector wage differentials in Serbia, 2003
Public-private differential in Serbia, males, 2003 Public-private differential in Serbia, females, 2003
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Notes: The uncorrected differential is the differential simulated without correcting for endogeneity, equals the 
coefficient and covariate components from Table 9.10, and excludes residual terms. The corrected differential is 
the differential that we would observe i f  the em ployees were sorted randomly between sectors conditional on 
their characteristics.
Similar results were found for males in Russia, where the corrected differential is 
much lower than the uncorrected one. Hence, a randomly drawn man employed in 
the public sector is predicted to earn less in that sector than would be earned by an 
observationally identical man, assuming that sector choice is exogenous. Both the 
gap due to the unobservables and observables tends to be negative at the top of the 
wage distribution. Unfortunately, we have not been able to estimate the model for 
females due to a convergence problem with the female sample due to inclusion of the 
power series in the QR model. The convergence rate was very slow in particular at 
the lower part of the distribution -  0.05 and 0.1 percentiles. We have tried 
experimenting with different specifications of the power series produced from the 
single index and probit models and with increasing the number of simulations; 
however the problem has not been resolved. With the Stata capture option, we 
should be able to overcome the convergence problem at the lower part o f the 
distribution and move on the next percentiles level, however, this could affect the 
final simulation results139.
139 Kwak (2010) propose that the convergence could be achived for a large enough sample size.
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TABLE 9.17: Decomposition of public-private wage differential for males in Russia
correcting for endogeneity, 2003
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Gap due to unobservables 0.265 0.173 -0.322 -0.332 -0.262
(0.0244) (0.0159) (0.0181) (0.0179) (0.0205)
Gap due to observables 0.141 0.107 -0.354 -0.352 -0.249
(0.0089) (0.0072) (0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0157)
N otes: The bootstrapped standard errors in brakets. The differential is calculating by every 5th percentile. The main 
percentile results are presented.
FIG U R E9.il
Uncorrected and endogeneity corrected sector wage differentials for males
in Russia, 2003
Public-private differential in R u ssia , m a les, 2003
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The selection correction seems to be very important for the Tajikistan data. We find 
that the corrected differential for both males and females is negative across the entire 
wage distribution and rather low as compared to the uncorrected one. The lowest 
wage gap for males is around -25% and it is observed in the lower-end of the 
distribution. The public sector wage penalty for males declines more monotonically 
toward higher percentiles where corrected differential tends to be higher compared to 
the uncorrected one. Allowing for the endogeneity in the sector choice the advantage 
enjoyed by private sector workers is higher for females. In addition, for males in 
Tajikistan, the portion of selection effect related to the unobservable characteristics is 
similar in size and shape across the distribution with the uncorrected unexplained
iL iL
component with a more obvious decline between the 75 and 80 percentiles (see 
Figure A9.1). Similar to the uncorrected estimates, the advantage enjoyed by private 
sector workers is higher for women than for men.
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FIGURE 9.12
Uncorrected and endogeneity corrected sector wage differential in Tajikistan, 2003
Public-private differential in Tajikistan, males, 2003
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Public-private differential in Tajikistan, females, 2003
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N otes: The uncorrected differential is the differential simulated without correcting for endogeneity, equals the 
coefficient and covariate components from Table 9.10, and excludes residual terms. The corrected differential is 
the differential that we would observe i f  the em ployees were sorted randomly between sectors conditional on 
their characteristics.
TABLE 9.18: Decomposition of public-private wage differential in Tajikistan
correcting for endogeneity, 2003
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
MALES
Gap due to unobservable -0.040 0.197 -0.117 -0.530 -0.415
(0.0327) (0.0157) (0.0196) (0.0255) (0.0302)
Gap due to observables 0.056 0.423 0.209 -0.042 -0.055
(0.0238) (0.0155) (0.0095) (0.0190) (0.0199)
FEMALES
Gap due to unobservable -0.428 -0.223 0.081 -0.716 -1.040
i a ( > o - a ( » ,-M ) ] - [ a ( > o - a ( " ,,- ' m)] (0.0174) (0.0181) (0.0142) (0.0261) (0.0362)
Gap due to observables 0.063 0.413 0.641 -0.299 -0.349
(0.0117) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0213) (0.0331)
Notes: The bootstrapped standard errors in brakets. The differential is calculating by every 5th percentile. The main 
percentile results are presented.
9.5.4. Evolution in the public-private wage differential
A further question of interest is the public-private wage differential over time. In 
Table 9.19 we compare Bulgarian sector wage differential estimates, obtained by 
running the MM-OR separately for two years (1986 and 2003). In the first three 
columns, we present the raw public-private gap estimates for selected years and for 
the change between them. Thus a negative difference indicates that the public sector 
earnings gap decreases over time, while the reverse is true if  we observe the positive 
wage difference. In the next columns, we present the contribution of the coefficients
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and the covariates for both genders at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles. 
The bootstrapped standard errors for these contributions are given in parenthesis140. 
In Figures 9.13 and 9.14 we compare the estimated coefficient components of the 
gap for the two time periods.
Overall, the observed positive change in the raw wage gap implies that the sector 
wage differential in Bulgaria has risen over time, this is true for both men, and 
women (see Table 9.19). There seems to have been an improvement in the relative 
pay of the public sector and the differential has improved at the upper part of the 
distribution. In particular, the change in the raw gap is higher at the top o f the 
earnings distribution, where the gap for males increases from minus 14.7 log 
percentage points in 1986 to 35.7 log percentage points in 2003, and from minus 16.2 
log percentage points to 22.3 log percentage points for females. This suggests that 
the gains to the public sector employees tend to be concentrated among workers at 
the top half of the conditional earnings distribution. Only at the lower percentile 
levels, the coefficient effect (unexplained part) of the sector wage differential 
decreases over time. For example, the wage premium from working in the public 
sector for the low-waged male employees (the 10th percentile) declines from 32.6% 
in 1986 to 20,6% in 2003 and from 12.7% in 1986 to 7.5% in 2003 for females (see 
Table 9.19).
140 In bootstrapping the 95 % confidence intervals, 800 replications were used.
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TABLE 9.19
Decomposition of changes in the public-private sector wage differential for male and 
female employees in Bulgaria, 1986 and 2003
Sam ple estim ates D ecom position o f  changes:
MALES
R aw  differential 1986 2003
Percentiles 1986 2003 C hange C oefficients C ovariates Residuals C oefficients Covariates Residuals
10th 0.503 0.262 -0.241 0.326 0.119 0.058 0.206 0.119 -0.062
(0.017) (0 .011) (0 .000) (0 .000)
25th 0.230 0.405 0.175 0.165 0.084 -0.019 0.214 0.156 0.035
(0 .010) (0.006) (0 .011) (0.008)
50th 0.080 0.463 0.383 0.031 0.039 0.010 0.224 0.202 0.037
(0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
75th -0.287 0.445 0.732 -0.250 0.001 -0.038 0.199 0.231 0.015
(0 .010) (0.004) (0 .010) (0.007)
90th -0.147 0.357 0.504 -0.128 -0.035 0.016 0.135 0.242 -0.020
(0.007) (0.004) (0 .012) (0.009)
FEMALES
1986 2003
Percentiles 1986 2003 Change C oefficients C ovariates R esiduals C oefficients Covariates Residuals
10th 0.223 0.269 0.046 0.127 0.074 0.022 0.075 0.226 -0.032
(0.018) (0 .012) (0 .011) (0.008)
25th 0.179 0.310 0.131 0.096 0.067 0.016 0.085 0.213 0.012
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
50th 0.077 0.288 0.211 0.030 0.045 0.002 0.081 0.219 -0.012
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007)
75th -0.157 0.296 0.453 -0.151 0.007 -0.013 0.043 0.210 0.042
(0.006) (0.004) (0 .010) (0.007)
90th -0.162 0.223 0.385 -0.121 -0.050 0.009 0.023 0.209 -0.009
(0.008) (0.005) (0.016) (0 .011)
Notes'. Bulgaria Household surveys 1986 and 2003.
The results o f the decomposition clearly show that for both genders, the unexplained 
part of the differential in Bulgaria declines from the lower to the upper deciles. In 
1986, the estimated public sector wage differential tends to be positive at the bottom 
of the distribution but negative at the top, which indicate that public sector workers at 
the lower part of the conditional distribution enjoy significant wage premium, but at 
the top they face a wage penalty. For example, in the top of the wage distribution, the 
negative effect is about 12%. This is true for both men and women in 1986. Similarly 
to the 2003 findings, the advantage enjoyed by public sector workers at the bottom of 
the distribution in 1986 is higher for men than for women. For males, the estimated
thcoefficient effect in 1986 decreases across the distribution from 32.6% at the 10 
percentile to minus 12.8% at the 90th percentile. For females, the differential in the 
same year varies from 12.7% at the 10th percentile to a minus 12.1% at the 90th 
percentile (see Table 9.19). These results show that lower earners in 1986 tended to
gain more in the public sector but higher earners tend to be better in the private 
sector.
FIGURE 9.13: Estimated public-private wage differentials for males, Bulgaria
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-0.40
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Source: Authors’ decom position estim ates, 1986 and 2003 Bulgarian data.
FIGURE 9.14: Estimated public-private wage differentials for females, Bulgaria
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Source: Authors’ decom position estim ates, 1986 and 2003 Bulgarian data.
There have been relative improvements in the quality of public sector workers as 
differences in endowments seem to drive the increased wage premium across the 
distribution. While for both genders in 1986 the individual covariates only explain a 
small share of the observed gap, the effect is larger in 2003 and we conclude that 
changes in the characteristic component over time contributed to the increase in the 
relative earnings of public sector workers in Bulgaria. For example, at the top o f the 
male earnings distribution 68% of the observed gap in 2003 was due to the 
characteristic effect while the same effect was about 24% in 1986. This suggests that
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public sector employees gained individual and job characterises that are more 
conductive to higher remuneration.
Another important fact is that the position of both men and women in the Bulgarian 
labour market has changed during the economic transition to a market economy. As 
we have discussed, many jobs have been lost due to the economic restructuring and 
privatization and small number of new jobs has been created. Our results indicate 
that public sector in Bulgaria has to have taken a role o f the employment generator. 
Finally, the increased public sector premium over time that we found might also be a 
result o f some unobserved factors such as working conditions, job security and other 
non-wage aspects of employment.
A detailed examination of the public-private wage differential in Bulgaria over time 
using the modified MM-Donohue-Heckman procedure is presented in Table 9.20. 
Results on male workers have been undertaken and estimates at the 10th, 20th, 30th, 
40th, 50th, 60th, 70th, 80th and 90th percentile are shown. In order to identify the source 
of any change in the estimated differential, the effects of all four components given 
in methodology Section 9.4.5 are reported. Bootstrapped standard errors are given in 
parentheses. Again the convergence problem with the female sample does not allow 
us to estimate the model for females.
The MM-Donohue-Heckman estimates confirm the findings that for the period of 
1986 to 2003, the sector wage differential for males in Bulgaria has increased across 
the entire earnings distribution. The rise in the relative earnings of public sector 
workers tends to be higher at the upper part of the distribution (70th and 80th 
percentiles) than at the bottom, and the contribution made by changes in the relative 
workers’ characteristics tends to be higher at the top of the male distribution than at 
the bottom. Within the ‘characteristic effect’ changes in the parameters used to 
generate the baseline wage structure, accounted for significant part of the overall 
characteristics effect. Within the ‘coefficient effect’ changes in the wage advantage 
of public sector workers and disadvantage of private sector, holding sector 
characteristics constant at 2003 level, accounts for a major part of the coefficient 
effect (see Table 9.20).
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The Russian decomposition results are given in Table 9.21. The estimates are 
obtained by running the MM-OR decomposition separately for the two periods (1994 
and 2003). The results over the whole distribution are best viewed graphically. For 
reference, recall that Figure 9.15 and Figure 9.16 present the estimated coefficient 
effects by gender for the sector wage differential at different points of the conditional 
earnings distribution for 1994 and 2003. No confidence intervals are plotted to avoid 
to surchange the figures.
The observed positive change in the raw wage gaps in Russia implies that the raw 
public-private wage differential has risen over time. For both men and women and 
similar to the Bulgarian findings, the change in the raw gaps is higher at the top of 
the earnings distribution, where it turns from negative to positive. However, at the 
higher percentiles the coefficient effect stays negative in both years, indicating that 
workers with high potential wages tend to gain more from working in the private 
sector. Low-paid workers in Russia (generally those with low skills) benefit more 
from employment in the public sector.
For males, the sector wage differential slightly increases over time but overall it stays 
fairly stable (see Figure 9.15). In 2003, the differential is more positive for the lower 
percentiles (the wage premium from working in the public sector for the low-waged 
male employee’s raises from 10% in 1994 to 13% in 2003) and it is less negative at 
the top of the distribution. This is in sharp contrast to female distribution, where 
public sector differential changes substantially over the observed period and the 
changes for the extremes of the wage distribution are more pronounced. For instance, 
the public sector wage differential in 1994 is 14% at the lower part of the female’s 
distribution and become insignificantly below zero in 2003 (see Figure 9.16).
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TABLE 9.21: Decomposition of changes in the public-private sector wage 
differential for male and female employees in Russia, 1994 and 2003
Sam ple estim ates D ecom position  o f  changes:
M ALES
R aw  D ifferentia l 1994 2003
Percen tiles 1994 2003 C hange C o e f f ic ie n ts C o v a r ia te s R esid uals C o e f f ic ie n ts C o v a r ia te s R esiduals
1 0 th 0 .088 0.231 0.143 0 .1 0 2 -0 .037 0.023 0.130 0.135 -0.034
(0 .0274) (0.019) (0.023) (0.017)
2 5 th 0 .016 0.163 0.146 0.014 -0.061 0.063 0.045 0.128 -0 .0 1 0
(0 .019) (0 .013) (0.015) (0 .0 1 0 )
5 0 th -0.113 0.148 0.261 -0.025 -0.090 0 .0 0 2 0.009 0 .1 2 1 0.018
(0.015) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .013) (0.009)
7 5 th -0.135 0.087 0 .2 2 2 -0 .039 -0.092 -0.004 -0.015 0.116 -0.014
(0.016) (0.009) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .009)
9 0 th -0 .159 0.168 0.327 -0.067 -0 .1 0 0 0.008 -0.036 0 .1 1 2 0.092
(0 .0 2 1 ) (0 .014) (0.013) (0.0095)
FEM ALES
1994 2003
P ercen tiles 1994 2003 C hange C o e f f ic ie n ts C o v a r ia te s R esiduals C o e f f ic ie n t s C o v a r ia te s R esiduals
1 0 th 0.134 0.183 0.049 0.144 -0.038 0.028 -0.014 0.183 0.014
(0.025) (0.017) (0 .0182) (0 .0133)
2 5 th -0 .069 0.134 0.203 -0 .0 2 2 -0 .043 -0.004 -0.072 0.184 0 .0 2 2
(0 .018) (0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0159) (0 .0106)
■soin -0 .117 0.118 0.235 -0.115 -0.042 0.040 -0.077 0.165 0.030
(0.014) (0 .009) (0 .0 1 1 2 ) (0 .0081)
■5
-0 .159 0.133 0.292 -0.104 -0.051 -0.004 -0.067 0.157 0.043
(0.015) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0126) (0 .0092)
9 0 th -0 .324 0.090 0.414 -0.214 -0.067 -0.043 -0.081 0.151 0 .0 2 0
(0 .0 2 2 ) (0 .014) (0 .0169) (0 .0 1 2 1 )
Source: 1994 RLMS and 2003 N O B U S data.
FIGURE 9.15: Estimated public-private wage differentials for males, Russia
 1994
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Source: Authors’ decom position estim ates based on the 1994 and 2003 Russian data.
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FIGURE 9.16: Estimated public-private wage differentials for females, Russia
 1994
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Source: Authors’ decom position estimates based on the 1994 and 2003 Russian data.
The remaining discussion and Table 9.22 identify the source o f any change in the 
estimated public-private wage differential. For the period of 1994 to 2003, changes 
in the characteristics component actually contributed to an increase in the relative 
earnings for both male and female workers in the public sector. More specifically, 
changes in the relative hourly earnings attributable to between sectors changes in 
characteristics of public and private sector workers accounted for a major part of the 
overall characteristics effect. The contribution made by changes in the relative 
worker characteristics was not only larger for men than for women in this period but 
it also tended to be higher at the top of the distribution. Further investigation of what 
lay behind changes in the coefficient effect for this period suggest that both changes 
in the wage advantages/disadvantages of public and private sector and changes in the 
characteristics of workers at which the advantage/disadvantage was measured, 
contributed to the overall coefficient effect identified in Figure 9.15 and Figure 9.16.
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9.5.5. Sensitivity analysis (occupational effect)
One cause o f disparity may be the different concentration of professionals and 
technicians between sectors. For instance, both male and female public workers in 
Bulgaria are more likely to be in a higher and lower managerial positions, whereas 
the private sector workers tend to be in semi-routine occupations. Six different 
occupational categories are used in the 1986 Bulgarian decomposition analysis: 
higher managerial and professional occupations (includes large establishments); 
lower managerial and professional occupations; intermediate occupations 
(intermediate clerical and administrative); lower supervisory and technical 
occupations; semi-routine occupations and routine occupations.
As we expected, including occupational controls reduces significantly the size of the 
sector wage differential (see Table 9.23). The overall pattern of results, however, 
when looking at the differential at different points in the conditional distribution 
remains largely unchanged. Controlling for occupation, public sector male workers at 
the lower part of the distribution still enjoy a wage premium over their private sector 
counterparts. At the top of the distribution the differential turns to be negative. 
Moreover, the differential is less negative at the 90th percentile when we control for 
occupation, implying that there are differences in individual characteristics and 
occupations across sectors. It may be argued that transferability of skills between 
public and private sectors were different between occupations, especially at the top 
of the distribution.
TABLE 9.23
Decomposition of changes in the public-private sector wage differential for male and 
female employees in Bulgaria with occupational controls, 1986
1986 M A LES FE M A L E S
Percentiles R aw  gap C oefficients Covariates Residuals R aw  gap C oefficients Covariates Residuals
10th 0.503 0.211 0.231 0.061 0.212 0.038 0.158 0.016
(0.016) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013)
25th 0.230 0.106 0.142 -0.018 0.179 0.022 0.128 0.029
(0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
50th. 0.080 0.011 0.050 0.019 0.073 0.005 0.066 0.002
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
75th -0.282 -0.150 -0.091 -0.041 -0.153 -0.045 -0.082 -0.026
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
90th -0.151 -0.039 -0.121 0.009 -0.163 -0.017 -0.153 0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Notes'. Bulgaria Household Survey 1986.
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9.6. Conclusions
In this Chapter we have examined the differences in the wage distributions between 
the public and private sector in Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan. The effect of 
the endogenous sector selection on the sector wage differential was analysed. The 
Chapter also examined what has happened to the public-private wage differential 
over time by providing evidence for Bulgaria and Russia.
Our results support the use of the quantile regression decomposition method, 
including allowance for possible non-random selection between sectors. Taking the 
log wage gap at each quantile of the public and private sector distributions, in three 
of the countries, we found a wage premium for the public sector workers at the lower 
part of conditional wage distribution and wage penalty at the upper part o f the 
distribution, a result similar to a number of international studies. This means that the 
public sector successfully attracted better employees in the lower part of the 
distribution, but was unsuccessful in retaining the most productive employees at the 
top. The public wage premium at the lower end of the conditional wage distribution 
might be due to the more effective implementation of equal opportunity and anti- 
discrimination policies since the government may use the public sector pay to 
achieve objectives such as equity and to be a ‘good’ employer (Bender and Elliot, 
1997).
Since 2002, the Bulgarian government has tried to force the private sector to increase 
wages by rising payment in the public sector and increasing the minimum wages. 
However, we found that in 2003 the public sector workers in Bulgaria still earn more 
than their private sector counterparts across the conditional earnings distribution. 
Although the public sector premium in 2003 decreases as we move to the higher 
quantiles, it remains positive throughout the entire wage distribution. The public 
sector premium is higher in the lower tail of the wage distribution as compared to the 
top. Moreover, the sector wage differential for men in 2003 was invariably higher 
than those found for women. Specifically, the public sector wage advantage faced by 
men at the 10th percentile was about 20.6% compared to 7.5% for females.
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The covariate effect for both males and females in Bulgaria was positive across the 
whole earnings distribution. The part o f the wage gap due to differences in 
observable individual and job characteristics was substantial. The characteristics 
effect was much lower in 1986 as compared to 2003, and we concluded that the gain 
enjoyed by public sector workers over time was due to their increased endowment 
component. Public sector workers with their individual and job characteristics 
showed to be more conducive to higher remuneration. These results refute the widely 
held view by government employees in Bulgaria that they are underpaid compared to 
the private sector employees.
A negative public sector wage differential throughout the entire conditional earnings 
distribution was found for males in Serbia and for females in Russia. In Tajikistan, a 
positive wage premium was found at the lower part of the distribution for both men 
and women but at the higher quantiles the differential was significant and negative. 
The advantage enjoyed by private sector workers at the top of the distribution in 
Tajikistan was higher for women than for men. The findings of negative earnings 
differential for both males and females, especially in the upper part of the 
distribution in these three countries has important implications for the quality of 
public sector workers (since the high skilled workers may switching to the private 
sector) and the ability of government to retain the services of high quality public 
sector workers.
A number of important conclusions can be drawn from the Serbian estimates. As 
highlighted earlier, public sector wage differential for Serbian women was higher 
than those found for men indicating that the advantage enjoyed by female public 
sector workers tended to be higher. The estimated differential for females was 
especially high at the lower deciles, where public sector female employees earned 
about 15% more compared to their private sector counterparts. At the top o f the 
conditional earnings distribution, however, Serbian women, like men, tended to face 
a wage penalty from being employed in the public sector. This results indicate that 
public sector in Serbia is likely to have a problem relating to recruitment.
The study also found that in Bulgaria and Serbia, the probability of being employed 
in the public sector increased with university and college levels of education. These
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findings can also be compared to findings of studies of other transition countries. 
Adamchik and Bedi (2000) find that workers with higher education in Poland are less 
likely to work in the private sector. By contrast, university education in Russia did 
not show significant effect on the probability of being employed in the public sector. 
After allowing for possible selection into sectors, a lower sector wage gap is found 
for males in Bulgaria and Serbia and for both males and females in Russia and 
Tajiksitan. This is in line with Barbosa and Filho (2008) who show the lower wage 
gap (around 16.7%) for Brazil when endogenous sector choice is considered. 
Similarly Bargian and Melly (2008) find that small wage differential remain between 
the sectors after taking into account the non-observable heterogeneity. However, the 
sector wage gap widened for females in Bulgaria, when we control for non-random 
endogenous sector selection, which suggest that Bulgarian women were positively 
selected into the public sector. In line with Badel and Pena (2010), and in contrast 
Albrecht et al. (2009), we found that endogenous selection effect in selected 
transition countries was mostly due to the unobservables, which is the difference 
between the potential wage distributions of public and private sector workers and the 
endogeneity adjusted counterfactual distributions. A small part of the selection effect 
was due to the effect in observables, calculated as the difference between the 
simulated counterfactual distributions for the sector wage workers using selection 
adjusted coefficients and being sampled from the whole population of workers.
The present Chapter also answered the question what has been happening to the 
relative wages of public and private sector workers over time by providing further 
evidence from Bulgaria and Russia. The Chapter contributed with adaptation of the 
Donohue and Heckman (1991) time-wise decomposition framework across the entire 
wage distribution, which identifies the sources of changes in the estimated public- 
private wage differential. Public sector wage differential has widened over time in 
Bulgaria and this was observed for both genders. The rise in the public sector 
earnings tended to be higher at the top o f the conditional earnings distribution. The 
results showed that differences in endowments for Bulgarian workers gained 
importance over time in accounting for the general increasing trend in the public 
sector earnings distribution.
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In Russia, the public-private wage differential increased over time for males but 
overall the increase was fairly stable. In contrast, the differential changed 
substantially over the observed period for females. Further investigation o f what lay 
behind this change suggest that both changes in the wage advantages/disadvantages 
of public and private sector in Russia and changes in the characteristics of workers at 
which the advantages/disadvantages was measured, contributed to the overall 
coefficient effect.
Some of the limitations o f the present study are that we have not accounted for all 
cash and non-pecuniary advantages attached to a particular sector. There may be 
other factors, such as occupational pension benefits, or payments in kind, that can 
contribute to explaining the public sector wage differential. Moreover, the study has 
documented the existence of the public sector wage differential in all these countries, 
but has explained little about its causes and consequences. While understanding 
whether it depends on institutional features and what policy implications are is of 
crucial importance, we take the analysis in this study as a necessary step and leave 
the other questions for future research.
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CHAPTER NINE APPENDIX
TABLE A9.1
Descriptive statistics by public and private sector: males and females, Serbia 2003
M A L E S F E M A L E S
D escrip tion P u b lic P r iv a te P u b lic P r iv a te
M ean Std. D ev . M ean Std. D ev . M ean Std. D ev . M ean Std. D ev .
lo g  o f  hourly w a g e 4 .1 0 6 0 .627 4 .1 5 4 0 .7 8 4 4 .0 9 9 0 .639 3 .8 3 0 0 .733
1 i f  prim ary 0 .1 2 6 0 .3 3 2 0 .1 6 4 0 .371 0 .123 0 .3 2 9 0 .1 8 2 0 .3 8 6
1 i f  v oca tion a l ( 1 - 2  years) 0 .0 3 0 0 .171 0 .023 0 .1 5 0 0 .025 0 .155 0 .0 2 6 0 .1 6 0
1 i f  second ary  (3 y e a r s ) 0 .2 7 2 0 .445 0 .303 0 .4 6 0 0 .1 5 7 0 .3 6 4 0 .1 8 2 0 .3 8 6
1 i f  second ary  (4  years ) 0 .3 2 6 0 .4 6 9 0 .293 0 .455 0 .3 6 0 0 .4 8 0 0 .3 4 0 0 .4 7 4
1 i f  gym n asiu m 0 . 0 2 2 0 .147 0 .0 2 7 0 .163 0 .0 3 4 0 .1 8 2 0 .0 4 8 0 .215
1 i f  post-secon dary 0 .0 8 4 0 .2 7 7 0 .0 6 4 0 .245 0 . 1 1 0 0 .313 0 .053 0 .2 2 4
1 i f  un iversity 0 .1 0 6 0 .308 0 .0 4 9 0 .2 1 6 0 .1 6 7 0 .373 0 .055 0 .2 2 8
potential exp 25 .781 1 1 .2 2 0 2 4 .5 5 4 14.478 2 4 .3 5 4 9 .547 2 3 .9 0 6 15 .202
exp  squared 7 9 0 .3 4 8 59 8 .0 7 5 8 1 2 .193 8 8 4 .3 5 8 6 8 4 .0 9 7 4 4 6 .2 0 0 8 0 2 .0 7 2 1004.751
1 i f  m arried 0 .7 9 6 0 .4 0 4 0 .703 0 .457 0 .7 4 4 0 .4 3 7 0 .6 6 9 0.471
1 i f  <  1 year 0 .0 9 2 0 .2 8 9 0 .3 4 2 0 .475 0 .0 8 7 0 .2 8 2 0 .467 0 .4 9 9
1 i f  1 - 2  years 0 .0 2 1 0 .1 4 2 0 .0 3 8 0.191 0 .0 2 7 0.161 0 .037 0 .1 9 0
1 i f  3-5  years 0 .0 7 4 0 .2 6 2 0 .0 8 7 0 .2 8 2 0 .0 6 6 0 .2 4 9 0 .0 7 9 0 .2 7 0
1 i f  6 - 1 0  years 0 .091 0 .287 0 .1 0 4 0 .3 0 6 0 .1 3 4 0 .341 0 .0 9 9 0 .2 9 9
1 i f  > 1 0  years 0 .723 0 .4 4 8 0 .4 2 9 0 .495 0 . 6 8 6 0 .465 0 .3 1 8 0 .4 6 6
1 i f  m anagerial respon sib ility 0 .0 2 1 0 .1 4 2 0 .1 3 4 0.341 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 8 7 0 .083 0 .277
1 i f  in B elgrad e 0 .1 4 0 0 .347 0 .1 4 7 0 .3 5 4 0 .2 0 8 0 .407 0.171 0 .3 7 7
1 i f  in V ojvod ina 0 .2 6 5 0 .4 4 2 0 .2 5 8 0 .4 3 8 0 .2 5 2 0 .435 0 .2 9 8 0 .458
1 i f  in W est Serbia 0 .0 9 6 0 .295 0 .1 4 2 0 .3 5 0 0 .091 0 .288 0 .0 9 4 0 .293
1 i f  in Sum adija i Pom oravlje 0 .2 0 9 0 .4 0 7 0 . 2 0 2 0 .4 0 2 0 .193 0 .395 0 . 2 0 0 0 .4 0 0
1 i f  East Serbia 0 .1 0 8 0 .311 0 . 1 0 0 0.301 0 .093 0 .2 9 0 0 .103 0 .3 0 4
1 i f  South-E ast Serbia 0 .1 8 2 0 .3 8 6 0.151 0 .358 0 .163 0 .3 7 0 0 .1 3 4 0.341
N 729 7 3 7 52 8 4 5 6
Sou rce: Serbia LSM S, 2003.
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TABLE A9.6: QR estimates for m ales- public sector in Serbia, 2003
0 = 0 . 1 0 0 = 0 . 2 5
M a le s
0 = 0 .5 0 0 = 0 .7 5 0 = 0 .9 0
pu blic 0 . 0 1 2 1 -0 .0 2 1 3 -0 .0 8 4 5 * * * -0 .2 2 5 4 * * * -0 .3 4 7 8 * * *
(0 .0 6 2 2 ) (0 .0 3 2 6 ) (0 .0 3 4 4 ) (0 .0 5 1 5 ) (0 .0 8 5 3 )
un iversity 0 .7 7 5 1 * * * 0 .6 4 5 1 * * * 0 .4 1 9 1 * 0 .8 5 9 9 * * * 0 .8 2 8 8 * * *
(0 .1 5 9 2 ) (0 .1 8 7 3 ) ( 0 .2 2 2 1 ) (0 .2 9 8 4 ) (0 .2 2 0 3 )
post-secon dary 0 .6 8 8 2 * * * 0 .7 4 0 4 * * * 0 .6 8 5 9 * * * 0 .6 7 8 8 * * * 0 .7 7 8 4 * * *
(0 .1 2 7 4 ) (0 .0 6 9 2 ) (0 .0 7 4 1 ) (0 .1 1 1 9 ) (0 .1 7 9 6 )
gym n asiu m 0.4 8 4 6 * * * 0 .5 5 7 1 * * * 0 .4 0 4 9 * * * 0 .4 0 8 0 * * * 0 .3 073*
(0 .1 2 9 8 ) (0 .0 6 9 9 ) (0 .0 7 3 6 ) (0 . 1 1 2 2 ) (0 .1 8 3 5 )
second ary  (4  years) 0 .0 6 6 6 0 .3 0 5 0 * * * 0 .3 6 4 8 * * * 0 .3 1 2 3 * * 0 .5 8 6 5 * *
(0 .1 7 0 5 ) (0 .1 0 7 5 ) (0 .1 1 1 8 ) (0 .1 5 7 2 ) (0 .2 6 2 3 )
second ary ( 1 - 2  years) 0 .2 2 0 9 * * 0 .3 1 5 6 * * * 0 .2 2 1 5 * * * 0 .2 1 6 3 * * * 0 .2 0 9 0
(0 .0 9 4 4 ) (0 .0 4 9 9 ) (0 .0 5 2 8 ) (0 .0 7 7 8 ) (0 .1 2 7 7 )
prim ary -0 .0 8 6 7 0 .0 8 4 7 0 .0 3 2 8 0 .0 1 0 4 0 .0731
(0 .1 7 7 3 ) (0 .0 9 8 3 ) (0 .1 0 5 8 ) (0 .1 5 7 6 ) (0 .2 4 6 4 )
exp 0 .0081 0 .0 1 3 8 * * * 0 .0091 0 .0 1 1 5 0 .0081
(0 .0 0 9 8 ) (0 .0 0 5 3 ) (0 .0 0 5 6 ) (0 .0 0 8 7 ) (0 .0 1 5 3 )
expsq -0 .0 0 0 3 * * -0 .0 0 0 3 * * * -0 .0 0 0 2 * -0 . 0 0 0 2 -0 .0 0 0 1
(0 .0 0 0 2 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 2 )
1 - 2  years o f  tenure 0 .1 3 4 2 0 .0 5 8 3 0 .0 1 0 8 -0 .1 2 3 9 0 .0 0 9 4
(0 .1 8 3 9 ) (0 .0 9 4 7 ) (0 . 1 0 1 0 ) (0 .1 4 9 7 ) (0 .2 4 9 9 )
3-5  years o f  tenure 0 .1 1 4 6 0 .0 7 6 9 -0 .0 1 4 6 -0 .0 9 9 3 -0 .1 6 8 4
(0 .1 1 7 9 ) (0 .0 6 4 2 ) (0 .0 6 8 1 ) (0 .1 0 2 9 ) (0 .1 6 4 3 )
6 - 1 0  years o f  tenure 0 .1 2 3 5 0.0151 0 .0 2 4 7 -0 .0 6 5 9 -0 .0 9 3 8
(0 .1 1 4 7 ) (0 .0 6 2 0 ) (0 .0 6 5 2 ) (0 .0 9 8 0 ) (0 .1 4 9 8 )
> 1 0  years o f  tenure 0 .1 2 3 2 0.0381 0 .0 3 1 2 -0 .0 5 1 5 0 . 0 2 0 1
(0 .0 9 0 9 ) (0 .0 4 9 3 ) (0 .0 5 2 4 ) (0 .0 7 9 2 ) (0 .1 3 9 0 )
married 0 .0 9 1 9 0 .0 8 9 0 * * 0 .0 4 3 2 0 .0 0 3 7 0.0471
(0 .0 7 9 4 ) (0 .0 4 2 2 ) (0 .0 4 4 6 ) (0 .0 6 6 7 ) (0 .1 0 7 9 )
urban 0 .0 6 8 9 0 .0 8 1 9 * * 0 .0 1 1 6 0 .0 4 4 3 -0 .1251
(0 .0 6 1 6 ) (0 .0 3 3 5 ) (0 .0 3 5 4 ) (0 .0 5 3 5 ) (0 .0 8 8 1 )
B elgrad e 0 .5 4 7 6 * * * 0 .4 4 2 5 * * * 0 .3 2 1 6 * * * 0 .3 1 3 0 * * * 0 .4 1 7 9 * * *
(0 .1 0 9 9 ) (0 .0 5 6 1 ) (0 .0 5 9 4 ) (0 .0 8 9 4 ) (0 .1 4 6 3 )
V ojvod ina 0 .2 7 1 1 * * * 0 .1 6 4 8 * * * 0 .0 7 4 2 0 .0 3 1 7 0 .1 0 9 0
(0 .0 9 1 6 ) (0 .0 4 8 3 ) (0 .0 5 0 7 ) (0 .0 7 6 5 ) (0 .1 2 4 4 )
W est Serbia 0 .2 5 8 8 * * 0 .0 9 2 5 0 .0 2 3 6 0 .0 9 3 4 0 .1 3 9 7
(0 .1 1 2 4 ) (0 .0 5 7 9 ) (0 .0 6 1 3 ) (0 .0 9 2 9 ) (0 .1 4 7 9 )
Sum adija and Pom oravlje 0 .3 0 8 8 * * * 0 .1 6 1 8 * * * 0 .1 8 8 5 * * * 0 .1 6 1 7 * * 0 .2 4 6 4 *
(0 .0 9 5 0 ) (0 .0 5 0 1 ) (0 .0 5 2 9 ) (0 .0 7 9 2 ) (0 .1 3 1 2 )
E ast Serbia 0.1641 0 .0 1 7 9 0 .0 4 4 3 0 .0 0 1 7 -0 .0821
(0 .1 1 2 4 ) (0 .0 5 9 9 ) (0 .0 6 3 8 ) (0 .0 9 5 5 ) (0 .1 5 2 6 )
constant 2 .8 0 9 1 * * * 3 .1 2 5 1 * * * 3 .6 8 9 9 * * * 4 .1 7 4 9 * * * 4 .6 3 2 7 * * *
(0 .1 5 1 7 ) (0 .0 8 3 1 ) (0 .0 8 7 0 ) (0 .1 2 6 8 ) (0 .2 0 7 2 )
N 1466 1466 1466 1466 1466
N otes: Standard errors in parentheses * p  <  0.10, ** p  <  0 .05, *** p  <  0.01; The omitted categories- basic education, 
tenure less than 1 year and South East Serbia.
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TABLE A9.7: QR estimates for females -  public sector in Serbia, 2003
0 = 0.10 0 = 0 .2 5
Females
0=0 .50 0=0.75 0=0.90
public 0.1785* 0.1850*** 0.0874*** -0.0486 -0.1462
(0.0923) (0.0494) (0.0328) (0.0515) (0.0930)
university 1.1518*** 1.1522*** 1.3055*** 1.4300*** 1.9437***
(0.2197) (0.3013) (0.1887) (0.2895) (0.2399)
post-secondary 0.7911*** 0.6314*** 0.8395*** 0.9548*** 0.9862***
(0.1629) (0.0943) (0.0614) (0.0966) (0.1850)
gymnasium 0.7340*** 0.5566*** 0.5849*** 0.5070*** 0.3889**
(0.1827) (0.1033) (0.0656) (0.1008) (0.1951)
secondary (4 years) 0.5201** 0.2082 0.3037*** 0.3156** 0.2286
(0.2374) (0.1271) (0.0827) (0.1252) (0.2293)
secondary ( 1-2 years) 0.3606*** 0.2386*** 0.3084*** 0.2856*** 0.2748*
(0.1355) (0.0744) (0.0475) (0.0728) (0.1410)
primary 0.1381 -0.2087 -0.0156 0.0500 0.0910
(0.2668) (0.1451) (0.0974) (0.1516) (0.2836)
exp 0.0289** 0.0273*** 0.0230*** 0.0162** 0.0078
(0.0129) (0.0071) (0.0046) (0.0073) (0.0129)
expsq -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0 .0001) (0.0001) (0 .0001) (0.0002)
1-2 years o f tenure 0.1538 0.1530 0.1072 0.0855 -0.0102
(0.2449) (0.1346) (0.0883) (0.1344) (0.2307)
3-5 years o f  tenure 0.2112 0.1695* 0.1467** 0.0807 0.1019
(0.1712) (0.0989) (0.0628) (0.0964) (0.1844)
6-10 years o f tenure 0.0931 0.0691 0.1399** 0.2148*** 0.2778*
(0.1552) (0.0866) (0.0545) (0.0820) (0.1596)
>10 years o f tenure -0.0768 0.0202 0.0507 0.0797 0.1065
(0.1257) (0.0706) (0.0459) (0.0701) (0.1259)
married 0.0478 -0.0374 -0.0378 -0.0322 -0.1006
(0.0910) (0.0539) (0.0349) (0.0540) (0.1028)
urban 0.1480 0.1075*** 0.0832** 0.0183 -0.0282
(0.0975) (0.0541) (0.0340) (0.0524) (0.1028)
Belgrade 0.3329** 0.2344*** 0.2159*** 0.1690** 0.1928
(0.1421) (0.0803) (0.0516) (0.0796) (0.1505)
Vojvodina 0.2344* 0.1821** 0.1172** 0.1384* 0.0820
(0.1325) (0.0738) (0.0471) (0.0715) (0.1346)
West Serbia 0.0573 -0.0540 -0.0402 -0.1351 -0.2319
(0.1685) (0.0945) (0.0608) (0.0919) (0.1849)
Sumadija and Pomoravlje 0.1925 0.1112 0.0993** 0.0311 -0.0205
(0.1414) (0.0789) (0.0503) (0.0766) (0.1477)
East Serbia -0.1954 0.0910 0.0412 -0.0268 -0.1091
(0.1679) (0.0937) (0.0601) (0.0926) (0.1758)
constant 2.3287*** 2.8773*** 3.1328*** 3.6508*** 4.1832***
(0.2159) (0.1204) (0.0782) (0.1207) (0.2555)
N 984 984 984 984 984
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses * p  < 0.10, ** p <  0 .05, *** p <  0.01; The omitted categories- basic education, 
tenure less than 1 year and South East Serbia.
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TABLE A9.8
QR estimates for males -  public sector as a dummy variable, 2003 Russia
0 = 0.10 0 = 0 .2 5
Males
0 = 0 .50 0=0.75 0=0.90
public 0.0772*** 0.0310** -0.0119 -0.0451*** -0.0791***
(0.0205) (0.0123) (0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0147)
university 0.5541*** 0.4666*** 0.3793*** 0.3588*** 0.3312***
(0.0315) (0.0192) (0.0167) (0.0187) (0.0230)
college 0.4233*** 0.3975*** 0.3202*** 0.2941*** 0.2827***
(0.0562) (0.0342) (0.0294) (0.0327) (0.0399)
secondary 0.2947*** 0.2441*** 0.1793*** 0.1558*** 0.1116***
(0.0243) (0.0148) (0.0127) (0.0143) (0.0176)
primary 0.1426*** 0.1421*** 0.0858*** 0.0552*** 0.0161
(0.0341) (0.0207) (0.0177) (0.0198) (0.0243)
exp -0.0025 0.0008 0.0049*** 0.0094*** 0.0106***
(0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0026)
expsq -0.0001 -0 .0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0 .0001) (0 .0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
managerial 0.2394*** 0.1837*** 0.1379*** 0.1172*** 0.1289***
(0.0239) (0.0147) (0.0128) (0.0145) (0.0178)
married 0.0862*** 0.1292*** 0.1320*** 0.1209*** 0.1293***
(0.0264) (0.0159) (0.0136) (0.0153) (0.0184)
1-2 years o f  tenure 0.1126*** 0.1538*** 0.1404*** 0.1137*** 0.0826***
(0.0330) (0.0201) (0.0172) (0.0192) (0.0236)
3-5 years o f tenure 0.2742*** 0.2747*** 0.2382*** 0.1939*** 0.1450***
(0.0367) (0.0223) (0.0191) (0.0214) (0.0263)
6-10 years o f  tenure 0.3470*** 0.3424*** 0.2903*** 0.2404*** 0 .2020***
(0.0356) (0.0215) (0.0185) (0.0207) (0.0255)
>10 years o f tenure 0.2756*** 0.3237*** 0.3238*** 0.2838*** 0.2360***
(0.0333) (0.0202) (0.0172) (0.0193) (0.0238)
arrears -0.6139*** -0.4895*** -0.3556*** -0.2939*** -0.2878***
(0.0245) (0.0150) (0.0131) (0.0146) (0.0180)
Central region 0.2950*** 0.2723*** 0.2365*** 0.2425*** 0.2697***
(0.0342) (0.0207) (0.0177) (0.0198) (0.0243)
North-West 0.6324*** 0.6616*** 0.6185*** 0.6185*** 0.6139***
(0.0375) (0.0227) (0.0194) (0.0217) (0.0266)
Siberia 0.2861*** 0.3376*** 0.3606*** 0.3742*** 0.4274***
(0.0379) (0.0230) (0.0197) (0.0220) (0.0270)
Far-East 0.7709*** 0.7702*** 0.7490*** 0.7379*** 0.7429***
(0.0377) (0.0229) (0.0196) (0.0218) (0.0268)
Urals 0.4793*** 0.4808*** 0.5247*** 0.6139*** 0.8012***
(0.0433) (0.0262) (0.0224) (0.0250) (0.0307)
Volga 0.1397*** 0.1811*** 0.1920*** 0.1811*** 0.1218***
(0.0357) (0.0217) (0.0186) (0.0208) (0.0255)
constant 1.2077*** 1.6390*** 2.1356*** 2.5448*** 2.9461***
(0.0481) (0.0292) (0.0250) (0.0278) (0.0337)
N 21874 21874 21874 21874 21874
Pseudo R2 0.1541 0.1430 0.1389 0.1331 0.1339
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p  < 0.10, ** p  < 0.05, *** p  < 0.01; The omitted categories- basic education, 
tenure less than 1 year and South region.
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TABLE A9.9
QR estimates for females -  public sector as a dummy variable, 2003 Russia
II © © 0 = 0 .2 5
Females
0=0 .50 0=0.15 0=0.90
public -0.0113 -0.0932*** -0.1050*** -0.0785*** -0.0953***
(0.0161) (0.0117) (0.0098) (0.0129) (0.0143)
university 0.5505*** 0.5496*** 0.5055*** 0.4387*** 0.4158***
(0.0227) (0.0165) (0.0137) (0.0182) (0 .0200)
college 0.4333*** 0.4159*** 0.4169*** 0.3612*** 0.3511***
(0.0394) (0.0287) (0.0239) (0.0314) (0.0341)
secondary 0.2103*** 0.2046*** 0.1660*** 0.1125*** 0.0914***
(0.0187) (0.0136) (0.0113) (0.0150) (0.0165)
primary 0.0792*** 0.0942*** 0.1044*** 0.0738*** 0.0654**
(0.0301) (0 .0220) (0.0182) (0.0239) (0.0260)
exp 0.0087*** 0.0125*** 0 .0121*** 0.0135*** 0.0153***
(0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0 .0022)
expsq -0.0002*** -0 .0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0 .0001) (0 .0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
managerial 0.2632*** 0.2303*** 0.1691*** 0.1411*** 0.1509***
(0.0166) (0 .0122) (0 .0102) (0.0137) (0.0152)
married -0.0394*** -0.0479*** -0.0433*** -0.0165 -0.0164
(0.0150) (0.0109) (0.0090) (0.0119) (0.0130)
1-2 years o f  tenure 0.0740*** 0.0854*** 0.0867*** 0.0677*** 0.0623***
(0.0258) (0.0189) (0.0156) (0.0205) (0.0224)
3-5 years o f tenure 0.1663*** 0.1455*** 0.1453*** 0.1336*** 0.1079***
(0.0289) (0 .0212) (0.0176) (0.0230) (0.0251)
6-10 years o f tenure 0.2319*** 0.2109*** 0.2181*** 0.1844*** 0.1509***
(0.0278) (0.0203) (0.0168) (0.0221) (0.0240)
>10 years o f tenure 0.2581*** 0.2440*** 0.2390*** 0.1972*** 0.1599***
(0.0260) (0.0190) (0.0158) (0.0209) (0.0230)
arrears -0.2556*** -0.2172*** -0.2142*** -0.2126*** -0.2164***
(0 .0200) (0.0148) (0.0124) (0.0163) (0.0178)
Central region 0.1400*** 0.1520*** 0.1786*** 0.2274*** 0.2836***
(0.0247) (0.0180) (0.0149) (0.0196) (0.0213)
North-West 0.5008*** 0.5544*** 0.5859*** 0.5884*** 0.6070***
(0.0272) (0.0199) (0.0164) (0.0216) (0.0234)
Siberia 0.2573*** 0.2998*** 0.3134*** 0.3508*** 0.4312***
(0.0275) (0 .0201) (0.0167) (0.0219) (0.0238)
Far-East 0.7035*** 0.7404*** 0.7694*** 0.8015*** 0.8314***
(0.0276) (0 .0202) (0.0167) (0.0219) (0.0237)
Urals 0.2518*** 0.3181*** 0.4097*** 0.5402*** 0.6810***
(0.0315) (0.0230) (0.0191) (0.0250) (0.0272)
Volga 0.1019*** 0.1171*** 0.1223*** 0.1449*** 0.1503***
(0.0260) (0.0190) (0.0158) (0.0207) (0.0225)
constant 1.0344*** 1.4114*** 1.8585*** 2.2389*** 2.5662***
(0.0357) (0.0266) (0 .0222) (0.0294) (0.0318)
N 24318 24318 24318 24318 24318
Pseudo R2 0.1471 0.1539 0.1535 0.1488 0.1438
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p  < 0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p  < 0.01; The omitted categories- basic education, 
tenure less than 1 year and South region.
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TABLE A9.10
QR estimates for males -  public sector in Tajikistan, 2003
0 = 0.10 0 = 0 .2 5
Males
0=0.50 0=0.75 0=0.90
public -0.0132 -0.0869* -0.1991*** -0.3818*** -0.4338***
(0.0683) (0.0498) (0.0426) (0.0530) (0.0695)
university 0.2844** 0.3565*** 0.2856*** 0.3872*** 0.2891**
(0.1293) (0.0924) (0.0790) (0.0986) (0.1287)
secondary technical 0.1540 0.1113 0.2032** 0.3508*** 0.3857**
(0.1518) (0.1096) (0.0933) (0.1156) (0.1505)
Secondary special -0.0685 0.0824 0.0382 0.1452 0.0979
(0.1446) (0.1060) (0.0895) (0.1117) (0.1461)
secondary general -0.0373 0.0243 0.0012 0.1105 0.0914
(0.1125) (0.0816) (0.0694) (0.0858) (0.1115)
primary 0.0823 0.0061 -0.1532 -0.3042* -0.4963**
(0.2492) (0.1811) (0.1501) (0.1820) (0.2291)
exp 0.0477*** 0.0388*** 0.0389*** 0.0341*** 0.0321***
(0.0107) (0.0076) (0.0065) (0.0081) (0.0110)
expsq -0.0009*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0006***
(0.0002) (0 .0001) (0.0001) (0 .0002) (0 .0002)
1-2 years o f tenure -0.0431 -0.0538 0.0012 0.1093 0.2758*
(0.1429) (0.1027) (0.0874) (0.1079) (0.1427)
3-5 years o f tenure -0.2013 -0.0538 -0.1263 -0.0529 -0.0685
(0.1341) (0.0965) (0.0819) (0.1008) (0.1337)
6-10 years o f tenure -0.1230 -0.0653 -0.1437* -0.1377 -0.0563
(0.1299) (0.0925) (0.0791) (0.0980) (0.1295)
>10 years of tenure -0.2760** -0.3334*** -0.4763*** -0.4807*** -0.3947***
(0.1365) (0.0963) (0.0816) (0.0999) (0.1292)
married 0.0493 0.0939 0.0991 0.0638 -0.0126
(0.1117) (0.0781) (0.0648) (0.0810) (0.1061)
urban 0.5066*** 0.4502*** 0.5215*** 0.5363*** 0.5098***
(0.0813) (0.0586) (0.0501) (0.0621) (0.0791)
Dushanbe -0.1255 -0.0072 -0.0375 0.0915 -0.1117
(0.1235) (0.0897) (0.0767) (0.0951) (0.1247)
Khatlon -0.1785 -0.1173 -0.2332*** -0.2177** -0.4393***
(0.1196) (0.0881) (0.0762) (0.0968) (0.1273)
Rrg region 0.3083** 0.2738** 0.1638* 0.2304** -0.0013
(0.1485) (0.1077) (0.0905) (0 .1101) (0.1460)
Gbao region 0.0993 0.3410*** 0.3591*** 0.4503*** 0.2978**
(0.1417) (0.1031) (0.0880) (0.1090) (0.1449)
constant 1.9347*** 2.4494*** 3.1894*** 3.7238*** 4.6155***
(0.1977) (0.1458) (0 .1210) (0.1507) (0.1968)
N 3006 3006 3006 3006 3006
Pseudo R2 0.1005 0.1078 0.1236 0.1271 0.1078
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p <  0.01; The omitted categories- basic 
education, tenure less than 1 year and Sogd region.
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TABLE A 9 .l l
QR estimates for females -  public sector in Tajikistan, 2003
<9=0.10 0 = 0 .2 5
Females
0=0 .50 0=0.75 0=0.90
public -0.0625* -0.1562*** -0.2424*** -0.2385*** -0.3144***
(0.0372) (0.0536) (0.0578) (0.0616) (0.0970)
university 0.5280*** 0.6678*** 0.7903*** 0.5911*** 0.6515***
(0.0771) (0.1090) (0.1113) (0.1144) (0.1813)
secondary technical 0.1995* 0.4660*** 0.7111*** 0.5876*** 0.3939*
(0.1168) (0.1642) (0.1666) (0.1633) (0.2332)
Secondary special 0.0377 0.1500 0.2655** 0.2545** 0.3181*
(0.0786) (0.1142) (0.1157) (0.1169) (0.1832)
secondary general 0.0220 0.0435 0.1657** 0.1761** 0 .2220*
(0.0567) (0.0799) (0.0799) (0.0796) (0.1218)
primary -0.2774*** -0.1930 -0.1316 0.0484 -0.0140
(0.0985) (0.1397) (0.1437) (0.1383) (0.2035)
exp 0.0128** 0.0166** 0.0281*** 0.0320*** 0.0232**
(0.0058) (0.0080) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0118)
expsq -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0 .0002) (0 .0002) (0.0002)
1-2 years o f tenure 0.0126 0.0914 -0.1269 -0.0064 0.0664
(0.0869) (0.1231) (0.1260) (0.1258) (0.1889)
3-5 years o f  tenure 0.0711 0.1994* 0.0213 0.0656 0.0489
(0.0812) (0.1158) (0.1176) (0.1163) (0.1742)
6-10 years o f  tenure 0.0303 0.0659 -0.0982 0.0257 0.1888
(0.0780) (0.1119) (0.1147) (0.1139) (0.1718)
>10 years o f tenure -0.0735 -0.0791 -0.3332*** -0.2594** -0.3499**
(0.0761) (0.1129) (0.1168) (0.1171) (0.1741)
married -0.1175*** -0.0922 -0.0493 -0.1372** -0.0851
(0.0439) (0.0622) (0.0614) (0.0599) (0.0924)
urban 0.2881*** 0.3010*** 0.3115*** 0.4636*** 0.4806***
(0.0458) (0.0665) (0.0706) (0.0715) (0.1147)
Dushanbe 0.0813 0.2719*** 0.3229*** 0.0994 0.1006
(0.0649) (0.0920) (0.0959) (0.0973) (0.1469)
Khatlon -0.0267 -0.0420 0.0932 -0.1897* -0.2674
(0.0641) (0.0919) (0.0988) (0.1031) (0.1673)
Rrg region 0.3823*** 0.6129*** 0.8000*** 0.5520*** 0.4701***
(0.0844) (0.1143) (0.1124) (0.1101) (0.1624)
Gbao region -0.0853 0.0917 0.1106 0.1078 0.3413*
(0.0772) (0.1128) (0.1151) (0.1162) (0.1785)
constant 1.6236*** 1.8623*** 2.2781*** 2.8720*** 3.4351***
(0.1073) (0.1464) (0.1540) (0.1550) (0.2534)
N 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832
Pseudo R2 0.0897 0.1111 0.1504 0.1877 0.1989
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p  < 0.10, ** p  < 0.05, *** p  < 0.01; The omitted categories- basic 
education, tenure less than 1 year and Sogd region.
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TABLE A9.12
Second stage QR estimates for the public and private sector earnings equations
containing selection terms for males in Bulgaria, 2003
Public sector earnings equation Private sector earnings equation
0 = 0.10 0=0 .50 0=0.90 0 = 0.10 0=0 .50 0=0.90
university 0.7844* 1.4329*** 0.9868 0.6430** 0.9374*** 0.6259**
(0.4055) (0.3513) (0.6573) (0.3003) (0.2437) (0.2658)
college 0.3402 1.0179*** 0.4792 0.3742 0.6716** 0.1033
(0.4491) (0.3607) (0.7124) (0.2861) (0.2855) (0.2873)
secondary 0.1554 0.2629** 0.1422 0.2042** 0.2143*** 0.2123**
(0.1327) (0.1091) (0.2003) (0.0819) (0.0733) (0.0952)
exp 0.0214 0.0264** 0.0210 0.0077 0.0113 -0.0047
(0.0142) (0 .0120) (0 .0220) (0.0099) (0.0085) (0.0098)
expsq -0.0005** -0.0006*** -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000
(0 .0002) (0 .0002) (0.0004) (0 .0002) (0 .0002) (0 .0002)
1-2 years 0.0033 0.3039* 0.0462 0.1992** 0.1723** -0.0426
(0.1311) (0.1559) (0.2778) (0.0880) (0.0770) (0.0893)
3-5 years 0.3161 1.0302*** 0.4947 0.2167 0.4456** -0.0811
(0.2902) (0.2784) (0.4903) (0 .2211) (0 .1845) (0.2017)
6-10 years 0.4279 1.6247*** 0.8257 0.4770 0.9490*** 0.0418
(0.4470) (0.4459) (0.7993) (0.3691) (0.3140) (0.3227)
>10 years 0.6371 2.3200*** 1.2597 0.4781 1.1028** 0.0231
(0.7148) (0.6443) (1.1894) (0.5250) (0.4482) (0.4625)
married 0.0672 0.3512*** 0.1569 -0.0079 0.0810 -0.0650
(0.1274) (0.1152) (0.2167) (0.0982) (0.0821) (0.0908)
managerial 0.1748 0.2309** 0.2892 0.4659** 0.3978** 0.1625
(0.1218) (0.1144) (0.2027) (0.1917) (0.1680) (0.1520)
urban -0.0249 0.1701** 0.2795* 0.1493** 0.2343*** 0.2252***
(0.1117) (0.0848) (0.1565) (0.0719) (0.0631) (0.0778)
Sofia -0.2074 -0.3371* -0.0843 0.0803 0.1708 0.5577***
(0.2124) (0.1833) (0.3294) (0.1388) (0.1321) (0.1475)
psl 0.8196 2.9484*** 1.8722 0.2739 0.7253 -0.9388
(1.2636) (1.0958) (1.8714) (1.0401) (0.8470) (0.8904)
ps2 -0 .1930 -0.4214* -0.3380 -0.2113 -0.4196 -0.4185
(0.2831) (0.2541) (0.3864) (0.5495) (0.5373) (0.5429)
constant -0.2124 -3.2078** -0.7205 0.5768*** 0.9954*** 1.4586***
(1.7391) (1.5292) (2.8009) (0.1461) (0.1350) (0.1665)
N 397 397 397 899 899 899
Standard errors in parentheses * p  <  0.10, * * p  < 0.05, ** * p <  0.01
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TABLE A9.13
Second stage QR estimates for the public and private sector earnings equations
containing selection terms for females in Bulgaria, 2003
Public sector earnings equation Private sector earnings equation
0 = 0.10 0=0.50 0=0.90 0 = 0.10 0=0 .50 0=0.90
university 0.5745*** 0.6527*** 0.2095 0.7267*** 0.6168*** 0.7087***
(0.1237) (0.1126) (0.2181) (0.1814) (0.1140) (0.1384)
college 0.2718* 0.2602** -0.1669 0.7208** 0.2646 -0.0086
(0.1513) (0.1301) (0.2716) (0.3138) (0.1651) (0.2434)
secondary 0.1344* 0.2594*** -0.2418* 0.4415*** 0.1599** 0.1971**
(0.0806) (0.0664) (0.1373) (0.1098) (0.0685) (0.0782)
exp 0.0332*** 0.0355*** 0.0243* 0.0182* 0 .0112* 0.0028
(0.0071) (0.0076) (0.0144) (0 .0101) (0 .0068) (0.0083)
expsq -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0005* -0.0004* -0.0002 0.0000
(0 .0001) (0 .0002) (0.0003) (0 .0002) (0 .0002) (0 .0002)
1 -2 years -0.0298 0.0123 0.1518 0.0408 0.0953 0.0433
(0.1132) (0.1013) (0.1734) (0.1035) (0.0697) (0.0948)
3-5 years 0.2345 0.0008 0.4491 0.3038 0.3086** 0.1016
(0.1611) (0.1633) (0.2959) (0.2219) (0.1382) (0.1755)
6-10 years 0.1615 -0.0833 0.4992 0.3034 0.5269*** 0.0667
(0.2569) (0.2330) (0.4163) (0.2969) (0.1926) (0.2542)
> 10 years 0.2191 -0.0412 0.6107 0.4530 0.4215** 0.1162
(0.2912) (0.2687) (0.4929) (0.3193) (0.1897) (0.2223)
married -0.0158 -0.0778* -0.0445 0.0493 -0.0301 0.0067
(0.0581) (0.0470) (0.0934) (0.0831) (0.0534) (0.0624)
managerial 0.0636 0.0199 0.0634 0.7005*** 0.5234*** 0.2868
(0.0842) (0.0871) (0.1996) (0.2681) (0.1721) (0.2294)
urban 0.0079 0.0512 0.1308 0.0366 0.0654 0.1394*
(0.0624) (0.0546) (0.0995) (0.0880) (0.0545) (0.0711)
Sofia -0.0308 0.0959 0.1492 0.0756 0.1297 -0.0924
(0.0912) (0.0814) (0.1418) (0.1420) (0.1203) (0.1610)
psl 0.0010 -0.1789 0.0791 0.1892 0.3154 0.2340
(0.4309) (0.3833) (0.7401) (0.6560) (0.4513) (0.5650)
ps2 -0.0019 -0.0094 0.0359 -0.1563 0.0677 0.3854
(0.1409) (0.1302) (0.2661) (0.5074) (0.3509) (0.4319)
constant 0.4123 1.0029** 1.3218* 0.2161 0.9217*** 1.3534***
(0.4563) (0.4118) (0.7724) (0.1551) (0.1119) (0.1483)
N 462 462 462 724 724 724
Standard errors in parentheses * p  <  0.10, ** p  < 0.05, *** p  <  0.01
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TABLE A9.14
Second stage QR estimates for the public and private sector earnings equations
containing selection terms for males in Serbia, 2003
Public sector earnings equation Private sector earnings equation
0 = 0.10 0=0 .50 0 = 0.10 0=0.50 0 = 0.10 0=0 .50
university 0.9957*** 1.0854*** 0.7145* 0.8024*** 0.1387 -0.4223
(0.2656) (0.3097) (0.4076) (0.1930) (0.3418) (0.3338)
post-secondary 0.6174 0.6402*** 0.9263 0.2567 0.5798*** 0.7785
(0.4462) (0.2236) (0.5828) (0.2637) (0.1998) (0.5647)
gymnasium 0.5476** 0.4809*** 0.6338** 0.3255* 0.3184** 0.2750
(0.2402) (0.1235) (0.3054) (0.1976) (0.1304) (0.3045)
secondary (4 years) -0.0880 0.2604 -0.0733 0.2245 0.4601*** 0.8416**
(0.3300) (0.1891) (0.4522) (0.1911) (0.1655) (0.4068)
secondary ( 1-2 years) -0.0172 0.2080** 0.2953 0.1465 0.1679* 0.3559
(0.1975) (0.0997) (0.2427) (0.1298) (0.0961) (0.2389)
primary 0.0029 0.1177 0.0685 0.1451 0.0997 0.1130
(0.1415) (0.0832) (0.2349) (0.1065) (0.0728) (0.1628)
exp 0.0218 0.0084 0.0230 0.0066 0.0121 0.0180
(0.0259) (0.0125) (0.0330) (0.0103) (0.0079) (0.0195)
expsq -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0 .0002) (0 .0001) (0.0004)
1 -2 years o f tenure 0.3530 0.1639 1.8629*** -0.4730 -0.1230 -0.1048
(0.5511) (0.2804) (0.6857) (0.2952) (0.2213) (0.5741)
3-5 years o f tenure -0.2021 0.0034 0.5426 -0.2868 0.0139 -0.1479
(0.5931) (0.2980) (0.7873) (0.3486) (0.2418) (0.6966)
6-10 years o f tenure -0.1117 0.0962 0.8050 -0.5299 -0.1448 -0.5136
(0.7044) (0.3444) (0.9448) (0.4041) (0.2941) (0.8621)
>10 years o f  tenure -0.4607 -0.0443 1.1441 -0.6709 -0.1552 -0.3181
(1.0114) (0.5014) (1.3692) (0.5762) (0.4085) (1.1921)
married 0.0079 0.0119 -0.0173 0.0687 0.0832 0.0489
(0.1256) (0.0712) (0.1773) (0.0994) (0.0698) (0.1590)
urban 0.0254 0.0156 -0.0071 0.1378* 0.0491 -0.1716
(0.1157) (0.0649) (0.1641) (0.0815) (0.0595) (0.1480)
Belgrade 0.4141 0.3872*** 0.0688 0.7458*** 0.3497*** 0.4343
(0.2586) (0.1269) (0.3168) (0.1666) (0.1167) (0.3032)
Vojvodina 0.0536 0.1378 -0.1130 0.5760*** 0.1140 0.1583
(0.2774) (0.1332) (0.3575) (0.1481) (0.1103) (0.3068)
West Serbia -0.0215 0.1367 -0.2237 0.5797*** 0.0567 0.2176
(0.3381) (0.1607) (0.4482) (0.1878) (0.1358) (0.3855)
Sumadija and Pomoravlje 0.0699 0.1592* 0.0706 0.4685*** 0.1810** 0.3058
(0.1647) (0.0863) (0.2130) (0.1222) (0.0869) (0.2054)
East Serbia -0.1256 0.0584 -0.2261 0.4419*** 0.0664 -0.0227
(0.2025) (0.1041) (0.2638) (0.1534) (0.1034) (0.2467)
psl -0.1071 -0.4298 -0.4085 -0.3001 1.1723 -1.2442
(1.8254) (0.9428) (2.5084) (1.4410) (0.9576) (2.5357)
ps2 -0.1036 0.0779 1.0147 0.9899 1.0393* -0.4540
(0.5994) (0.2785) (0.6597) (0.7870) (0.5618) (1.3924)
constant 3.4444* 3.8852*** 3.0324 2.1726*** 3.9672*** 3.8778***
(1.8107) (0.9031) (2.4690) (0.6563) (0.4402) (1.2473)
N 670 670 670 796 796 796
Standard errors in parentheses * p  < 0.10, ** p  <  0.05, *** p  < 0.01
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TABLE A9.15
Second stage QR estimates for the public and private sector earnings equations
containing selection terms for females in Serbia, 2003
Public sector earnings equation Private sector earnings equation
0 = 0.10 0=0 .50 II p o 0=0 .50 0 = 0.10 0=0.50
university 0.9023*** 1.1896*** 1.8276*** 2.5658*** 1.9037*** 1.1523**
(0.3448) (0.1656) (0.4244) (0.3404) (0.1410) (0.4593)
post-secondary 0.2730 0.6438*** 1.1892*** 0.2026 0.8703*** 1.3229***
(0.2828) (0.0795) (0.4159) (0.2955) (0.1443) (0.4260)
gymnasium 0.5568** 0.5211*** 0.5343 0.6052** 0.5354*** 0.3628
(0.2742) (0.0723) (0.3539) (0.2565) (0.1367) (0.4120)
secondary (4 years) 0.2869 0.3551*** 0.2143 0.2966 0.2826** 0.1151
(0.3282) (0.0964) (0.4484) (0.2554) (0.1397) (0.4274)
secondary ( 1-2 years) 0.2032 0.3281*** 0.1873 0.4185** 0.3010*** 0.4189*
(0.2123) (0.0538) (0.2955) (0.1915) (0.0802) (0.2425)
primary 0.0041 .0.1882*** -0.0127 0.2653 0.0913 0.1712
(0.2089) (0.0614) (0.3371) (0.2123) (0.0914) (0.2806)
exp -0.0096 -0.0075 0.0164 0.0265 0.0351*** 0.0103
(0.0356) (0.0097) (0.0415) (0.0189) (0.0082) (0.0248)
expsq 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005*** - 0.0000
(0.0007) (0 .0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004)
1 -2 years o f  tenure -0.6588 -0.3109** 0.4949 -0.1216 0.2598 -0.1633
(0.5954) (0.1303) (0.4940) (0.3843) (0.1879) (0.5508)
3-5 years o f  tenure -0.4923 -0.1005 0.6424 -0.0137 0.2311 -0.2113
(0.5534) (0.1094) (0.5092) (0.3789) (0.1650) (0.4654)
6-10 years o f  tenure -0.6343 -0.1450 0.6414 -0.3472 0.1103 0.1506
(0.4825) (0.1075) (0.5951) (0.3356) (0.1618) (0.5164)
>10 years o f  tenure -0.9432* -0.2130* 0.7624 -0.3117 0.1502 -0.1066
(0.5202) (0.1155) (0.6161) (0.3608) (0.1782) (0.5749)
married -0.0509 -0.0396 -0.0587 -0.0648 -0.0829 -0.0098
(0.1580) (0.0388) (0.2015) (0.1223) (0.0627) (0.1870)
urban 0.0695 0.0657* 0.0356 0.1895 0 .1200* 0.0455
(0.1598) (0.0375) (0.1817) (0.1462) (0.0621) (0.2213)
Belgrade 0.5245** 0.3299*** 0.2054 0.2833 0.2471** 0.3039
(0.2237) (0.0590) (0.3012) (0.2250) (0.1033) (0.3276)
Vojvodina 0.4789** 0.2407*** -0.0680 0.3909* 0.0824 0.1778
(0.2248) (0.0585) (0.2994) (0.2194) (0.0946) (0.3010)
West Serbia 0.2434 0.1493** -0.2231 -0.0440 -0.1646 -0.3433
(0.2620) (0.0643) (0.3487) (0.2567) (0.1158) (0.3490)
Sumadija and Pomoravlje 0.2188 0.1790*** 0.0538 0.1811 0.0682 0.2200
(0.2232) (0.0532) (0.2628) (0.1965) (0.0955) (0.2887)
East Serbia 0.1367 0.2059*** -0.0805 -0.3495 -0.1043 -0.0645
(0.2764) (0.0677) (0.3298) (0.2342) (0 .1122) (0.3728)
psl -2.0892** -0.4289** 0.3416 -0.5050 0.4949 -0.2732
(0.8308) (0.2172) (1.0097) (1.2798) (0.5766) (1.9890)
ps2 0.5569 0.0253 0.0783 0.0748 0.2861 -0.2246
(0.4521) (0.1057) (0.4288) (0.8931) (0.4235) (1.4249)
constant 4.9557*** 4.0516*** 3.2224*** 2.1322*** 3.1710*** 3.9271***
(0.8569) (0.2168) (1.1194) (0.3883) (0.1799) (0.5860)
N 498 • 498 498 486 486 486
Standard errors in parentheses */? < 6.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p <  0.01
3 4 1
TABLE A9.16
Second stage QR estimates for the public and private sector earnings equations
containing selection terms for males in Russia, 2003
Public sector earnings equation Private sector earnings equation
0 = 0.10 0=0.50 0 = 0.10 0=0.50 0 = 0.10 0=0.50
university 0.4964*** 0.3450*** 0.2949*** 0.4431*** 0.4009*** 0.3897***
(0.0351) (0.0201) (0.0283) (0.0541) (0.0309) (0.0393)
college 0.2593*** 0.2320*** 0.2265*** 0.4535*** 0.3685*** 0.3505***
(0.0646) (0.0377) (0.0521) (0.0879) (0.0492) (0.0616)
secondary 0.2482*** 0.1681*** 0.0782*** 0.2446*** 0.1743*** 0.1441***
(0.0284) (0.0162) (0.0230) (0.0383) (0.0215) (0.0273)
primary 0.0797** 0.0408* -0.0139 0.1373*** 0.1127*** 0.0455
(0.0403) (0.0230) (0.0323) (0.0528) (0.0291) (0.0365)
exp -0.0049 0.0075*** 0.0125*** -0.0039 0.0101*** 0.0069*
(0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0058) (0.0031) (0.0039)
expsq - 0.0000 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 0.0000 -0.0003*** -0 .0002**
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0 .0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
managerial 0.1746*** 0.0996*** 0.0992*** 0.3392*** 0.2260*** 0.1710***
(0.0264) (0.0154) (0 .0220) (0.0422) (0.0240) (0.0303)
married 0.1177*** 0.1266*** 0.1305*** 0.0857** 0.1353*** 0.1599***
(0.0313) (0.0175) (0.0244) (0.0406) (0.0225) (0.0278)
1 -2 years o f tenure 0.1403*** 0.1474*** 0.0940*** 0.1248*** 0.0964*** 0.0656**
(0.0425) (0.0244) (0.0344) (0.0465) (0.0259) (0.0320)
3-5 years o f tenure 0.2762*** 0.2263*** 0.1826*** 0.2583*** 0.1839*** 0.1140***
(0.0450) (0.0259) (0.0367) (0.0555) (0.0304) (0.0379)
6-10 years o f  tenure 0.3341*** 0.2312*** 0.1951*** 0.1722*** 0.1940*** 0.2218***
(0.0452) (0.0251) (0.0353) (0.0571) (0.0313) (0.0386)
>10 years o f tenure 0.2881*** 0.2744*** 0.2464*** 0.0907* 0.1948*** 0.2304***
(0.0429) (0.0240) (0.0337) (0.0515) (0.0283) (0.0355)
arrears -0.3164*** -0.2814*** -0.2768*** -0.7190*** -0.4329*** -0.2900***
(0.0281) (0.0168) (0.0236) (0.0383) (0 .0222) (0.0283)
Central region 0.2255*** 0.3074*** 0.3699*** 0.3021*** 0.1247*** 0.1155***
(0.0391) (0.0222) (0.0313) (0.0550) (0.0304) (0.0380)
North-West 0.5834*** 0.6320*** 0.6683*** 0.5793*** 0.5583*** 0.5149***
(0.0422) (0.0241) (0.0340) (0.0618) (0.0341) (0.0427)
Siberia 0.2805*** 0.3593*** 0.4463*** 0.2715*** 0.2982*** 0.4044***
(0.0436) (0.0249) (0.0350) (0.0608) (0.0336) (0.0418)
Far-East 0.7503*** 0.7967*** 0.7643*** 0.6742*** 0.6209*** 0.7450***
(0.0412) (0.0236) (0.0332) (0.0656) (0.0365) (0.0452)
Urals 0.3177*** 0.5251*** 0.8542*** 0.5587*** 0.4515*** 0.6600***
(0.0506) (0.0288) (0.0405) (0.0678) (0.0374) (0.0464)
Volga 0.1166*** 0.2171*** 0.1872*** 0.1670*** 0.1152*** 0.0053
(0.0407) (0.0233) (0.0329) (0.0580) (0.0321) (0.0399)
psl -0.5765*** 0.1017* 0.5784*** -12.7486*** -9.5304*** -7.8672***
(0.1083) (0.0565) (0.0728) (1.1738) (0.6573) (0.9042)
ps2 0.0734 -0.3551*** -0.5592*** -7.5415*** -5.4560*** -4.6119***
(0.0849) (0.0454) (0.0578) (0.7334) (0.4115) (0.5719)
constant 1.4666*** 2.1551*** 2.7806*** -3.7306*** -1.7887*** -0.1630
(0.0598) (0.0336) (0.0456) (0.4395) (0.2441) (0.3285)
N 13020 13020 13020 8854 8854 8854
Standard errors in parentheses */? < 0.10, ** p <  0.05, * * * /? <  0.01
3 4 2
TABLE A 9.17
QR estimates for second stage estimates for the public and private sector earnings
equations containing selection terms for males in Tajikistan, 2003
Public sector earnings equation Private sector earnings equation
0 = 0.10 0=0 .50 0 = 0.10 0=0 .50 0 = 0.10 0=0 .50
university 0.4529*** 0.3078*** 0.1980 -0.0881 0.0062 0.1711
(0.1639) (0.0868) (0.1953) (0.1707) (0.1148) (0.2167)
secondary technical 0.2267 0 .2222** 0.4671** -0.0137 0.0160 0.0927
(0.1791) (0.0968) (0.2142) (0.1614) (0.1118) (0.2137)
secondary special -0.0574 0.0859 0.2429 0.1286 -0.1750 0.0667
(0.1810) (0.0947) (0.2137) (0.1542) (0.1065) (0.1997)
secondary general 0.0958 0.0923 0.3135* 0.1046 -0.0194 0.1045
(0.1481) (0.0781) (0.1747) (0.1090) (0.0780) (0.1423)
primary -0.1977 -0.0039 -0.0756 0.4091* -0.2001 -0.4808*
(0.2609) (0.1663) (0.3979) (0.2379) (0.1640) (0.2789)
exp 0.0218 0.0262*** 0.0288** 0.0471*** 0.0285*** 0.0166
(0.0136) (0.0067) (0.0145) (0.0099) (0.0075) (0.0156)
expsq -0.0004 -0.0006*** -0.0006** -0 .0010*** -0.0006*** -0.0003
(0.0003) (0 .0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0 .0001) (0.0003)
1-2 years o f  tenure -0.1325 -0.1016 0.4219* -0.0158 0.0983 0.3286*
(0.2131) (0.1113) (0.2469) (0.1329) (0.0919) (0.1742)
3-5 years o f tenure 0.0420 -0.1017 -0.0476 -0.1326 -0.1772** -0.0191
(0.1848) (0.0978) (0.2155) (0.1338) (0.0893) (0.1745)
6-10 years o f tenure -0.0824 -0.1249 -0.2263 -0.2231 -0.2279** -0.1787
(0.1772) (0.0933) (0.1989) (0.1402) (0.0922) (0.1857)
>10 years o f  tenure 0.1331 -0.1750* -0.5306*** -0.6207*** -0.6846*** -0.3667
(0.1878) (0.0985) (0.2028) (0.1628) (0.1105) (0.2245)
married 0.1229 -0.0158 -0.2871* -0.0238 0.1759** 0.0618
(0.1407) (0.0711) (0.1623) (0.1075) (0.0751) (0.1389)
urban 0.2180** 0.3165*** 0.4103*** 0.7021*** 0.6630*** 0.6587***
(0.0918) (0.0507) (0.1107) (0.0898) (0.0606) (0 .1201)
Dushanbe 0.0002 0.1338* -0.1221 -0.4557** -0.0112 0.3023
(0.1361) (0.0709) (0.1529) (0.1911) (0.1256) (0.2384)
Khalton 0.0411 0.1736** -0.1538 -0.3533* -0.2257* -0.0017
(0.1303) (0.0710) (0.1556) (0.1925) (0.1303) (0.2593)
Rrg region 0.4008*** 0.4354*** 0.3396* 0.0763 -0.0109 -0.3668
(0.1525) (0.0779) (0.1812) (0.2140) (0.1385) (0.2546)
Gbao region -0.0340 0.5064*** 0.9380*** 0.0560 0.2107 0.3159
(0.1497) (0.0808) (0.1639) (0.2020) (0.1347) (0.2534)
psl -0.2940 0.5874*** 0.7703* 0.2632 0.9592 -0.1961
(0.3747) (0.1882) (0.4295) (1.0104) (0.7136) (1.3748)
ps2 0.1886 -0.4642*** -0.6724*** 1.2816* 1.8105*** 1.0133
(0.2153) (0.1096) (0.2568) (0.7077) (0.4980) (0.9122)
constant 1.8959*** 2.7859*** 4.1621*** 1.8434*** 3.1891*** 3.8763***
(0.3008) (0.1503) (0.3115) (0.3895) (0.2848) (0.5645)
N 1397 1397 1397 1609 1609 1609
Standard errors in parentheses */? < 0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01
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TABLE A9.18
QR estimates for second stage estimates for the public and private sector earnings
equations containing selection terms for females in Tajikistan, 2003
Public sector earnings equation Private sector earnings equation
0 = 0.10 0=0 .50 0 = 0.10 0=0 .50 0 = 0.10 0=0.50
university 0.7362*** 0.8116*** 0.7736*** -0.1387*** 0.6445*** 0.6659
(0.2452) (0.1184) (0.1597) (0.0430) (0.2040) (0.4335)
secondary technical 0.4278 0.4074*** 0.6304*** 0.0697 0.4037 0.0021
(0.3201) (0.1500) (0.1992) (0.0604) (0.2559) (0.2924)
secondary special 0.1448 0.2329* 0.3850** 0.1051** 0.5333*** 0.3128
(0.2529) (0.1215) (0.1572) (0.0482) (0.1966) (0.3978)
secondary general 0.1730 0.0901 0.1189 0.0188 0.1284 0.1586
(0.2056) (0.0969) (0.1182) (0 .0221) (0.0906) (0.1666)
primary -0.0628 -0.1410 0.1013 -0.2859*** -0.1917 -0.4616*
(0.3535) (0.1721) (0.1881) (0.0472) (0.1660) (0.2799)
exp 0.0146 0.0236*** 0.0328*** 0.0010 0 .0212** 0.0087
(0.0169) (0.0089) (0.0116) (0.0030) (0.0100) (0.0176)
expsq -0.0003 -0.0005*** -0.0006** - 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0004) (0 .0002) (0.0003) (0 .0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
1 -2 years o f tenure -0.5217* -0.1450 -0.0738 0.2721*** -0.0326 0.0946
(0.2717) (0.1438) (0.1891) (0.0408) (0.1514) (0.3047)
3-5 years o f  tenure 0.0213 -0.0205 0.2196 0.1891*** 0.1365 0.1132
(0.2381) (0.1243) (0.1580) (0.0370) (0.1393) (0.2669)
6-10 years o f tenure -0.1129 -0.1592 0.0694 0.1492*** 0.1400 0.3563
(0.2227) (0.1206) (0.1596) (0.0378) (0.1414) (0.2632)
>10 years o f tenure -0.0810 0.0224 0.0689 0.1171*** 0.0527 -0.2736
(0.2396) (0.1251) (0.1610) (0.0426) (0.1644) (0.3213)
married -0.1417 -0.0999* -0.2148*** 0.0005 -0.0383 0.0751
(0.1198) (0.0581) (0.0787) (0.0213) (0.0840) (0.1520)
urban -0.1019 0.0154 0.2395*** 0.6993*** 0.5044*** 0.6083***
(0.1219) (0.0625) (0.0865) (0.0283) (0.0988) (0.2256)
Dushanbe 0.0185 0.5184*** 0.2591** -0.9655*** -0.4881*** -0.2720
(0.1520) (0.0778) (0.1054) (0.0406) (0.1658) (0.3084)
Khalton 0.0489 0.3512*** 0.0191 -0.8772*** -0.7508*** -0.7833**
(0.1729) (0.0893) (0.1330) (0.0485) (0.1890) (0.3652)
Rrg region 0.4742** 0.8405*** 0.7975*** -0.3819*** 0.0859 -0.0637
(0.1872) (0.0938) (0.1119) (0.0463) (0.1802) (0.3319)
Gbao region 0.0216 0.2614*** 0.6310*** -0.9926*** -0.6989*** -0.1977
(0.1879) (0.0959) (0.1361) (0.0472) (0.1883) (0.3615)
psl -0.3952 0.2724 0.9975*** 0.0500 1.1380 1.4732
(0.4687) (0.2149) (0.2710) (0.3651) (1.2326) (2.2706)
ps2 0.3792 -0.0047 -0.3895** 0.5678** 1.2764 1.8406
(0.3062) (0.1399) (0.1820) (0.2358) (0.8314) (1.6000)
constant 1.6365*** 1.9013*** 2.3315*** 2.2105*** 3.1366*** 4.1153***
(0.3287) (0.1722) (0.2154) (0.1382) (0.4802) (0.9220)
N 812 812 812 1020 1020 1020
Standard errors in parentheses */? < 0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01
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FIGURE A 9.1
Comparison between uncorrected ‘unexplained’ gap and endogeneity corrected
unobservable gap for males in Tajikistan, 2003
Males, 2003
0.4-
0 . 2 -
o.o-
- 0 .2 -
-0 .4-
- 0 .6 -
9.6 .81 3 ,5 70 .2 .4
Q uantile
Uncorrected 'unexpla ined' gap 
E ndogeneity corrected unobservable gap
3 4 5
CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
10.1. Introduction
This thesis undertook country specific empirical research on a range of key labour 
market indicators. The empirical findings have contributed in filling the gap in the 
existing literature on returns to education, gender wage gap and public-private wage 
differential in a number of post-transition countries. The current Chapter highlights 
and summarises the key findings from each of the preceding empirical essays and 
develops overall conclusions. Broader examination of the contribution of the thesis 
provides a more informative point to consider the possible policy implications and 
directions for future research.
Each chapter in the present thesis examined our main objectives’ providing empirical 
evidence to implement and support this. Several contributions have been made. First, 
the literature has been enhanced by providing comprehensive analysis on the returns 
to education, gender wage gap and public-private sector wage differential in four 
transition countries -  Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan. Relatively few studies 
were found which had covered together a number of countries. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first empirical study that estimates evolution of returns to 
education in Bulgaria over the transition period from the early 1986 to 2003. The main 
novelty in respect of the first empirical study lays on the estimation of the rate of 
returns to education controlling for endogeneity and selectivity bias in a quantile 
regression framework. Second, contributions have been made to the econometrics 
literature by extending the popular Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition 
technique and considering the ‘index’ number problem. The proposed technique has 
not been applied before in the context of gender earnings gap and sector wage 
differential in the selected transition countries. The third contribution has been to 
further extend the technique by considering the endogenous sector choice. The idea 
was to use the technique to simulate other counterfactual distributions for public and 
private sector workers by using sector selection adjusted coefficients and being
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sampled from the whole sample of workers. The method for accounting for 
endogenous selection also allowed decomposition of the selection gap into a 
component due to observables and component due to unobservable characteristics. 
Finally, the technique has been further modified by adapting a time-wise 
decomposition framework in order to identify the main factors contributing to the 
changes in the ratio of the public to private sector earnings for two periods identified 
as being of interest. Again the study for Bulgaria is the first one which examined the 
differences in the sector wage differential across the earrings distribution in early 
1986. As far as it is known, the study on public-private sector gap is the first one that 
both controls for endogeneous sector choice and analyses the public sector pay gap 
across the distribution in the selected transition countries. The results will be of 
interest to both policy makers and practitioners interested in what has happened to the 
relative pay of public and private sector workers over time.
10.2. Summary of main findings
Returns to education over time
The first empirical analysis permitted us to account for the variation in the rate of 
returns to education in Bulgaria over time, looking at the rates of returns to education 
in pre-1990s period. The study estimated returns to education before and during 
transition from centrally planned to market economy for a country that has received 
little attention in the literature. The main finding was that returns to education in 
Bulgaria increased over time, which confirmed the statement that increase in human 
capital would raise productivity and thus would increase individual earnings. While 
the average returns to education were positive and quite low during the communist 
regime -  in the range of 1.1% for males and 2.1% for females in 1986, it increased to 
5.8% for males and 6.7% for females in 2003, when the wage constraints imposed by 
the ‘old regime’ were relaxed. In line with Flabbi et al. (2008) the largest increase in 
the rate of returns to education took place in the early transition period, when it 
increased from 1.1% in 1986 to 4.5% in 1995 for males and from 2.1% to 7.0% for 
females. Women also showed higher returns to education than men. The most 
prominent increase in the rate of returns to education over the period of 1986 to 2003 
occurred at the top of the earnings distribution, where the rate of returns to education,
3 4 7
in particular for females, rose from a negative and insignificant value in 1986 to 
nearly 7% in 2003.
The study also addressed the selectivity and endogeneity biases by adopting 
Heckman’s two-step, semi-parametric two-step approach, and instrumental variable 
method. The sample selection correction has not made a significant difference in the 
coefficients for both males and females in Bulgaria. In almost all specifications, the 
Mills ratio and the power series approximation terms were statistically insignificant. 
Only for males in 1995, the two approximation terms were significant at 5% level. 
The similarity of the parametric and semi-parametric two-step estimates indicated that 
inclusion of the two approximation terms essentially performed the same task as the 
inclusion of the Mills ratio. The endogeneity issue in the education-eamings 
relationship was examined by instrumenting years of schooling with mother’s 
education and variation in the average regional schooling. Assumption in applying the 
regional average differences in schooling as an instrument was based on the data 
district’s educational composition, which provided evidence on diverse regional 
human capital concentration. The corresponding IV results revealed a similar 
increasing pattern over time. By using mother education as an instrument for 
schooling, the IV estimates for males rose from 2.2% in 1986 to 9.9% in 2003. 
Similarly, for females the returns to education increased from 4.2% in 1986 to 10.5% 
in 2003. Overall, the endogeneity adjusted returns to education estimates increased by 
approximately 42% as compared to the OLS estimates, and this is broadly in line with 
the literature. The estimates have not changed significantly in the over-identified 
specifications where both mother’s education and regional average schooling were 
used as instruments for schooling.
An explanation for the steady increase in the rate of returns to education was that, as a 
transition country, Bulgaria moved from a system of compressed wage scale to a 
market-oriented system. The 1980s was a decade of considerable economic change. 
The situation changed with transition, when the structure of incentives was 
progressively altered in favour of college and university education. The expansion of 
skill-intensive services increased the demand for more educated employees in 
Bulgaria. However, it was not the intention to evaluate the systematic link between 
education, economic reforms and technological changes. Following Flabbi et al.
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(2008) it was found that returns to education in Bulgaria evolved differently across the 
distribution and we indicated that non-competitive forces might have determined the 
wage levels. The results demonstrated that the returns to education for both males and 
females in Bulgaria were driven by an increasing trend in the upper end of the 
conditional wage distribution.
Heterogeneity in returns to education
In the second empirical study we examined dispersion of the returns to education in 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan, attempting to test for evidence of 
heterogeneity for individuals in the upper part of the wage distribution as compared to 
the individuals in the lower part of the distribution. It was advantageous to have data 
for each country for the same year, as this allowed comparison of the results between 
countries. The estimates suggested a monotonic increase in the rate of returns to 
education across the conditional earnings distribution for both males and females in 
Bulgaria and for females in Tajikistan. Returns to education in Bulgaria increased
th t hbetween the 10 and 90 percentile levels from 3.9% to 6.2% for males and from
th  •4.7% to 7.2% for females. For females in Tajikistan, the return at the 10 percentile 
was no greater than 6% and it reached 12% at the 90th percentile. In contrast, for both 
males and females in Russia, the estimated returns to education were higher at the 
lower part of the earnings distribution, suggesting that education had higher impact on 
the Tess able’ individuals. A little heterogeneity in the estimated returns to education 
was found in Serbia.
The selectivity bias was also addressed by applying Buchinsky (1998) semi- 
parametric approach. The results for both males and females in Russia and for males 
in Tajikistan were sensitive to the inclusion of the power series approximation terms. 
In Russia there was compelling evidence of strong sample selection effect at the 
bottom of the distribution where the estimated coefficients increased from 11.7% to 
14.6% for males and from 12.1% to 19.4% for females. Correcting for selection had a 
drastic effect on the returns to schooling at the 10th percentiles for males in Tajikistan, 
changing the coefficient from insignificant to significantly different from zero. 
However, the two power-series correction terms were not significant for either males 
or females in Bulgaria and Serbia. The test of whether the selectivity corrected returns
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to education differ across each quanitle levels was significantly different for female 
workers in Bulgaria and Tajikistan and for males in Russia.
The issue of endogeneity in the quantile regression framework was considered by 
applying Lee’s (2007) control function approach. For all four countries, the DWH test 
undertaken at the mean led to strong rejection of the null hypothesis of exogeneity in 
education, therefore correcting for endogeneity was a necessary step in the analysis. 
Overall, the endogeneity adjusted QR estimates were higher with the unadjusted 
estimates. Finally, by considering both endogeneity and sample selection biases, the 
quantile regression point estimates for Russia suggested considerable homogeneity 
across conditional wage distribution. The negative earnings premium, found in the 
unadjusted QR estimates, was no more evident.
Gender wage differential in transition
The third empirical study considered the gender wage gap across entire earnings 
distribution by examining the same countries of interest. Applying the extended 
quantile regression decomposition to data from Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia and 
Tajikistan, positive coefficient effect was found across the whole earnings 
distribution, indicating that in all these countries otherwise identical men and women 
receive different returns to their characteristics. The coefficient effect was larger at the 
top of the distribution than at the bottom for both years in Bulgaria, Serbia and 
Tajikistan. The observed positive and significant differential, found in Russia, was 
larger at the middle of the distribution. The decomposition results indicated that the 
gender wage differential in Bulgaria, Russia and Serbia was mainly attributed to 
differences in return, that is, the ‘male advantage’ and ‘female disadvantage’ and to a 
lesser extent to the employee’s endowment component. Hence, the conclusion is that 
the observed gender differences in human capital characteristics appeared to be too 
small (and often in favour of women) to explain the large wage discrepancies between 
men and women.
A further interesting consideration concerned the changes in the composition of the 
samples over time. The study focused on two time periods in order to observe whether 
the differences in payment between men and women have changed over time. 
Unfortunately, the data availability did not permit us to explore the changes over a
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longer time span and to examine the position before 1990 in all four countries. We 
found that both coefficient and covariate components of the gap contributed to the 
actual evolution of the gender wage differential over time. The largest fraction of the 
gap was attributed to the differences in the coefficient component. Overall, there was 
a clear trend in narrowing of the earnings differential over the examined period for 
both males and females in Bulgaria, Serbia and Russia. In 2007, the overall gender 
wage gap decreased in Serbia, but the coefficient effect of the gap was pronounced 
especially at the higher end of the wage distribution. In contrast, the estimated 
differential for Tajikistan has risen over the observed period and this was mainly due 
to the increased effect of the endowment component. The relatively high unexplained 
wage differential in Russia is in line with Newell and Reilly (2001) findings. In 
Bulgaria and Serbia, women showed more favourable observed characteristics than 
men.
Public-private wage differential
The third essay provided a comprehensive empirical study of the wage differential 
between the public and private sector in Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan. 
Given differences in the sector wage setting procedures, the study sought to ascertain 
whether identical individuals working in the same job in the public and in the private 
sector would earn the same or a different amount. Public sector men and women in 
Bulgaria were found to be the ones who derive the greatest financial benefit from such 
employment. The advantage enjoyed by public sector workers in Bulgaria tended to 
be higher for males. Although public sector employees in Russia have individual 
characteristics that were more conducive to a higher remuneration, they faced a wage 
penalty, especially at the top of the distribution. A negative sector wage differential 
across the entire wage distribution was found for females in Russia and for males in 
Serbia. In Serbia, the advantage enjoyed by public sector females tended to be higher 
than those found for males. At the top of the conditional earnings distribution, 
however, Serbian women, like men, tended to face a wage penalty from being 
employed in the public sector. In Tajikistan, a positive wage premium was found at 
the lower part of the distribution, and significant wage penalty at the upper part of the 
distribution, a result similar to a number of international studies (see for example 
Blackaby et al., 1999, Poterba and Rueben, 1998).
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The selection process between both sectors was also considered. As a first step 
estimation for the endogenous selection correction, an estimation was made of the 
probability of working in the public sector conditional on a set of characteristics in a 
probit equation. Since probit equation depends for consistency heavily on the 
distributional assumption, the sector choice equation was also estimated using single 
index model (Ichimura, 1993). For the identification of the selection effect a variable 
which allowed for a possible regional variation in the public sector employment was 
constructed. With some exceptions, the coefficients of the probit and the single index 
estimates were not fundamentally different. The standard errors of the probit estimates 
were generally slightly lower than those of the single index model. Overall, in three of 
the countries, the probability to work in the public sector increased with higher 
education and the worker’s tenure. As the intercept in the wage equations is not 
separately identified in the quantile regression models and it is conflated with the 
constant term of the higher order power series, Anndrews and Scahfgan (1998) 
identification at unity was followed.
The results of the sector wage gap show that controlling for the endogenous sector 
choice has an important impact on the estimated public-private wage gap. Public 
sector employees located at the lower end of the wage distribution were positively 
selected for this sector. At the end of the distribution, those with the highest wage 
potential chose the private sector. These findings are largely consistent with the rest of 
the related literature (Heitmueller (2004), Barbosa and Filho (2008)). In particular, our 
results indicate that when the endogeneity is considered, in most cases, the sector 
wage gap tended to be lower compared against the uncorrected results obtained by 
adopting the modified Machado and Mata procedure. However, the sector wage gap 
for females in Bulgaria widened, which suggests that Bulgarian women were 
positively selected into the public sector.
The study also explored what had happened to the public sector hourly wage 
differential at different points in the conditional earnings distribution over time by 
providing further evidence for Bulgaria and Russia. We found that the sector wage 
differential widened over time for both males and females in Bulgaria. The increase in 
the public earnings tended to be higher at the top of the conditional earnings 
distribution. Differences in the observable characteristics gained importance over time
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in accounting for the general increasing trend in the public sector earnings distribution 
in Bulgaria. The sector wage differential in Russia tended to increase over time for 
males. In contrast, the differential changed substantially over the observed period for 
females. Further investigation of what lay behind this change suggests that both 
changes in the wage advantages/disadvantages of public and private sector in Russia 
and changes in the characteristics of workers at which the advantages/disadvantages 
was measured, contributed to the overall coefficient effect.
10.3. Policy implications and recommendations
In concluding the present thesis, the policy implications of our research will be 
considered. This is a difficult task due to the fact that establishing a link between 
research results and policy initiative is not always straightforward. The main policy 
implications and recommendations that can be drawn from the empirical evidence can 
be summarised in several points.
The economic return to education is a fundamental parameter of interest in many 
different areas of economics and public policy. It allows researchers to perceive the 
significance of the role played by education in terms of enhancing an individual’s 
wage perspectives. The importance of the returns to education is seen in the OECD 
adoption as a key indicator in their annual Education at Glance series. The observed 
increasing trend in the rate of returns to education between 1986 and 2003 suggests 
that the liberalised Bulgarian economy has responded to the market forces by 
providing larger returns for human capital investment. These results may reflect 
transformation of the labour market to a more flexible and less rigid wage structure. 
Increased returns to education may be due to the need of wages to respond to market 
forces after transition.
The finding of education-ability complementarities has potentially strong 
implications. The fact that returns to education can be heterogeneous across 
individuals has implications for the inequality-reducing role of education. If returns to 
education for the less able are lower, it follows that a policy of raising the level of 
schooling for everyone will generally increase the inequality of earnings. Even the 
policies which are targeted at the less able may be a poor use of resources if marginal
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returns are very low (Denny and O’Sullivan, 2007). On the other hand if education is 
benefiting only the higher-eamers, then education policy needs to be targeted towards 
improving educational quality and outcomes for the lower income individuals.
The gender wage decomposition findings have a very important message for the 
policy makers, oriented in providing equal opportunities for women. Gender 
inequality constraints economic growth, increases poverty and has negative effect on 
the well-being of individuals. A recent study 4 Global Employment Trends for Women ’ 
published by the ILO in 2009 provides information about the global gender pay gap. 
The report reconfirms that gender inequality remains an issue within the labour market 
globally. However, the report does not look at the gap in different points of the wage 
distribution. This study attests that a more detailed explanation of the wage gap, 
utilizing quantile regression technique, is required.
Despite the remarkable improvement of female labour marker characteristics, we 
found that men are paid more than women. The estimated gender wage differential 
was found to be high in all four countries. Males in Tajikistan for example, were 
found to be paid on average nearly 24% more compared to their female counterparts. 
At the bottom of the distribution the estimated coefficient effect of the gap was lower, 
suggesting that minimum wage legislations in Tajikistan helped to reduce the wage 
gap and led to a relatively equal distribution for low-paid workers. The wage 
differential was found to be mainly attributed to differences in returns and to a lesser 
extent to the workers observable characteristics. In other words, the pricing of 
workers’ characteristics drives gender wage differentials in all these countries. 
Although the Tajikistan data show women are still less educated than men (23% of 
employed men in 2007 have completed university degree compared to 15% for 
women), further improvements in the human capital alone are unlikely to be sufficient 
as long as gender differences remain in returns.
One further implication of our results is the necessity to improve the research in 
transition countries and to investigate the nature of the ‘unexplained’ component. 
Concrete policy measures need to take into account the evidence on the various 
factors underlying the gender wage differential. This step requires not only clear sex- 
disaggregated data from baseline household surveys but also attention in those surveys
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to the causes of gender inequality, for example barriers in accessing certain productive 
inputs. Furthermore, a pro-active policies and measures to enhance payment equity in 
all examined countries are needed, especially in Tajikistan, where a significant gender 
pay differential was found. Clearly, labour market policies in that particular country 
should be aimed at removing barriers to female career progression.
Existence of a sizable public sector wage differential in the examined countries can 
make it difficult for the public sector to retain and recruit ‘high ability’ workers. The 
positive premium for public sector workers, found in Bulgaria, has obvious 
implications for the country’s labour market and can create ‘queues’ for public sector 
jobs given they are comparatively well-paid across the entire wage distribution. 
Higher public sector wages in Bulgaria may have negative consequence on the fiscal 
position of the government. It will increase the wage bill and place a strain on the 
fiscal position of the public sector. In this context, the recent government’s decision in 
Bulgaria to freeze the public sector wages is an obvious solution to halt the differences 
in the relative pay of public and private sector workers.
On the other hand, underpayment of the public sector workers relative to the private 
sector at the top of the distribution, found in Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan, may induce 
negative selection into the public sector. A recent call by the Prime Minister of Russia 
to raise the public sector wages by 6.5% was clearly meant to address the underpaid 
public sector workers. The existence of a positive public sector wage differential in 
the lower tail of the wage distribution compared to the top tail, found for females in 
Serbia, males in Russia and for both males and females in Tajikistan, implied that 
skilled workers in the public sectors in these countries were much less well paid than 
their private sector counterparts. This may result in the public sector being 
characterised as a sector that has difficulty in retaining high-skilled workers. In order 
to attract high skill workers and to improve the quality of public service, public wage 
setting policy in these countries should introduce more flexible pay structures in the 
public sector, such as increasing the role of competition and linking pay with 
performance. It is vital for these countries, in both sectors, to pursue wage policy that 
aims to increase medium-run productivity and achieve moderate inflation.
355
10.4. Limitations and avenues for future research
Limitations
The analysis in this thesis is not without limitations. These limitations could also help 
to open possibilities for further empirical research. The first issue to be pointed out is 
data limitation and availability. One problem was the lack of reliable data, or 
sometimes any data in the countries of interest. It was impossible to obtain a longer 
time span of data for each country, as required by the analysis over time. Poorer 
countries, such as Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia or Tajikistan, have been largely ignored by 
statistical authorities. Examination of the individual data from the transition period in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia suggests that availability of data in Britain for 
example, compares favourably with that in these countries. The position in the Central 
European countries, such as Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland differs as well. In 
these countries there has been a long tradition of data collection.
The concern about quality of data on household incomes in transition countries 
extends beyond the constraints of this thesis. In the literature a common expressed 
view is that Eastern European data cover only ‘official’ income and that ‘hidden’ 
economy income is not reported. As discussed in Chapter Nine, illegal employment 
and tax evasion have been problematic during the early transition period. Because 
these problems occurred in the private sector, actual labour income in the private 
sector might be underestimated both by official wage statistics and probably by 
reported wages in the surveys.
Despite the availability of detailed information in the data files, it was not possible to 
fully capture all workers specific characteristics. In the case of Bulgaria the Sargan 
test of instrumental validity was passed, lending support to the case for the 
instruments. Due to the lack of information on the parent education in the other 
samples, however, we were unable to test the over-identifying restriction on the 
returns to education for Serbia, Russia and Tajikistan. Moreover, due to issues of 
comparability in using national cross-sectional data it is recommended that World 
wide data will be a potentially useful source of information from which to provide up 
to date estimations on different indicators on the labour market outcomes.
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Although we considered human capital and work experience as major determinants of 
the gender pay gap, another possible answer to that question might be that the degree 
of gender specific policies and antidiscrimination laws differ from country to country. 
Unfortunately, it was difficult to capture the effect of these policies with the models 
utilised in this thesis. Better data that brings information on actual experience, firm 
size and female decisions could improve analysis of the evolution of the gender wage 
gap since it will bring more aspects that were not captured here.
Finally, the workplace characteristics such as presence of performance-related 
payment, company pension schemes and family employment practices are important 
in explaining the sector wage differential. Unfortunately, the data in this study had no 
information on work efforts and non-wage benefits, and it was not possible to include 
more job related characteristics than those used in the models. Therefore, the sector 
wage differential examined in essay three may not reflect the total compensation 
differentials between the two sectors.
Empirical evidence shows the importance of accounting for endogeneity and 
selectivity biases in the estimates of the gender wage differential. It was surprising, 
that apart from Albrecht et al. (2009), Picchino and Mussida (2010), Badel and Pena 
(2010) and Chzhen and Mumford (2011), there were no studies that correct the gender 
wage gap for sample selection across the conditional wage distribution. Given the 
data, however, we were not able to cope with all of the methodological issues. No 
attempt was made to account for the potential endogeneity problem in occupational 
decision as there was a lack of appropriate instruments in the samples. Using the 
presence or total number of young children as instrumental variables in the selection 
equation is a common practise in the literature on wage modelling. However, the 
variable was found to be not valid for men in the estimates of this research. No 
significant selection effects were detected in the case of Bulgaria and Serbia. Due to 
these difficulties, the influence of the endogeneity issue of occupational choice and 
selectivity on the estimates of gender wage gap was left for future research. The 
proposed method that accounts for endogenous sector selection, applied in essay three, 
could successfully be utilised to account for selection in the gender wage gap. This is 
proposed as a subject for further research.
3 5 7
The most important point to note was that the applied decomposition method allowed 
differences across the conditional wage distribution to be taken into account and the 
index number problem was overcome by choosing the pooled sample of males and 
females as a non-discriminatory wage structure. Although the decomposition method 
of Brown et al. (1980) was appealing as it focuses on occupational segregation, the 
method was not applicable across the earnings distribution.
Directions for future research
There are a number of specific aspects that would provide an avenue for future 
research. First, a future updates on the returns to education based on more recent data 
could not only provide more robust estimates, but also provide evidence on whether 
the performance of transition’s labour market are improving over time. Second, as the 
evidence presented in this thesis has all been based on cross sectional data, an 
alternative identifying strategy relying on time variation in individual wages and work 
histories could be extended to analyse the gender wage gap and account for 
unobserved characteristics.
An obvious agenda for future research in the public-private sector wage gap literature 
would be to investigate the extent to which the sector wage differential in these 
countries changes by controlling for both non-labour force participation and 
endogeneous sector choice biases. Another suggestion for future research would be to 
examine whether the differences in the public-private sector wage differential can be 
explained by compensating factors such as fringe benefits and working conditions.
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